THE LIFE AND DEATH
OP
JOHN OF BARNEVELD
ADVOCATE OF HOLLAND
WITH
A VIEW OF THE PRIMARY CAUSES AND MOVEMENTS
OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR
BY
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY, D.C.L., LL.D.
CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, ETC.
IN TWO VOLUMES— VOL. I
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS
NEW YORK
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS
FRANKLIN SQUARE
Entered according to Act of Congress, in tlie year 1874, by
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
College
Library
TH
133
C4M8>
v. i
PKEFACE,
THESE volumes make a separate work in themselves. They
form, also the natural sequel to the other histories already
published by the Author, as well as the necessary intro-
duction to that concluding portion of his labours which he
has always desired to lay before the public ; a History of
the Thirty Years' War.
For the two great wars which successively established the
independence of Holland and the disintegration of Germany
are in reality but one ; a prolonged Tragedy of Eighty
Years. The brief pause, which in the Netherlands was
known as the Twelve Years' Truce with Spain, was precisely
the epoch in which the elements were slowly and certainly
gathering for the renewal over nearly the whole surface of
civilized Europe of that immense conflict which for more
than forty years had been raging within the narrow precincts
of the Netherlands.
The causes and character of the two wars were essentially
the same. There were many changes of persons and of
scenery during a struggle which lasted for nearly three
generations of mankind ; yet a natural succession both of
actors, motives, and events will be observed from the be-
ginning to the close.
The designs of Charles V. to establish universal monarchy,
which he had passionately followed for a lifetime through
a series of colossal crimes against humanity and of private
misdeeds against individuals, such as it has rarely been
I.^
0
If ^^
vi PREFACE.
permitted to a single despot to perpetrate, had been baffled
at last. Disappointed, broken, but even to our own gene-
ration never completely unveiled, the tyrant had withdrawn
from the stage of human affairs, leaving his son to carry on
the great conspiracy against Human Eight, independence
of nations, liberty of thought, and equality of religions,
with the additional vigour which sprang from intensity of
conviction.
For Philip possessed at least that superiority over his
father that he was a sincere bigot. In the narrow and
gloomy depths of his soul he had doubtless persuaded
himself that it was necessary for the redemption of the
human species that the empire of the world should be
vested in his hands, that Protestantism in all its forms
should be extirpated as a malignant disease, and that to
behead, torture, burn alive, and bury alive all heretics who
opposed the decree of himself and the Holy ChuKch was the
highest virtue by which he could merit Heaven.
The father would have permitted Protestantism if Pro-
testantism would have submitted to universal monarchy.
There would have been small difficulty in the early part
of his reign in effecting a compromise between Home and
Augsburg, had the gigantic secular ambition of Charles not
preferred to weaken the Church and to convert conscientious
religious reform into political mutiny ; a crime against him
who claimed the sovereignty of Christendom.
The materials for the true history of that reign lie in the
Archives of Spain, Austria, Home, Venice, and the Nether-
lands, and in many other places. When out of them one
day a complete and authentic narrative shall have been
constructed, it will be seen how completely the policy of
Charles foreshadowed and necessitated that of Philip, how
logically, under the successors of Philip, the Austrian dream
of universal empire ended in the shattering, in the minute
PREFACE.
Vll
subdivision, and the reduction to a long impotence of that
Germanic Empire which had really belonged to Charles.
Unfortunately the great Republic which, notwithstanding
the aid of England on the one side and of France on the
other, had withstood almost single-handed the onslaughts of
Spain, now allowed the demon of religious hatred to enter
into its body at the first epoch of peace, although it had
successfully exorcised the evil spirit during the long and
terrible war.
There can be no doubt whatever that the discords within
the interior of the Dutch Republic during the period of
the Truce, and their tragic catastrophe, had weakened her
purpose and partially paralysed her arm. When the noble
Commonwealth went forward to the renewed and general
conflict which succeeded the concentrated one in which it
had been the chief actor, the effect of those misspent twelve
years became apparent.
Indeed the real continuity of the war was scarcely broken
by the fitful armistice. The death of John of Cleve, an
event almost simultaneous with the conclusion of the Truce,
seemed to those gifted with political vision the necessary
precursor of a new and more general war.
The secret correspondence of Barneveld shows the almost
prophetic accuracy with which he indicated the course of
events and the approach of an almost universal conflict,
while that tragedy was still in the future, and was to be
enacted after he had been laid in his bloody grave. No man
then living was so accustomed as he was to sweep the political
horizon, and to estimate the signs and portents of the times.
No statesman was left in Europe during the epoch of the
Twelve Years' Truce to compare with him in experience,
breadth of vision, political tact, or administrative sagacity.
Imbued with the grand traditions and familiar with the
great personages of a most heroic epoch ; the trusted friend
PREFACE.
or respected counsellor of William the Silent, Henry IV.,
Elizabeth, and the sages and soldiers on whom they leaned ;
having been employed during an already long lifetime in
the administration of greatest affairs, he stood alone after
the deaths of Henry of France and the second Cecil, and
the retirement of Sully, among the natural leaders of man-
kind.
To the England of Elizabeth, of Walsingham, Raleigh,
and the Cecils, had succeeded the Great Britain of James,
with his Carrs and Carletons, Nauntons, Lakes, and Win-
woods. France, widowed of Henry and waiting for Richelieu,
lay in the clutches of Concini's, Epernons, and Bouillons,
bound hand and foot to Spain. Germany, falling from
Rudolph to Matthias, saw Styrian Ferdinand in the back-
ground ready to shatter the fabric of a hundred years of
attempted Reformation. In the Republic of the Nether-
lands were the great soldier and the only remaining states-
man of the age. At a moment when the breathing space
had been agreed upon before the conflict should be renewed,
on a wider field than ever, between Spanish-Austrian world-
empire and independence of the nations ; between the
ancient and only Church and the spirit of religious Equality ;
between popular Right and royal and sacerdotal Despotism ;
it would have been desirable that the soldier and the states-
man should stand side by side, and that the fortunate
Confederacy, gifted with two such champions and placed by
its own achievements at the very head of the great party of
resistance, should be true to herself.
These volumes contain a slight and rapid sketch of Bar-
neveld's career up to the point at which the Twelve Years'
Truce with Spain was signed in the year 1609. In previous
works the Author has attempted to assign the great Ad-
vocate's place as part and parcel of history during the con-
tinuance of the War for Independence. During the period
PREFACE. ix
of the Truce lie will be found the central figure. The
history of Europe, especially of the Netherlands, Britain,
France, and Germany, cannot be thoroughly appreciated
without a knowledge of the designs, the labours, and the
fate of Barneveld.
The materials for estimating his character and judging
his judges lie in the national archives of the land of
which he was so long the foremost citizen. But they have
not long been accessible. The letters, state papers, and
other documents remain imprinted, and have rarely been
read. M. van Deventer has published three most in-
teresting volumes of the Advocate's correspondence, but
they reach only to the beginning of 1609. He has sus-
pended his labours exactly at the moment when these
volumes begin. I have carefully studied however nearly
the whole of that correspondence, besides a mass of other
papers. The labour is not light, for the handwriting of the
great Advocate is perhaps the worst that ever existed, and
the papers, although kept in the admirable order which
distinguishes the Archives of the Hague, have passed
through many hands at former epochs before reaching their
natural destination in the treasure-house of the nation.
Especially the documents connected with the famous trial
were for a long time hidden from mortal view, for Bar-
neveld's judges had bound themselves by oath to bury the
proceedings out of sight. And the concealment lasted for
centuries. Very recently a small portion of those papers
has been published by the Historical Society of Utrecht.
The " Verhooren," or Interrogatories of the Judges, and the
replies of Barneveld, have thus been laid before the reading
public of Holland, while within the last two years the dis-
tinguished and learned historian, Professor Fruin, has edited
the " Verhooren " of Hugo Grotius.
But papers like these, important as they are, make but
x PREFACE.
a slender portion of the material out of which a judgment
concerning these grave events can be constructed. I do
not therefore offer an apology for the somewhat copious
extracts which I have translated and given in these volumes
from the correspondence of Barneveld and from other manu-
scripts of great value — most of them hi the Koyal Archives
of Holland and Belgium — which are unknown to the
public.
I have avoided as much as possible any dealings with
the theological controversies so closely connected with the
events which I have attempted to describe. This work
aims at being a political study. The subject is full of
lessons, examples, and warnings for the inhabitants of all
free states. Especially now that the republican system
of government is undergoing a series of experiments with
more or less success in one hemisphere — while in our own
land it is consolidated, powerful, and unchallenged — will
the conflicts between the spirits of national centralization
and of provincial sovereignty, and the struggle between the
church, the sword, and the magistracy for supremacy in a
free commonwealth, as revealed in the first considerable
republic of modern history, be found suggestive of deep
reflection.
Those who look in this work for a history of the Synod of
Dordtrecht will look in vain. The Author has neither wish
nor power to grapple with the mysteries and passions which
at that epoch possessed so many souls. The Assembly marks
a political period. Its political aspects have been anxiously
examined, but beyond the ecclesiastical threshold there has
been no attempt to penetrate.
It was necessary for my purpose to describe in some detail
the relations of Henry IV. with the Dutch Eepublic during
the last and most pregnant year of his life, which makes the
first of the present history. These relations are of European
PREFACE. xi
importance, and the materials for appreciating them are of
unexpected richness, in the Dutch and Belgian Archives.
Especially the secret correspondence, now at the Hague,
of that very able diplomatist Francis Aerssens with Barne-
veld during the years 1609, 1610, and 1611, together with
many papers at Brussels, are full of vital importance.
They throw much light both on the vast designs which
filled the brain of Henry at this fatal epoch and on his
extraordinary infatuation for the young Princess of Conde
by which they were traversed, and which was productive of
such widespread political and tragical results. This episode
forms a necessary portion of my theme, and has therefore
been set forth from original sources.
I am under renewed obligations to my friend M. Gachard,
the eminent publicist and archivist of Belgium, for his
constant and friendly offices to me (which I have so often
experienced before), while studying the documents under
his charge relating to this epoch ; especially the secret
correspondence of Archduke Albert with Philip III. and
his ministers, and with Pecquius, the Archduke's agent at
Paris.
It is also a great pleasure to acknowledge the unceasing
courtesy and zealous aid rendered me during my renewed
studies in the Archives at the Hague — lasting through
nearly two years — by the Chief Archivist, M. van den Berg,
and the gentlemen connected with that institution, espe-
cially M. de Jonghe and M. Hingman, without whose aid
it would have been difficult for me to decipher and to
procure copies of the almost illegible holographs of
Barneveld.
I must also thank M. van Devcnter for communicating
copies of some curious manuscripts relating to my subject,
some from private archives in Holland, and others from
those of Simancas.
Xll
PREFACE.
A single word only remains to be said in regard to the
name of the statesman whose career I have undertaken to
describe.
His proper appellation and that by which he has always
been known in his own country is Oldenbarneveld, but in
his lifetime and always in history from that time to this ha
has been called Barneveld in English as well as French,
and this transformation, as it were, of the name has become
so settled a matter that after some hesitation it has been
adopted in the present work.
The Author would take this opportunity of expressing his
gratitude for the indulgence with which his former attempts
to illustrate an important period of European history have
been received by the public, and his anxious hope that the
present volumes may be thought worthy of attention. They
are the result at least of severe and conscientious labour
at the original sources of history, but the subject is so
complicated and difficult that it may well be feared that
the ability to depict and unravel is unequal to the earnest-
ness with which the attempt has been made.
LONDON, 1873.
CONTENTS OF VOL. I.
CHAPTER I.
John of Barneveld the Founder of the Commonwealth of the United
Provinces — Maurice of Orange Stadholder, but Servant to the
States-General — The Union of Utrecht maintained — Barneveld
makes a Compromise between Civil Functionaries and Church
Officials — Embassies to France, England, and to Venice — The
Appointment of Arminius to be Professor of Theology at Leyden
creates Dissension — The Catholic League opposed by the Great
Protestant Union — Death of the Duke of Cleve and Struggle for
his Succession — The Elector of Brandenburg and Palatine of
Neuburg hold the Duchies by Barneveld's Advice against the
Emperor, although having Rival Claims themselves — Negotiations
with the King of France — He becomes the Ally of the Stales-
General to protect the Possessory Princes, and prepares for war . 1
CHAPTER II.
Passion of Henry IV. for Margaret do Montmorency — Her Marriage
with the Prince of Conde — Their Departure for the Country —
Their Flight to the Netherlands — Rage of the King — Intrigues
of Spain — Reception of the Prince and Princess of Conde by the
Archdukes at Brussels — Splendid Entertainments by Spinola —
Attempts of the King to bring the Fugitives back — Mission of de
Coeuvres to Brussels — Difficult Position of the Republic — Vast
but secret Preparations for War 110
CHAPTER III.
Strange Scene at the Archduke's Palace — Henry's Plot frustrated —
His Triumph changed to Despair — Conversation of the Dutch
Ambassador with the King — The War determined upon . .143
CONTENTS OF VOL. I.
CHAPTER IV.
PAGI
Difficult Position of Barneveld — Insurrection at Utrecht subdued by
the States' Army — Special Embassies to England and France —
Anger of the King with Spain and the Archdukes — Arrangements
of Henry for the coming War — Position of Spain — Anxiety of
the King for the Presence of Barneveld in Paris — Arrival of the
Dutch Commissioners in France and their brilliant Reception —
Their Interview with the King and his Ministers — Negotiations
— Delicate Position of the Dutch Government — India Trade —
Simon Danzer, the Corsair — Conversations of Henry with the
Dutch Commissioners — Letter of the King to Archduke Albert —
Preparations for the Queen's Coronation and of Henry to open the
Campaign in person — Perplexities of Henry — Forebodings and
Warnings — The Murder accomplished — Terrible Change in France
— Triumph of Concini and of Spain — Downfall of Sully — Dis-
putes of the Grandees among themselves — Special Mission of
Condolence from the Republic — Conference on the great Enter-
prise— Departure of van der Myle from Paris 156
CHAPTER V.
Interviews between the Dutch Commissioners and King James —
Prince Maurice takes command of the Troops — Surrender of
Jiilich — Matthias crowned King of Bohemia — Death of Rudolph
— James's Dream of a Spanish Marriage — Appointment of Vorstius
in place of Arminius at Leyden — Interview between Maurice and
Winwood — Increased Bitterness between Barneveld and Maurice —
Projects of Spanish Marriages in France 247
CHAPTER VI.
Establishment of the Condominium in the Duchies — Dissensions
between the Neuburgers and Brandenburgers — Occupation of
Julich by the Brandenburgers assisted by the States-General —
Indignation in Spain and at the Court of the Archdukes — Subsidy
despatched to Brussels — Spinola descends upon Aix-la-Chapelle
and takes possession of Orsoy and other Places — Surrender of
Wesel — Conference at Xanten — Treaty permanently dividing the
Territory between Brandenburg and Neuburg — Prohibition from
Spain — Delays and Disagreements 298
CONTENTS OF VOL. L XV
CHAPTER VII.
FACM
Proud Position of the Republic — France obeys her — Animosity of
Carleton — Position and Character of Aerssens — Claim for the
"Third" — Recall of Aerssens — Rivalry between Maurice and
Barneveld, who always sustains the separate Sovereignties of the
Provinces — Conflict between Church and State added to other
Elements of Discord in the Commonwealth — Religion a necessary
Element in the Life of all Classes 310
CHAPTER VIII.
Schism in the Church a Public Fact — Struggle for Power between
the Sacerdotal and Political Orders — Dispute between Arminius
and Qomarus — Rage of James I. at the Appointment of Vorstius —
Arminians called Remonstrants — Hague Conference — Contra-Re-
monstrance by the Qomarites of Seven Points to the Remonstrants'
Five — Fierce Theological Disputes throughout the Country —
Ryswyk Secession — Maurice wishes to remain neutral, but finds
himself the Chieftain of the Contra-Remonstrant Party — The
States of Holland Remonstrant by a large Majority — The States-
General Contra-Remonstrant — Sir Ralph \Vinwood leaves the
Hague — Three Armies to take the Field against Protestantism . 333
CHAPTER IX.
Aerssens remains Two Years longer in France — Derives many
Personal Advantages from his Post — He visits the States-General
— Aubery du Manner appointed French Ambassador — He de-
mands the Recall of Aerssens — Peace of Sainte-Mt-nehould —
Asperen de Langerac appointed in Aerssens' Place .... 356
CHAPTER X.
Weakness of the Rulers of France and England — The Wisdom of
Barneveld inspires Jealousy — Sir Dudley Carleton succeeds Win-
wood — Young Neuburg under the Guidance of Maximilian —
Barneveld strives to have the Treaty of Xanten enforced — Spain
and the Emperor wish to make the States abandon their Position
with regard to the Duchies — The French Government refuses to
aid the States — Spain and the Emperor resolve to hold Wesel —
The great Religious War begun — The Protestant Union and
Catholic League both wish to secure the Border Provinces —
Troubles in Turkey — Spanish Fleet seizes La Roche — Spain
places large Armies on a War Footing 373
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
VOL. I.
PAGE
VIEW OP THE VYVERBERG AT THE HAGUE . . Frontispiece.
PORTRAIT o*1 HUGO GROTIUS . 343
VOL. II.
PACB
THE "NEUDE" SQUARE, UTRECHT 233
THE BIHNENHOF AT THE HAGUE, ON MAY 13, 1619 ; from an Old
Print . ... 885
THE LIFE AND DEATH
OF
JOHN OF BARNEVELD.
CHAPTER I.
John of Barneveld the Founder of the Commonwealth of the United
Provinces — Maurice of Orange Stadholder, but Servant to the States-
General — The Union of Utrecht maintained — Barneveld makes a Com-
promise between Civil Functionaries and Church Officials — Embassies
to France, England, and to Venice — the Appointment of Arminius to be
Professor of Theology at Leyden creates Dissension— The Catholic League
opposed by the Great Protestant Union — Death of the Duke of Cleve
and Struggle for his Succession — The Elector of Brandenburg and
Palatine of Neuburg hold the Duchies at Barneveld's Advice against the
Emperor, though having Rival Claims themselves — Negotiations with
tha King of France — He becomes the Ally of the States-General to
Protect the Possessory Princes, and prepares for war.
I PROPOSE to retrace the history of a great statesman's
career. That statesman's name, but for the dark and tragic
scenes with which it was ultimately associated, might after
the lapse of two centuries and a half have faded into com-
parative oblivion, so impersonal and shadowy his presence
would have seemed upon the great European theatre where
he was so long a chief actor, and where his efforts and his
achievements were foremost among those productive of long
enduring and widespread results.
There is no doubt whatever that John of Barneveld,
Advocate and Seal Keeper of the little province of Holland
during forty years of as troubled and fertile an epoch as any
in human history, was second to none of his contemporary
statesmen. Yet the singular constitution and historical
VOL. i. B
2 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
position of the republic whose destinies he guided and the
peculiar and abnormal office which he held combined to
cast a veil over his individuality. The ever teeming brain,
the restless almost omnipresent hand, the fertile pen, the
eloquent and ready tongue, were seen, heard, and obeyed by
the great European public, by the monarchs, statesmen, and
warriors of the time, at many critical moments of history, but
it was not John of Barneveld that spoke to the world. Those
" high and puissant Lords my masters the States-General "
personified the young but already majestic republic. Digni-
fied, draped, and concealed by that overshadowing title the
informing and master spirit performed its never ending task.
Those who study the enormous masses of original papers
in the archives of the country will be amazed to find how
the penmanship, most difficult to decipher, of the Advocate
meets them at every turn. Letters to monarchs, generals,
ambassadors, resolutions of councils, of sovereign assemblies,
of trading corporations, of great Indian companies, legal
and historical disquisitions of great depth and length on
questions agitating Europe, constitutional arguments, drafts
of treaties among the leading powers of the world, instruc-
tions to great commissions, plans for European campaigns,
vast combinations covering the world, alliances of empire,
scientific expeditions and discoveries — papers such as these,
covered now with the satirical dust of centuries, written in
the small, crabbed, exasperating characters which make
Barneveld's handwriting almost cryptographic, were once,
when fairly engrossed and sealed with the great seal of the
haughty burgher-aristocracy, the documents which occupied
the olose attention of the cabinets of Christendom.
It is not unfrequent to find four or five important des-
patches compressed almost in miniature upon one sheet of
gigantic foolscap. It is also curious to find each one of
these rough drafts conscientiously beginning in the states-
BAENEVELD THE FOUNDER OF THE REPUBLIC. 3
man's own hand with the elaborate phrases of compliment
belonging to the epoch such as " Noble, strenuous, severe,
highly honourable, very learned, very discreet, and very wise
masters," and ending with " May the Lord God Almighty
eternally preserve you and hold you in His holy keeping in
this world and for ever " — decorations which one might have
thought it safe to leave to be filled in by the secretary or
copying clerk.
Thus there have been few men at any period whose lives
have been more closely identical than his with a national
history. There have been few great men in any history
whose names have become less familiar to the world, and
lived less in the mouths of posterity. Yet there can be no
doubt that if William the Silent was the founder of the
independence of the United Provinces Barneveld was
the founder of the Commonwealth itself. He had never
the opportunity, perhaps he might have never had the
capacity, to make such prodigious sacrifices in the cause of
country as the great prince had done. But he had served
his country strenuously from youth to old age with an
abiding sense of duty, a steadiness of purpose, a broad
vision, a firm grasp, and an opulence of resource such as
not one of his compatriots could even pretend to rival.
Had that country of which he was so long the first citizen
maintained until our own day the same proportionate posi-
tion among the empires of Christendom as it held in the
seventeenth century, the name of John of Barneveld would
have perhaps been as familiar to all men as it is at this
moment to nearly every inhabitant of the Netherlands.
Even now political passion is almost as ready to flame forth
either in ardent affection or enthusiastic hatred as if two
centuries and a half had not elapsed since his death. His
name is so typical of a party, a polity, and a faith, so in-
delibly associated with a great historical cataclysm, as to
4 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
render it difficult even for the grave, the conscientious, the
learned, the patriotic of his own compatriots to speak of him
with absolute impartiality.
A foreigner who loves and admires all that is great and
noble in the history of that famous republic and can have
no hereditary bias as to its ecclesiastical or political theories
may at least attempt the task with comparative coldness,
although conscious of inability to do thorough justice to a
most complex subject.
In former publications devoted to Netherland history I
have endeavoured to trace the course of events of which the
life and works of the Advocate were a vital ingredient down
to the period when Spain after more than forty years of hard
fighting virtually acknowledged the independence of the
Republic and concluded with her a truce of twelve years.
That convention was signed in the spring of 1609. The ten
ensuing years in Europe were comparatively tranquil, but
A rii 9 they were scarcely to be numbered among the full
1609. anc[ fruitful sheaves of a pacific epoch. It was a
pause, a breathing spell during which the sulphurous clouds
which had made the atmosphere of Christendom poisonous for
nearly half a century had sullenly rolled away, while at every
point of the horizon they were seen massing themselves anew in
portentous and ever accumulating strength. At any moment
the faint and sickly sunshine in which poor exhausted
Humanity was essaying a feeble twitter of hope as it plumed
• itself for a peaceful flight might be again obscured. To us
of a remote posterity the momentary division of epochs
seems hardly discernible. So rapidly did that fight of
Demons which we call the Thirty Years' War tread on the
heels of the forty years' struggle for Dutch Independence
which had just been suspended that we are accustomed to
think and speak of the Eighty Years' War as one pure, per-*
feet, sanguinary whole.
BAENEVELD THE FOUNDER OF THE REPUBLIC. 5
And indeed the Tragedy which was soon to sweep solemnly
across Europe was foreshadowed in the first fitful years of
peace. The throb of the elementary forces already shook
the soil of Christendom. The fantastic but most significant
conflict in the territories of the dead Duke of Cleve reflected
the distant and gigantic war as in a mirage. It will be
necessary to direct the reader's attention at the proper mo-
ment to that episode, for it was one in which the beneficent
sagacity of Barneveld was conspicuously exerted in the cause
of peace and conservation. Meantime it is not agreeable to
reflect that this brief period of nominal and armed peace
which the Republic had conquered after nearly two genera-
tions of warfare was employed by her in tearing her own
flesh. The heroic sword which had achieved such triumphs
in the cause of freedom could have been better employed
than in an attempt at political suicide.
In a picture of the last decade of Barneveld's eventful life
his personality may come more distinctly forward perhaps
than in previous epochs. It will however be difficult to
disentangle a single thread from the great historical tapestry
of the Republic and of Europe in which his life and achieve-
ments are interwoven. He was a public man in the fullest
sense of the word, and without his presence and influence
the record of Holland, France, Spain, Britain, and Germany
might have been essentially modified.
The Republic was so integral a part of that system which
divided Europe into two great hostile camps according to
creeds rather than frontiers that the history of its fore-
most citizen touches at every point the general history of
Christendom.
The great peculiarity of the Dutch constitution at this
epoch was that no principle was absolutely settled. In
throwing off a foreign tyranny and successfully vindicating
national independence the burghers and nobles had not hud
6 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. I.
leisure to lay down any organic law. Nor had the day for
profound investigation of the political or social contract
arrived. Men dealt almost exclusively with facts, and when
the facts arranged themselves illogically and incoherently
the mischief was grave and difficult to remedy. It is not a
trifling inconvenience for an organized commonwealth to be in
doubt as to where, in whom, and of what nature is its sove-
reignty. Yet this was precisely the condition of the United
Netherlands. To the external world so dazzling were the
reputation and the achievements of their great captain that
he was looked upon by many as the legitimate chief of the
state and doubtless friendly monarchs would have cordially
welcomed him into their brotherhood.
During the war he had been surrounded by almost royal
state. Two hundred officers lived daily at his table. Great
nobles and scions of sovereign houses were his pupils or
satellites. The splendour of military despotism and the awe
inspired by his unquestioned supremacy in what was deemed
the greatest of all sciences invested the person of Maurice of
Nassau with a grandeur which many a crowned potentate
might envy. His ample appointments united with the spoils
of war provided him with almost royal revenues, even before
the death of his elder brother Philip William had placed in
his hands the principality and wealthy possessions of Orange.
Hating contradiction, arbitrary by instinct and by military
habit, impatient of criticism, and having long acknowledged
no master in the chief business of state, he found himself
at the conclusion of the truce with his great occupation
gone, and, although generously provided for by the trea-
sury of the Republic, yet with an income proportionately
limited.
Politics and theology were fields in which he had hardly
served an apprenticeship, and it was possible that when he
should step forward as a master in those complicated and
BARNEVELD THE FOUNDER OF THE REPUBLIC. 7
difficult pursuits, soon to absorb the attention of the Com-
monwealth and the world, it might appear that war was not
the only science that required serious preliminary studies.
Meantime he found himself not a king, not the master of
a nominal republic, but the servant of the States-General,
and the limited stadholder of five out of seven separate
provinces.
And the States-General were virtually John of Barneveld.
Could antagonism be more sharply defined ? Jealousy, that
potent principle which controls the regular movements and
accounts for the aberrations of humanity in widest spheres as
well as narrowest circles far more generally and conclusively
ihan philosophers or historians have been willing to admit,
began forthwith to manifest its subtle and irresistible in-
fluence.
And there were not to be wanting acute and dangerous
schemers who saw their profit in augmenting its intensity.
The Seven Provinces, when the truce of twelve years had
been signed, were neither exhausted nor impoverished. Yet
they had just emerged from a forty years' conflict such as
no people in human history had ever waged against a foreign
tyranny. They had need to repose and recruit, but they
stood among the foremost great powers of the day. It is
not easy in imagination to thrust back the present leading
empires of the earth into the contracted spheres of their not
remote past. But to feel how a little confederacy of seven
provinces loosely tied together by an ill-defined treaty could
hold so prominent and often so controlling a place in the
European system of the seventeenth century, we must re-
member that there was then no Germany, no Kussia, no
Italy, no United States of America, scarcely even a Great
Britain in the sense which belongs to that mighty empire
now.
France, Spain, England, the Pope, and the Emperor were
8
THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD.
CHAP. I.
the leading powers with which the Netherlands were daily
called on to solve great problems and try conclusions ; the
study of political international equilibrium, now rapidly
and perhaps fortunately becoming one of the lost arts,
being then the most indispensable duty of kings and
statesmen.
Spain and France, which had long since achieved for
themselves the political union of many independent king-
doms and states into which they had been divided were the
most considerable powers and of necessity rivals. Spain,
or rather the House of Austria divided into its two great
branches, still pursued its persistent and by no means fan-
tastic dream of universal monarchy. Both Spain and France
could dispose of somewhat larger resources absolutely,
although not relatively, than the Seven Provinces, while at
least trebling them in population. The yearly revenue
of Spain after deduction of its pledged resources was perhaps
equal to a million sterling, and that of France with the
same reservation was about as much. England had hardly
been able to levy and make up a yearly income of more
than £600,000 or £700,000 at the end of Elizabeth's reign
or in the first years of James, while the Netherlands had
often proved themselves capable of furnishing annually ten
or twelve millions of florins, which would be the equivalent
of nearly a million sterling.1
The yearly revenues of the whole monarchy of the Im-
perial house of Habsburg can scarcely be stated at a higher
figure than £350,000.2
Thus the political game — for it was a game — was by no
means a desperate one for the Netherlands, nor the resources
1 The best sources for these statis-
tics, imperfect as they are, will be
found in the ' Relazioni ' of the Vene-
tian envoys, Molin, Foscarini, Con-
tarini, Correr, and others. See the
published collections of Barozzi and
Berchat, Venice, 1863.
2 Gindely, 158.
BARNEVELD THE FOUNDER OF THE REPUBLIC. 9
of the various players so unequally distributed as at first
sight it might appear.
The emancipation of the Provinces from the grasp of
Spain and the establishment by them of a commonwealth,
for that epoch a very free one, and which contained within
itself the germs of a larger liberty, religious, political, and
commercial, than had yet been known, was already one of
the most considerable results of the Reformation. The proba-
bility of its continued and independent existence was hardly
believed in by potentate or statesman outside its own borders,
and had not been very long a decided article of faith even
within them.- The knotty problem of an acknowledgment
of that existence, the admission of the new-born state into
the family of nations, and a temporary peace guaranteed
by two great powers, had at last been solved mainly by the
genius of Barneveld working amid many disadvantages and
against great obstructions. The truce had been made, and it
now needed all the skill, coolness, and courage of a practical
and original statesman to conduct the affairs of the Con-
federacy. The troubled epoch of peace was even now
heaving with warlike emotions, and was hardly less stormy
than the war which had just been suspended.
The Republic was like a raft loosely strung together, float-
ing almost on a level of the ocean, and often half submerged,
but freighted with inestimable treasures for itself and the
world. It needed an unsleeping eye and a powerful brain
to conduct her over the quicksands and through the whirl-
pools of an unmapped and intricate course.
The sovereignty of the country so far as its nature could
be satisfactorily analysed seemed to be scattered through,
and inherent in each one of, the multitudinous boards of
magistracy — close corporations, self-elected — by which every
city was governed. Nothing could be more preposterous.
Practically, however, those boards were represented by
10
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. L
deputies in each of the seven provincial assemblies, and
these again sent councillors from among their number to the
general assembly which was that of their High Mightinesses
the Lords States-General.1
The Province of Holland, being richer and more
powerful than all its six sisters combined, was not unwilling
to impose a supremacy which on the whole was practically
conceded by the rest. Thus the Union of Utrecht esta-
blished in 1579 was maintained for want of anything better
as the foundation of the Commonwealth.
The Advocate and Keeper of the Great Seal of that province
was therefore virtually prime minister, president, attorney-
general, finance minister, and minister of foreign aifairs of
the whole republic. This was Barneveld's position. He
took the lead in the deliberations both of the States of
Holland and the States-General, moved resolutions, advocated
great measures of state, gave heed to their execution,
collected the votes, summed up the proceedings, corre-
sponded with and instructed ambassadors, received and
negotiated with foreign ministers, besides directing and
holding in his hands the various threads of the home policy
and the rapidly growing colonial system of the Republic.
All this work Barneveld had been doing for thirty
years.
The Reformation was by no means assured even in the
1 Such a constitution, rudimentary
and almost chaotic, would have been
impossible on a large territorial scale.
Nothing but the exiguity of the do-
main prevented its polity from falling
into imbecility instead of manifesting
that extraordinary vigour which asto-
nished the world. The secret of its
force lay in the democratic principle,
the sentiment of national independ-
enceandpopularfreedom of movement
which underlay these petty municipal
sovereignties. They were indeed so
numerous that, while claiming to be
oligarchies, they made up a kind of
irregular democracy. Had such a
constitution been copied instead of
avoided by the fathers of our own
republicthe consequenceswould have
probably been disastrous. Disintegra-
tion of the commonwealth at an early
day, and possibly the birth of a hun-
dred rival states, with different reli-
gions, laws, and even languages —
such might have been the phenomena
exhibited on what is now the soil of
the United States.
BAENEVELD THE FOUNDER OF THE REPUBLIC. 11
lands where it had at first made the most essential progress.
But the existence of the new commonwealth depended on
the success of that great movement which had called it into
being. Losing ground in France, fluctuating in England,
Protestantism was apparently more triumphant in vast
territories where the ancient Church was one day to recover
its mastery. Of the population of Bohemia, there were
perhaps ten Protestants to one Papist,1 while in the United
Netherlands at least one- third of the people were still
attached to the Catholic faith.
The great religious struggle in Bohemia and other domi-
nions of the Habsburg family was fast leading to a war of
which no man could even imagine the horrors or foresee the
vast extent. The Catholic League and the Protestant Union
were slowly arranging Europe into two mighty confederacies.
They were to give employment year after year to millions of
mercenary freebooters who were to practise murder,- pillage,
and every imaginable and unimaginable outrage as the most
legitimate industry that could occupy mankind. The Holy
Empire which so ingeniously combined the worst charac-
teristics of despotism and republicanism kept all Germany
and half Europe in the turmoil of a perpetual presidential
election. A theatre where trivial personages and graceless
actors performed a tragi-comedy of mingled folly, intrigue,
and crime, and where earnestness and vigour were destined
to be constantly baffled, now offered the principal stage for
the entertainment and excitement of Christendom.
There was but one king in Europe, Henry the Bearnese.
The men who sat on the thrones in Madrid, Vienna, London,
would have lived and died unknown but for the crowns they
wore, and while there were plenty of bustling politicians
here and there in Christendom, there were not many states-
men.
1 Gindely.
12 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
Among them there was no stronger man than John of
Barneveld, and no man had harder or more complicated
work to do.
Born in Amersfoort in 1547, of the ancient and knightly
house of Oldenbarne veldt, of patrician blood through all
his ancestors both male and female, he was not the heir
to large possessions, and was a diligent student and hard-
working man from youth upward. He was not wont to
boast of his pedigree until in later life, being assailed by
vilest slander, all his kindred nearest or most remote being
charged with every possible and unmentionable crime, and
himself stigmatized as sprung from the lowest kennels of
humanity — as if thereby his private character and public
services could be more legitimately blackened — he was
stung into exhibiting to the world the purity and antiquity
of his escutcheon, and a roll of respectably placed, well
estated, and authentically noble, if not at all illustrious,
forefathers in his country's records of the previous centuries.
Without an ancestor at his back he might have valued
himself still more highly on the commanding place he held
in the world by right divine of intellect, but as the father
of lies seemed to have kept his creatures so busy with the
Barneveld genealogy, it was not amiss for the statesman
once for all to make the truth known.
His studies in the universities of Holland, France, Italy,
and Germany had been profound. At an early age he was
one of the first civilians of the time. His manhood being
almost contemporary with the great war of freedom, he had
served as a volunteer and at his own expense through
several campaigns, having nearly lost his life in the disas-
trous attempt to relieve the siege of Haarlem, and having
been so disabled by sickness and exposure at the heroic
leaguer of Leyden as to have been deprived of the joy of
witnessing its triumphant conclusion.
BARXEVELD THE FOUNDER OF THE REPUBLIC. 13
Successfully practising his profession afterwards before
the tribunals of Holland, he had been called at the com-
paratively early age of twenty-nine to the important
post of Chief Pensionary of Kotterdam. So long as
William the Silent lived, that great prince was all in all to
his country, and Barneveld was proud and happy to be
among the most trusted and assiduous of his counsellors.
When the assassination of William seemed for an instant
to strike the Republic with paralysis, Barneveld was fore-
most among the statesmen of Holland to spring forward and
help to inspire it with renewed energy.
The almost completed negotiations for conferring the
sovereignty, not of the Confederacy, but of the Province of
Holland, upon the Prince had been abruptly brought to an
end by his death. To confer that sovereign countship on
his son Maurice, then a lad of eighteen and a student at
Leyden, would have seemed to many at so terrible a crisis
an act of madness, although Barneveld had been willing to
suggest and promote the scheme. The confederates under
his guidance soon hastened however to lay the sovereignty,
and if not the sovereignty, the protectorship, of all the pro-
vinces at the feet first of England and then of France.
Barneveld was at the head of the embassy, and indeed
was the indispensable head of all important embassies to
each of those two countries throughout all this portion of
his career. Both monarchs refused, almost spurned, the
offered crown in which was involved a war with the greatest
power in the world, with no compensating dignity or benefit,
as it was thought, beside.
Then Elizabeth, although declining the sovereignty, pro-
mised assistance and sent the Earl of Leicester as governor-
general at the head of a contingent of English troops. Pre-
cisely to prevent the consolidation thus threatened of
the Provinces into one union, a measure which had been
14 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. L
attempted more than once in the Burgundian epoch, and
always successfully resisted by the spirit of provincial sepa-
ratism, Barneveld now proposed and carried the appointment
of Maurice of Nassau to the stadholdership of Holland. This
was done against great opposition and amid fierce debate.
Soon afterwards Barneveld was vehemently urged by the
nobles and regents of the cities of Holland to accept the
post of Advocate of that province. After repeatedly declin-
ing the arduous and most responsible office, he was at last
induced to accept it. He did it under the remark-
1s) SB
able condition that in case any negotiation should
be undertaken for the purpose of bringing back the Province
of Holland under the dominion of the King of Spain, he
should be considered as from that moment relieved from the
service.1
His brother Elias Barneveld succeeded him as Pensionary
of Kotterdam, and thenceforth the career of the Advocate is
identical with the history of the Netherlands. Although a
native of Utrecht, he was competent to exercise such functions
in Holland, a special and ancient convention between those
two provinces allowing the citizens of either to enjoy legal
and civic rights in both. Gradually, without intrigue or
inordinate ambition, but from force of circumstances and the
commanding power of the man, the native authority stamped
upon his forehead, he became the political head of the Con-
federacy. He created and maintained a .system of public
credit absolutely marvellous in the circumstances, by means
of which an otherwise impossible struggle was carried to a
victorious end.
When the stadholderate of the provinces of Gelderland,
Utrecht, and Overyssel became vacant, it was again Barne-
veld's potent influence and sincere attachment to the House
of Nassau that procured the election of Maurice to those
1 ' Waaragtige Historic,' ed. 1670, p. 23.
BARXEVELD THE FOUNDER OF THE REPUBLIC. 15
posts. Thus within six years after his father's death the
youthful soldier who had already given proof of his surpass-
ing military genius had become governor, commander-in-
chief, and high admiral, of five of the seven provinces con-
stituting the Confederacy.
At about the same period the great question of Church
and State, which Barneveld had always felt to be among the
vital problems of the age, and on which his opinions were
most decided, came up for partial solution. It would have
been too much to expect the opinion of any statesman to
be so much in advance of his time as to favor religious
equality. Toleration of various creeds, including the Roman
Catholic, so far as abstinence from inquisition into consciences
and private parlours could be called toleration, was secured,
and that was a considerable step in advance of the practice
of the sixteenth century. Burning, hanging, and burying
alive of culprits guilty of another creed than the dominant
one had become obsolete. But there was an established
creed — the Reformed religion, founded on the Netherland
Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. And there was
one established principle then considered throughout Europe
the grand result of the Reformation ; " Cujus regio ejus
religio;" which was in reality as impudent an invasion of
human right as any heaven-born dogma of Infallibility. The
sovereign of a country, having appropriated the revenues
of the ancient church, prescribed his own creed to his sub-
jects. In the royal conscience were included the million
consciences of his subjects. The inevitable result in a
country like the Netherlands, without a personal sovereign,
was a struggle between the new church and the civil
government for mastery. And at this period, and always in
Barneveld's opinion, the question of dogma was subordinate
to that of church government. That there should be
no authority over the King had been settled in England.
16 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. L
Henry VIII., Elizabeth, and afterwards James, having become
popes in their own realm, had no great hostility to, but
rather an affection for, ancient dogma and splendid cere-
monial. But in the Seven Provinces, even as in France,
Germany, and Switzerland, the reform where it had been
effected at all had been more thorough, and there was little
left of Popish pomp or aristocratic hierarchy. Nothing
could be severer than the simplicity of the Reformed Church,
nothing more imperious than its dogma, nothing more infal-
lible than its creed. It was the true religion, and there was
none other. But to whom belonged the ecclesiastical edifices,
the splendid old minsters in the cities — raised by the people's
confiding piety and the purchased remission of their sins in a
bygone age — and the humbler but beautiful parish churches
in every town and village ? To the State, said Barneveld,
speaking for government ; to the community represented by
the states of the provinces, the magistracies of the cities and
municipalities. To the Church itself, the one true church
represented by its elders, and deacons, and preachers, was
the reply.
And to whom belonged the right of prescribing laws
and ordinances of public worship, of appointing preachers,
church servants, schoolmasters, sextons ? To the Holy
Ghost inspiring the Class and the Synod, said the Church.
To the civil authority, said the magistrates, by which
the churches are maintained, and the salaries of the
ecclesiastics paid. The states of Holland are as sove-
reign as the kings of England or Denmark, the electors
of Saxony or Brandenburg, the magistrates of Zurich
or Basel or other Swiss cantons. " Cujus regio ejus
religio"
In 1590 there was a compromise under the guidance of
Barneveld. It was agreed that an appointing board should
be established composed of civil functionaries and church
COMPROMISE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. 17
officials in equal numbers. Thus should the interests of
religion and of education be maintained.
The compromise was successful enough during the war.
External pressure kept down theological passion, and there
were as yet few symptoms of schism in the dominant church.
But there was to come a time when the struggle between
church and government was to break forth with an intensity
and to rage to an extent which no man at that moment
could imagine.
Towards the end of the century Henry IV. made peace
with Spain. It was a trying moment for the Provinces.
Barneveld was again sent forth on an embassy to the King.
The cardinal point in his policy, as it had ever been in that
of William the Silent, was to maintain close friendship with
France, whoever might be its ruler. An alliance between
that kingdom and Spain would be instantaneous ruin to the
Republic. With the French and English sovereigns united
with the Provinces, the cause of the Reformation might
triumph, the Spanish world-empire be annihilated, national
independence secured.
Henry assured the Ambassador that the treaty of Vervins
was indispensable, but that he would never desert his old
allies. In proof of this, although he had just bound himself
to Spain to give no assistance to the Provinces, open or
secret, he would furnish them with thirteen hundred thou-
sand crowns, payable at intervals during four years. He
was under great obligations to his good friends the States,
he said, and nothing in the treaty forbade him to pay his
tdebts.
It was at this period too that Barneveld was employed
by the King to attend to certain legal and other private
business for which he professed himself too poor at the
moment to compensate him. There seems to have been
nothing in the usages of the time or country to make tho
VOL. i. c
18 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
transaction, innocent in itself, in any degree disreputable.
The King promised at some future day, when he should be
more in funds, to pay him a liberal fee. Barneveld, who a
dozen years afterwards received 20,000 florins for his labour,
professed that he would much rather have had one thousand
at the time.
Thence the Advocate, accompanied by his colleague,
Justinus de Nassau, proceeded to England, where they had
many stormy interviews with Elizabeth. The Queen swore
with many an oath that she too would make peace with
Philip, recommended the Provinces to do the same thing
with submission to their ancient tyrant, and claimed from the
States immediate payment of one million sterling in satis-
faction of their old debts to her. It would have been as
easy for them at that moment to pay a thousand million. It
was at last agreed that the sum of the debt should be fixed
at £800,000, and that the cautionary towns should be
held in Elizabeth's hands by English troops until all the
debt should be discharged. Thus England for a long time
afterwards continued to regard itself as in a measure the
sovereign and proprietor of the Confederacy, and Barneveld
then and there formed the resolve to relieve the country
of the incubus, and to recover those cautionary towns and
fortresses at the earliest possible moment. So long as foreign
soldiers commanded by military governors existed on the
soil of the Netherlands, they could hardly account them-
selves independent. Besides, there was the perpetual and
horrid nightmare, that by a sudden pacification between Spain
and England those important cities, keys to the country's
defence, might be handed over to their ancient tyrant.
Elizabeth had been pacified at last, however, by the
eloquence of the Ambassador. " I will assist you even if you
were up to the neck in water," she said. " Jusque la/' she
added, pointing to her chin.
BARNEVELD THE FOUNDER OF THE REPUBLIC. 19
Five years later Barneveld, for the fifth time at the head
of a great embassy, was sent to England to congratulate
James on his accession. It was then and there that he took
measure of the monarch with whom he was destined to have
many dealings, and who was to exert so baleful an influence
on his career. At last came the time when it was felt that
peace between Spain and her revolted provinces might be
made. The conservation of their ancient laws, privileges,
and charters, the independence of the States, and included
therein the freedom to establish the Reformed religion, had
been secured by forty years of fighting.
The honour of Spain was saved by a conjunction. She
agreed to treat with her old dependencies " as " with states
over which she had no pretensions. Through virtue of an
" as" a truce after two years' negotiation, perpetually tra-
versed and secretly countermined by the military party under
the influence of Maurice, was carried by the determination
of Barneveld. The great objects of the war had been secured.
The country was weary of nearly half a century of blood-
shed. It was time to remember that there could be such a
condition as Peace.
The treaty was signed, ratifications exchanged, and the
usual presents of considerable sums of money to the nego-
tiators made. Barneveld earnestly protested against carry-
ing out the custom on this occasion, and urged that
those presents should be given for the public use. He
was overruled by those who were more desirous of
receiving their reward than he was, and he accordingly,
in common with the other diplomatists, accepted the
gifts.1
The various details of these negotiations have been related
by the author in other volumes, to which the present one is
intended as a sequel. It has been thought necessary merely
1 ' Waaragt. Hist.' 105.
20 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
to recall very briefly a few salient passages in the career of
the Advocate up to the period when the present history
really opens.
Their bearing upon subsequent events will easily be
observed. The truce was the work of Barneveld. It was
detested by Maurice and by Maurice's partisans.
" I fear that our enemies and evil reports are the cause of
many of our difficulties," said the Advocate to the States1
envoy in Paris, in 1606.1 "You are to pay no heed tc
private advices. Believe and make others believe that
more than one half the inhabitants of the cities and in the
open country are inclined to peace. And I believe, in case
of continuing adversities, that the other half will not remain
constant, principally because the Provinces are robbed of
all traffic, prosperity, and navigation, through the actions
of France and England. I have always thought it for the
advantage of his Majesty to sustain us in such wise as would
make us useful in his service. As to his remaining per-
manently at peace with Spain, that would seem quite out of
the question/'
The King had long kept, according to treaty, a couple of
French regiments in the States' service, and furnished, or
was bound to furnish, a certain yearly sum for their support.
But the expenses of the campaigning had been rapidly
increasing and the results as swiftly dwindling. The Ad-
vocate now explained that, " without loss both of important
places and of reputation," the States could not help spend-
ing every month that they took the field 200,000 florins
over and above the regular contributions, and some months
a great deal more.2 This sum, he said, in nine months,
would more than eat up the whole subsidy of the King.
If they were to be in the field by March or beginning
of April, they would require from him an extraordinary
1 Barneveld to F. Aerssens, 18 Jan. 1606. (Hague Arch. MS.) 2 Ibid.
BARNEVELD THE FOUNDER OF THE REPUBLIC. 21
sum of 200,000 crowns, and as much more in June or
July.
Eighteen months /ater, when the magnificent naval victory
of Heemskerk in the Bay of Gibraltar1 had just made a
startling interlude to the languishing negotiations for peace,
the Advocate again warned the French King of the difficulty
in which the Eepublic still laboured of carrying on the
mighty struggle alone. Spain was the common enemy of
all. No peace or hope was possible for the leading powers as
long as Spain was perpetually encamped in the very heart
of Western Europe. The Netherlands were not fighting
their own battle merely, but that of freedom and independ-
ence against the all-encroaching world-power. And their
means to carry on the conflict were dwindling, while at the
same time there was a favourable opportunity for cropping
some fruit from their previous labours and sacrifices.
" We are led to doubt," he wrote once more to the envoy
in France,2 " whether the King's full powers will come from
Spain. This defeat is hard for the Spaniards to digest.
Meantime our burdens are quite above our capacity, as you
will understand by the enclosed statement, which is made
out with much exactness to show what is absolutely neces-
sary for a vigorous defence on land and a respectable position
at sea to keep things from entire confusion. The Provinces
could raise means for the half of this estimate. But it is a
great difference when the means differ one half from the
expenses. The sovereignst and most assured remedy would
be the one so often demanded, often projected, and some-
times almost prepared for execution, namely that our neigh-
bour kings, princes, and republics should earnestly take the
matter in hand and drive the Spaniards and their adherents
out of the Netherlands and over the mountains. Their own
1 See ' History of the United Netherlands,' iv. ch. xlvii.
* Barneveld to F. Aerssens, 2 June 1607. (Hague Archives MS.)
22 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
dignity and security ought not to permit such great bodies
of troops of both belligerents permanently massed in the
Netherlands. Still less ought they to allow these Provinces
to fall into the hands of the Spaniards, whence they could
with so much more power and convenience make war upon all
kings, princes, and republics. This must be prevented by
one means or another. It ought to be enough for every one
that we have been between thirty and forty years a firm
bulwark against Spanish ambition. Our constancy and
patience ought to be strengthened by counsel and by deed
in order that we may exist ; a Christian sympathy and a
small assistance not being sufficient. Believe and cause to
be believed that the present condition of our affairs requires
more aid in counsel and money than ever before, and that
nothing could be better bestowed than to further this end.
" Messieurs Jeannin, Buzenval, and de Russy have been
all here these twelve days. We have firm hopes that other
kings, princes, and republics will not stay upon formalities,
but will also visit the patients here in order to administer
sovereign remedies.
" Lend no ear to any flying reports. We say with the
wise men over there, ( Metuo Danaos et donaferentes.' We
know our antagonists well, and trust their hearts no more
than before, ' sed ultra posse non est esse.' To accept more
burthens than we can pay for will breed military mutiny ; to
tax the community above its strength will cause popular
^tumults, especially in rebus adversis, of which the beginnings
were seen last year, and without a powerful army the enemy
is not to be withstood. I have received your letters to the
17th May. My advice is to trust to his 1 upright proceed-
ings and with patience to overcome all things. Thus shall
the detractors and calumniators best be confounded. Assure
1 The King's probably.
MAURICE OF ORANGE STADHOLDER. 23
his Majesty and his ministers that I will do my utmost to
avert our ruin and his Majesty's disservice."
The treaty was made, and from that time forth the
antagonism between the eminent statesman and the great
military chieftain became inevitable. The importance of the
one seemed likely to increase day by day. The occupation
of the other for a time was over.
During the war Maurice had been, with exception of
Henry IV., the most considerable personage in Europe. He
was surrounded with that visible atmosphere of power the
poison of which it is so difficult to resist, and through the
golden haze of which a mortal seems to dilate for the vulgar
eye into the supernatural. The attention of Christendom
was perpetually fixed upon him. Nothing like his sieges,
his encampments, his military discipline, his scientific cam-
paigning had been seen before in modern Europe. The
youthful aristocracy from all countries thronged to his camp
to learn the game of war, for he had restored by diligent
Btudy of the ancients much that was noble in that pursuit,
and had elevated into an art that which had long since
degenerated into a system of butchery, marauding, and
rapine. And he had fought with signal success and unques-
tionable heroism the most important and most brilliant
pitched battle of the age. He was a central figure of the
current history of Europe. Pagan nations looked up to
him as one of the leading sovereigns of Christendom. The
Emperor of Japan addressed him as his brother monarch,
assured him that his subjects trading to that distant empire
should be welcomed and protected, and expressed himself
ashamed that so great a prince, whose name and fame had
spread through the world, should send his subjects to visit
a country so distant and unknown, and offer its emperor a
friendship which he was unconscious of deserving.1
1 Van Meteren, 061 ; de la Pise, 753.
24 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
He had been a commander of armies and a chief among
men since he came to man's estate, and he was now in the
very vigour of life, in his forty-second year. Of Imperial
descent and closely connected by blood or alliance with
many of the most illustrious of reigning houses, the acknow-
ledged master of the most royal and noble of all sciences, he
was of the stuff of which kings were made, and belonged
by what was then accounted right divine to the family of
kings. His father's death had alone prevented his elevation
to the throne of Holland, and such possession of half the
sovereignty of the United Netherlands would probably have
expanded into dominion over all the seven with a not fan-
tastic possibility of uniting the ten still obedient provinces
into a single realm. Such a kingdom would have been more
populous and far wealthier than contemporary Great Britain
and Ireland. Maurice, then a student at Lcyden, was too
young at that crisis, and his powers too undeveloped to
justify any serious attempt to place him in his father's place.
The Netherlands drifted into a confederacy of aristocratic
republics, not because they had planned a republic, but
because they could not get a king, foreign or native. The
documents regarding the offer of the sovereign countship to
William remained in the possession of Maurice, and a few
years before the peace there had been a private meeting of
leading personages, of which Barneveld was the promoter
and chief spokesman, to take into consideration the propriety
and possibility of conferring that sovereignty upon the son
which had virtually belonged to the father. The obstacles
were deemed so numerous, and especially the scheme seemed
so fraught with danger to Maurice, that it was reluctantly
abandoned by his best friends, among whom unquestionably
was the Advocate.
There was no reason whatever why the now successful and
mature soldier, to whom the country was under such vast
MAURICE OF ORANGE STADHOLDER. 25
obligations, should not aspire to the sovereignty. The Pro-
vinces had not pledged themselves to republicanism, but
rather to monarchy, and the crown, although secretly
coveted by Henry IV., could by no possibility now be con-
ferred on any other man than Maurice. It was no impeach-
ment on his character that he should nourish thoughts in
which there was nothing criminal.
But the peace negotiations had opened a chasm. It was
obvious enough that Barneveld having now so long exercised
great powers, and become as it were the chief magistrate of
an important commonwealth, would not be so friendly as
formerly to its conversion into a monarchy and to the eleva-
tion of the great soldier to its throne. The Advocate had
even been sounded, cautiously and secretly, so men believed,
by the Princess-Dowager, Louise de Coligny, widow of
William the Silent, as to the feasibility of procuring the
sovereignty for Maurice. She had done this at the in-
stigation of Maurice, who had expressed his belief that the
favourable influence of the Advocate would make success
certain and who had represented to her that, as he was him-
self resolved never to marry, the inheritance after his death
would fall to her son Frederick Henry. The Princess, who
was of a most amiable disposition, adored her son. Devoted
to the House of Nassau and a great admirer of its chief,
she had a long interview with Barneveld, in which she
urged the scheme upon his attention without in all pro-
bability revealing that she had come to him at the solicita-
tion of Maurice.
The Advocate spoke to her with frankness and out of the
depths of his heart. He professed an ardent attachment
to her family, a profound reverence for the virtues, sacrifices,
and achievements of her lamented husband, and a warm
desire to do everything to further the interests of the son
who had proved himself so worthy of his parentage.
26 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I
But he proved to her that Maurice, in seeking the sove-
reignty, was seeking his ruin. The Hollanders, he said,
liked to be persuaded and not forced. Having triumphantly
shaken off the yoke of a powerful king, they would scarcely
consent now to accept the rule of any personal sovereign.
The desire to save themselves from the claws of Spain had
led them formerly to offer the dominion over them to various
potentates. Now that they had achieved peace and inde-
pendence and were delivered from the fears of Spanish
ferocity and French intrigue, they shuddered at the dangers
from royal hands out of which they had at last escaped. He
believed that they would be capable of tearing in pieces any
one who might make the desired proposition. After all, he
urged, Maurice was a hundred times more fortunate as he
was than if he should succeed in desires so opposed to his own
good. This splendour of sovereignty was a false glare which
would lead him to a precipice. He had now the power of a
sovereign without the envy which ever followed it. Having
essentially such power, he ought, like his father, to despise
an empty name, which would only make him hated. For it
was well known that William the Silent had only yielded to
much solicitation, agreeing to accept that which then seemed
desirable for the country's good but to him was more than
indifferent.
Maurice was captain-general and admiral -general of five
provinces. He appointed to governments and to all military
office. He had a share of appointment to the magistracies.
He had the same advantages and the same authority as had
been enjoyed in the Netherlands by the ancient sovereign
counts, by the dukes of Burgundy, by Emperor Charles V.
himself.
Every one now was in favour of increasing his pensions,
his salaries, his material splendour. Should he succeed in
seizing the sovereignty, men would envy him even to the
MAURICE OF ORANGE STADHOLDER. 27
ribbands of his pages' and his lackeys' shoes. He turned to
the annals of Holland and showed the Princess that there
had hardly been a sovereign count against whom his subjects
had not revolted, marching generally into the very court-
yard of the palace at the Hague in order to take his life.
Convinced by this reasoning, Louise de Coligny had at
once changed her mind, and subsequently besought her step-
son to give up a project sure to be fatal to his welfare, his
peace of mind, and the good of the country. Maurice
listened to her coldly, gave little heed to the Advocate's
logic, and hated him in his heart from that day forth.
The Princess remained loyal to Barneveld to the last.1
Thus the foundation was laid of that terrible enmity which,
inflamed by theological passion, was to convert the period
of peace into a hell, to rend the Provinces asunder when they
had most need of repose, and to lead to tragical results for
ever to be deplored. Already in 1607 Francis Aerssens had
said that the two had become so embroiled and things had
gone so far that one or the other would have to leave the
country.2 He permitted also the ridiculous statement to be
made in his house at Paris, that Henry IV. believed the
Advocate to have become Spanish, and had declared that
Prince Maurice would do well to have him put into a sack
and thrown into the sea.3
His life had been regularly divided into two halves, the
campaigning season and the period of winter quarters. In
the one his business and his talk was of camps, marches,
sieges, and battles only. In the other he was devoted to his
stud, to tennis, to mathematical and mechanical inventions,
great intrinsic probability and is sus-
tained as to its general bearings by
1 ' Memoires de Messire Louis Au-
bery, Seigneur du Maurier,' 1680,
pp. 183, gqq. The story rests en-
tirely on the testimony of du Mau-
rier, son of the French ambassa-
dor so long resident at the Hague,
who often recounted it secretly, in all
its details, to his family. It has so
so much of collateral circumstance
that I do not hesitate to accept it as
substantially accurate.
8 Vreede, ' Inloiding tot eeno
Qesch. d. Nederl. Diplomatic,' i. 150.
» Ibid. p. 151.
28 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
and to chess, of which he was passionately fond, and which he
did not play at all well. A Gascon captain serving in the
States' army was his habitual antagonist in that game, and,
although the stakes were hut a crown a game, derived a
steady income out of his gains, which were more than
equal to his pay. The Prince was sulky when he lost,
sitting, when the candles were burned out and bed-time
had arrived, with his hat pulled over his brows, without
bidding his guest good night, and leaving him to find his
way out as he best could ; and, on the contrary, radiant
with delight when successful, calling for valets to light the
departing captain through the corridor, and accompanying
him to the door of the apartment himself. That warrior was
accordingly too shrewd not to allow his great adversary as
fair a share of triumph as was consistent with maintaining
the frugal income on which he reckoned.
He had small love for the pleasures of the table, but was
promiscuous and unlicensed in his amours. He was me-
thodical in his household arrangements, and rather stingy
than liberal in money matters. He personally read all his
letters, accounts, despatches, and other documents trivial or
important, but wrote few letters with his own hand, so that,
unlike his illustrious father's correspondence, there is little
that is characteristic to be found in his own. He was plain
but not shabby in attire, and was always dressed in exactly
the same style, wearing doublet and hose of brown woollen,
a silk under vest, a short cloak lined with velvet, a little
plaited ruff on his neck, and very loose boots. He ridiculed
the smart French officers who, to show their fine legs, were
wont to wear such tight boots as made them perspire to get
into them, and maintained, in precept and practice, that a
man should be able to jump into his boots and mount and
ride at a moment's notice. The only ornaments he indulged
in, except, of course, on state occasions, were a golden hilt
MAURICE OF ORANGE STADHOLDER.
29
to his famous sword, and a rope of diamonds tied around his
felt hat.
He was now in the full flower of his strength and his
fame, in his forty-second year, and of a noble and martial
presence. The face, although unquestionably handsome,
offered a sharp contrast within itself; the upper half all
intellect, the lower quite sensual. Fair hair growing thin,
but hardly tinged with grey, a bright, cheerful, and thought-
ful forehead, large hazel eyes within a singularly large orbit
of brow ; a straight, thin, slightly aquiline, well-cut nose —
such features were at open variance with the broad, thick-
lipped, sensual mouth, the heavy pendant jowl, the sparse
beard on the glistening cheek, and the moleskin-like mous-
tachio and chin tuft. Still, upon the whole, it was a face
and figure which gave the world assurance of a man and a
commander of men. Power and intelligence were stamped
upon him from his birth.
Barneveld was tall and majestic of presence, with large
quadrangular face, austere, blue eyes looking authority and
command, a vast forehead, and a grizzled beard. Of fluent
and convincing eloquence with tongue and pen, having the
power of saying much in few words, he cared much more
for the substance than the graces of speech or composition.
This tendency was not ill exemplified in a note of his
written on a sheet of questions addressed to him by a States'
ambassador about to start on an important mission, but a
novice in his business, the answers to which questions were
to serve for his diplomatic instructions.1
" Item and principally," wrote the Envoy, " to request of
M. de Barneveld a formulary or copy of the best, soundest,
wisest, and best couched despatches done by several pre-
1 Boetzclacr van Langerac/'Vraach-
etucken ende poincten by ray injje-
Btelt endo by den adv. Oldenbarne-
velt geappoetilleert tot myncr onder-
richtinge endc instructie voor myn
vertrek naer Vrankryck." (Hague
Archives MS.)
30 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
ceding ambassadors in order to regulate myself accordingly
for the greater service of the Province and for my uttermost
reputation."
The Advocate's answer, scrawled in his nearly illegible
hand, was —
"Unnecessary. The truth in shortest about matters of
importance shall be taken for good style."
With great love of power, which he was conscious of
exerting with ease to himself and for the good of the public,
he had little personal vanity, and not the smallest ambition
of authorship. Many volumes might be collected out of the
vast accumulation of his writings now mouldering and for-
gotten in archives. Had the language in which they are
written become a world's language, they would be worthy
of attentive study, as containing noble illustrations of the
history and politics of his age, with theories and sentiments
often far in advance of his age. But he cared not for style.
" The truth in shortest about matters of importance " was
enough for him ; but the world in general, and especially
the world of posterity, cares much for style. The vehicle is
often prized more than the freight. The name of Barneveld
is fast fading out of men's memory. The fame of his pupil
and companion in fortune and misfortune, Hugo Grotius, is
ever green. But Grotius was essentially an author rather
than a statesman : he wrote for the world and posterity with
all the love, pride, and charm of the devotee of literature,
and he composed his noblest works in a language which is
ever living because it is dead. Some of his writings, epoch-
making when they first appeared, are text-books still fami-
liar in every cultivated household on earth. Yet Barneveld
was vastly his superior in practical statesmanship, in law, in
the science of government, and above all in force of character,
while certainly not his equal in theology, nor making any
pretensions to poetry. Although a ripe scholar, he rarely
MAURICE OF ORANGE STADHOLDER. 31
wrote in Latin, and not often in French. His ambition was
to do his work thoroughly according to his view of duty,
and to ask God's blessing upon it without craving overmuch
the applause of men.
Such were the two men, the soldier and the statesman.
Would the Republic, fortunate enough to possess two such
magnificent and widely contrasted capacities, be wise enough
to keep them in its service, each supplementing the other,
and the two combining in a perfect whole ?
Or was the great law of the Discords of the World, as
potent as that other principle of Universal Harmony and
planetary motion which an illustrious contemporary — that
Wiirtemberg astronomer, once a soldier of the fierce Alva,
now the half-starved astrologer of the brain-sick Kudolph —
was at that moment discovering, after " God had waited six
thousand years for him to do it," to prevail for the misery
of the Republic and shame of Europe ? Time was to show.
The new state had forced itself into the family of sove-
reignties somewhat to the displeasure of most of the Lord's
anointed. Rebellious and republican, it necessarily excited
the jealousy of long-established and hereditary governments.
The King of Spain had not formally acknowledged the
independence of the United Provinces. He had treated with
them as free, and there was supposed to be much virtue in
the conjunction. But their sovereign independence was
virtually recognized by the world. Great nations had
entered into public and diplomatic relations and conventions
with them, and their agents at foreign courts were now
dignified with the rank and title of ambassadors.
The Spanish king had likewise refused to them the con-
cession of the right of navigation and commerce in the East
Indies, but it was a matter of notoriety that the absence of
the word India, suppressed as it was in the treaty, implied an
immense triumph on the part of the States, and that their
32 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
flourishing and daily increasing commerce in the farthest
East and the imperial establishments already rising there
were cause of envy and jealousy not to Spain alone, hut to
friendly powers.
Yet the government of Great Britain affected to regard
them as something less than a sovereign state. Although
Elizabeth had refused the sovereignty once proffered to her,
although James had united with Henry IV. in guaranteeing
the treaty just concluded between the States and Spain, that
monarch had the wonderful conception that the Republic
was in some sort a province of his own, because he still held
the cautionary towns in pledge for the loans granted by his
predecessor. His agents at Constantinople were instructed
to represent the new state as unworthy to accredit its envoys
as those of an independent power. The Provinces were
represented as a collection of audacious rebels, a piratical
scum of the sea.1 But the Sultan knew his interests better
than to incur the enmity of this rising maritime power.
The Dutch envoy declaring that he would sooner throw him-
self into the Bosphorus than remain to be treated with less
consideration than that accorded to the ministers of all
great powers, the remonstrances of envious colleagues were
hushed, and Haga was received with all due honours.
Even at the court of the best friend of the Republic, the
French king, men looked coldly at the upstart common-
wealth. Francis Aerssens, the keen and accomplished
minister of the States, resident in Paris for many years, was
received as ambassador after the truce with all the cere-
monial befitting the highest rank in the diplomatic service ;
yet Henry could not yet persuade himself to look upon the
power accrediting him as a thoroughly organized common-
wealth.
The English ambassador asked the King if he meant to
1 Van Rees and Brill.
1609. EMBASSY TO VENICE. 33
continue his aid and assistance to the States during the
truce. " Yes," answered Henry.
" And a few years beyond it ?"
" No. I do not wish to offend the King of Spain from
mere gaiety of heart."
" But they are free," replied the Ambassador ; " the King
of Spain could have no cause for offence."
" They are free," said the King, " but not sovereign."
" Judge then," wrote Aerssens to Barneveld, " how we shall
be with the King of Spain at the end of our term when our
best friends make this distinction among themselves to our
disadvantage. They insist on making a difference between
liberty and sovereignty ; considering liberty as a mean term
between servitude and sovereignty." 1
" You would do well," continued the Dutch ambassador,
"to use the word ' sovereignty' on all occasions instead
of ' liberty.' " 2 The hint was significant and the advice
sound.
The haughty republic of Venice, too, with its "golden
Book " and its pedigree of a thousand years, looked askance
at the republic of yesterday rising like herself out of
lagunes and sand banks, and affecting to place herself side
by side with emperors, kings, and the lion of St. Mark.
But the all-accomplished council of that most serene
commonwealth had far too much insight and too wide
experience in political combinations to make the blunder of
yielding to this aristocratic sentiment.
The natural enemy of the Pope, of Spain, of Austria,
must of necessity be the friend of Venice, and it was soon
thought highly desirable to intimate half officially that "a
legation from the States-General to the Queen of the
1 Aersscns to Barneveld, 14 Jan. 1609. (National Archives at the Hague MS.)
• Ibid.
VOL. I. D
34
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. I.
Adriatic, announcing the conclusion of the Twelve Years'
Truce, would be extremely well received.
The hint was given by the Venetian ambassador at Paris
to Francis Aerssens, who instantly recommended van der
Myle, son-in-law of Barneveld, as a proper personage to be
entrusted with this important mission. At this moment an
open breach had almost occurred between Spain and Venice,
and the Spanish ambassador at Paris, Don Pedro de Toledo,
naturally very irate. with Holland, Venice, and even with
France, was vehement in his demonstrations. The arrogant
Spaniard had for some time been employed in an attempt to
negotiate a double marriage between the Dauphin and the
eldest daughter of Philip III., and between the eldest son of
that king and the Princess Elizabeth of France. An indis-
pensable but secret condition of this negotiation was the
absolute renunciation by France of its alliance and friendly
relations with the United Provinces. The project was in
truth a hostile measure aimed directly at the life of the
Republic. Henry held firm however, and Don Pedro was about
to depart malcontent, his mission having totally failed. He
chanced, when going to his audience of leavetaking, after
the arrival of his successor, Don luigo de Cardenas, to meet
the Venetian ambassador, Antonio Foscarini. An altercation
took place between them, during which the Spaniard poured
out his wrath so vehemently, calling his colleague with neat
alliteration " a poltroon, a pantaloon, and a pig," that Henry
heard him.1
What Signor Antonio replied has not been preserved, but
it is stated that he was first to seek a reconciliation, not
liking, he said, Spanish assassinations.2
Meantime the double marriage project was for a season at
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 9 Feb.
1609. (Hague Archives MS.)
8 Ibid. ". . . qui ce nonobstant a
cerche 1'accord le premier, d'autant,
dit-il, que les assassinats des Espa-
gnols ne lui plaisent pas."
1609.
EMBASSY TO VENICE.
35
least suspended, and the alliance between the two republics
went forwards. Van der Myle, appointed ambassador to
Venice, soon afterwards arrived in Paris, where he made a
very favourable impression, and was highly lauded by
Aerssens in his daily correspondence with JBarneveld. No
portentous shadow of future and fatal discord between those
statesmen fell upon the cheerful scene. Before the year
closed, he arrived at his post, and was received with great
distinction, despite the obstacles thrown in his way by Spain
and other powers ; the ambassador of France itself, de
Champigny, having privately urged that he ought to be
placed on the same footing with the envoys of Savoy and of
Florence.
Van der Myle at starting committed the trifling fault of
styling the States-General "most illustrious" (illustrissimi)
instead of " most serene," the title by which Venice desig-
nated herself.
The fault was at once remedied, however, Priuli the
Doge seating the Dutch ambassador on his right hand at his
solemn reception, and giving directions that van der Myle
should be addressed as Excellency, his post being assigned him
directly after his seniors, the ambassadors of Pope, Emperor,
and kings.1 The same precedence was settled in Paris, while
Aerssens, who did not consider himself placed in a position of
greater usefulness by his formal installation as ambassador,
received private intimation from Henry, with whom he was
on terms of great confidence and intimacy, that he should
have private access to the King as frequently and as in-
formally as before.2 The theory that the ambassador,
representing the personality of his sovereign, may visit the
monarch to whom he is accredited, without ceremony and at
1 Aeresons to Barneveld, 23 April
1609, 13 June 1609, 6 Sept. 1609, 30
Nov. 1(509, 16 Dec. 1609. (Hague
Arch. MSS.)
17 Doc. 1609.
* Ibid.
Samo to van der Myle,
(Ibid. MS.)
36 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. L
his own convenience, was as rarely carried into practice in
the sixteenth century as in the nineteenth, while on the
other hand Aerssens, as the private and confidential agent of
a friendly but not publicly recognized commonwealth, had
been for many years in almost daily personal communica-
tion with the King.
It is also important to note that the modern fallacy
according to which republics being impersonal should
not be represented by ambassadors had not appeared in
that important epoch in diplomatic history. On the con-
trary, the two great republics of the age, Holland and
Venice, vindicated for themselves, with as much dignity
and reason as success, their right to the highest diplomatic
honours.
The distinction was substantial not shadowy ; those
haughty commonwealths not considering it advantageous
or decorous that their representatives should for want of
proper official designations be ranked on great ceremonial
occasions with the ministers of petty Italian principalities
or of the three hundred infinitesimal sovereignties of
Germany.
It was the advice of the French king especially, who
knew politics and the world as well as any man, that the
envoys of the Eepublic which he befriended and which
stood now on the threshold of its official and national exist-
ence, should assert themselves at every court with the self-
reliance and courtesy becoming the functionaries of a great
power. That those ministers were second to the represen-
tatives of no other European state in capacity and accom-
plishment was a fact well known to all who had dealings
with them, for the States required in their diplomatic re-
presentatives knowledge of history and international law,
modern languages, and the classics, as well as familiarity
with political customs and social courtesies ; the breeding of
1609. RELATIONS OF REPUBLIC WITH FOREIGN STATES. 37
gentlemen in short and the accomplishments of scholars.
It is both a literary enjoyment and a means of historical
and political instruction to read after the lapse of centuries
their reports and despatches. They worthily compare as
works of art with those diplomatic masterpieces the letters
and ' Kelazioni ' of the Venetian ambassadors ; and it is
well known that the earlier and some of the most important
treatises on public and international law ever written are
from the pens of Hollanders, who indeed may be said to
have invented that science.
The Kepublic having thus steadily shouldered its way
into the family of nations was soon called upon to perform
a prominent part in the world's affairs. More than in our own
epoch there was a close political commingling of such inde-
pendent states as held sympathetic views on the great
questions agitating Europe. The policy of isolation so
wisely and successfully carried out by our own trans- Atlantic
commonwealth was impossible for the Dutch republic, born
as it was of a great religious schism, and with its narrow
territory wedged between the chief political organizations
of Christendom. Moreover the same jealousy on the part
of established powers which threw so many obstacles in
its path to recognized sovereignty existed in the highest
degree between its two sponsors and allies, France and
England, in regard to their respective relations to the new
state.
" If ever there was an obliged people," said Henry's
secretary of state, Villeroy, to Aerssens, "then it is you
Netherlandcrs to his Majesty. He has converted your war
into peace, and has never abandoned you. It is for you now
to show your affection and gratitude." l
In the time of Elizabeth, and now in that of her suc-
cessor, there was scarcely a day in which the envoys of the
1 Aeresena to Barneveld. (MS.)
38 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
States were not reminded of the immense load of favour
from England under which they tottered, and of the greater
sincerity and value of English friendship over that of
France.
Sully often spoke to Aerssens on the subject in even stronger
language, deeming himself the chief protector and guardian
angel of the Eepublic, to whom they were bound by ties of
eternal gratitude. " But if the States," he said, " should
think of caressing the King of England more than him, or
even of treating him on an equality with his Majesty,
Henry would be very much affronted. He did not mean
that they should neglect the friendship of the King of
Britain, but that they should cultivate it after and in sub-
ordination to his own, for they might be sure that James
held all things indifferent, their ruin or their conserva-
tion, while his Majesty had always manifested the contrary
both by his counsels and by the constant furnishing of
supplies." l
Henry of France and Navarre — soldier, statesman, wit,
above all a man and every inch a king — brimful of human
vices, foibles, and humours, and endowed with those high
qualities of genius which enabled him to mould events and
men by his unscrupulous and audacious determination to
conform to the spirit of his times which no man better
understood than himself, had ever been in such close rela-
tions with the Netherlands as to seem in some sort their
^sovereign.
James Stuart, emerging from the school of Buchanan and
the atmosphere of Calvinism in which he had been bred,
now reigned in those more sunny and liberal regions where
Elizabeth so long had ruled. Finding himself at once, after
years of theological study, face to face with a foreign com-
monwealth and a momentous epoch, in which politics were
1 Aerssens to Barneveld. (Hague Archives MS.)
1609. RELATIONS OF REPUBLIC WITH FOREIGN STATES. 39
so commingled with divinity as to offer daily the most
puzzling problems, the royal pedant hugged himself at
beholding so conspicuous a field for his talents.
To turn a throne into a pulpit, and amaze mankind with
his learning, was an ambition most sweet to gratify. The
Calvinist of Scotland now proclaimed his deadly hatred of
Puritans in England and Holland, and denounced the
Netherlander as a pack of rebels whom it always pleased
him to irritate, and over whom he too claimed, through
the possession of the cautionary towns, a kind of sove-
reignty. Instinctively feeling that in the rough and un-
lovely husk of Puritanism was enclosed the germ of a wider
human liberty than then existed, he was determined to
give battle to it with his tongue, his pen, with everything
but his sword.
Doubtless the States had received most invaluable assist-
ance from both France and England, but the sovereigns of
those countries were too apt to forget that it was their own
battles, as well as those of the Hollanders, that had been
fought in Flanders and Brabant. But for the alliance and
subsidies of the faithful States, Henry would not so soon
have ascended the throne of his ancestors, while it was
matter of history that the Spanish government had for
years been steadily endeavouring to subjugate England not
so much for the value of the conquest in itself as for a
stepping-stone to the recovery of the revolted Netherlands.
For the dividing line of nations or at least of national
alliances was a frontier not of language but of faith. Ger-
many was but a geographical expression. The union of
Protestantism, subscribed by a large proportion of its three
hundred and seven sovereigns, ran zigzag through the
country, a majority probably of the people at that moment
being opposed to the Roman Church.1
1 Gindely, anno 1609.
40 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. L
It has often been considered amazing that Protestantism
having accomplished so much should have fallen backwards
so soon, and yielded almost undisputed sway in vast regions
to the long dominant church. But in truth there is nothing
surprising about it. Catholicism was and remained a unit,
while its opponents were eventually broken up into hundreds
of warring and politically impotent organizations. Keligious
faith became distorted into a weapon for selfish and greedy
territorial aggrandizement in the hands of Protestant
princes. " Cujus regio ejus religio " was the taunt hurled in
the face of the imploring Calvinists of France and the Low
Countries by the arrogant Lutherans of Germany. Such a
sword smote the principle of religious freedom and mutual
toleration into the dust, and rendered them comparatively
weak in the conflict with the ancient and splendidly organized
church.
The Huguenots of France, notwithstanding the protection
grudgingly afforded them by their former chieftain, were
dejected and discomfited by his apostasy, and Henry, placed
in a fearfully false position, was an object of suspicion to
both friends and foes. In England it is difficult to say
whether a Jesuit or a Puritan was accounted the more
noxious animal by the dominant party.
In the United Provinces perhaps one half the population
was either openly or secretly attached to the ancient church,
while among the Protestant portion a dire and tragic con-
vulsion was about to break forth, which for a time at least
was to render Kemonstrants and Contra-Kemonstrants more
fiercely opposed to each other than to Papists.
The doctrine of predestination in its sternest and strictest
sense had long been the prevailing one in the Reformed
Church of the revolted Netherlands, as in those of Scotland,
France, Geneva, and the Palatinate. No doubt up to the
period of the truce a majority had acquiesced in that
1603. APPOINTMENT OF ARMINIUS CREATES DISSENSION. 41
dogma and its results, although there had always been
many preachers to advocate publicly a milder creed. It
was not until the appointment of Jacob Arminius to the
professorship of theology at Leyden, in the place of Francis
Junius, in the year 1603, that a danger of schism in the
Church seemed impending. Then rose the great Gomarus
in his wrath, and with all the powers of splendid eloquence,
profound learning, and the intense bigotry of conviction,
denounced the horrible heresy. Conferences between the
two before the Court of Holland, theological tournaments
between six champions on a side, gallantly led by their
respective chieftains, followed, with the usual result of con-
firming both parties in the conviction that to each alone
belonged exclusively the truth.
The original influence of Arminius had however been so
great that when the preachers of Holland had been seve-
rally called on by a synod to sign the Heidelberg Catechism,
many of them refused. Here was open heresy and revolt.
It was time for the true church to vindicate its authority.
The great war with Spain had been made, so it was urged
and honestly believed, not against the Inquisition, not to
prevent Netherlanders from being burned and buried alive
by the old true church, not in defence of ancient charters,
constitutions, and privileges — the precious result of cen-
turies of popular resistance to despotic force — not to main-
tain an amount of civil liberty and local self-government
larger in extent than any then existing in the world, not to
assert equality of religion for all men, but simply to esta-
blish the true religion, the one church, the only possible
creed ; the creed and church of Calvin.
It is perfectly certain that the living fire which glowed in
the veins of those hot gospellers had added intense enthu-
siasm to the war spirit throughout that immense struggle.
It is quite possible that without that enthusiasm the war
42 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
might not have been earned on to its successful end. But
it is equally certain that Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists, and
devotees of many other creeds, had taken part in the con-
flict in defence both of hearth and altar, and that without
that aid the independence of the Provinces would never have
been secured.
Yet before the war was ended the arrogance of the Ke-
formed priesthood had begun to dig a chasm. Men who
with William the Silent and Barneveld had indulged in
the vision of religious equality as a possible result of so
much fighting against the Holy Inquisition were perhaps
to be disappointed.
Preachers under the influence of the gentle Arminius
having dared to refuse signing the Creed were to be dealt
with. It was time to pass from censure to action.
"I fW*
Heresy must be trampled down. The churches
called for a national synod, and they did this as by divine
right. " My Lords the States-General must observe," they
said, "that this assembly now demanded is not a human
institution but an ordinance of the Holy Ghost in its com-
munity, not depending upon any man's authority, but pro-
ceeding from God to the community/' They complained
that the true church was allowed to act only through the
civil government, and was thus placed at a disadvantage
compared even with Catholics and other sects, whose pro-
ceedings were winked at. " Thus the true church suffered
from its apparent and public freedom, and hostile sects
gained by secret connivance." 1
A crisis was fast approaching. The one church claimed
infallibility and superiority to the civil power. The Holy
Ghost was placed in direct, ostentatious opposition to My
Lords the States-General. It was for Netherlander to
1 Continuation of Arend's ' Vad. Hist.' by van Rees and Dr. Brill, iii.
p. 420.
1606. RELIGIOUS DISSENSION. 43
decide whether, after having shaken off the Holy Inquisi-
tion, and subjected the old true church to the public
authority, they were now to submit to the imperious claims
of the new true church.
There were hundreds of links connecting the Church with
the State. In that day a divorce between the two was hardly
possible or conceivable. The system of Congregationalism
so successfully put into practice soon afterwards in the wil-
derness of New England, and to which so much of American
freedom political as well as religious is due, was not easy
to adopt in an old country like the Netherlands. Splendid
churches and cathedrals, the legal possession of which would
be contended for by rival sects, could scarcely be replaced
by temporary structures of lath and plaster, or by humble
back parlours of mechanics' shops. There were questions of
property of complicated nature. Not only the states and
the communities claimed in rivalry the ownership of church
property, but many private families could show ancient
advowsons and other claims to present or to patronize,
derived from imperial or ducal charters.
So long as there could be liberty of opinion within the
Church upon points not necessarily vital, open schism could
be avoided, by which the cause of Protestantism throughout
Europe must be weakened, while at the same time sub-
ordination of the priesthood to the civil authority would be
maintained. But if the Holy Ghost, through the assembled
clergy, were to dictate an iron formulary to which all must
conform, to make laws for church government which every
citizen must obey, and to appoint preachers and school-
masters from whom alone old and young could receive
illumination and instruction religious or lay, a theocracy
would be established which no enlightened statesman could
tolerate.
The States-General agreed to the synod, but imposed a
44 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. L
condition that there should be a revision of Creed and Cate-
chism. This was thundered down with one blast.
1 fv\p
The condition implied a possibility that the vile
heresy of Arminius might be correct. An unconditional synod
was demanded. The Heidelberg Creed and Netherland Cate-
chism were sacred, infallible, not to be touched. The answer
of the government, through the mouth of Barneveld, was
that " to My Lords the States-General as the foster-fathers
and protectors of the churches every right belonged."
Thus far the States-General under the leadership of the
Advocate were unanimous. The victory remained with
State against Church. But very soon after the truce had
been established, and men had liberty to devote themselves
to peaceful pursuits, the ecclesiastical trumpet again sounded
far and wide, and contending priests and laymen rushed madly
to the fray. The Remonstrance and Contra-Remonstrancc,
and the appointment of Conrad Vorstius, a more abominable
heretic than Arminius, to the vacant chair of Arminius — a
step which drove Gomarus and the Gomarites to frenzy,
although Gomarus and Vorstius remained private and inti-
mate friends to the last — are matters briefly to be men-
tioned on a later page.
Thus to the four chief actors in the politico-religious
drama, soon to be enacted as an interlude to an eighty
years' war, were assigned parts at first sight inconsistent
with their private convictions. The King of France, who
nad often abjured his religion, and was now the best of
Catholics, was denounced ferociously in every Catholic
pulpit in Christendom as secretly an apostate again, and
the open protector of heretics and rebels.1 But the cheerful
Henry troubled himself less than he perhaps had cause to
do with these thundcrblasts. Besides, as we shall soon see, he
had other objects political and personal to sway his opinions.
1 Van Mcteren, fo. 645.
1606. RELIGIOUS DISSENSION. 45
James the ex-Calvinist, crypto-Arminian, pseudo-Papist,
and avowed Puritan hater, was girding on his armour to
annihilate Arminians and to defend and protect Puritans
in Holland, while swearing that in England he would pepper
them and harry them and hang them and that he would
even like to bury them alive.
Barneveld, who turned his eyes, as much as in such an
inflammatory age it was possible, from subtle points of
theology, and relied on his great-grandfather's motto of
humility, "Nil scire tutissima fides " was perhaps nearer to .'
the dogma of the dominant Eeformed Church than he knew,
although always the consistent and strenuous champion of
the civil authority over Church as well as State.
Maurice was no theologian. He was a steady church-
goer, and his favorite divine, the preacher at his court
chapel, was none other than Uytenbogaert. The very man
who was instantly to be the champion of the Arminians, the
author of the Remonstrance, the counsellor and comrade of
Barneveld and Grotius, was now sneered at by the Goma-
rites as the " Court Trumpeter." The preacher was not
destined to change his opinions. Perhaps the Prince might
alter. But Maurice then paid no heed to the great point at
issue, about which all the Netherlander were to take each
other by the throat — absolute predestination. He knew
that the Advocate had refused to listen to his stepmother's
suggestion as to his obtaining the sovereignty. " He knew
nothing of predestination," he was wont to say, " whether it
was green, or whether it was blue. He only knew that his
pipe and the Advocate's were not likely to make music
together." This much of predestination he did know, that
if the Advocate and his friends were to come to open conflict
with the Prince of Orange-Nassau, the conqueror of Nicuw-
poort, it was predestined to go hard with the Advocate and
his friends.
46
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD.
CHAP. L
The theological quibble did not interest him much, and
he was apt to blunder about it.
" Well, preacher," said he one day to Albert Huttenus,
who had come to him to intercede for a deserter condemned
to be hanged, "are you one of those Arminians who be-
lieve that one child is born to salvation and another to
damnation ?"
Huttenus, amazed to the utmost at the extraordinary
question, replied, " Your Excellency will be graciously
pleased to observe that this is not the opinion of those
whom one calls by the hateful name of Arminians, but the
opinion of their adversaries."
" Well, preacher," rejoined Maurice, " don't you think I
know better ? " And turning to Count Lewis William,
Stadholder of Friesland, who was present, standing by the
hearth with his hand on a copper ring of the chimneypiece,
he cried,
" Which is right, cousin, the preacher or I ? "
"No, cousin," answered Count Lewis, "you are in the
wrong." *
Thus to the Catholic League organized throughout
Europe in solid and consistent phalanx was opposed the
Great Protestant Union, ardent and enthusiastic in detail,
but undisciplined, disobedient, and inharmonious as a
whole.
The great principle, not of religious toleration, which is
a phrase of insult, but of religious equality, which is the
natural right of mankind, was to be evolved after a lapse of
1 The anecdote rests on the autho-
rity of the annotator to the 2nd edi-
tion of Brandt's ' Hist. v. d. Rechts-
pleging.' (1710) p. 179. He derived
it, he says, from the MS. note of a
man well known to him, venerable
and trustworthy, who had heard it
more than once from the mouth of
Dr. Huttenus himself.
Of course it may be disputed by
violent partisans who deem such
stories criminal or discreditable to a
plain soldier. It seems characteristic
enough, and the evidence is sufficient
for such a trifle.
1609. THE CATHOLIC LEAGUE AND PROTESTANT UNION. 47
additional centuries out of the elemental conflict which had
already lasted so long. Still later was the total divorce of
State and Church to be achieved as the final consummation
of the great revolution. Meantime it was almost inevitable
that the privileged and richly endowed church, with eccle-
siastical armies and arsenals vastly superior to anything
which its antagonist could improvise, should more than hold
its own.
At the outset of the epoch which now occupies our atten-
tion, Europe was in a state of exhaustion and longing for
repose. Spain had submitted to the humiliation of a treaty
of truce with its rebellious subjects which was substantially
a recognition of their independence. Nothing could be
more deplorable than the internal condition of the country
which claimed to be mistress of the world and still aspired
to universal monarchy.
It had made peace because it could no longer furnish
funds for the war. The French ambassador, Barante, re-
turning from Madrid, informed his sovereign that he had
often seen officers in the army prostrating themselves on
their knees in the streets before their sovereign as he went
to mass, and imploring him for payment of their salaries,
or at least an alms to keep them from starving, and always
imploring in vain.1
The King, who was less than a cipher, had neither capa-
city to feel emotion, nor intelligence to comprehend the most
insignificant affair of state. Moreover the means were
wanting to him even had he been disposed to grant assist-
ance. The terrible Duke of Lerma was still his inexorable
lord and master, and the secretary of that powerful per-
sonage, who kept an open shop for the sale of offices of
state both high and low, took care that all the proceeds
1 Aeresens to Barneveld, 30 Jan. 1609. (MS.)
48 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
should flow into the coffers of the Duke and his own lap
instead of the royal exchequer.
In France both king and people declared themselves dis-
gusted with war. Sully disapproved of the treaty just con-
cluded between Spain and the Netherlands, feeling sure that
the captious and equivocal clauses contained in it would be
interpreted to the disadvantage of the Kepublic and of the
Reformed religion whenever Spain felt herself strong enough
to make the attempt. He was especially anxious that the
States should make no concessions in regard to the exercise
of the Catholic worship within their territory, believing that
by so doing they would compromise their political independ-
ence besides endangering the cause of Protestantism every-
where. A great pressure was put upon Sully that moment
by the King to change his religion.
"You will all be inevitably ruined if you make con-
cessions in this regard," said he to Aerssens. "Take
example by me. I should be utterly undone if I had
listened to any overture on this subject." 1
Nevertheless it was the opinion of the astute and caustic
envoy that the Duke would be forced to yield at last. The
Pope was making great efforts to gain him, and thus to
bring about the extirpation of Protestantism in France. And
the King, at that time much under the influence of the Jesuits,
had almost set his heart on the conversion. Aerssens in-
sinuated that Sully was dreading a minute examination
into the affairs of his administration of the finances — a
groundless calumny — and would be thus forced to comply.
Other enemies suggested that nothing would effect this
much desired apostasy but the office of Constable of
France, which it was certain would never be bestowed on
him.2
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 9 Feb. and 27 March 1609. (Hague Archives MS.)
2 Ibid.
1609. THE CATHOLIC LEAGUE AND PROTESTANT UNION. 49
At any rate it was very certain that Henry at this period
was bent on peace.
" Make your account," said Aerssens to Barneveld, as the
time for signing the truce drew nigh, " on this indubitable
foundation that the King is determined against war, what-
ever pretences he may make. His bellicose demeanour has
been assumed only to help forward our treaty, which he
would never have favoured, and ought never to have
favoured, if he had not been too much in love with
peace. This is a very important secret if we manage it
discreetly, and a very dangerous one if our enemies discover
it." 1
Sully would have much preferred that the States should
stand out for a peace rather than for a truce, and believed it
might have been obtained if the King had not begun the
matter so feebly, and if he had let it be understood that he
would join his arms to those of the Provinces in case of
rupture.
He warned the States very strenuously that the Pope
and the King of Spain, and a host of enemies open
and covert, were doing their best to injure them at the
French court. They would find little hindrance in this
course if the Kepublic did not show its teeth, and especially
if it did not stiffly oppose all encroachments of the
Roman religion, without even showing any deference to
the King in this regard, who was much importuned on the
subject.
He advised the States to improve the interval of truce by
restoring order to their finances and so arranging their affairs
that on the resumption of hostilities, if come they must,
their friends might be encouraged to help them, by the
exhibition of thorough vigour on their part.2
1 Aeresens to Barneveld, 27 March 1609. (MS.)
1 Ibid
VOL. I.
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD.
CHAP. I
France then, although utterly indisposed for war at that
moment, was thoroughly to be relied on as a friend and in
case of need an ally, so long as it was governed by its present
policy. There was but one king left in Europe since the
death of Elizabeth of England.
But Henry was now on the abhorred threshold of old age
which he obstinately refused to cross.
There is something almost pathetic, in spite of the cen-
sure which much of his private life at this period provokes,
in the isolation which now seemed his lot.
Deceived and hated by his wife and his mistresses, who
were conspiring with each other and with his ministers,
not only against his policy but against his life ; with a
vile Italian adventurer, dishonouring his household, en-
tirely dominating the queen, counteracting the royal mea-
sures, secretly corresponding, by assumed authority, with
Spain, in direct violation of the King's instructions to his
ambassadors, and gorging himself with wealth and offices
at the expense of everything respectable in France ; sur-
rounded by a pack of malignant and greedy nobles, who
begrudged him his fame, his authority, his independence ;
without a home, and almost without a friend, the Most
Christian King in these latter days led hardly as merry
a life as when fighting years long for his crown, at the head
of his Gascon chivalry, the beloved chieftain of Huguenots.1
Of the triumvirate then constituting his council, Villeroy,
Sillery, and Sully, the two first were ancient Leaguers, and
more devoted at heart to Philip of Spain than to Henry of
France and Navarre.
Both silent, laborious, plodding, plotting functionaries,
thriftily gathering riches ; skilled in routine and adepts at
1 See especially 'Memoires de
Sully,' ed. Paris, 1747, vols. vii. and
viii. passim, and Michelet's remark-
able volume, ' Henry IV. et Richa
lieu.'
1609. THE CATHOLIC LEAGUE AND PROTESTANT UNION. 51
intrigue ; steady self-seekers, and faithful to office in which
their lives had passed, they might be relied on at any emer-
gency to take part against their master, if to ruin would
prove more profitable than to serve him.
There was one man who was truer to Henry than Henry
had been to himself. The haughty, defiant, austere grandee,
brave soldier, sagacious statesman, thrifty financier, against
whom the poisoned arrows of religious hatred, envious am-
bition, and petty court intrigue were daily directed, who
watched grimly over the exchequer confided to him, which
was daily growing fuller in despite of the cormorants who
trembled at his frown ; hard worker, good hater, conscientious
politician, who filled his own coffers without dishonesty, and
those of the state without tyranny; unsociable, arrogant, pious,
very avaricious, and inordinately vain, Maximilian de Bethune,
Duke of Sully, loved and respected Henry as no man or
woman loved and respected him. In truth, there was but one
living being for whom the Duke had greater reverence and
affection than for the King, and that was the Duke of Sully
himself.
At this moment he considered himself, as indeed he was,
in full possession of his sovereign's confidence. But he was
alone in this conviction. Those about the court, men like
Epernon and his creatures, believed the great financier on
the brink of perdition. Henry, always the loosest of talkers
even in regard to his best friends, had declared, on some
temporary vexation in regard to the affair between Aiguillon
and Balagny, that he would deal with the Duke as with the
late Marshal de Biron, and make him smaller than he had
ever made him great : 1 goading him on this occasion with
importunities, almost amounting to commands, that both he
and his son should forthwith change their religion or expect
instant ruin. The blow was so severe that Sully shut him-
1 Aeresens to Barnoveld, 9 Feb. 1009. (MS.)
52 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
self up, refused to see anyone, and talked of retiring for good
to his estates.1 But he knew, and Henry knew, how indis-
pensable he was, and the anger of the master was as short-
lived as the despair of the minister.
There was no living statesman for whom Henry had a more
sincere respect than for the Advocate of Holland. " His
Majesty admires and greatly extols your wisdom, which he
judges necessary for the preservation of our State ; deeming
you one of the rare and sage counsellors of the age." 2 It is
true that this admiration was in part attributed to the singu-
lar coincidence of Barneveld's views of policy with the King's
own. Sully, on his part, was a severe critic of that policy.
He believed that better terms might have been exacted from
Spain in the late negotiations, and strongly objected to the
cavilling and equivocal language of the treaty. Kude in
pen as in speech, he expressed his mind very freely in his
conversation and correspondence with Henry in regard to
leading personages and great affairs, and made no secret of
his opinions to the States' ambassador.
He showed his letters in which he had informed the King
that he ought never to have sanctioned the truce without
better securities than existed, and that the States would never
have moved in any matter without him. It would have
been better to throw himself into a severe war than to see
the Kepublic perish. He further expressed the conviction
that Henry ought to have such authority over the Nether-
lands that they would embrace blindly whatever counsel he
chose to give them, even if they saw in it their inevitable
ruin ; and this not so much from remembrance of assistance
rendered by him, but from the necessity in which they
should always feel of depending totally upon him.
" You may judge, therefore," concluded Aerssens, " as to
1 Aeresens to Barneveld, 9 Feb. 1609. (MS.)
8 Same to same, 27 March 1609. (MS.)
1609. THE CATHOLIC LEAGUE AND PROTESTANT UNION. 53
how much we can build on such foundations as these. I
have been amazed at these frank communications, for in
those letters he spares neither My Lords the States, nor his
Excellency Prince Maurice, nor yourself; giving his judg-
ment of each of you with far too much freedom and without
sufficient knowledge." 1
Thus the alliance between the Netherlands and France,
notwithstanding occasional traces of caprice and flaws of
personal jealousy, was on the whole sincere, for it was
founded on the surest foundation of international friendship,
the self-interest of each. Henry, although boasting of having
bought Paris with a mass, knew as well as his worst enemy
that in that bargain he had never purchased the confidence
of the ancient church, on whose bosom he had flung himself
with so much dramatic pomp. His noble position, as cham-
pion of religious toleration, was not only unappreciated in an
age in which each church and every sect arrogated to itself
a monopoly of the truth, but it was one in which he did not
himself sincerely believe.
After all, he was still the chieftain of the Protestant Union,
and, although Eldest Son of the Church, was the bitter
antagonist of the League and the sworn foe to the House of
Austria. He was walking through pitfalls with a crowd of
invisible but relentless foes dogging his every footstep. In
his household or without were daily visions of dagger and
bowl, and he felt himself marching to his doom. How could
the man on whom the heretic and rebellious Hollanders and
the Protestant princes of Germany relied as on their saviour
escape the unutterable wrath and the patient vengeance of a
power that never forgave ?
In England the jealousy of the Republic and of Franco
as co-guardian and protector of the Republic was even
greater than in France. Though placed by circumstances
1 Acrsscn's letter last cited. (MS.)
54 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
in the position of ally to the Netherlands and enemy to
Spain, James hated the Netherlands and adored Spain. His
first thought on escaping the general destruction to which
the Gunpowder Plot was to have involved himself and family
and all the principal personages of the realm seems to have
been to exculpate Spain from participation in the crime.
His next was to deliver a sermon to Parliament, exonerating
the Catholics and going out of his way to stigmatize the
Puritans as entertaining doctrines which should be punished
with fire. As the Puritans had certainly not been accused of
complicity with Guy Fawkes or Garnet, this portion of the
discourse was at least superfluous. But James loathed
nothing so much as a Puritan. A Catholic at heart, he
would have been the warmest ally of the League had he
only been permitted to be Pope of Great Britain. He hated
and feared a Jesuit, not for his religious doctrines, for with
these he sympathized, but for his political creed. He liked
not that either Roman Pontiff or British Presbyterian should
abridge his heaven-born prerogative. The doctrine of Papal
superiority to temporal sovereigns was as odious to him as
Puritan rebellion to the hierarchy of which he was the chief.
Moreover, in his hostility to both Papists and Presbyterians,
there was much of professional rivalry. Having been de-
prived by the accident of birth of his true position as theo-
logical professor, he lost no opportunity of turning his throne
into a pulpit and his sceptre into a controversial pen.
> Henry of France, who rarely concealed his contempt for
Master Jacques, as he called him, said to the English ambas-
sador, on receiving from him one of the King's books, and
being asked what he thought of it — " It is not the business
of us kings to write, but to fight. Everybody should mind
his own business, but it is the vice of most men to wish to
appear learned in matters of which they are ignorant/' 1
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 24 June 1609. (Hague Archives MS.)
1609. THE CATHOLIC LEAGUE AND PROTESTANT UNION. 55
The flatterers of James found their account in pandering
to his sacerdotal and royal vanity. " I have always be-
lieved," said the Lord Chancellor, after hearing the King
argue with and browbeat a Presbyterian deputation, " that
the high-priesthood and royalty ought to be united, but I
never witnessed the actual junction till now, after hearing the
learned discourse of your Majesty." Archbishop Whitgift,
grovelling still lower, declared his conviction that James, in
the observations he had deigned to make, had been directly
inspired by the Holy Ghost.1
Nothing could be more illogical and incoherent with
each other than his theological and political opinions. He
imagined himself a defender of the Protestant faith, while
hating Holland and fawning on the House of Austria.
In England he favoured Arminianism, because the
Anglican Church recognized for its head the temporal
chief of the State. In Holland he vehemently denounced the
Arminians, indecently persecuting their preachers and states-
men, who were contending for exactly the same principle — the
supremacy of State over Church. He sentenced Bartholomew
Legate to be burned alive in Smithfield as a blasphemous
heretic, and did his best to compel the States of Holland to
take the life of Professor Vorstius of Leyden. He perse-
cuted the Presbyterians in England as furiously as he de-
fended them in Holland. He drove Bradford and Carver into
the New England wilderness, and applauded Gomarus and
Walaeus and the other famous leaders of the Presbyterian
party in the Netherlands with all his soul and strength.
He united with the French king in negotiations for
Netherland independence, while denouncing the Provinces
as guilty of criminal rebellion against their lawful sovereign.
" He pretends," said Jeannin, " to assist in bringing about
the peace, and nevertheless does his best openly to prevent it."
1 Rapin, 'Hist. d'Anglcterre ' (la Have, 1725), t. vii. 14
56 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
Kichardot declared that the firmness of the King of Spain
proceeded entirely from reliance on the promise of James
that there should be no acknowledgment in the treaty of the
liberty of the States. Henry wrote to Jeannin that he knew
very well "what that was capable of, but that he
should not be kept awake by anything he could do." 1
As a king he spent his reign — so much of it as could
be spared from gourmandizing, drunkenness, dalliance with
handsome minions of hia own sex, and theological pursuits
— in rescuing the Crown from dependence on Parliament ; in
straining to the utmost the royal prerogative ; in substi-
tuting proclamations for statutes ; in doing everything in
his power, in short, to smooth the path for his successor to
the scaffold. As father of a family he consecrated many
years of his life to the wondrous delusion of the Spanish
marriages.
The Gunpowder Plot seemed to have inspired him with an
insane desire for that alliance, and few things in history are
more amazing than the persistency with which he pursued
the scheme, until the pursuit became not only ridiculous, but
impossible.
With such a man, frivolous, pedantic, conceited, and licen-
tious, the earnest statesmen of Holland were forced into
close alliance. It is pathetic to see men like Barneveld and
Hugo Grotius obliged, on great occasions of state, to use
the language of respect and affection to one by whom they
were hated, and whom they thoroughly despised.
But turning away from France, it was in vain for them to
look for kings or men either among friends or foes. In Ger-
many religious dissensions were gradually ripening into
open war, and it would be difficult to imagine a more hope-
lessly incompetent ruler than the man who was nominally
chief of the Holy Koman Kealm. Yet the distracted Bu-
1 Rapin, vii. 59, 60.
1609. THE CATHOLIC LEAGUE AND PROTESTANT UNION. 57
dolph was quite as much an emperor as the chaos over
which he was supposed to preside was an empire. Perhaps
the very worst polity ever devised by human perverseness
was the system under which the great German race was then
writhing and groaning. A mad world with a lunatic to
govern it ; a democracy of many princes, little and big,
fighting amongst each other, and falling into daily changino-
combinations as some masterly or mischievous hand whirled
the kaleidoscope ; drinking Ehenish by hogsheads, and beer
by the tun ; robbing churches, dictating creeds to their
subjects, and breaking all the commandments themselves ; a
people at the bottom dimly striving towards religious freedom
and political life out of abject social, ecclesiastical, and politi-
cal serfdom, and perhaps even then dumbly feeling within its
veins, with that prophetic instinct which never abandons
great races, a far distant and magnificent Future of national
unity and Imperial splendour, the very reverse of the con-
fusion which was then the hideous Present ; an Imperial
family at top with many heads and slender brains ; a band
of brothers and cousins wrangling, intriguing, tripping
up each others' heels, and unlucky Kudolph, in his Hrad-
schin, looking out of window over the peerless Prague,
spread out in its beauteous landscape of hill and dale,
darkling forest, dizzy cliffs, and rushing river, at his feet,
feebly cursing the unhappy city for its ingratitude to an
invisible and impotent sovereign ; his excellent brother
Matthias meanwhile marauding through the realms and
taking one crown after another from his poor bald head.
It would be difficult to depict anything more precisely
what an emperor in those portentous times should not be.
He collected works of art of many kinds — pictures, statues,
gems. He passed his days in his galleries contemplating
in solitary grandeur these treasures, or in his stables, ad-
miring a numerous stud of horses which he never drove or
58 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP, I
rode. Ambassadors and ministers of state disguised them-
selves as grooms and stable-boys to obtain accidental glimpses
of a sovereign who rarely granted audiences. His nights
were passed in star-gazing with Tycho de Brahe, or with that
illustrious Suabian whose name is one of the great lights
and treasures of the world. But it was not to study the
laws of planetary motion nor to fathom mysteries of divine
harmony that the monarch stood with Kepler in the observa-
tory. The influence of countless worlds upon the destiny of
one who, by capricious accident, if accident ever exists in
history, had been entrusted with the destiny of so large a
portion of one little world ; the horoscope, not of the Uni-
verse, but of himself ; such were the limited purposes with
which the Kaiser looked upon the constellations.
For the Catholic Kudolph had received the Protestant
Kepler, driven from Tubingen because Lutheran doctors,
knowing from Holy Writ that the sun had stood still in
Ajalon, had denounced his theory of planetary motion. His
mother had just escaped being burned as a witch, and the
world owes a debt of gratitude to the Emperor for protecting
the astrologer, when enlightened theologians might, per-
haps, have hanged the astronomer.1
A red-faced, heavy-jowled, bald-headed, somewhat goggle-
eyed old gentleman, Rudolph did his best to lead the life of
a hermit, and escape the cares of royalty. Timid by tem-
perament, yet liable to fits of uncontrollable anger, he broke
his furniture to pieces when irritated, and threw dishes that
displeased him in his butler's face, but left affairs of state
mainly to his valet, who earned many a penny by selling
the Imperial signature.
He had just signed the famous " Majestatsbrief," by
1609. which he granted vast privileges to the Protestants
of Bohemia, and had bitten the pen to pieces in a paroxysm
1 Wolfgang Menzel, ' Geschichte der Deutschen,' B. iii. 188.
1609. DEATH OP THE DUKE OF CLEVE. 59
of anger, after dimly comprehending the extent of the con-
cessions which he had made.
There were hundreds of sovereign states over all of
which floated the shadowy and impalpable authority of an
Imperial crown scarcely fixed on the head of any one of the
rival brethren and cousins ; there was a confederation of
Protestants, with the keen-sighted and ambitious Christian
of Anhalt acting as its chief, and dreaming of the Bohemian
crown ; there was the just-born Catholic League, with the
calm, far-seeing, and egotistical rather than self-seeking
Maximilian at its head ; each combination extending over
the whole country, stamped with imbecility of action from its
birth, and perverted and hampered by inevitable jealousies.
In addition to all these furrows ploughed by the very genius
of discord throughout the unhappy land was the wild and
secret intrigue with which Leopold, Archduke and Bishop,
dreaming also of the crown of Wenzel, was about to tear its
surface as deeply as he dared.1
Thus constituted were the leading powers of Europe in the
earlier part of 1609 — the year in which a peaceful period
seemed to have begun. To those who saw the entangled
interests of individuals, and the conflict of theological
dogmas and religious and political intrigue which furnished
so much material out of which wide-reaching schemes of
personal ambition could be spun, it must have been obvious
that the interval of truce was necessarily but a brief inter-
lude between two tragedies.
It seemed the very mockery of Fate that, almost at the
very instant when after two years' painful negotiation a truce
had been made, the signal for universal discord should be
sounded. One day in the early summer of 1G09, Henry
IV. came to the Royal Arsenal, the residence of Sully,
accompanied by Zamet and another of his intimate com-
1 Anton Gindcly, ' Rudolf II. und seine Zeit,' Band ii. 35-00, sqq.
60 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
panions. He asked for the Duke and was told that he was
busy in his study. " Of course," said the King, turning to
his followers, " I dare say you expected to be told that he was
out shooting, or with the ladies, or at the barber's. But who
works like Sully ? Tell him," he said, " to come to the
balcony in his garden, where he and I are not accustomed
to be silent."
As soon as Sully appeared, the King observed : " Well ;
here the Duke of Cleve is dead, and has left everybody his
heir." *
It was true enough, and the inheritance was of vital im-
portance to the world.
It was an apple of discord thrown directly between the
two rival camps into which Christendom was divided. The
Duchies of Cleve, Berg, and Jiilich, and the Counties and
Lordships of Mark, Eavcnsberg, and Kavenstein, formed
a triangle, political and geographical, closely wedged be-
tween Catholicism and Protestantism, and between France,
the United Provinces, Belgium, and Germany. Should
it fall into Catholic hands, the Netherlands were lost,
trampled upon in every corner, hedged in on all sides, with
the House of Austria governing the Rhine, the Meuse, and
the Scheldt. It was vital to them to exclude the Empire
from the great historic river which seemed destined
to form the perpetual frontier of jealous powers and rival
creeds.
Should it fall into heretic hands, the States were vastly
strengthened, the Archduke Albert isolated and cut off
from the protection of Spain and of the Empire. France,
although Catholic, was the ally of Holland and the secret
but well known enemy of the House of Austria. It was
inevitable that the king of that country, the only living
statesman that wore a crown, should be appealed to by all
1 'Memoires de Sully,' vii. 306. 307.
1609. STEUGGLE FOR THE CLEVE SUCCESSION. 61
parties and should find himself in the proud but dangerous
position of arbiter of Europe.
In this emergency he relied upon himself and on two
men besides, Maximilian de Bethune and John of Barneveld.
The conference between the King and Sully and between
both and Francis Aerssens, ambassador of the States, were of
almost daily occurrence. The minute details given in the
adroit diplomatist's correspondence indicate at every stage
the extreme deference paid by Henry to the opinion of
Holland's Advocate and the confidence reposed by him in
the resources and the courage of the Kepublic.
All the world was claiming the heritage of the duchies.
It was only strange that an event which could not be
long deferred and the consequences of which were soon
to be so grave, the death of the Duke of Cleve, should
at last burst like a bomb-shell on the council tables of
the sovereigns and statesmen of Europe. That mis-
chievous madman John William died childless in the spring
of 1609. His sister Sibylla, an ancient and malignant
spinster, had governed him and his possessions except in
his lucid intervals. The mass of the population over
which he ruled being Protestant, while the reigning family
and the chief nobles were of the ancient faith, it was
natural that the Catholic party under the lead of Maxi-
milian of Bavaria should deem it all-important that there
should be direct issue to that family. Otherwise the in-
heritance on his death would probably pass to Protestant
princes.1
The first wife provided for him was a beautiful princess,
Jacobea of Baden. The Pope blessed the nuptials, and sent
the bride a golden rose, but the union was sterile and un-
happy. The Duke, who was in the habit of careering through
his palace in full armour, slashing at and wounding anyone
1 W. Menzcl, iii. 203, 204.
62 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
that came in his way, was at last locked up. The hapless
Jacobea, accused by Sibylla of witchcraft and other crimes
possible and impossible, was thrown into prison. Two years
long the devilish malignity of the sister-in-law was exercised
upon her victim, who, as it is related, was not allowed natural
sleep during all that period, being at every hour awakened by
command of Sibylla. At last the Duchess was strangled in
prison. 1 A new wife was at once provided for the lunatic,
Antonia of Lorraine. The two remained childless, and Sibylla
at the age of forty-nine took to herself a husband, the
Margrave of Burgau, of the House of Austria, the humble
birth of whose mother, however, did not allow him the rank
of Archduke. Her efforts thus to provide Catholic heirs to
the rich domains of Cleve proved as fruitless as her previous
attempts.2
And now Duke John William had died, and the repre-
sentatives of his three dead sisters, and the living Sibylla
were left to fight for the duchies.
It would be both cruel and superfluous to inflict on the
reader a historical statement of the manner in which these
six small provinces were to be united into a single state.
It would be an equally sterile task to retrace the legal
arguments by which the various parties prepared themselves
to vindicate their claims, each pretender more triumphantly
than the other. The naked facts alone retain vital interest,
and of these facts the prominent one was the assertion of
the Emperor that the duchies, constituting a fief masculine,
could descend to none of the pretenders, but were at his
disposal as sovereign of Germany.
On the other hand nearly all the important princes of
that country sent their agents into the duchies to look
after the interests real or imaginary which they claimed,
1 W. Menzel, iii. 203, 201 * Ibid.
1609. STRUGGLE FOR THE CLEVE SUCCESSION. 63
There were but four candidates who in reality could be con-
sidered serious ones.
Mary Eleanor, eldest sister of the Duke, had been married
in the lifetime of their father to Albert Frederic of Branden-
burg, Duke of Prussia. To the children of this marriage
was reserved the succession of the whole property in case of
the masculine line becoming extinct. Two years afterwards
the second sister, Anne, was married to Duke Philip Lewis,
Count-Palatine of Neuburg ; the children of which marriage
stood next in succession to those of the eldest sister, should
that become extinguished. Four years later the third sister,
Magdalen, espoused the Duke John, Count-Palatine of Deux-
Ponts ; who, like Neuburg, made resignation of rights of
succession hi favour of the descendants of the Brandenburg
marriage.1 The marriage of the youngest sister, Sibylla,
with the Margrave of Burgau has been already mentioned.
It does not appear that her brother, whose lunatic condition
hardly permitted him to assure her the dowry which had
been the price of renunciation in the case of her three elder
sisters, had obtained that renunciation from her.
The claims of the childless Sibylla as well as those of the
Deux-Ponts branch were not destined to be taken into serious
consideration.
The real competitors were the Emperor on the one side
and the Elector of Brandenburg and the Count-Palatine of
Neuburg on the other.
It is not necessary to my purpose to say a single word
as to the legal and historical rights of the controversy.
Volumes upon volumes of forgotten lore might be con-
sulted, and they would afford exactly as much refreshing
nutriment as would the heaps of erudition hardly ten
years old, and yet as antiquated as the title-deeds of the
Pharaohs, concerning the claims to the Duchies of Schleswig-
1 Memoires de Sully,' vii. 312, sqq.
G4
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
Holstein. The fortunate house of Brandenburg may have
been right or wrong in both disputes. It is certain that
it did not lack a more potent factor in settling the political
problems of the world in the one case any more than in the
other.
But on the occasion with which we are occupied it was
not on the might of his own right hand that the Elector of
Brandenburg relied. Moreover, he was dilatory in appealing
to the two great powers on whose friendship he must depend
for the establishment of his claims : the United Republic
and the King of France. James of England was on the
whole inclined to believe in the rights of Brandenburg.
His ambassador, however, with more prophetic vision than
perhaps the King ever dreamt of, expressed a fear lest
Brandenburg should grow too great and one day come to
the Imperial crown.1
The States openly favoured the Elector. Henry was at
first disposed towards Neuburg, but at his request Barneveld
furnished a paper on the subject, by which the King seems
to have been entirely converted to the pretensions of
Brandenburg.2
But the solution of the question had but little to do with the
legal claim of any man. It was instinctively felt throughout
Christendom that the great duel between the ancient church
and the spirit of the Reformation was now to be renewed
upon that narrow, debateable spot.
The Emperor at once proclaimed his right to arbitrate
on the succession and to hold the territory until decision
should be made ; that is to say, till the Greek Kalends. His
familiar and most tricksy spirit, Bishop- Archduke Leopold,
1 " D craint la puissance de Bran-
debourg s'il parvient a cette succes-
sion d'autant plus qu'a la longueur il
pourroit venira I 'Empire."— Aerssens
to Barneveld, 13 June 1609. (Hague
Archives MS.)
2 Same to same, 13 May 1609 ;
and see several letters of Aerssens
to Barneveld, in May 1609. (Hague
Archives MS.)
1609. STRUGGLE FOR THE CLEVE SUCCESSION. 65
played at once on his fears and his resentments against
the ever encroaching, ever menacing, Protestantism of Grer-
many, with which he had just sealed a compact so bitterly
detested.
That bold and bustling prelate, brother of the Queen of
Spain and of Ferdinand of Styria, took post from Prague
in the middle of July. Accompanied by a certain Jul
canon of the Church and disguised as his servant, l
he arrived after a rapid journey before the gates of Jiilich,
chief city and fortress of the duchies. The governor of
the place, Nestelraed, inclined like most of the functionaries
throughout the duchies to the Catholic cause, was delighted
to recognize under the livery of the lackey the cousin and
representative of the Emperor. Leopold, who had brought
but five men with him, had conquered his capital at a
blow. For while thus comfortably established as temporary
governor of the duchies he designed through the fears or folly
of Kudolph to become their sovereign lord. Strengthened by
such an acquisition and reckoning on continued assistance in
men and money from Spain and the Catholic League, he meant
to sweep back to the rescue of the perishing Eudolph, smite
the Protestants of Bohemia, and achieve his appointment to
the crown of that kingdom.1
The Spanish ambassador at Prague had furnished him
with a handsome sum of money for the expenses of his
journey and preliminary enterprise. It should go hard but
funds should be forthcoming to support him throughout this
audacious scheme. The champion of the Church, the sove-
reign prince of important provinces, the possession of which
ensured conclusive triumph to the House of Austria and to
Rome — who should oppose him in his path to Empire ?
Certainly not the moody Rudolph, the slippery and un-
stable Matthias, the fanatic and Jesuit-ridden Ferdinand.
1 A. Gindely, • Rudolf II.' ii. 85, sqq.
VOL. I. F
66 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
" Leopold in Jiilich," said Henry's agent in Germany, "is
a ferret in a rabbit warren." *
But early in the spring and before the arrival of Leopold,
the two pretenders, John Sigismund, Elector of Branden-
Ma burg, and Philip Lewis, Palatine of Neuburg, had
16°k made an arrangement. By the earnest advice of
Barneveld in the name of the States-General and as the
result of a general council of many Protestant princes of Ger-
many, it had been settled that those two should together
provisionally hold and administer the duchies until the
principal affair could be amicably settled.2
The possessory princes were accordingly established in
Diisseldorf with the consent of the provincial estates, in
which place those bodies were wont to assemble.
Here then was Spain in the person of Leopold quietly
perched in the chief citadel of the country, while Pro-
testantism in the shape of the possessory princes stood
menacingly in the capital.
Hardly was the ink dry on the treaty which had suspended
for twelve years the great religious war of forty years, not
yet had the ratifications been exchanged, but the trumpet
was again sounding, and the hostile forces were once more
face to face.
Leopold, knowing where . his great danger lay, sent a
friendly message to the States-General, expressing the hope
that they would submit to his arrangements until the
Imperial decision should be made.3
The States, through the pen and brain of Barneveld,
replied that they had already recognized the rights of the
possessory princes, and were surprised that the Bishop- Arch-
duke should oppose them. They expressed the hope that,
when better informed, he would see the validity of the
1 ' Memoires de Sully,' vii. 331.
* Van Rees and Brill, iii. d. ii. stukk, 406, sqq. 8 Ibid.
1609. THE POSSESSORY PRINCES IN THE DUCHIES. 67
Treaty of Dortmund. " My Lords the States-General," said
the Advocate, " will protect the princes against violence and
actual disturbances, and are assured that the neighbouring
kings and princes will do the same. They trust that his
Imperial Highness will not allow matters to proceed to
extremities." 1
This was language not to be mistaken. It was plain that
the Kepublic did not intend the Emperor to decide a
question of life and death to herself, nor to permit Spain,
exhausted by warfare, to achieve this annihilating triumph
by a petty intrigue.
While in reality the clue to what seemed to the outside
world a labyrinthine maze of tangled interests and passions
was firmly held in the hand of Barneveld, it was not to him
nor to My Lords the States-General that the various parties
to the impending conflict applied in the first resort.
Mankind were not yet sufficiently used to this young
republic, intruding herself among the family of kings, to
defer at once to an authority which they could not but feel.
Moreover, Henry of France was universally looked to both
by friends and foes as the probable arbiter or chief champion
in the great debate. He had originally been inclined to favour
Neuberg, chiefly, so Aerssens thought, on account of his
political weakness. The States-General on the other hand
were firmly disposed for Brandenburg from the first, not only
as a strenuous supporter of the Reformation and an ancient
ally of their own always interested in their safety, but
because the establishment of the Elector on the Rhine
would roll back the Empire beyond that river. As Aerssens
expressed it, they would have the Empire for a frontier, and
have no longer reason to fear the Rhine.2
The King, after the representations of the States, saw good
1COO. Same to same, 97 April and
1 See Barneveld's Memoir to van
der Myle. (Hague Archives MS.)
1 Aerasens to Barneveld, 23 April
13 May. (Hague Archives MS.)
68 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. L
ground to change his opinion and, becoming convinced that
the Palatine had long been coquetting with the Austrian
party, soon made no secret of his preference for Branden-
burg. Subsequently Neuburg and Brandenburg fell into
a violent quarrel notwithstanding an arrangement that the
Palatine should marry the daughter of the Elector. In the
heat of discussion Brandenburg on one occasion is said to have
given his intended son-in-law a box on the ear,1 an argument
ad hominem which seems to have had the effect of sending
the Palatine into the bosom of the ancient church and
causing him to rely thenceforth upon the assistance of the
League. Meantime, however, the Condominium settled by
the Treaty of Dortmund continued in force; the third
brother of Brandenburg and the eldest son of Neuburg
sharing possession and authority at Diisseldorf until a final
decision could be made.
A flock of diplomatists, professional or volunteers, openly
accredited or secret, were now flying busily about through the
troubled atmosphere, indicating the coming storm in which
they revelled. The keen-sighted, subtle, but dangerously in-
triguing ambassador of the Kepublic, Francis Aerssens, had
his hundred eyes at all the keyholes in Paris, that centre of
ceaseless combination and conspiracy, and was besides in
almost daily confidential intercourse with the King. Most
patiently and minutely he kept the Advocate informed,
almost from hour to hour, of every web that was spun, every
conversation public or whispered in which important affairs
were treated anywhere and by anybody. He was all-sufficient
as a spy and intelligencer, although not entirely trustworthy
as a counsellor. Still no man on the whole could scan the
present or forecast the future more accurately than he was
able to do from his advantageous position and his long
experience of affairs.
1 W. Menzel, iii. 305.
1609.
THE POSSESSORY PRINCES IN THE DUCHIES.
69
There was much general jealousy between the States and
the despotic king, who loved to be called the father of the
Republic and to treat the Hollanders as his deeply obliged
and very ungrateful and miserly little children.1 The India
trade was a sore subject, Henry having throughout the
negotiations sought to force or wheedle the States into re-
nouncing that commerce at the command of Spain, because
he wished to help himself to it afterwards, and being now in
the habit of secretly receiving Isaac Le Maire and other
Dutch leaders in that lucrative monopoly, who lay disguised
in Paris and in the house of Zamet — but not concealed from
Aerssens, who pledged himself to break the neck of their
enterprise — and were planning with the King a French East
India Company in opposition to that of the Netherlands.2
On the whole, however, despite these commercial intrigues
which Barneveld through the aid of Aerssens was enabled
to baffle, there was much cordiality and honest friendship
between the two countries. Henry, far from concealing
his political affection for the Republic, was desirous of re-
ceiving a special embassy of congratulation and gratitude
from the States on conclusion of the truce ; not being satis-
fied with the warm expressions of respect and attachment
conveyed through the ordinary diplomatic channel.
" He wishes," wrote Aerssens to the Advocate, "a public de-
monstration in order to show on a theatre to all Christen-
dom the regard and deference of My Lords the States for his
Majesty." The Ambassador suggested that Cornells van
der Myle, son-in-law of Barneveld, soon to be named first
envoy for Holland to the Venetian republic, might be
selected as chief of such special embassy.3
1 Report of the Special Ambassa-
dors to France ; an important MS. in
the Archives of the Hague, to be cited
freoly hereafter.
* See the MS. correspondence of
Aerssens \vith Barneveld, years 1G09
and 1610, pamm.
3 Aerssens to Barneveld, 28 April
1609. Same to same, 21 May, 160ft
(MSS.)
70 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. L
" Without the instructions you gave me/' wrote Aerssens,
" Neuburg might have gained his cause in this court.
Brandenburg is doing himself much injury by not soliciting
the King."
" Much deference will be paid to your judgment/' added
the envoy, " if you see fit to send it to his Majesty."
Meantime, although the agent of Neuburg was busily din-
ning in Henry's ears the claims of the Palatine, and even
urging old promises which, as he pretended, had been made,
thanks to Barneveld, he took little by his importunity, not-
withstanding that in the opinion both of Barneveld and
Villeroy his claim stricti juris was the best. But it was
policy and religious interests, not the strict letter of the law,
that were likely to prevail. Henry, while loudly asserting
that he would oppose any usurpation on the part of the
Emperor or any one else against the Condominium, privately
renewed to the States assurances of his intention to support
ultimately the claims of Brandenburg, and notified them to
hold the two regiments of French infantry, which by con-
vention they still kept at his expense in their service, to be
ready at a moment's warning for the great enterprise which
he was already planning. " You would do well perhaps,"
wrote Aerssens to Barneveld, " to set forth the various inte-
rests in regard to this succession, and of the different rela-
tions of the claimants towards our commonwealth ; but in
such sort nevertheless and so dexterously that the King
•may be able to understand your desires, and on the other
hand may see the respect you bear him in appearing to
defer to his choice." l
Neuburg, having always neglected the States and made
advances to Archduke Albert, and being openly preferred over
Brandenburg by the Austrians, who had however no intention
of eventually tolerating either, could make but small headway
1 MS. letter of Aeresens before cited, 13 May 1GOO.
1609. THE POSSESSORY PRINCES IN THE DUCHIES.
71
at court, notwithstanding Henry's indignation that Branden-
burg had not yet made the slightest demand upon him for
assistance.1
The Elector had keenly solicited the aid of the States, who
were bound to him by ancient contract on this subject, but
had manifested wonderful indifference or suspicion in regard
to France. "These nonchalant Germans," said Henry on
more than one occasion, " do nothing but sleep or drink." 2
It was supposed that the memory of Metz might haunt
the imagination of the Elector. That priceless citadel,
fraudulently extorted by Henry II. as a forfeit for assistance
to the Elector of Saxony three quarters of a century before,
gave solemn warning to Brandenburg of what might be
exacted by a greater Henry, should success be due to his
protection. It was also thought that he had too many
dangers about him at home, the Poles especially, much
stirred up by emissaries from Home, making many trouble-
some demonstrations against the Duchy of Prussia.3
It was nearly midsummer before a certain Baron Donals
arrived as emissary of the Elector. He brought with
him many documents in support of the Branden- junea4f
burg claims, and was charged with excuses for the 1609-
dilatoriness of his master.4 Much stress was laid of course
on the renunciation made by Neuburg at the time of his
marriage, and Henry was urged to grant his protection to
the Elector in his good rights. But thus far there were
few signs of any vigorous resolution for active measures in
an affair which could scarcely fail to lead to war.
"I believe," said Henry to the States' ambassador, "that the
1 Aerssens to Duplessis-Mornay, 15
May 1609. (MS.)
* ". . . je suis encore assez verd,
m'a dit S. M1*, pour mener une armee
enCleves. J'enaurai bonmarclie.mais
lea Allemands ne font quo dormir ou
boire. Ils en auroient le profit et me
departeront la peine : touttefois je ne
souffrirai pas raccroissement de ceux
d'Autriche," &c. — Aerssons to Barne-
veld, 26 July 1609. (MS.)
8 Same to same, 24 June 1609.
(MS.)
* Ibid.
72 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. L
right of Brandenburg is indubitable, and it is better for you
and for me that he should be the man rather than Neuburg,
who has always sought assistance from the House of Austria.
But he is too lazy in demanding possession. It is the fault
of the doctors by whom he is guided. This delay works in
favour of the Emperor, whose course however is less governed
by any determination of his own than by the irresolution of
the princes." 1
Then changing the conversation, Henry asked the Am-
bassador whether the daughter of de Maldere, a leading
statesman of Zealand, was married or of age to be married,
and if she was rich ; adding that they must make a match
between her and Barneveld's second son, then a young
gentleman in the King's service, and very much liked by
him.2
Two months later a regularly accredited envoy, Belin by
name, arrived from the Elector. His instructions were
general. He was to thank the King for his declarations in
favour of the possessory princes, and against all usurpation
on the part of the Spanish party. Should the religious cord
be touched, he was to give assurances that no change would
be made in this regard. He was charged with loads of fine
presents in yellow amber, such as ewers, basins, tables, cups,
chessboards, for the King and Queen, the Dauphin, the
Chancellor, Yilleroy, Sully, Bouillon, and other eminent
personages.3 Beyond the distribution of these works of art
and the exchange of a few diplomatic commonplaces, no-
thing serious in the way of warlike business was transacted,
and Henry was a few weeks later much amused by receiving
a letter from the possessory princes coolly thrown into the
post-office, and addressed like an ordinary letter to a private
person, in which he was requested to advance them a loan
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 24 June 1609. (MS.) * Ibid.
8 Same to same, 27 Aug. 1609. (MS.)
1609. THE POSSESSORY PRINCES EST THE DUCHIES. 73
of 400,000 crowns.1 There was a great laugh at court at a
demand made like a bill of exchange at sight upon his
Majesty as if he had been a banker, especially as there
happened to be no funds of the drawers in his hands.2 It
was thought that a proper regard for the King's quality and
the amount of the sum demanded required that the letter
should be brought at least by an express messenger, and
Henry was both diverted and indignant at these proceedings,
at the months' long delay before the princes had thought
proper to make application for his protection, and then for
this cool demand for alms on a large scale as a proper be-
ginning of their enterprise.
Such was the languid and extremely nonchalant manner
in which the early preparations for a conflict which seemed
likely to set Europe in a blaze, and of which possibly few
living men might witness the termination, were set on foot
by those most interested in the immediate question.
Chessboards in yellow amber and a post-office order for
400,000 crowns could not go far in settling the question of
the duchies in which the great problem dividing Christen-
dom as by an abyss was involved.
Meantime, while such were the diplomatic beginnings of
the possessory princes, the League was leaving no stone
unturned to awaken Henry to a sense of his true duty to the
Church of which he was Eldest Son.
Don Pedro de Toledo's mission in regard to the Spanish
marriages had failed because Henry had spurned the con-
dition which was unequivocally attached to them on tho
part of Spain, the king's renunciation of his alliance with
the Dutch Republic, which then seemed an equivalent to its
ruin. But the treaty of truce and half-independence had
been signed at last by the States and their ancient master,
and the English and French negotiators had taken their
Aeresens to Bamcveld, 18 Sept. 1G09. (MS.) * Ibid.
74 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
departure, each receiving as a present for concluding the
convention 20,000 livres from the Archdukes, and 30,000
from the States-General.1 Henry, returning one summer's
morning from the chase and holding the Count of Soissons
by one hand and Ambassador Aerssens by the other, told
them he had just received letters from Spain by which he
learned that people were marvellously rejoiced at the con-
clusion of the truce. Many had regretted that its con-
ditions were so disadvantageous and so little honourable to
the grandeur and dignity of Spain, but to these it was
replied that there were strong reasons why Spain should
consent to peace on these terms rather than not have it at all.
During the twelve years to come the King could repair his
disasters and accumulate mountains of money in order to
finish the war by the subjugation of the Provinces by force
of gold.2
Soissons here interrupted the King by saying that the
States on their part would finish it by force of iron.
Aerssens, like an accomplished courtier, replied they would
finish it by means of his Majesty's friendship.
The King continued by observing that the clear-sighted
in Spain laughed at these rodomontades, knowing well that
it was pure exhaustion that had compelled the King to
such extremities. "I leave you to judge," said Henry,
" whether he is likely to have any courage at forty-five years
of age, having none now at thirty-two. Princes show what
they have in them of generosity and valour at the age of
twenty-five or never." He said that orders had been sent
from Spain to disband all troops in the obedient Nether-
lands except Spaniards and Italians, telling the Archdukes
that they must raise the money out of the country to content
them. They must pay for a war made for their benefit, said
Philip. As for him he would not furnish one maravedi.3
1 Aerssens to Duplessis-Mornay, 7 July 1609. (Archives MS.)
2 Aerssens to Barneveld, 28 May 1603. (MS.) 3 Ibid.
1009. THE POSSESSORY PRINCES EN THE DUCHIES. 75
Aerssens asked if the Archdukes would disband their
troops so long as the affair of Cleve remained unsettled.
" You are very lucky," replied the King, " that Europe is
governed by such princes as you wot of. The King of
Spain thinks of nothing but tranquillity. The Archdukes
will never move except on compulsion. The Emperor, whom
every one is so much afraid of in this matter, is in such
plight that one of these days, and before long, he will be
stripped of all his possessions. I have news that the Bohe-
mians are ready to expel him." 1
It was true enough that Rudolph hardly seemed a for-
midable personage. The Utraquists and Bohemian Brothers,
making up nearly the whole population of the country,
were just extorting religious liberty from their unlucky
master in his very palace and at the point of the knife.
The envoy of Matthias was in Paris demanding recognition
of his master as King of Hungary, and Henry did not suspect
the wonderful schemes of Leopold, the ferret in the rabbit
warren of the duchies, to come to the succour of his cousin
ind to get himself appointed his successor and guardian.
Nevertheless, the Emperor's name had been used to protest
solemnly against the entrance into Diisseldorf of the
Margrave Ernest of Brandenburg and Palatine Wolfgang
William of Neuburg, representatives respectively of their
brother and father.
The induction was nevertheless solemnly made by the
Elector-Palatine and the Landgrave of Hesse, and joint
possession solemnly taken by Brandenburg and Neuburg in
the teeth of the protest, and expressly in order to cut short
the dilatory schemes and the artifices of the Imperial
court.
Henry at once sent a corps of observation consisting of
1500 cavalry to the Luxemburg frontier by way of Toul,
Mezieres, Verdun, and Metz, to guard against movements by
1 Aerssens to Barnevcld, 28 May 1G09. (MS.)
76 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
the disbanded troops of the Archdukes, and against any
active demonstration against the possessory princes on the
part of the Emperor.1
The Condominium was formally established, and Henry
stood before the world as its protector threatening any
power that should attempt usurpation. He sent his agent
Vidomacq to the Landgrave of Hesse with instructions to do
his utmost to confirm the princes of the Union in organized
resistance to the schemes of Spain, and to prevent any inter-
ference with the Condominium.
He wrote letters to the Archdukes and to the Elector of
Cologne, sternly notifying them that he would permit no
assault upon the princes, and meant to protect them in their
lights. He sent one of his most experienced diplomatists,
de Boississe, formerly ambassador in England, to reside for
a year or more in the duchies as special representative of
France, and directed him on his way thither to consult
especially with Barneveld and the States-General as to
the proper means of carrying out their joint policy
either by diplomacy or, if need should be, by their united
arms.2
Troops began at once to move towards the frontier to
counteract the plans of the Emperor's council and the
secret levies made by Duchess Sibylla's husband, the Mar-
grave of Burgau. The King himself was perpetually at
Monceaux watching the movements of his cavalry towards
the Luxemburg frontier, and determined to protect the
princes in their possession until some definite decision as to
the sovereignty of the duchies should be made.
Meantime great pressure was put upon him by the op-
posite party. The Pope did his best through the Nuncius at
Paris directly, and through agents at Prague, Brussels, and
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 2!) June 1609. (MS.)
* Same to same, 9 July 1609. (MS.)
1609. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KING OF FRANCE.
77
Madrid indirectly, to awaken the King to a sense of the
enormity of his conduct.
Being a Catholic prince, it was urged, he had no right to
assist heretics. It was an action entirely contrary to his
duty as a Christian and of his reputation as Eldest Son of
the Church. Even if the right were on the side of the
princes, his Majesty would do better to strip them of it and
to clothe himself with it than to suffer the Catholic faith
and religion to receive such notable detriment in an affair
likely to have such important consequences.1
Such was some of the advice given by the Pontiff. The
suggestions were subtle, for they were directed to Henry's
self-interest both as champion of the ancient church and
as a possible sovereign of the very territories in dispute.
They were also likely, and were artfully so intended, to
excite suspicion of Henry's designs in the breasts of the
Protestants generally and of the possessory princes especi-
ally. Allusions indeed to the rectification of the French
border in Henry II.'s time at the expense of Lorraine were
very frequent. They probably accounted for much of the
apparent supineness and want of respect for the King of
which he complained every day and with so much bitterness.
The Pope's insinuations, however, failed to alarm him, for
he had made up his mind as to the great business of what
might remain to him of life ; to humble the House of
Austria and in doing so to uphold the Dutch Kepublic on
which he relied for his most efficient support. The situation
was a false one viewed from the traditional maxims which
governed Europe. How could the Eldest Son of the Church
and the chief of an unlimited monarchy make common
cause with heretics and republicans against Spain and
1 " . . . et quand bien le droict ser-
vit de leur cote, 8. M'* les en devroit
pluatot despouiller pour s'en ycstir
elle-mesmo sans souffrir quo la reli-
et foy catholiquo re^oivo une si
notable bresche," &c. — Aerssens to
Barneveld, 8 Aug. 1609. (MS.)
78 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. L
Rome ? That the position was as dangerous as it was
illogical, there could be but little doubt. But there was a
similarity of opinion between the King and the political
chief of the Republic on the great principle which was
to illume the distant future but which had hardly then
dawned upon the present ; the principle of religious equality.
As he protected Protestants in France so he meant to protect
Catholics in the duchies. Apostate as he was from the
Reformed Church as he had already been from the Catholic,
he had at least risen above the paltry and insolent maxim
of the princely Protestantism of Germany : " Cujus regio
ejus religio."
While refusing to tremble before the wrath of Rome or
to incline his ear to its honeyed suggestions, he sent Car-
dinal Joyeuse with a special mission to explain to the Pope
that while the interests of France would not permit him to
allow the Spaniard's obtaining possession of provinces so
near to her, he should take care that the Church received
no detriment and that he should insist as a price of the
succour he intended for the possessory princes that they
should give ample guarantees for the liberty of Catholic
worship.1
There was no doubt in the mind either of Henry or of
Barneveld that the secret blows attempted by Spain at the
princes were in reality aimed at the Republic and at him-
self as her ally.
While the Nuncins was making these exhortations in
Paris, his colleague from Spain was authorized to propound
a scheme of settlement which did not seem deficient in
humour. At any rate Henry was much diverted with the
suggestion, which was nothing less than that the decision as
to the succession to the duchies should be left to a board
of arbitration consisting of the King of Spain, the Emperor,
1 Aerssens' letter, 8 Aug. 1609, last cited.
1609.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KING OF FRANCE.
79
and the King of France.1 As Henry would thus be pain-
fully placed by himself in a hopeless minority, the only
result of the scheme would be to compel him to sanction a
decision sure to be directly the reverse of his own resolve.
He was hardly such a schoolboy in politics as to listen to the
proposal except to laugh at it.
Meantime arrived from Julich, without much parade, a
quiet but somewhat pompous gentleman named Teynagel.2
He had formerly belonged to the Eeformed religion, but
finding it more to his taste or advantage to become privy
councillor of the Emperor, he had returned to the ancient
church. He was one of the five who had accompanied the
Archduke Leopold to Jiilich.
That prompt undertaking having thus far succeeded so
well, the warlike bishop had now despatched Teynagel on a
roving diplomatic mission. Ostensibly he came to persuade
Henry that, by the usages and laws of the Empire, fiefs left
vacant for want of heirs male were at the disposal of the
Emperor. He expressed the hope therefore of obtaining the
King's approval of Leopold's position in Jiilich as temporary
vicegerent of his sovereign and cousin. The real motive
of his mission, however, was privately to ascertain whether
Henry was really ready to go to war for the protection
of the possessory princes, and then to proceed to Spain.3
It required an astute politician, however, to sound all the
shoals, quicksands, and miseries through which the French
government was then steering, and to comprehend with
accuracy the somewhat varying humours of the monarch
and the secret schemes of the ministers who immediately
surrounded him.
People at court laughed at Teynagel and his mission, and
Henry treated him as a crackbrained adventurer.4 He
1 Aeresens to Baraeveld, 27 July
1009. (MS.)
1 Same to same, 8 Aug. 1609. (MS.)
3 Letter of Aersscns before cited.
4 Aerssens to Barnevcld, 10 Aug.
1609. (MS.)
80 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I
announced himself as envoy of the Emperor, although he
had instructions from Leopold only. He had interviews
with the Chancellor and with Villeroy, and told them that
Rudolf claimed the right of judge between the various
pretenders to the duchies. The King would not be pleased,
he observed, if the King of Great Britain should constitute
himself arbiter among claimants that might make their
appearance for the crown of France ; but Henry had set him-
self up as umpire without being asked by any one to act in
that capacity among the princes of Germany. The Emperor,
on the contrary, had been appealed to by the Duke of
Nevers, the Elector of Saxony, the Margrave of Burgau, and
other liege subjects of the Imperial crown as a matter of course
and of right. This policy of the King, if persisted in, said
Teynagel, must lead to war. Henry might begin such a war,
but he would be obliged to bequeath it to the Dauphin. He
should remember that France had always been unlucky when
waging war with the Empire and with the house of Austria.1
The Chancellor and Villeroy, although in their hearts not
much in love with Henry's course, answered the emissary
with arrogance equal to his own that their king could finish
the war as well as begin it, that he confided in his strength
and the justice of his cause, and that he knew very well and
esteemed very little the combined forces of Spain and the
Empire. They added that France was bound by the treaty
of Vervins to protect the princes, but they offered no proof
of that rather startling proposition.
Meantime Teynagel was busy in demonstrating that the
princes of Germany were in reality much more afraid of
Henry than of the Emperor. His military movements and
deep designs excited more suspicion throughout that country
and all Europe than the quiet journey of Leopold and five
friends by post to Julich.2
1 Aersaens to Barneveld, 16 Aug. 1609. (MS.) * Ibid.
1609. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KING OF FRANCE. 81
He had como provided with copies of the King's private
letters to the princes, and seemed fully instructed as to his
most secret thoughts. For this convenient information he
was supposed to be indebted to the revelations of Father
Cotton, who was then in disgrace ; having been detected in
transmitting to the General of Jesuits Henry's most sacred
confidences and confessions as to his political designs.1
Fortified with this private intelligence, and having been
advised by Father Cotton to carry matters with a high hand
in order to inspire the French court with a wholesome awe,
he talked boldly about the legitimate functions of the
Emperor. To interfere with them, he assured the ministers,
would lead to a long and bloody war, as neither the King
nor the Archduke Albert would permit the Emperor to be
trampled upon.
Peter Pecquius, the crafty and experienced agent of the
Archduke at Paris, gave the bouncing envoy more judicious
advice, however, than that of the Jesuit, assuring him that
he would spoil his whole case should he attempt to hold
such language to the King.
He was admitted to an audience of Henry at Monceaux,
but found him prepared to show his teeth as Aerssens had
predicted. He treated Teynagel as a mere madcap and
adventurer who had no right to be received as a public
minister at all, and cut short his rodomontades by assuring
him that his mind was fully made up to protect the posses-
sory princes. Jeannin was present at the interview, although,
as Aerssens well observed, the King required no pedagogue
on such an occasion.2 Teynagel soon afterwards departed
malcontent to Spain, having taken little by his abnormal
legation to Henry, and being destined to find at the court of
Philip as urgent demands on that monarch for assistance to
1 Aeresens to Barncveld, 24 May and 8 and 16 Aug. 1609. (MS.)
1 Letters of Aerssens, 8 and 16 Aug. last cited.
VOL. I. G
82 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
the League as lie was to make for Leopold and the House of
Austria.1
For the League, hardly yet thoroughly organized under
the leadership of Maximilian of Bavaria, was rather a
Catholic corrival than cordial ally of the Imperial house.
It was universally suspected that Henry meant to destroy
and discrown the Habsburgs, and it lay not in the schemes
of Maximilian to suffer the whole Catholic policy to be
bound to the fortunes of that one family.
Whether or not Henry meant to commit the anachronism
and blunder of reproducing the part of Charlemagne might
be doubtful. The supposed design of Maximilian to renew
the glories of the House of Wittelsbach was equally vague.
It is certain, however, that a belief in such ambitious schemes
on the part of both had been insinuated into the ears of
Rudolf, and had sunk deeply into his unsettled mind.2
Scarcely had Teynagel departed than the ancient Presi-
dent Eichardot appeared upon the scene. " The mischievous
old monkey," as he had irreverently been characterized
during the Truce negotiations, " who showed his tail the
higher he climbed," was now trembling at the thought that
all the good work he had been so laboriously accomplishing
during the past two years should be annihilated. The Arch-
dukes, his masters, being sincerely bent on peace, had de-
puted him to Henry, who, as they believed, was determined
to rekindle war. As frequently happens in such cases, they
were prepared to smooth over the rough and almost im-
passable path to a cordial understanding by comfortable and
cheap commonplaces concerning the blessings of peace,
and to offer friendly compromises by which they might
secure the prizes of war without the troubles and dangers
of making it.
1 Letters of Aerssens, 8 and 16 Aug. last cited. Compare A. Gindely.
• Rudolf II.' ii. 40, sgg. s Ibid. 30, 42.
1609.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KING OF FRANCE.
83
They had been solemnly notified by Henry that he would
go to war rather than permit the House of Austria to acquire
the succession to the duchies.1 They now sent Bichardot
to say that neither the Archdukes nor the King of Spain
would interfere in the matter, and that they hoped the King
of France would not prevent the Emperor from exercising
his rightful functions of judge.
Henry, who knew that Don Baltasar de Cuniga, Spanish
ambassador at the Imperial court, had furnished Leopold,
the Emperor's cousin, with 50,000 crowns to defray his first
expenses in the Jiilich expedition, considered that the veteran
politician had come to perform a school boy's task. He was
more than ever convinced by this mission of Kichardot that
the Spaniards had organized the whole scheme, and he was
likely only to smile at any propositions the President might
make.
At the beginning of his interview, in which the King was
quite alone, Kichardot asked if he would agree to maintain
neutrality like the King of Spain and the Archdukes, and
allow the princes to settle their business with the Emperor.2
" No," said the King.
He then asked if Henry would assist them in their wrong.
" No," said the King.
He then asked if the King thought that the princes had
justice on their side, and whether, if the contrary were shown,
he would change his policy ?
Henry replied that the Emperor could not be both judge
and party in the suit and that the King of Spain was
plotting to usurp the provinces through the instrumentality
of his brother-in-law Leopold and under the name of the
Emperor. He would not suffer it, he said.
1 Aerssens to Barnoveld, 10 Aujr.
1609. (MS.) Same to same, 22 Aug.
1609. (MS.) Same to Digart, 10 Aug.
1609. (MS.)
» Same to Barneveld, 2 Sept 1609.
(MS.)
84 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
" Then there will be a general war," replied Richardot,
" since you are determined to assist these princes."
" Be it so," said the King.
" You are right," said the President, " for you are a great
and puissant monarch, having all the advantages that could
be desired, and in case of rupture I fear that all this im-
mense power will be poured out over us who are but little
princes."
" Cause Leopold to retire then and leave the princes in
their right," was the reply. " You will then have nothing
to fear. Are you not very unhappy to live under those poor
weak archdukes ? Don't you foresee that as soon as they
die you will lose all the little you have acquired in the
obedient Netherlands during the last fifty years ? " 1
The President had nothing to reply to this save that he
had never approved of Leopold's expedition, and that when
Spaniards make mistakes they always had recourse to their
servants to repair their faults. He had accepted this mission
inconsiderately, he said, inspired by a hope to conjure the
rising storms mingled with fears as to the result which were
now justified. He regretted having come, he said.
The King shrugged his shoulders.
Richardot then suggested that Leopold might be recog-
nized in Julich, and the princes at Diisseldorf, or that all
parties might retire until the Emperor should give his
decision.
All these combinations were flatly refused by the King,
who swore that no one of the House of Austria should ever
perch in any part of those provinces. If Leopold did not
withdraw at once, war was inevitable.
He declared that he would break up everything and dare
everything, whether the possessory princes formally applied
1 Aeresens to Barneveld, 2 Sept. 1609. (MS.)
1609. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KING OF FRANCE. 85
to him or not. He would not see his friends oppressed nor
allow the Spaniard by this usurpation to put his foot on the
throat of the States-General, for it was against them that this
whole scheme was directed.
To the President's complaints that the States-General had
been moving troops in Gelderland, Henry replied at once that
it was done by his command, and that they were his troops.
With this answer Richardot Avas fain to retire crestfallen,
mortified, and unhappy. He expressed repentance and
astonishment at the result, and protested that those peoples
were happy whose princes understood affairs. His princes
were good, he said, but did not give themselves the trouble
to learn their business.1
Richardot then took his departure from Paris, and very
soon afterwards from the world. He died at Arras early
in September, as many thought of chagrin at the ill success
of his mission, while others ascribed it to a surfeit of
melons and peaches.2
" Sencctus etiam morbus est," said Aerssens with Seneca.
Henry said he could not sufficiently wonder at these last
proceedings at his court, of a man he had deemed capable
and sagacious, but who had been committing an irreparable
blunder. He had never known two such impertinent ambas-
sadors as Don Pedro de Toledo and Richardot on this occa-
sion.3 The one had been entirely ignorant of the object of
his mission ; the other had shown a vain presumption in
thinking he could drive him from his fixed purpose by a
flood of words. He had accordingly answered him on the
spot without consulting his council, at which poor Richardot
had been much amazed.4
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 2 Sept.
1609. (MS.)
* Same to same,14 Sept. 1609. (MS.)
3 Same to same, 2 Sept. 1609. (MS.)
4 Ibid.
86
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
And now another envoy appeared upon the scene, an
ambassador coming directly from the Emperor. Count
Hohenzollern, a young man, wild, fierce, and arrogant,
scarcely twenty-three years of age, arrived in Paris on the
7th of September, with a train of forty horsemen.1
De Colly, agent of the Elector-Palatine, had received an
outline of his instructions, which the Prince of Anhalt had
obtained at Prague. He informed Henry that Hohenzollern
would address him thus : " You are a king. You would not
like that the Emperor should aid your subjects in rebellion.
He did not do this in the time of the League, although often
solicited to do so. You should not now sustain the princes
in disobeying the Imperial decree. Kings should unite in
maintaining the authority and majesty of each other." He
would then in the Emperor's name urge the claims of the
House of Saxony to the duchies.2
Henry was much pleased with this opportune communica-
tion by de Colly of the private instructions to the Emperor's
envoy, by which he was enabled to meet the wild and
fierce young man with an arrogance at least equal to his
own.
The interview was a stormy one. The King was alone in
the gallery of the Louvre, not choosing that his words and
gestures should be observed.3 The Envoy spoke much in the
sense which de Colly had indicated ; making a long argu-
ment in favour of the Emperor's exclusive right of arbitra-
i tion, and assuring the King that the Emperor was resolved
on war if interference between himself and his subjects was
persisted in. He loudly pronounced the proceedings of the
possessory princes to be utterly illegal, and contrary to all
precedent. The Emperor would maintain his authority at
1 "Fier et hazard," — Ibid. Aerssens
always calls this envoy " Hohenzol-
lern: " Dr. Qindely calls him " Zol-
lera."
s Aerssens to Barneveld, 18 Sept.
1609. (MS.)
3 Ibid.
1609. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KING OF FRANCE.
87
all hazards, and one spark of war would set everything in a
blaze within the Empire and without.
Henry replied sternly but in general terms, and referred
him for a final answer to his council.
" What will you do," asked the Envoy, categorically, at a
subsequent interview about a month later, " to protect the
princes in case the Emperor constrains them to leave the
provinces which they have unjustly occupied ? " i
" There is none but Grod to compel me to say more than
I choose to say," replied the King. " It is enough for you
to know that I will never abandon my friends in a just
cause. The Emperor can do much for the general peace.
He is not to lend his name to cover this usurpation."
And so the concluding interview terminated in an ex-
change of threats rather than with any hope of accom-
modation.3
Hohenzollern used as high language to the ministers as
to the monarch, and received payment in the same coin. He
rebuked their course not very adroitly as being contrary to
the interests of Catholicism. They were placing the pro-
vinces in the hands of Protestants, he urged. It required
no envoy from Prague to communicate this startling fact.
Friends and foes, Villeroy and Jeannin, as well as Sully and
Duplessis, knew well enough that Henry was not taking up
arms for Home. " Sir ! do you look at the matter in that
way ? " cried Sully, indignantly. " The Huguenots are as
good as the Catholics. They fight like the devil ! " 3
" The Emperor will never permit the princes to remain
nor Leopold to withdraw," said the Envoy to Jeannin.
Jeannin replied that the King was always ready to listen
1 Aerescns to Barneveld, 18 Oct.
1609. (MS.)
* Ibid.
* From a despatch of Colly, quoted
by Gindely, ' Rudolf II.' B. ii. p. 8'J,
note. " Monsieur, la prenez vous par
la? Da ne valent pas moins pour
cela, les Huguenots frappent commo
le diable."
88
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVFLD. CHAP. I.
to reason, but there was no use in holding language of
authority to him. It was money he would not accept.
" Fiat justitia pereat mundus," said the haggard Hohen-
zollern.
" Your world may .perish/' replied Jeannin, " but not ours.
It is much better put together." 1
A formal letter was then written by the King to the
Emperor, in which Henry expressed his desire to maintain
peace and fraternal relations, but notified him that if, under
any pretext whatever, he should trouble the princes in their
possession, he would sustain them with all his power, being
bound thereto by treaties and by reasons of state.2
This letter was committed to the care of Hohenzollern,
who forthwith departed, having received a present of 4000
crowns.3 His fierce, haggard face thus vanishes for the
present from our history.
The King had taken his ground, from which there was no
receding. Envoys or agents of Emperor, Pope, King of Spain,
Archduke at Brussels, and Archduke at Julich, had failed to
shake his settled purpose. Yet the road was far from smooth.
He had thus far no ally but the States-General. He could
not trust James of Great Britain. Boderie came back late
in the summer from his mission to that monarch, reporting
him as being favourably inclined to Brandenburg, but hoping
for an amicable settlement in the duchies.4 No suggestion
being made even by the sagacious James as to the manner
in which the ferret and rabbits were to come to a compro-
mise, Henry inferred, if it came to fighting, that the English
government would refuse assistance. James had asked
Boderie in fact whether his sovereign and the States, being
the parties chiefly interested, would be willing to fight it
1 Aeresens to Barneveld, 7 Oct.
1609. (MS.)
* Same to same, 18 Oct. 1609. (MS.)
3 Same to same, 27 Oct. 1609. (MS.)
4 Same to same, 2 Sept. 1609. (MS.)
1609. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KING OF FRANCE. 89
out without allies. He had also sent Sir Ralph Winwood on
a special mission to the Hague, to Dusseldorf, and with
letters to the Emperor, in which he expressed confidence
that Rudolph would approve the proceedings of the posses-
sory princes.1 As he could scarcely do that while loudly
claiming through his official envoy in Paris that the princes
should instantly withdraw on pain of instant war, the value
of the English suggestion of an amicable compromise might
easily be deduced.
Great was the jealousy in France of this mission from
England. That the princes should ask the interference of
James while neglecting, despising, or fearing Henry, excited
Henry's wrath. He was ready, and avowed his readiness, to
put on armour at once in behalf of the princes, and to arbi-
trate on the destiny of Germany, but no one seemed ready
to follow his standard. No one asked him to arbitrate. The
Spanish faction wheedled and threatened by turns, in order
to divert him from his purpose, while the Protestant party
held aloof, and babbled of Charlemagne and of Henry II.
He said he did not mean to assist the princes by halves,
but as became a King of France, and the princes expressed
suspicion of him, talked of the example of Metz, and called
the Emperor their very clement lord.2
It was not strange that Henry was indignant and jealous.
He was holding the wolf by the ears, as he himself observed
more than once. The war could not long be delayed ; yet
they in whose behalf it was to be waged treated him with a
disrespect and flippancy almost amounting to scorn.
They tried to borrow money of him through the post, and
neglected to send him an ambassador. This was most de-
cidedly putting the cart before the oxen, so Henry said, and
so thought all his friends. When they had blockaded the
1 Aeresens to Barneveld. 6 Sept. 1609. (MS.)
* Same to Duplessis-Mornay, 18 and 21 Oct. 1609. (MS.)
90
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARN E VELD. CHAP. I.
road to Jiilich, in order to cut off Leopold's supplies, they
sent to request that the two French regiments in the States'
service might be ordered to their assistance, Archduke
Albert having threatened to open the passage by force of
arms. " This is a fine stratagem," said Aerssens, " to fling
the States-General headlong into the war, and, as it were,
without knowing it." l
But the States-General, under the guidance of Barneveld,
were not likely to be driven headlong by Brandenburg and
Neuburg. They managed with caution, but with perfect
courage, to move side by side with Henry, and to leave the
initiative to him, while showing an unfaltering front to the
enemy. That the princes were lost, Spain and the Emperor
triumphant, unless Henry and the States should protect
them with all their strength, was as plain as a mathematical
demonstration.
Yet firm as were the attitude and the language of Henry,
he was thought to be hoping to accomplish much by bluster.
It was certain that the bold and unexpected stroke of Leo-
pold had produced much effect upon his mind, and for a
time those admitted to his intimacy saw, or thought they
saw, a decided change in his demeanour.2 To the world at
large his language and his demonstrations were even more
vehement than they had been at the outset of the contro-
versy ; but it was believed that there was now a disposition
to substitute threats for action. The military movements set
on foot were thought to be like the ringing of bells and firing
of cannon to dissipate a thunderstorm.3 Yet it was treason
at court to doubt the certainty of war. The King ordered
new suits of armour, bought splendid chargers,4 and gave
himself all the airs of a champion rushing to a tournament
1 Aerssens to Vosbergen, 19 Oct.
1609. (MS.)
* Same to Barneveld, 29 July 1609.
(MS.)
3 Same to same, 2 Aug. 1609. (MS.)
4 Ibid.
HENRY BECOMES THE ALLY OF THE STATES-GENERAL. 91
as gaily as in the earliest days of his king-errantry. He
spoke of his eager desire to break a lance with Spinola, and
give a lesson to the young volunteer who had sprung into
so splendid a military reputation, while he had been rusting,
as he thought, in pacific indolence, and envying the laurels
of the comparatively youthful Maurice. Yet those most
likely to be well informed believed that nothing would come
of all this fire and fury.
The critics were wrong. There was really no doubt of
Henry's sincerity, but his isolation was terrible. There was
none true to him at home but Sully. Abroad, the States-
General alone were really friendly, so far as positive agree-
ments existed. Above all, the intolerable tergiversations
and suspicions of those most interested, the princes in pos-
session, and their bickerings among themselves, hampered
his movements.
Treason and malice in his cabinet and household, jealousy
and fear abroad, were working upon and undermining him
like a slow fever. His position was most pathetic, but his
purpose was fixed.
James of England, who admired, envied, and hated Henry,
was wont to moralize on his character and his general un-
popularity, while engaged in negotiations with him. He
complained that in the whole affair of the truce he had
sought only his particular advantage. " This is not to be
wondered at in one of his nature," said the King, " who only
careth to provide for the felicities of his present life, with-
out any respect for his life to come. Indeed, the considera-
tion of his own age and the youth of his children, the doubt
of their legitimation, the strength of competitioners, and the
universal hatred borne unto him, makes him seek all means
of security for preventing of all dangers." ]
1 King to CecU (probably in 1608). (MS. in the Cecil Archives at Hatfield.)
See Appendix.
92 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
There were changes from day to day ; hot and cold fits
necessarily resulting from the situation. As a rule, no emi-
nent general who has had much experience wishes to go into
a new war inconsiderately and for the mere love of war.
The impatience is often on the part of the non-combatants.
Henry was no exception to the rule. He felt that the
complications then existing, the religious, political, and
dynastic elements arrayed against each other, were almost
certain to be brought to a crisis and explosion by the in-
cident of the duchies. He felt that the impending struggle
was probably to be a desperate and a general one, but there
was no inconsistency in hoping that the show of a vigorous
and menacing attitude might suspend, defer, or entirely dis-
sipate the impending storm.
The appearance of vacillation on his part from day to
day was hardly deserving of the grave censure which it
received, and was certainly in the interests of humanity.
His conferences with Sully were almost daily and marked
by intense anxiety. He longed for Barneveld, and repeat-
edly urged that the Advocate, laying aside all other busi-
ness, would come to Paris, that they might advise together
thoroughly and face to face.1 It was most important that
the combination of alliances should be correctly arranged
before hostilities began, and herein lay the precise difficulty.
The princes applied formally and freely to the States-General
for assistance. They applied to the King of Great Britain.
The agents of the opposite party besieged Henry with en-
treaties, and, failing in those, with threats ; going off after-
wards to Spain, to the Archdukes, and to other Catholic
powers in search of assistance.
The States-General professed their readiness to put an
army of 15,000 foot and 3000 horse in the field for the
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 6 Oct. 1609 (MS.), and many other letters in the
Archives.
HENRY BECOMES THE ALLY OF THE STATES-GENERAL. 93
spring campaign, so soon as they were assured of Henry's
determination for a rupture.
" I am fresh enough still," said he to their ambassador,
" to lead an army into Cleve. I shall have a cheap bargain
enough of the provinces. But these Germans do nothing
but eat and sleep. They will get the profit and assign to me
the trouble. No matter, I will never suffer the aggrandize-
ment of the House of Austria. The States-General must
disband no troops, but hold themselves in readiness." *
Secretary of State Villeroy held the same language, but
it was easy to trace beneath his plausible exterior a secret
determination to traverse the plans of his sovereign. " The
Cleve affair must lead to war," he said. " The Spaniard,
considering how necessary it is for him to have a prince
there at his devotion, can never quietly suffer Brandenburg
and Neuburg to establish themselves in those territories.
The support thus gained by the States-General would cause
the loss of the Spanish Netherlands." 2
This was the view of Henry, too, but the Secretary of
State, secretly devoted to the cause of Spain, looked upon
the impending war with much aversion.
" All that can come to his Majesty from war," he said,
" is the glory of having protected the right. Counterbalance
this with the fatigue, the expense, and the peril of a great
conflict, after our long repose, and you will find this to be
buying glory too dearly." 3
When a Frenchman talked of buying glory too dearly, it
seemed probable that the particular kind of glory was not to
his taste.
Henry had already ordered the officers, then in France,
of the 4000 French infantry kept in the States' service at
his expense to depart at once to Holland, and he privately
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 29 July 1000. (MS.) * Ibid.
8 Ibid.
94
THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD.
CHAP. I.
announced his intention of moving to the frontier at the head
of 30,000 men.1
Yet not only Villeroy, but the Chancellor and the Con-
stable, while professing opposition to the designs of Austria
and friendliness to those of Brandenburg and Neuburg,
deprecated this precipitate plunge into war. " Those most
interested," they said, " refuse to move ; fearing Austria,
distrusting France. They leave us the burden and danger,
and hope for the spoils themselves. We cannot play
cat to their monkey. The King must hold himself in
readiness to join in the game when the real players have
shuffled and dealt the cards. It is no matter to us
whether the Spaniard or Brandenburg or anyone else gets
the duchies. The States-General require a friendly sovereign
there, and ought to say how much they will do for that
result."2
The Constable laughed at the whole business. Coming
straight from the Louvre, he said " there would be no
serious military movement, and that all those fine freaks
would evaporate in air." 3
But Sully never laughed. He was quietly preparing the
ways and means for the war, and he did not intend, so far
as he had influence, that France should content herself
with freaks and let Spain win the game. Alone in the
council he maintained that "France had gone too far to
recede without sacrifice of reputation." " The King's word
is engaged both within and without," he said. "Not to
follow it with deeds would be dangerous to the kingdom.
The Spaniard will think France afraid of war. We must
strike a sudden blow, either to drive the enemy away or
to crush him at once. There is no time for delay. The
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 29 July
1609. (MS.)
* Ibid. ; also same to same, 28 Sept.
1609. (MS.) Aerssens to Duplessis-
Mornay, 15 Nov. 1609. (MS.)
* Ibid.
HENRY BECOMES THE ALLY OF THE STATES-GENERAL. 95
Netherlands must prevent the aggrandizement of Austria
or consent to their own ruin." 1
Thus stood the game therefore. The brother of Branden-
burg and son of Neuburg had taken possession of Diissel-
dorf.
The Emperor, informed of this, ordered them forthwith to
decamp. He further summoned all pretenders to the duchies
to appear before him, in person or by proxy, to make good
their claims. They refused and appealed for advice and
assistance to the States-General. Barneveld, aware of the
intrigues of Spain, who disguised herself in the drapery of
the Emperor, recommended that the Estates of Cleve,
Jiilich, Berg, Mark, Kavensberg, and Eavenstein, should be
summoned in Diisseldorf. This was done and a resolution
taken to resist any usurpation.2
The King of France wrote to the Elector of Cologne, who,
by directions of Home and by means of the Jesuits, had been
active in the intrigue, that he would not permit the princes
to be disturbed.
The Archduke Leopold suddenly jumped into the chief
citadel of the country and published an edict of the Em-
peror. All the proceedings were thereby nullified as illegal
and against the dignity of the realm and the princes pro-
claimed under ban.
A herald brought the edict and ban to the princes in full
assembly. The princes tore it to pieces on the spot.3
Nevertheless they were much frightened, and many mem-
bers of the Estates took themselves off; others showing an
inclination to follow.
The princes sent forthwith a deputation to the Hague to
consult My Lords the States-General. The States-General
sent an express messenger to Paris. Their ambassador
' Aeresens to Barneveld, 2 Aup:. 1609. (MS.)
* Same to Duplessis-Mornay, 7 Aug. 1609. (MS.) 3 Ibid.
96 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
there sent him back a week later, with notice of the King's
determination to risk everything against everything to pre-
serve the rights of the princes. It was added that Henry
required to be solicited by them, in order not by volunteer
succour to give cause for distrust as to his intentions.1
Thq States-General were further apprised by the King that
his interests and theirs were so considerable in the matter
that they would probably be obliged to go into a brisk and
open war, in order to prevent the Spaniard from establishing
himself in the duchies. He advised them to notify the
Archdukes in Brussels that they would regard the truce as
broken if, under pretext of maintaining the Emperor's
rights, they should molest the princes. He desired them
further to send their forces at once to the frontier of Gelder-
land under Prince Maurice, without committing any overt
act of hostility, but in order to show that both the King and
the States were thoroughly in earnest.
• The King then sent to Archduke Albert, as well as to the
Elector of Cologne, and despatched a special envoy to the
King of Great Britain.
Immediately afterwards came communications from Barne-
veld to Henry, with complete adhesion to the King's plans.
The States would move in exact harmony with him, neither
before him nor after him, which was precisely what he
wished. He complained bitterly to Aerssens, when he com-
municated the Advocate's despatches, of the slothful and
timid course of the princes. He ascribed it to the arts of
Leopold, who had written and inspired many letters against
him insinuating that he was secretly in league and cor-
respondence with the Emperor ; that he was going to the
duchies simply in the interest of the Catholics ; that he was
like Henry II. only seeking to extend the French frontier ;
1 Aerssens to Duplessis-Mornay, 7 Aug. 1609. (MS.) Same to Digart,
10 Aug. 1609. (MS.)
1609. HENRY THE ALLY OF THE STATES-GENERAL. 97
and Leopold, by these intrigues and falsehoods, had suc-
ceeded in filling the princes with distrust, and they had
taken umbrage at the advance of his cavalry.1
Henry professed himself incapable of self-seeking or am-
bition. He meant to prevent the aggrandizement of Austria,
and was impatient at the dilatoriness and distrust of the
princes.
" All their enemies are rushing to the King of Spain. Let
them address themselves to the King of France," he said,
" for it is we two that must play this game."
And when at last they did send an embassy, they prefaced
it by a post letter demanding an instant loan, and Septi U)
with an intimation that they would rather have his 1609-
money than his presence !
Was it surprising that the King's course should seem
occasionally wavering when he found it so difficult to stir up
such stagnant waters into honourable action? Was it strange
that the rude and stern Sully should sometimes lose his
patience, knowing so much and suspecting more of the foul
designs by which his master was encompassed, of the web
of conspiracy against his throne, his life, and his honour,
which was daily and hourly spinning ?
" We do nothing and you do nothing," he said one day to
Aerssens. " You are too soft, and we are too cowardly. I
believe that we shall spoil everything, after all. I always
suspect these sudden determinations of ours. They are of
bad augury. We usually founder at last when we set off so
fiercely at first. There are words enough on every side, but
there will be few deeds. There is nothing to be got out of
the King of Great Britain, and the King of Spain will end
by securing these provinces for himself by a treaty." 2
1 Aerssens to Duplesais-Mornay, 7
Aug. 1609. (MS.) Same to Digart,
10 Aug. 1609. (MS.)
VOL. I.
* Same to Barneveld, 14 Nov.
1609. (MS.)
98 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. L
Sully knew better than this, but he did not care to let
even the Dutch envoy know, as yet, the immense prepara-
tions he had been making for the coming campaign.
The envoys of the possessory princes, the Counts Solms,
Colonel Pallandt, and Dr. Steyntgen, took their departure,
after it had been arranged that final measures should be
concerted at the general congress of the German Protestants
to be held early in the ensuing year at Hall, in Suabia.
At that convention de Boississe would make himself
heard on the part of France, and the representatives of the
States-General, of Venice, and Savoy, would also be present.1
Meantime the secret conferences between Henry and his
superintendent of finances and virtual prime minister were
held almost every day. Scarcely an afternoon passed that
the King did not make his appearance at the Arsenal,
Sully 's residence, and walk up and down the garden with
him for hours, discussing the great project of which his
brain was full. This great project was to crush for ever the
power of the Austrian house ; to drive Spain back into her
own limits, putting an end to her projects for universal
monarchy ; and taking the Imperial crown from the House
of Habsburg. By thus breaking up the mighty cousinship
which, with the aid of Eome, overshadowed Germany and
the two peninsulas, besides governing the greater part of
both the Indies, he meant to bring France into the pre-
ponderant position over Christendom which he believed to
be her due.
It was necessary, he thought, for the continued existence
of the Dutch commonwealth that the opportunity should
be taken once for all, now that a glorious captain com-
manded its armies and a statesman unrivalled for experi-
ence, insight, and patriotism controlled its politics and its
diplomacy, to drive the Spaniard out of the Netherlands,
1 ' Memoires de Sully,' vii. 337, sqq.
1610. HENRY'S PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 99
The Cleve question, properly and vigorously handled, pre-
sented exactly the long desired opportunity for carrying out
these vast designs.
The plan of assault upon Spanish power was to be three-
fold. The King himself at the head of 35,000 men, supported
by Prince Maurice and the States' forces amounting to at
least 14,000, would move to the Khine and seize the duchies.
The Duke de la Force would command the army of the
Pyrenees and act in concert with the Moors of Spain, who
roused to frenzy by their expulsion from the kingdom could
be relied on for a revolt or at least a most vigorous diversion.1
Thirdly, a treaty with the Duke of Savoy by which Henry
accorded his daughter to the Duke's eldest son, the Prince
of Piedmont, a gift of 100,000 crowns, and a monthly pension
during the war of 50,000 crowns a month, was secretly
concluded.
Early in the spring the Duke was to take the field with
at least 10,000 foot and 1200 horse, supported by a French
army of 12,000 to 15,000 men under the experienced Marshal
de Lesdiguieres. These forces were to operate against the
Duchy of Milan with the intention of driving the Spaniards
out of that rich possession, which the Duke of Savoy claimed
for himself, and of assuring to Henry the dictatorship of
Italy. With the cordial alliance of Venice, and by playing
off the mutual jealousies of the petty Italian princes, like
Florence, Mantua, Montserrat, and others, against each other
and against the Pope, it did not seem doubtful to Sully that
the result would be easily accomplished. He distinctly
urged the wish that the King should content himself with
political influence, with the splendid position of holding
all Italy dependent upon his will and guidance, but with-
out annexing a particle of territory to his own crown
'Memoires de Sullv,' t. vii. liv. rxvii. passim. Letters of Acrsscns to
Barneveld, 1609 and 1610 (MS.), passim, especially letter of 25 Dec. 1609.
100
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I
It was Henry's intention, however, to help himself to the
Duchy of Savoy, and to the magnificent city and port of
Genoa1 as a reward to himself for the assistance, matrimonial
alliance, and aggrandizement which he was about to bestow
upon Charles Emmanuel. Sully strenuously opposed these
self-seeking views on the part of his sovereign, however, con-
stantly placing before him the far nobler aim of controlling
the destinies of Christendom, of curbing what tended to
become omnipotent, of raising up and protecting that which
had been abased, of holding the balance of empire with just
and steady hand in preference to the more vulgar and com-
monplace ambition of annexing a province or two to the
realms of France.2
It is true that these virtuous homilies, so often preached
by him against territorial aggrandizement in one direction,
did not prevent him from indulging in very extensive visions
of it in another. But the dreams pointed to the east rather
than to the south. It was Sully's policy to swallow a portion
not of Italy but of Germany. He persuaded his master that
the possessory princes, if placed by the help of France in the
heritage which they claimed, would hardly be able to main-
tain themselves against the dangers which surrounded them
except by a direct dependence upon France. In the end
the position would become an impossible one, and it would
be easy after the war was over to indemnify Brandenburg
with money and with private property in the heart of France
^for example, and obtain the cession of those most coveted
1 "... pour engager le due de Sa-
voie de rompre avec 1'Espagne, on luy
a accorde quasi tout ce qu'il a de-
mande — il semble que desormais on
veut commencer a faire de la part du
Roi n'estant pas raisonnable que le
Roi face ceste grande depense sans
en espereraucune utilite— et pourtant
propose on de demander au Due le
ducuc de Savoje en contrechange du
secoure du Roi et de la cession de
ses titres en outre la ville de Gennes
avec plein pied en Italic ; je ne scais
pas si on fera ces demandes au Due
comme il se dispute encore ; mais les
faisant veil a notre dessin en Italie
a vau 1'eau. . . . On leve ici jusqu'a
quarante mille fantassins sans conter
les 6000 Suisses." — Aerssens to Barne-
veld, 20^ Feb. 1610. (MS.)
2 ' Memoires de Sully,' ubi sup.
1610. flENRT'S PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 101
provinces between the Meuse and the Weser to the King.
" What an advantage for France," whispered Sully, " to unite
to its power so important a part of Germany. For it cannot
be denied that by accepting the succour given by the King
now those princes oblige themselves to ask for help in the
future in order to preserve their new acquisition. Thus your
Majesty will make them pay for it very dearly." 1
Thus the very virtuous self-denial in regard to the Duke
of Savoy did not prevent a secret but well developed ambi-
tion at the expense of the Elector of Brandenburg. For after
all it was well enough known that the Elector was the really
important and serious candidate. Henry knew full well that
Neuburg was depending on the Austrians and the Catholics,
and that the claims of Saxony were only put forward by the
Emperor in order to confuse the princes and excite mutual
distrust.
The King's conferences with the great financier were most
confidential, and Sully was as secret as the grave. But
Henry never could keep a secret even when it concerned his
most important interests, and nothing would serve him but
he must often babble of his great projects even to their
minutest details in presence of courtiers and counsellors
whom in his heart he knew to be devoted to Spain and in
receipt of pensions from her king.2 He would boast to them
of the blows by which he meant to demolish Spain and the
whole house of Austria, so that there should be no longer
danger to be feared from that source to the tranquillity and
happiness of Europe, and he would do this so openly and in
presence of those who, as he knew, were perpetually setting
traps for him and endeavouring to discover his deepest
secrets as to make Sully's hair stand on end. The faithful
minister would pluck his master by the cloak at times,3 and
1 ' M£moires do Sully,' t. vii. p. 324.
» Ibid. p. 362. "Ibid.
102 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I
the King, with the adroitness which never forsook him when
he chose to employ it, would contrive to extricate himself
from a dilemma and pause at the brink of tremendous dis-
closures. But Sully could not be always at his side, nor
were the Nuncius or Don Inigo de Cardenas or their con-
fidential agents and spies always absent. Enough was known
of the general plan, while as to the probability of its coming
into immediate execution, perhaps the enemies of the King
were often not more puzzled than his friends.
But what the Spanish ambassador did not know, nor the
Nuncius, nor even the friendly Aerssens, was the vast amount
of supplies which had been prepared for the coming conflict
by the finance minister. Henry did not know it himself.
"The war will turn on France as on a pivot," said Sully;
"it remains to be seen if we have supplies and money
enough. I will engage if the war is not to last more than
three years and you require no more than 40,000 men at
a time that I will show you munitions and ammunition and
artillery and the like to such an extent that you will say,
' It is enough.'
" As to money "
" How much money have I got ? " asked the King ; " a
dozen millions ? "
" A little more than that," answered the Minister.
" Fourteen millions ? "
"More still."
" Sixteen ? " continued the King.
" More yet," said Sully.
And so the King went on adding two millions at each
question until thirty millions were reached, and when the
question as to this sum was likewise answered in the affirma-
tive, he jumped from his chair, hugged his minister around
the neck, and kissed him on both cheeks.
" I want no more than that," he cried.
1610.
HENRY'S PREPARATIONS FOR WAE.
103
Sully answered by assuring him that he had prepared a
report showing a reserve of forty millions on which he might
draw for his war expenses, without in the least degree in-
fringing on the regular budget for ordinary expenses.1
The King was in a transport of delight, and would have
been capable of telling the story on the spot to the Nuncius
had he met him that afternoon, which fortunately did not
occur.
But of all men in Europe after the faithful Sully, Henry
most desired to see and confer daily and secretly with
Barneveld. He insisted vehemently that, neglecting all
other business, he should come forthwith to Paris at the head
of the special embassy which it had been agreed that the
States should send. No living statesman, he said, could com-
pare to Holland's Advocate in sagacity, insight, breadth of
view, knowledge of mankind and of great affairs, and none he
knew was more sincerely attached to his person or felt more
keenly the value of the French alliance.
With him he indeed communicated almost daily through
the medium of Aerssens, who was in constant receipt of most
elaborate instructions from Barneveld, but he wished to
confer with him face to face, so that there would be no
necessity of delay in sending back for instructions, limita-
tions, and explanation. No man knew better than the King
did that so far as foreign affairs were concerned the States-
General were simply Barneveld.
On the 22nd January the States' ambassador had a long
and secret interview with the King.2 He informed him that
the Prince of Anhalt had been assured by Barneveld that
the possessory princes would be fully supported in their
position by the States, and that the special deputies of
1 ' Memoires de Sully,' t. vii. pp.
340-342.
1 Aerseens to Barneveld, 24 Jan.
1010. (MS.) Many citations will be
given from this very remarkable des-
patch, which, so far as I know, has
never been printed or even alluded to.
104 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. I.
Archduke Albert, whose presence at the Hague made Henry
uneasy, as he regarded them as perpetual spies, had been
dismissed. Henry expressed his gratification. They are
there, he said, entirely in the interest of Leopold, who
has just received 500,000 crowns from the King of Spain,
and is to have that sum annually, and they are only sent to
watch all your proceedings in regard to Cleve.
The King then fervently pressed the Ambassador to urge
Barneveld's coming to Paris with the least possible delay.
He signified his delight with Barneveld's answer to Anhalt,
who thus fortified would be able to do good service at the
assembly at Hall. He had expected nothing else from
Barneveld's sagacity, from his appreciation of the needs of
Christendom, and from his affection for himself. He told
the Ambassador that he was anxiously waiting for the
Advocate in order to consult with him as to all the details
of the war. The affair of Cleve, he said, was too special a
cause. A more universal one was wanted. The King pre-
ferred to begin with Luxemburg, attacking Charlemont or
Namur, while the States ought at the same time to besiege
Venlo, with the intention afterwards of uniting with the
King in laying siege to Maestricht.
He was strong enough, he said, against all the world, but
he still preferred to invite all princes interested to join him
in putting down the ambitious and growing power of Spam.
Cleve was a plausible pretext, but the true cause, he said,
should be found in the general safety of Christendom.
Boississe had been sent to the German princes to ascertain
whether and to what extent they would assist the King.
He supposed that once they found him engaged in actual
warfare in Luxemburg, they would get rid of their jealousy
and panic fears of him and his designs. He expected them
to furnish at least as large a force as he would supply as a
contingent.
1610.
HENRY'S PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
105
For it was understood that Anhalt as generalissimo of the
German forces would command a certain contingent of
French troops, while the main army of the King would be
led by himself in person.
Henry expressed the conviction that the King of Spain
would be taken by surprise finding himself attacked in three
places and by three armies at once, he believing that the
King of France was entirely devoted to his pleasures and
altogether too old for warlike pursuits, while the States, just
emerging from the misery of their long and cruel conflict,
would be surely unwilling to plunge headlong into a great
and bloody war.1
Henry inferred this, he said, from observing the rude and
brutal manner in which the soldiers in the Spanish Nether-
lands were now treated. It seemed, he said, as if the Arch-
dukes thought they had no further need of them, or as if
a stamp of the foot could raise new armies out of the earth.
" My design," continued the King, " is the more likely to
succeed as the King of Spain, being a mere gosling and a
valet of the Duke of Lerma, will find himself stripped of all
his resources and at his wits' end ; 2 unexpectedly embarrassed
as he will be on the Italian side, where we shall be threaten-
ing to cut the jugular vein of his pretended universal
monarchy." 3
He intimated that there was no great cause for anxiety in
regard to the Catholic League just formed at Wiirzburg.
He doubted whether the King of Spain would join it, and he
had learned that the Elector of Cologne was making very
little progress in obtaining the Emperor's adhesion. As to
this point the King had probably not yet thoroughly under-
stood that the Bavarian League wag intended to keep clear
1 Aeresens to Barneveld, 24 Jan.
1610. (MS.)
4 " . . . et pourra reussircedessein
de S. M. plus facilement que Jo roi
d'Espajjne, n'tHant qu'un oyson et
valet du due de Lerma, so trouvcdea-
nue de tous moyens," &c. — Ibid.
» Ibid.
106 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. L
of the House of Habsburg, Maximilian not being willing to
identify the success of German Catholicism with the fortunes
of that family.
Henry expressed the opinion that the King of Spain, that
is to say, his counsellors, meant to make use of the Emperor's
name while securing all the profit, and that Kudolph quite
understood their game, while Matthias was sure to make
use of this opportunity, supported by the Protestants of
Bohemia, Austria, and Moravia, to strip the Emperor of the
last shred of Empire.
The King was anxious that the States should send a special
embassy at once to the King of Great Britain. His ambas-
sador, de la Boderie, gave little encouragement of assistance
from that quarter, but it was at least desirable to secure his
neutrality. "'Tis a prince too much devoted to repose,"
said Henry, " to be likely to help in this war, but at least he
must not be allowed to traverse our great designs. He will
probably refuse the league offensive and defensive which I
have proposed to him, but he must be got, if possible, to
pledge himself to the defensive. I mean to assemble my
army on the frontier, as if to move upon Jiilich, and then
suddenly sweep down on the Meuse, where, sustained by the
States' army and that of the princes, I will strike my blows
and finish my enterprise before our adversary has got wind
of what is coming. We must embark James in the enter-
prise if we can, but at any rate we must take measures to
prevent his spoiling it." *
Henry assured the Envoy that no one would know any-
thing of the great undertaking but by its effect ; that no
one could possibly talk about it with any knowledge except
himself, Sully, Villcroy, Barneveld, and Aerssens.2 With
them alone he conferred confidentially, and he doubted not
1 Aeresens to Barneveld, 24 Jan. 1610. (MS.)
8 Ibid.
1610. HENRY'S PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 107
that the States would embrace this opportunity to have
done for ever with the Spaniards. He should take the field
in person, he said, and with several powerful armies
would sweep the enemy away from the Meuse, and after
obtaining control of that river would quietly take possession
of the sea-coast of Flanders, shut up Archduke Albert be-
tween the States and the French, who would thus join hands
and unite their frontiers.
Again the King expressed his anxiety for Barneveld's
coming, and directed the Ambassador to urge it, and to com-
municate to him the conversation which had just taken
place. He much preferred, he said, a general war. He
expressed doubts as to the Prince of Anhalt's capacity as
chief hi the Cleve expedition, and confessed that being
jealous of his own reputation he did not like to commit his
contingent of troops to the care of a stranger and one so
new to his trade. The shame would fall on himself, not on
Anhalt in case of any disaster. Therefore, to avoid all
petty jealousies and inconveniences of that nature by which
the enterprise might be ruined, it was best to make out of
this small affair a great one, and the King signified his hope
that the Advocate would take this view of the case and give
him his support. He had plenty of grounds of war himself,
and the States had as good cause of hostilities in the rupture
of the trace by the usurpation attempted by Leopold with
the assistance of Spain and in the name of the Emperor.
He hoped, he said, that the States would receive no more
deputations from Archduke Albert, but decide to settle
everything at the point of the sword. The moment was
propitious, and, if neglected, might never return. Marquis
Spinola was about to make a journey to Spain on various
matters of business. On his return, Henry said, he meant to
make him prisoner as a hostage for the Prince of Conde,
whom the Archdukes were harbouring and detaining Thid
108 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. I.
would be the pretext, lie said, but the object would be to
deprive the Archdukes of any military chief, and thus to
throw them into utter confusion. Count van den Berg
would never submit to the authority of Don Luis de Velasco,
nor Velasco to his, and not a man could come from Spain
or Italy, for the passages would all be controlled by
France.1
Fortunately for the King's reputation, Spinola's journey
was deferred, so that this notable plan for disposing of the
great captain fell to the ground.
Henry agreed to- leave the two French regiments and
the two companies of cavalry in the States' service as usual,
but stipulated in certain contingencies for their use.
Passing to another matter concerning which there had
been so much jealousy on the part of the States, the for-
mation of the French East India Company — to organize
which undertaking Le Koy and Isaac Le Maire of Amsterdam
had been living disguised in the house of Henry's famous
companion, the financier Zamet at Paris — the King said that
Barneveld ought not to envy him a participation in the great
profits of this business.2
Nothing would be done without consulting him after his
arrival in Paris. He would discuss the matter privately
with him, he said, knowing that Barneveld was a great
personage, but however obstinate he might be, he felt sure
that he would always yield to reason. On the other h;md the
King expressed his willingness to submit to the Advocate's
opinions if they should seem the more just.3
On leaving the Kins; the Ambassador had an interview
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 24 Jan.
1610. (MS.)
8 Same to same, 21 Dec. 1609 ; 2
Dec. 1609 ; 16 Dec. 1609 ; 24 Jan.
1610. (MSS.)
. qu'il en disputera particu-
etes un graiivl personnage, mais quel-
que opiniatre que puissiez etre, elle
salt que cederiez toujours, et en tout
a la raison, comme elle se soubmettra
aussi a la votre sy la lui presenteriez
plus forte." — Letter of Aerssens, 24
idrement avec vous, sachant que vous I Jan. 1610. (MS. before cited.)
1610. HENRY'S PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 109
with Sully, who again expressed his great anxiety for the
arrival of Barneveld, and his hopes that he might come with
unlimited powers, so that the great secret might not leak
out through constant referring of matters back to the
Provinces.
After rendering to the Advocate a detailed account of this
remarkable conversation, Aerssens concluded with an inti-
mation that perhaps his own opinion- might be desired as to
the meaning of all those movements developing themselves
so suddenly and on so many sides.
" I will say," he observed, " exactly what the poet sings of
the army of ants —
' Hi motus animorum atque haec certamina tanta
Pulveris exigui jactu contacta quiescunt.'
If the Prince of Conde comes back, we shall be more plau-
sible than ever. If he does not come back, perhaps the
consideration of the future will sweep us onwards. All have
their special views, and M. de Villeroy more warmly than
all the rest." 1
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 24 Jan. 1610. (MS.)
110 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. II
CHAPTEE II.
Passion of Henry IV. for Margaret de Montmorency — Her Marriage witb
the Prince of Conde — Their Departure for the Country — Their Flight
to the Netherlands — Rage of the King — Intrigues of Spain — Reception
of the Prince and Princess of Conde by the Archdukes at Brussels —
Splendid Entertainments by Spinola — Attempts of the King to bring
the Fugitives back — Mission of De Coeuvres to Brussels — Difficult
Position of the Republic — Vast but secret Preparations for War.
" IF the Prince of Conde comes back." What had the Prince
of Conde, his comings and his goings, to do with this vast
enterprise ?
It is time to point to the golden thread of most fantastic
passion which runs throughout this dark and eventful
history.
One evening in the beginning of the year which had just
come to its close there was to be a splendid fancy ball at
the Louvre in the course of which several young ladies of
highest rank were to perform a dance in mythological
costume.
The King, on ill terms with the Queen, who harassed
him with scenes of affected jealousy, while engaged in
permanent plots with her paramour and master, the
Italian Concini, against his policy and his life ; on still
worse terms with his latest mistress in chief, the Marquise
de Verneuil, who hated him and revenged herself for en-
during his caresses by making him the butt of her venomous
wit, had taken the festivities of a court in dudgeon where
he possessed hosts of enemies and flatterers but scarcely a
single friend.
HENRY'S PASSION FOR MARGARET DE MONTMORENCY. Ill
He refused to attend any of the rehearsals of the ballet,
but one day a group of Diana and her nymphs passed him
in the great gallery of the palace.1 One of the nymphs
as she went by turned and aimed her gilded javelin at
his heart. Henry looked and saw the most beautiful
young creature, so he thought, that mortal eye had
ever gazed upon, and according to his wont fell instantly
over head and ears in love. He said afterwards that he
felt himself pierced to the heart and was ready to faint
away.2
The lady was just fifteen years of age. The King was
turned of fifty-five. The disparity of age seemed to make
the royal passion ridiculous. To Henry the situation seemed
poetical and pathetic. After this first interview he never
missed a single rehearsal. In the intervals he called per-
petually for the services of the court poet Malherbe,
who certainly contrived to perpetrate in his behalf some
of the most detestable verses that even he had ever
composed.
The nymph was Marguerite de Montmorency, daughter of
the Constable of France, and destined one day to become
the mother of the great Conde, hero of Kocroy. There can
be no doubt that she was exquisitely beautiful. Fair-
haired, with a complexion of dazzling purity, large expres-
sive eyes, delicate but commanding features, she had a
singular fascination of look and gesture, and a winning,
almost childlike, simplicity of manner. Without feminine
artifice or commonplace coquetry, she seemed to bewitch
and subdue at a glance men of all ranks, ages, and pursuits ;
kings and cardinals, great generals, ambassadors and states-
men, as well as humbler mortals whether Spanish, Italian,
1 Tallomant des Reaux (ed. 1854),
i. 170. Bontivoprlio, ' Relnzione dclla
Fuga di Frrinna d'Henrico di Bon>on«
Principe do Condc' (' Opere,' Parigi,
17481, p. 153. Michelet, ' Hist, dc la
France au 17«™« SiOclc: Henri IV
et Richelieu,' pp. 161, 162.
2 Tallemant dea Reaux, i. 171.
112 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. II.
French, or Flemish.1 The Constable, an ignorant man who,
as the King averred, could neither write nor read, understood
as well as more learned sages the manners and humours of
the court. He had destined his daughter for the young and
brilliant Bassompierre, the most dazzling of all the cavaliers
of the day. The two were betrothed.
But the love-stricken Henry, then confined to his bed with
the gout, sent for the chosen husband of the beautiful
Margaret.2
" Bassompierre, my friend," said the aged king, as the
youthful lover knelt before him at the bedside, "I have
become not in love, but mad, out of my senses, furious for
Mademoiselle de Montmorency. If she should love you, I
should hate you. If she should love me, you would hate me.
'Tis better that this should not be the cause of breaking
up our good intelligence, for I love you with affection and
inclination. I am resolved to marry her to my nephew the
Prince of Conde, and to keep her near my family. She will
be the consolation and support of my old age into which I
am now about to enter. I shall give my nephew, who loves
the chace a thousand times better than he does ladies,
100,000 livres a year, and I wish no other favour from her
than her affection without making further pretensions." 3
It was eight o'clock of a black winter's morning, and the
tears as he spoke ran down the cheeks of the hero of Ivry
and bedewed the face of the kneeling Bassompierre.4
The courtly lover sighed and — obeyed. He renounced
1 " Haveva, la principessa di Conde
alhora sedici anni xxx la sua belJezza
corrispondera alia relazione che ne
haveva portata inanzi la fama," says
Cardinal Bentivoglio, who was Papal
nuncio at Brussels during this period,
and was himself much in love with
the Princess, as she related long after-
wards to ^ Lenet at Chantilly (P.
Lenet, ' Memoires,' ed. Petitot, p. ).
" Era bianchissima, plena di gratia
negli occhi e nel volto ; piena di vezzi
nel parlareed in ogni suo gesto; tutta
naturalmente si commendava per se
medesima la sua bellezza perche non
1' ajutava alcun donnesco artificio."—
' Rel. della Fuga,' 155.
2 ' Memoires de Bassompierre/ ed.
Petitot, i. p. 387, sag.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. pp. 386-388.
HENRY'S PASSION FOR MARGARET DE MONTMORSNCT. 113
the hand of the beautiful Margaret, and came daily to play
at dice with the King at his bedside with one or two other
companions.
And every day the Duchess of Angouleme, sister of the
Constable, brought her fair niece to visit and converse with
the royal invalid. But for the dark and tragic clouds
which were gradually closing around that eventful and
heroic existence there would be something almost comic in
the spectacle of the sufferer making the palace and all
France ring with the howlings of his grotesque passion for
a child of fifteen as he lay helpless and crippled with the
gout.
One day as the Duchess of Angouleme led her niece away
from their morning visit to the King, Margaret as she passed
by Bassompierre shrugged her shoulders with a scornful
glance. Stung by this expression of contempt, the lover
who had renounced her sprang from the dice table, buried
his face in his hat, pretending that his nose was bleeding,
and rushed frantically from the palace.1
Two days long he spent in solitude, unable to eat, drink,
or sleep, abandoned to despair and bewailing his wretched
fate, and it was long before he could recover sufficient
equanimity to face his lost Margaret and resume his place
at the King's dicing table. When he made his appearance,
he was according to his own account so pale, changed, and
emaciated that his friends could not recognise him.2
The marriage with Conde, first prince of the blood, took
place early in the spring. The bride received magnificent
presents, and the husband a pension of 100,000 March 10,
livres a year. The attentions of the King be- 1G09>
came soon outrageous and the reigning scandal of the
hour. Henry, discarding the grey jacket and simple cos-
1 ' M6moires de Bassompierre,' ed Petitot, i. p. 389.
* Ibid.
VOL. I. I
114 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. II.
tume on which he was wont to pride himself, paraded
himself about in perfumed ruffs and glittering doublet,
an ancient fop, very little heroic, and much ridiculed.
The Princess made merry with the antics of her royal
adorer, while her vanity at least, if not her affection,
was really touched, and there was one great round of
court festivities in her honour, at which the King and
herself were ever the central figures. But Conde was not
at all amused. Not liking the part assigned to him in
the comedy thus skilfully arranged by his cousin king,
never much enamoured of his bride, while highly ap-
preciating the 100,000 livres of pension, he remonstrated
violently with his wife, bitterly reproached the King, and
made himself generally offensive. " The Prince is here,"
wrote Henry to Sully, "and is playing the very devil.
You would be in a rage and be ashamed of the things
he says of me. But at last I am losing patience, and am
resolved to give him a bit of my mind." 1 He wrote in
the same terms to Montmorency.2 The Constable, whose
conduct throughout the affair was odious and pitiable, pro-
mised to do his best to induce the Prince, instead of playing
the devil, to listen to reason, as he and the Duchess of
Angouleme understood reason.
Henry had even the ineffable folly to appeal to the Queen
to use her influence with the refractory Conde. Mary de'
Medici replied that there were already thirty go-betweens
at work, and she had no idea of being the thirty-first.3
Conde, surrounded by a conspiracy against his honour and
happiness, suddenly carried off his wife to the country, much
to the amazement and rage of Henry.
In the autumn he entertained a hunting party at a seat of
his, the Abbey of Verneuille, on the borders of Picardy. De
1 ' Mem. de Sully,' vii. 247.
9 Henrard, ' Henri IV et la Princesse de Conde,' Bruxelles, 1870, p. 27.
s Henrard, 30.
1609. HEB MARRIAGE WITH THE PRIXCE OF CONDE. 115
Traigny, governor of Amiens, invited the Prince, Princess,
and the Dowager-Princess to a banquet at his chateau not far
from the Abbey. On their road thither they passed a group
of huntsmen and grooms in the royal livery. Among them
was an aged lackey with a plaister over one eye, holding a
couple of hounds in leash. The Princess recognized at a
glance under that ridiculous disguise the King.1
" What a madman ! " she murmured as she passed him, " I
will never forgive you ; " out as she confessed many years
afterwards, this act of gallantry did not displease her.2
In truth, even in mythological fable, Love has scarcely
ever reduced demi-god or hero to more fantastic plight than
was this travesty of the great Henry. After dinner Madame
de Traigny led her fair guest about the castle to show her
the various points of view. At one window she paused, say-
ing that it commanded a particularly fine prospect. The
Princess looked from it across a courtyard, and saw at an
opposite window an old gentleman holding his left hand
tightly upon his heart to show that it was wounded, and
blowing kisses to her with the other. " My God ! it is the
King himself," she cried to her hostess. The princess with
this exclamation rushed from the window, feeling or affecting
much indignation, ordered horses to her carriage instantly,
and overwhelmed Madame de Traigny with reproaches.
The King himself, hastening to the scene, was received with
passionate invectives, and in vain attempted to assuage the
Princess's wrath and induce her to remain.3
They left the chateau at once, both Prince and Princess.
One night, not many weeks afterwards, the Due de Sully,
in the Arsenal at Paris, had just got into bed NOV. 30,
at past eleven o'clock when he received a visit 1609-
from Captain de Praslin, who walked straight into his bed-
1 ' Memoircs do Pierre Lenet ' (ed. Petitot), i. 140. Tallemant des Rcaux
i. 172. » Ibid. » Ibid. 141.
116 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. 11.
chamber, informing him that the King instantly required
his presence.
Sully remonstrated. He was obliged to rise at three the
next morning, he said, enumerating pressing and most
important work which Henry required to be completed with
all possible haste. " The King said you would be very angry,"
replied Praslin ; "but there is no help for it. Come you
must, for the man you know of has gone out of the country,
as you said he would, and has carried away the lady on the
crupper behind him."
" Ho, ho," said the Duke, " I am wanted for that affair,
am I ? " And the two proceeded straightway to the Louvre,
and were ushered, of all apartments in the world, into the
Queen's bedchamber. Mary de' Medici had given birth only
four days before to an infant, Henrietta Maria, future queen
of Charles I. of England. The room was crowded with
ministers and courtiers ; Villeroy, the Chancellor, Bassom-
pierre, and others, being stuck against the wall at small
intervals like statues, dumb, motionless, scarcely daring to
breathe. The King, with his hands behind him and his grey
beard sunk on his breast, was pacing up and down the room
in a paroxysm of rage and despair
"Well," said he, turning to Sully as he entered, "our man
has gone off and carried everything with him. What do
you say to that ? "
The Duke beyond the boding " I told you so " phrase of
consolation which he was entitled to use, having repeatedly
warned his sovereign that precisely this catastrophe was
impending, declined that night to offer advice. He insisted
on sleeping on it. The manner in which the proceedings
of the King at this juncture would be regarded by the
Archdukes Albert and Isabella — for there could be no
doubt that Conde had escaped to their territory — and by
the King of Spain, in complicity with whom the step had
1609. THEIR FLIGHT TO THE NETHERLANDS. 117
unquestionably been taken — was of gravest political im-
portance.1
Henry had heard the intelligence but an hour before.
He was at cards in his cabinet with Bassompierre and others
when d'Elbene entered and made a private communication to
him. " Bassompierre, my friend," whispered the King im-
mediately in that courtier's ear, " I am lost. This man has
carried his wife off into a wood. I don't know if it is to kill
her or to take her out of France. Take care of my money
and keep up the game." 2
Bassompierre followed the King shortly afterwards and
brought him his money. He said that he had never seen a
man so desperate, so transported.
The matter was indeed one of deepest and universal
import. The reader has seen by the preceding narrative
how absurd is the legend often believed in even to our own
days that war was made by France upon the Archdukes
and upon Spain to recover the Princess of Conde from
captivity in Brussels.
From contemporary sources both printed and unpublished ;
from most confidential conversations and revelations, we have
seen how broad, deliberate, and deeply considered were the
warlike and political combinations in the King's ever restless
brain. But although the abduction of the new Helen by
her own Menelaus was not the cause of the impending Iliad,
there is no doubt whatever that the incident had much to
do with the crisis, was the turning point in a great tragedy,
and that but for the vehement passion of the King for
this youthful princess events might have developed them-
selves on a far different scale from that which they were
destined to assume. For this reason a court intrigue,
which history under other conditions might justly disdain,
1 ' M£m. de BaBsompierro,' i. 420, 421, sqq. ' Mem. de Sully/ vii. 255, sqq.
» Ibid. Ibid.
118 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. II.
assumes vast proportions and is taken quite away from the
scandalous chronicle which rarely busies itself with grave
affairs of state.
"The flight of Conde," wrote Aerssens, "is the catas-
trophe to the comedy which has been long enacting. Tis to
be hoped that the sequel may not prove tragical." 1
" The Prince," for simply by that title he was usually
called to distinguish him from all other princes in France,
was next of blood. Had Henry no sons, he would have suc-
ceeded him on the throne. It was a favourite scheme of the
Spanish party to invalidate Henry's divorce from Margaret
of Yalois, and thus to cast doubts on the legitimacy of
the Dauphin and the other children of Mary de' Medici.
The Prince in the hands of the Spanish government
might prove a docile and most dangerous instrument to
the internal repose of France not only after Henry's death
but in his life-time. Conde's character was frivolous, un-
stable, excitable, weak, easy to be played upon by design-
ing politicians, and he had now the deepest cause for anger
and for indulging in ambitious dreams.
He had been wont during this unhappy first year of his
marriage to loudly accuse Henry of tyranny, and was now
likely by public declaration to assign that as the motive of
his flight. Henry had protested in reply that he had never
been guilty of tyranny but once in his life, and that was
when he allowed this youth to take the name and title of
1 Conde.2
For the Princess-Dowager his mother had lain for years in
prison, under the terrible accusation of having murdered her
husband, in complicity with her paramour, a Gascon page,
named Belcastel. The present prince had been born several
months after his reputed father's death. Henry, out of
1 Aeresens to Carew, 30 Nov. 1609. (MS.)
2 Sully, ubi sup.
1609. THEIR FLIGHT TO THE NETHERLANDS. 119
good nature, or perhaps for less creditable reasons, had come
to the rescue of the accused princess, and had caused the
process to be stopped, further enquiry to be quashed, and
the son to be recognized as legitimate Prince of Conde.
The Dowager had subsequently done her best to further
the King's suit to her son's wife, for which the Prince bit-
terly reproached her to her face, heaping on her epithets
which she well deserved.1
Henry at once began to threaten a revival of the criminal
suit, with a view of bastardizing him again, although the
Dowager had acted on all occasions with great docility in
Henry's interests.
The flight of the Prince and Princess was thus not only
an incident of great importance to the internal politics of
France, but had a direct and important bearing on the im-
pending hostilities. Its intimate connection with the affairs of
the Netherland commonwealth was obvious. It was probable
that the fugitives would make their way towards the Arch-
dukes' territory, and that afterwards their first point of des-
tination would be Breda, of which Philip William of Orange,
eldest brother of Prince Maurice, was the titular proprietor.
Since the truce recently concluded the brothers, divided so
entirely by politics and religion, could meet on fraternal and
friendly terms, and Breda, although a city of the Common-
wealth, received its feudal lord. The Princess of Orange
was the sister of Conde. The morning after the flight the
King, before daybreak, sent for the Dutch ambassador.2 Ha
directed him to despatch a courier forthwith to Barneveld,
notifying him that the Prince had left the kingdom without
the permission or knowledge of his sovereign, and stating
the King's belief that he had fled to the territory of the
Archdukes. If he should come to Breda or to any other place
. ' L'Estoile, 'Registres journaux
sur lo R£gne dc Henry IV ' (cd. Peti-
tot), vol. iii. 2G8.
9 Aerssens to Barneveld, 30 Nov.
1609. (MS.)
120
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. U
within the jurisdiction of the States, they were requested to
make sure of his person at once, and not to permit him to
retire until further instructions should be received from the
King. De Praslin, captain of the body-guards and lieu-
tenant of Champagne, it was further mentioned, was to be
sent immediately on secret mission concerning this affair to
the States and to the Archdukes.
The King suspected Conde of crime, so the Advocate was
to be informed. He believed him to be implicated in the
conspiracy of Poitou ; the six who had been taken prisoners
having confessed that they had thrice conferred with a
prince at Paris, and that the motive of the plot was to free
themselves and France from the tyranny of Henry IV.
The King insisted peremptorily, despite of any objections
from Aerssens, that the thing must be done and his in-
structions carried out to the letter. So much he expected
of the States, and they should care no more for ulterior con-
sequences, he said, than he had done for the wrath of Spain
when he frankly undertook their cause. Conde was im-
portant only because his relative, and he declared that if the
Prince should escape, having once entered the territory of
the Republic, he should lay the blame on its government.
" If you proceed languidly in the affair," wrote Aerssens to
Barneveld, " our affairs will suffer for ever." 1
Nobody at court believed in the Poitou conspiracy, or
that Conde had any knowledge of it. The reason of his
flight was a mystery to none, but as it was immediately
followed by an intrigue with Spain, it seemed ingenious to
Henry to make use of a transparent pretext to conceal the
ugliness of the whole affair.2
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 30 Nov.
1609. (MS.)
* " . . . et luy pent etre se voudra
couvrir de quelque aultre raison quy
sera heureuse sy creue au dyhors. Je
crains qu'on a fait crevcr 1'apostmne
a la trop presser. Vous scaviez trop
bienceste histoiresansq u'il soitbesoin
de vous en entretenir davantage." —
Aerssens to Carew, before cited.
1609. THEIR FLIGHT TO THE NETHERLANDS. 121
He hoped that the Prince would be arrested at Breda and
sent back by the States. Villeroy said that if it was not
done, they would be guilty of black ingratitude. It would
be an awkward undertaking, however, and the States
devoutly prayed that they might not be put to the test.
The crafty Aerssens suggested to Barneveld that if Conde
was not within their territory it would be well to assure the
King that, had he been there, he would have been delivered
up at once. " By this means," said the Ambassador, " you
will give no cause of offence to the Prince, and will at the
same time satisfy the King. It is important that he should
think that you depend immediately upon him. If you see
that after his arrest they take severe measures against him,
you will have a thousand ways of parrying the blame which
posterity might throw upon you. History teaches you
plenty of them." 1
He added that neither Sully nor anyone else thought
much of the Poitou conspiracy. Those implicated asserted
that they had intended to raise troops there to assist the
King in the Cleve expedition. Some people said that Henry
had invented this plot against his throne and life. The
Ambassador, in a spirit of prophecy, quoted the saying
of Domitian : " Misera conditio imperantium quibus dc con-
spiratione non credifur nisi occisis."
Meantime the fugitives continued their journey. The
Prince was accompanied by one of his dependants, a rude
officer, de Rochefort, who carried the Princess on a pillion
behind him. She had with her a lady-in-waiting named
du Certeau and a lady's maid named Philippote. She had
no clothes but those on her back, not even a change of
linen. Thus the young and delicate lady made the wintry
journey through the forests. They crossed the frontier at
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 8 Dec. 1609. (MS.)
122
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. II.
Landrecies,1 then in the Spanish Netherlands, intending to
traverse the Archduke's territory in order to reach Breda,
where Conde meant to leave his wife in charge of his sister,
the Princess of Orange, and then to proceed to Brussels.
He wrote from the little inn at Landrecies to notify the
Archduke of his project. He was subsequently informed
that Albert would not prevent his passing through his
territories, but should object to his making a fixed residence
within them.2 The Prince also wrote subsequently to the
King of Spain and to the King of France.
To Henry he expressed his great regret at being obliged
to leave the kingdom in order to save his honour and his
life, but that he had no intention of being anything else
than his very humble and faithful cousin, subject, and
servant. He would do nothing against his service, he said,
unless forced thereto, and he begged the King not to take it
amiss if he refused to receive letters from any one whomsoever
at court, saving only such letters as his Majesty himself
might honour him by writing.3
1 Bentivoglio, 'Rel. della Fuga,'
153, 154. Le Pere G. Daniel, ' His-
toire de France,' Paris, 1756, t. xii.
p. 541, sqq. Magistrals de Lan-
drecies a 1'Archiduc Albert, 1 Dec.
1609.
I desire to express my obliga-
tions to tlie excellent work of Cap-
tain Paul Henrard, ' Henri IV et la
Princesse de Conde/ Brussels, 1870,
•who has narrated this singular epi-
sode with succinctness and elegance,
enriching his volumes with an ap-
pendix containing the diplomatic cor-
respondence of Pecquius, so far as it
relates to this subject, besides other
Freviously unpublished documents,
have read much of the original
manuscript of the Archdukes and of
Pecquius, both for this and some sub-
sequent epochs, in the Royal Archives
at Brussels. My citations, however,
of these letters are from M. Henrard's
printed collection, as careful compa-
rison with the originals has shown
me their perfect accuracy.
Many of these papers, as well as
additional ones from the Archives
of Simancas, are likewise printed in
the second volume of the instructive
work of H. R. H. the Due d'Aumale,
' Histoire des Princes de Conde pen-
dant les xvi" et xvii8 Siecles,' from
which I have derived much infor-
mation.
s " . . . mais qu'il pouvoit asscurer
le diet Seigneur Roy quo nous ne
souffrirons qu'il face sejouret moins
sa demeure fixe rifire les pais de notre
obeissance et que nous avion s faict
dire mesme responce au dit Sieur de
Praslain," &c. &c. — Archdukes to P.
Pecquius, 4 Dec. 1609, in Henrard.
Archdukes to Ortemberg, agent at
Rome, same date.
3 ' Mem. de Sully,' vii. 264, note 30.
'Mem. pour 1'Hist. de France,' arm.
1610.
1609. RAGE OF THE KIXG. 123
The result of this communication to the King was of
course to enrage that monarch to the utmost, and his first
impulse on finding that the Prince was out of his reach was
to march to Brussels at once and take possession of him and
the Princess by main force. More moderate counsels pre-
vailed for the moment however, and negotiations were
attempted.
Praslin did not contrive to intercept the fugitives, but the
States-General, under the advice of Barneveld, absolutely
forbade their coming to Breda or entering any part of their
jurisdiction. The result of Conde's application to the King
of Spain was an ultimate offer of assistance and asylum,
through a special emissary, one Anover ; for the politicians
of Madrid were astute enough to see what a card the Prince
might prove in their hands.
Henry instructed his ambassador in Spain * to use strong
and threatening language in regard to the harbouring a
rebel and a conspirator against the throne of France ; while
on the other hand he expressed his satisfaction with the
States for having prohibited the Prince from entering their
territory.2 He would have preferred, he said, if they had
allowed him entrance and forbidden his departure, but on
the whole he was content. It was thought in Paris that the
Netherland government had acted with much adroitness in
thus abstaining both from a violation of the law of nations
and from giving offence to the King.
A valet of Conde was taken with some papers of the
Prince about him, which proved a determination on his part
never to return to France during the lifetime of Henry.3
They made no statement of the cause of his flight, except to
intimate that it might be left to the judgment of every one,
as it was unfortunately but too well known to all.
1 ' Recueil des Lettrea missives de
Henri IV.' t. v.
1 Aerssens to Bamevold, 10 Dec.
1609. (HajErues Archives MS.)
8 Same to same, 8 Dec. 1609. (MS.)
124
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. II.
Kefused entrance into the Dutch territory, the Prince was
obliged to renounce his project in regard to Breda, and
brought his wife to Brussels. He gave Bentivoglio, the
Papal nuncio, two letters to forward to Italy, one to the
Pope, the other to his nephew, Cardinal Borghese. En-
couraged by the advices which he had received from Spain,
he justified his flight from France both by the danger to his
honour and to his life, recommending both to the protection of
his Holiness and his Eminence. Bentivoglio sent the letters,
but while admitting the invincible reasons for his departure
growing out of the King's pursuit of the Princess, he
refused all credence to the pretended violence against Conde
himself.1 Conde informed de Praslin that he would not
consent to return to France. Subsequently he imposed as
conditions of return that the King should assign to him
certain cities and strongholds in Guienne, of which province
he was governor, far from Paris and very near the Spanish
frontier ; a measure dictated by Spain and which inflamed
Henry's wrath almost to madness.2 The King insisted on
his instant return, placing himself and of course the Princess
entirely in his hands and receiving a full pardon for this
effort to save his honour.3 The Prince and Princess of
Orange came from Breda to Brussels to visit their brother
and his wife. Here they established them in the Palace of
Nassau, once the residence in his brilliant youth of William
the Silent ; a magnificent mansion, surrounded by park and
garden, built on the brow of the almost precipitous hill,
beneath which is spread out so picturesquely the antique and
beautiful capital of Brabant.
The Archdukes received them with stately courtesy at
their own palace. On their first ceremonious visit to the
1 Bent. ' Bel. della Fuga,' 156.
* Ibid. Daniel, ' Hist, de France,'
sii. 544, sqq.
8 Bent. 'Rel. della Fujra,' 157.
Aerssens to Barneveld. (H. Arch.
MS.)
THEIR RECEPTION BY THE ARCHDUKES AT BRUSSELS. 125
sovereigns of the land, the formal Archduke, coldest and
chastest of mankind, scarcely lifted his eyes to gaze on the
wondrous beauty of the Princess, yet assured her after he
had led her through a portrait gallery of fair women that
formerly these had been accounted beauties, but that hence-
forth it was impossible to speak of any beauty but her own.1
The great Spinola fell in love with her at once, sent for
the illustrious Rubens from Antwerp to paint her portrait,2
and offered Mademoiselle de Chateau Vert 10,000 crowns
in gold if she would do her best to further his suit
with her mistress.3 The Genoese banker-soldier made love,
war, and finance on a grand scale.4 He gave a magnificent
banquet and ball in her honour on Twelfth Night, and the
festival was the wonder of the town. Nothing like it had
been seen in Brussels for years. At six in the evening
Spinola in splendid costume, accompanied by Don Luis
Velasco, Count Ottavio Visconti, Count Bucquoy, with other
nobles of lesser note, drove to the Nassau Palace to bring the
Prince and Princess and their suite to the Marquis's mansion.
Here a guard of honour of thirty musketeers was standing
before the door, and they were conducted from their coaches
by Spinola preceded by twenty-four torch-bearers up the
grand staircase to a hall, where they were received by
the Princesses of Mansfeld, Velasco, and other distinguished
dames. Thence they were led through several apartments
rich with tapestry and blazing with crystal and silver plate
to a splendid saloon where was a silken canopy, under which
the Princess of Conde and the Princess of Orange seated
themselves, the Nuncius Bentivoglio to his delight being
placed next the beautiful Margaret. After reposing for a
little while they were led to the ball-room, brilliantly lighted
' Hcnrard, 47. « Ibid. 50.
* Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 3 March 1610, in Henrard.
4 Henrard, p. 70.
126 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELJX CHAP. II.
with innumerable torches of perfumed wax and hung with
tapestry of gold and silk, representing in fourteen em-
broidered designs the chief military exploits of Spinola.
Here the banquet, a cold collation, was already spread on
a table decked and lighted with regal splendour. As soon
as the guests were seated, an admirable concert of instru-
mental music began. Spinola walked up and down providing
for the comforts of his company, the Duke of Aumale stood
behind the two princesses to entertain them with conver-
sation, Don Luis Velasco served the Princess of Conde with
plates, handed her the dishes, the wine, the napkins, while
Bucquoy and Yiseonti in like manner waited upon the
Princess of Orange ; other nobles attending to the other
ladies. Forty-eight pages in white, yellow, and red scarves
brought and removed the dishes. The dinner, of courses
innumerable, lasted two hours and a half, and the ladies,
being thus fortified for the more serious business of the
evening, were led to the tiring-rooms while the hall was
made ready for dancing. The ball was opened by the
Princess of Conde and Spinola, and lasted until two in the
morning. As the apartment grew warm, two of the pages
went about with long staves and broke all the windows until
not a single pane of glass remained. The festival was
estimated by the thrifty chronicler of Antwerp to have
cost from 3000 to 4000 crowns. It was, he says, "an
earthly paradise of which soon not a vapour remained." He
added that he gave a detailed account of it " not because he
took pleasure in such voluptuous pomp and extravagance,
but that one might thus learn the vanity of the world." 1
These courtesies and assiduities on the part of the great " shop-
keeper," as the Constable called him, had so much effect,
if not on the Princess, at least on Conde himself, that he
threatened to throw his wife out of window if she refused to
1 Van Meteren, ' Ned. Hist.' b. xxxi. p. 687.
1610.
SPLENDID ENTERTAINMENTS BY SPINOLA.
127
caress Spinola.1 These and similar accusations were made
by the father and aunt when attempting to bring about a
divorce of the Princess from her husband.2 The Nuncius
Bentivoglio, too, fell in love with her, devoting himself to
her service, and his facile and eloquent pen to chronicling
her story. Even poor little Philip of Spain in the depths
of the Escurial heard of her charms,3 and tried to imagine
himself in love with her by proxy.
Thenceforth there was a succession of brilliant festivals in
honour of the Princess. The Spanish party was radiant with
triumph, the French maddened with rage. Henry in Paris
was chafing like a lion at bay. A petty sovereign whom he
could crush at one vigorous bound was protecting the lady
for whose love he was dying. He had secured Conde's
exclusion from Holland, but here were the fugitives
splendidly established in Brussels ; the Princess surrounded
by most formidable suitors, the Prince encouraged in his
rebellious and dangerous schemes by the power which the
King most hated on earth, and whose eternal downfall he
had long since sworn to accomplish.
For the weak and frivolous Conde began to prattle publicly
of his deep projects of revenge. Aided by Spanish money
and Spanish troops he would show one day who was the
real heir to the throne of France — the illegitimately born
Dauphin or himself.
The King sent for the first president of Parliament^
Harlay, and consulted with him as to the proper means of
reviving the suppressed process against the Dowager and
of publicly degrading Condu from his position of first prince
of the blood which he had been permitted to usurp.4 He
likewise procured a decree accusing him of high-treason and
1 Pecquius to Archduko Albert, 8
March 1610, in Henrard.
* Ibid.
8 Same to same, 31 March 1610,
in Henrard.
4 Aerssena to Bameveld, 8 Doc
1609. (MS.)
128
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IL
ordering him to be punished at his Majesty's pleasure, to be
prepared by the Parliament of Paris ; going down to the
court himself in his impatience and seating himself in every-
day costume on the bench of judges to see that it was im-
mediately proclaimed.1
Instead of at once attacking the Archdukes in force as he
intended in the first ebullition of his wrath, he resolved to
send de Boutteville-Montmorency, a relative of the Con-
stable, on special and urgent mission to Brussels. He was
to propose that Conde and his wife should return with the
Prince and Princess of Orange to Breda, the King pledging
himself that for three or four months nothing should be
undertaken against him.2 Here was a sudden change of
determination fit to surprise the States-G-eneral, but the
King's resolution veered and whirled about hourly in
the tempests of his wrath and love.
That excellent old couple, the Constable and the Duchess
of Angouleme, did their best to assist their sovereign in
his fierce attempts to get their daughter and niece into his
power.
The Constable procured a piteous letter to be written 3 to
Archduke Albert, signed "Montmorency his mark," imploring
him not to "suffer that his daughter, since the Prince
refused to return to France, should leave Brussels to be a
wanderer about the world following a young prince who had
no fixed purpose in his mind.4
Archduke Albert, through his ambassador in Paris, Peter
Pecquius, suggested the possibility of a reconciliation be-
tween Henry and his kinsman, and offered himself as inter-
mediary. He enquired whether the King would find it
1 ' Mem. de Sully,' vii. 270, note.
* Aerssens to Barneveld. 16 Dec.
1609. (MS.)
3 Henry said that with his Chan-
cellor (Sillery), who knew no Latin,
and his Constable, who could neither
write nor read, he could get through
the most difficult affairs. ' Memoires
de Sully,' vii. 227, note 22.
4 Montmorency to Archduke Albert,
16 Jan. 1610, in Henrard.
1610. ATTEMPTS TO BRING THE FUGITIVES BACK.
agreeable that he should ask for pardon in name of the
Prince. Henry replied that he was willing that the Archduke
should accord to Conde secure residence for the time within
his dominions on three inexorable conditions : — Firstly,
that the Prince should ask for pardon without any stipula-
tions, the King refusing to listen to any treaty or to assign
him towns or places of security as had been vaguely sug-
gested, and holding it utterly unreasonable that a man
sueing for pardon should, instead of deserved punishment,
talk of terms and acquisitions ; secondly, that, if Conde
should reject the proposition, Albert should immediately
turn him out of his country, showing himself justly irritated
at finding his advice disregarded ; thirdly, that, sending
away the Prince, the Archduke should forthwith restore the
Princess to her father the Constable and her aunt Angou-
leme, who had already made their petitions to Albert and
Isabella for that end, to which the King now added his own
most particular prayers.
If the Archduke should refuse consent to these three con-
ditions, Henry begged that he would abstain from any
farther attempt to effect a reconciliation and not suffer
Conde to remain any longer within his territories.
Pccquius replied that he thought his master might agree
to the two first propositions while demurring to the third,
as it would probably not seem honourable to him to se-
parate man and wife, and as it was doubtful whether the
Princess would return of her own accord.1
The King, in reporting the substance of this conversation
to Aerssens, intimated his conviction that they were only
wishing in Brussels to gain time ; that they were waiting
for letters from Spain, which they were expecting ever
Bince the return of Condc's secretary from Milan, whither he
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 22 Dor. 1609. (MS.) Same to Caron, 27 Dec.
1609. (MS.)
VOL. I. K
130 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IL
had been sent to confer with the Governor, Count Fuentes.1
He said farther that he doubted whether the Princess
would go to Breda, which he should now like, but which
Coiide would not now permit. This he imputed in part
to the Princess of Orange, who had written a letter full
of invectives against himself to the Dowager-Princess
of Conde which she had at once sent to him. Henry
expressed at the same time his great satisfaction with the
States-General and with Barneveld in this affair, repeating
his assurances that they were the truest and best friends he
had.
The news of Condi's ceremonious visit to Leopold in
Jiilich could not fail to exasperate the King almost as much
as the pompous manner in which he was subsequently re-
ceived at Brussels ; Spinola and the Spanish Ambassador
going forth to meet him.2 At the same moment the secre-
tary of Vaucelles, Henry's ambassador in Madrid, arrived
in Paris, confirming the King's suspicions that Conde's
flight had been concerted with Don Inigo de Cardenas, and
was part of a general plot of Spain against the peace of the
kingdom. The Due d'Epernon, one of the most dangerous
plotters at the court, and deep in the intimacy of the Queen
and of all the secret adherents of the Spanish policy, had
been sojourning a long time at Metz, under pretence of
attending to his health, had sent his children to Spain,
as hostages according to Henry's belief, had made himself
master of the citadel, and was turning a deaf ear to all the
commands of the King.3
The supporters of Conde in France were openly changing
their note and proclaiming by the Prince's command that
he had left the kingdom in order to preserve his quality of
first prince of the blood, and that he meant to make good
1 Aerssens to Caron, 27 Dec. 1609. (MS.)
* Same to Barneveld, 29 Dec. 1609. (MS.) 8 Ibid.
1610. ATTEMPTS TO BEING THE FUGITIVES BACK. 131
his right of primogeniture against the Dauphin and sll
competitors.1
Such bold language and such open reliance on the support
of Spain in disputing the primogeniture of the Dauphin
were fast driving the most pacifically inclined in France
into enthusiasm for the war.
The States, too, saw their opportunity more vividly every
day. "What could we desire more," wrote Aerssens to
Barneveld, " than open war between France and Spain ?
Posterity will for ever blame us if we reject this great
occasion." 2
Peter Pecquius, smoothest and sliest of diplomatists, did
his best to make things comfortable, for there could be little
doubt that his masters most sincerely deprecated war. On
their heads would come the first blows, to their provinces
would return the great desolation out of which they had
hardly emerged. Still the Archduke, while racking his
brains for the means of accommodation, refused, to his
honour, to wink at any violation of the law of nations, gave
a secret promise, in which the Infanta joined, that the
Princess should not be allowed to leave Brussels without her
husband's permission,3 and resolutely declined separating
the pair except with the full consent of both. In order to
protect himself from the King's threats, he suggested send-
ing Conde to some neutral place for six or eight months, to
Prague, to Breda, or anywhere else ; but Henry knew that
Conde would never allow this unless he had the means by
Spanish gold of bribing the garrison there, and so of hold-
ing the place in pretended neutrality, but in reality at the
devotion of the King c f Spain.4
Meantime Henry had despatched the Marquis de Coeuvres,
1 Aeresene to van derWarcke, 6 Jan.
1610. (MS.)
* Same to Barneveld, 6 Jan. 1G10.
(MS.)
8 Bent. 'Rel. della Fuga,' 159.
4 Aereseus to Barneveld, 24 Jan.
1610. (MS.)
132
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. IL
brother of the beautiful Gabrielle, Duchess de Beaufort, and
one of the most audacious and unscrupulous of courtiers, on
a special mission to Brussels.1 De Coeuvres saw Conde
before presenting his credentials to the Archduke, and found
him quite impracticable. Acting under the advice of the
Prince of Orange, he expressed his willingness to retire to
some neutral city of Germany or Italy, drawing meanwhile
from Henry a pension of 40,000 crowns a year. But
de Coeuvres firmly replied that the King would make no
terms with his vassal nor allow Conde to prescribe con-
ditions to him. To leave him in Germany or Italy, he said,
was to leave him in the dependence of Spain. The King
would not have this constant apprehension of her intrigues
while living, nor leave such matter in dying for turbulence
in his kingdom. If it appeared that the Spaniards wished
to make use of the Prince for such purposes, he would be
beforehand with them, and show them how much more
injury he could inflict on Spain than they on France.2
Obviously committed to Spain, Conde replied to the en-
treaties of the emissary that if the King would give him
half his kingdom he would not accept the offer nor return
to France ; at least before the 8th of February, by which
date he expected advices from Spain. He had given his
word, he said, to lend his ear to no overtures before that
time.3 He made use of many threats, and swore that he
would throw himself entirely into the arras of the Spanish
'king if Henry would not accord him the terms which he
had proposed.4
To do this was an impossibility. To grant him places of
security would, as the King said, be to plant a standard for
all the malcontents of France to rally around. Conde had
1 Bent. 'Rel. della Fuga,'157, 158.
Daniel, ' Hist, de France,' t. xii. 546.
547.
1 Bent. • Rel. della Fuga,' 158.
3 Aerssens to Barneveld, 24 Jan.
1610. (MS.)
4 Peter Pecquius to Archduke Al
bert, 4 Feb. 1610. Hearard, 205.
1610. MISSION OF DE COETJVRES TO BRUSSELS. 133
evidently renounced all hopes of a reconciliation, however
painfully his host the Archduke might intercede for it. He
meant to go to Spain. Spinola was urging this daily and
hourly, said Henry, for he had fallen in love with the
Princess, who complained of all these persecutions in her
letters to her father, and said that she would rather die
than go to Spain.
The King's advices from de Coeuvres were however to
the effect that the step would probably be taken, that the
arrangements were making, and that Spiuola had been shut
up with Conde six hours long with nobody present but
Rochefort and a certain counsellor of the Prince of Orange
named Keeremans.1
Henry was taking measures to intercept them on their
flight by land, but there was some thought of their proceed-
ing to -Spain by sea. He therefore requested the States to
send two ships of war, swift sailers, well equipped, one to
watch in the roads of St. Jean and the other on the English
coast. These ships were to receive their instructions from
Admiral de Vicq, who would be well informed of all the
movements of the Prince and give warning to the captains
of the Dutch vessels by a preconcerted signal. The King
begged that Barneveld would do him this favour, if he
loved him, and that none might have knowledge of it
but the Advocate and Prince Maurice. The ships would
be required for two or three months only, but should be
equipped and sent forth as soon as possible.2
The States had no objection to performing this service,
although it subsequently proved to be unnecessary, and they
were quite ready at that moment to go openly into the war
to settle the affairs of Cleve, and once for all to drive the
Spaniards out of the Netherlands and beyond seas and
1 Letter of Aerssens, 24 Jan. 1610. (MS. before cited.) Aerssens to Bar-
neveld, 31 Jan. 1610. (MS.) * Letter of Aerssens, 24 Jan. 1010.
134 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. II.
mountains. Yet strange to say, those most conversant with
the state of affairs could not yet quite persuade themselves
that matters were serious, and that the King's mind was
fixed. Should Conde return, renounce his Spanish strata-
gems, and bring back the Princess to court, it was felt by
the King's best and most confidential friends that all might
grow languid again, the Spanish faction get the upper hand
in the King's councils, and the States find themselves in a
terrible embarrassment.1
On the other hand, the most prying and adroit of politi-
cians were puzzled to read the signs of the times. Despite
Henry's garrulity, or perhaps in consequence of it, the envoys
of Spain, the Empire, and of Archduke Albert were ignorant
whether peace were likely to be broken or not, in spite of
rumours which filled the air. So well had the secrets
been kept which the reader has seen discussed in con-
fidential conversations — the record of which has always
remained unpublished — between the King and those
admitted to his intimacy that very late in the winter
Pecquius, while sadly admitting 'to his masters that the
King was likely to take part against the Emperor in the
affair of the duchies, expressed the decided opinion that
it would be limited to the secret sending of succour to
Brandenburg and Neuburg as formerly to the United
Provinces, but that he would never send troops into Cleve,
or march thither himself.2
It is important, therefore, to follow closely the develop-
ment of these political and amorous intrigues, for they
furnish one of the most curious and instructive lessons of
history ; there being not the slightest doubt that upon their
issue chiefly depended the question of a great and general
war.
1 Aerssens to Duplessis-Mornay, 29 Jan. 1610. (MS.)
8 Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 10 Feb. 1610, in Henrard, 216.
1610. VAST BUT SECRET PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 135
Pecquius, not yet despairing that his master would effect
a reconciliation between the King and Conde, proposed
again that the Prince should be permitted to reside for a
time in some place not within the jurisdiction of Spain or of
the Archdukes, being allowed meantime to draw his annual
pension of 100,000 livres. Henry ridiculed the idea of
Conde's drawing money from him while occupying his time
abroad with intrigues against his throne and his children's
succession. He scoffed at the Envoy's pretences that Conde
was not in receipt of money from Spain, as if a man so
needy and in so embarrassing a position could live without
money from some source ; and as if he were not aware, from
his correspondents in Spain, that funds were both promised
and furnished to the Prince.
He repeated his determination not to accord him pardon
unless he returned to France, which he had no cause to
leave, and, turning suddenly on Pecquius, demanded why,
the subject of reconciliation having failed, the Archduke
did not immediately fulfil his promise of turning Conde
out of his dominions.1
Upon this Albert's minister drew back with the air of one
amazed, asking how and when the Archduke had ever made
such a promise.
" To the Marquis de Coeuvres," replied Henry.
Pecquius asked if his ears had not deceived him, and if
the King had really said that de Coeuvres had made such
a statement.
Henry repeated and confirmed the story.
Upon the Minister's reply that he had himself received
no such intelligence from the Archduke, the King suddenly
changed his tone, and said,
" No, I was mistaken — I was confused — the Marquis never
wrote me this ; but did you not say yourself that I might
1 Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 4 Feb. 1610, in Henrard.
136
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. H.
be assured that there would be no difficulty about it if the
Prince remained obstinate." 1
Pecquius replied that he had made such a proposition to
his masters by his Majesty's request ; but there had been
no answer received, nor time for one, as the hope of recon-
ciliation had not yet been renounced. He begged Henry to
consider whether, without instructions from his master, he
could have thus engaged his word.
" Well," said the King, " since you disavow it, I see very
well that the Archduke has no wish to give me pleasure,
and that these are nothing but tricks that you have been
amusing me with all this time. Very good ; each of us will
know what we have to do."
Pecquius considered that the King had tried to get him
into a net, and to entrap him into the avowal of a promise
which he had never made. Henry remained obstinate in his
assertions, notwithstanding all the envoy's protestations.2
" A fine trick, indeed, and unworthy of a king, i Si dicere
fas est,' " he wrote to Secretary of State Praets.3 " But the
force of truth is such that he who spreads the snare always
tumbles into the ditch himself."
Henry concluded the subject of Conde at this interview
by saying that he could have his pardon on the conditions
already named, and not otherwise.
He also made some complaints about Archduke Leopold,
who, he said, notwithstanding his demonstrations of wishing
a treaty of compromise, was taking towns by surprise which
he could not hold, and was getting his troops massacred on
credit.
Pecquius expressed the opinion that it would be better to
leave the Germans to make their own arrangements among
1 Pecqtuus to Archduke Albert, 4
Feb. 1610, in Henrard.
• Ibid.
3 Same to Praets, 4 Feb. 1610, in
Henrard, 208, 209.
1610. VAST BUT SECRET PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 137
themselves, adding that neither his masters nor the King
of Spain meant to mix themselves up in the matter.
" Let them mix themselves in it or keep out of it, as they
like/' said Henry, " I shall not fail to mix myself up in it." *
The King was marvellously out of humour.
Before finishing the interview, he asked Pecquius whether
Marquis Spinola was going to Spain very soon, as he had per-
mission from his Majesty to do so, and as he had information
that he would be on the road early in Lent. The Minister re-
plied that this would depend on the will of the Archduke, and
upon various circumstances. The answer seemed to displease
the King, and Pecquius was puzzled to know why.2 He was
not aware, of course, of Henry's project to kidnap the Marquis
on the road, and keep him as a surety for Conde.
The Envoy saw Villeroy after the audience, who told him
not to mind the King's ill-temper, but to bear it as patiently
as he could. His Majesty could not digest, he said, his
infinite displeasure at the obstinacy of the Prince ; but they
must nevertheless strive for a reconciliation. The King
was quick in words, but slow in deeds, as the Ambassador
might have observed before, and they must all try to main-
tain peace, to which he would himself lend his best efforts.3
As the Secretary of State was thoroughly aware that the
King was making vast preparations for war, and had given
in his own adhesion to the project, it is refreshing to observe
the candour with which he assured the representative of the
adverse party of his determination that friendliest relations
should be preserved.
It is still more refreshing to find Villeroy, the same after-
noon, warmly uniting with Sully, Lesdiguieres, and the
Chancellor, in the decision that war should begin forthwith.4
1 Pecquius to Archduke Albert,
letter last cited.
9 "... responce qui sembloit luy
deplaire, jo no scay pourquoi." —
Pecquius to Praets, last cited.
8 Ibid.
4 Aeresens to Barneveld, 7 Feb.
1610. (MS.)
138
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARJSTEVELD. CHAP. II.
For the King held a council at the Arsenal immediately
after this interview with Pecquius, in which he had become
convinced that Conde would never return. He took the
Queen with him, and there was not a dissentient voice as to
the necessity of beginning hostilities at once.1
Sully, however, was alone in urging that the main force of
the attack should be in the north, upon the Khine and Meuse.
Villeroy and those who were secretly in the Spanish interest
were for beginning it with the southern combination and
against Milan. Sully believed the Duke of Savoy to be
variable and attached in his heart to Spain, and he thought
it contrary to the interests of France to permit an Italian
prince to grow so great on her frontier. He therefore
thoroughly disapproved the plan, and explained to the
Dutch ambassador that all this urgency to carry on the
war in the south came from hatred to the United Provinces,
jealousy of their aggrandizement, detestation of the Reformed
religion, and hope to engage Henry in a campaign which he
could not carry on successfully. But he assured Aerssens
that he had the means of counteracting these designs and
of bringing on an invasion for obtaining possession of the
Meuse. If the possessory princes found Henry making war
in the Milanese only, they would feel themselves ruined,
and might throw up the game. He begged that Barneveld
would come on to Paris at once, as now or never was the
moment to assure the Republic for all time.2
The King had acted with malicious adroitness in turning
the tables upon the Prince and treating him as a rebel and
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 7 Feb.
1610. (MS.) Compare Pecquius to
Archduke Albert, 10 Feb. 1610, Hen-
rard, 215.
8 Letter of Aerssens last cited. A
comparison of the famous 'Economies
royales,' or 'Memoirs of Sully,' com-
piled from recollection, and dictated
to secretaries, and the letters of
Aerssens, written at the moment and
on the spot, shows in general extra-
ordinary accuracy on the part of the
great soldier and statesman, while
at the same time exhibiting an oc-
casional discrepancy and default of
memory.
1610. VAST BUT SECRET PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 139
a traitor because, to save his own and his wife's honour, he
had fled from a kingdom where he had but too good reason
to suppose that neither was safe. The Prince, with infinite
want of tact, had played into the King's hands. He had
bragged of his connection with Spain and of his deep
designs, and had shown to all the world that he was thence-
forth but an instrument in the hands of the Spanish cabinet,
while all the world knew the single reason for which he had
fled.
The King, hopeless now of compelling the return of
Conde, had become most anxious to separate him from his
wife. Already the subject of divorce between the two had
been broached, and it being obvious that the Prince would
immediately betake himself into the Spanish dominions,
the King was determined that the Princess should not follow
him thither.
He had the incredible effrontery and folly to request the
Queen to address a letter to her at Brussels, urging her to
return to France. But Mary de' Medici assured her husband
that she had no intention of becoming his assistant, using,
to express her thought, the plainest and most vigorous word
that the Italian language could supply.1 Henry had then
recourse once more to the father and aunt.
That venerable couple being about to wait upon the Arch-
duke's envoy, in compliance with the royal request, Pecquius,
out of respect to their advanced age, went to the Constable's
residence. Here both the Duchess and Constable, with
tears in their eyes, besought that diplomatist to do his
utmost to prevent the Princess from the sad fate of any
longer sharing her husband's fortunes.
The father protested that he would never have consented
to her marriage, preferring infinitely that she should have
espoused any honest gentleman with 2000 crowns a year
1 Henrard, 102, citing Sir», ' Mem. rec.' partie x. p. 84
140 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. II.
than this first prince of the blood, with a character such as
it had proved to be ; but that he had not dared to disobey
the King.1
He spoke of the indignities and cruelties to which she
was subjected, said that Rochefort, whom Conde had em-
ployed to assist him in their flight from France, and on
the crupper of whose horse the Princess had performed the
journey, was constantly guilty of acts of rudeness and in-
civility towards her ; that but a few days past he had fired
off pistols in her apartment where she was sitting alone with
the Princess of Orange, exclaiming that this was the way he
would treat anyone who interfered with the commands of his
master, Conde ; that the Prince was incessantly railing at
her for refusing to caress the Marquis of Spinola ; and that,
in short, he would rather she were safe in the palace of
the Archduchess Isabella, even in the humblest position
among her gentlewomen, than to know her vagabondizing
miserably about the world with her husband.2
This, he said, was the greatest fear he had, and he would
rather see her dead than condemned to such a fate.3
He trusted that the Archdukes were incapable of be-
lieving the stories that he and the Duchess of Angouleme
were influenced in the appeals they made for the separation
of the Prince and Princess by a desire to serve the purposes
of the King.4 Those were fables put about by Conde. All
that the Constable and liis sister desired was that the Arch-
duchess would receive the Princess kindly when she should
throw herself at her feet, and not allow her to be torn away
against her will. The Constable spoke with great gravity
and simplicity, and with all the signs of genuine emotion,
and Peter Pecquius was much moved. He assured the aged
pair that he would do his best to comply with their wishes,
1 Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 10 Feb. 1610, in Henrard.
2 Ibid. s Ibid- 4
1610. ATTEMPTS TO BRING THE FUGITIVES BACK. 141
and should immediately apprise the Archdukes of the
interview which had just taken place. Most certainly they
were entirely disposed to gratify the Constable and the
Duchess as well as the Princess herself, whose virtues, quali-
ties, and graces had inspired them with affection, but it
must be remembered that the law both human and divine
required wives to submit themselves to the commands of
their husbands and to be the companions of their good and
evil fortunes. Nevertheless, he hoped that the Lord would
so conduct the affairs of the Prince of Conde that the Most
Christian King and the Archdukes would all be satisfied.1
These pious and consolatory commonplaces on the part of
Peter Pecquius deeply affected the Constable. He fell upon
the Envoy's neck, embraced him repeatedly, and again wept
plentifully.
1 Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 10 Feb. 1610, in Henrard.
142 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. III.
CHAPTER III.
Strange Scene at the Archduke's Palace — Henry's Plot frustrated — His
Triumph changed to Despair — Conversation of the Dutch Ambassador
with the King — The War determined upon.
IT was in the latter part of the Carnival, the Saturday
night preceding Shrove Tuesday, 1610. The winter had "been
' Feb. is a rigorous one in Brussels, and the snow lay in
I6io. drifts three feet deep in the streets. Within and
about the splendid palace of Nassau there was much com-
motion. Lights and flambeaux were glancing, loud voices,
martial music, discharge of pistols and even of artillery1
were heard together with the trampling of many feet, but
there was nothing much resembling the wild revelry or
cheerful mummery of that holiday season. A throng of the
great nobles of Belgium with drawn swords and menacing
aspect were assembled in the chief apartments, a detach-
ment of the Archduke's mounted body-guard was stationed
in the courtyard, and five hundred halberdiers of the burgher
guilds kept watch and ward about the palace.
The Prince of Conde, a square-built, athletic young man
of middle stature, with regular features, but a sulky expres-
sion, deepened at this moment into ferocity, was seen chasing
the secretary of the French resident minister out of the
courtyard, thwacking him lustily about the shoulders with
his drawn sword, and threatening to kill him or any other
Frenchman on the spot, should he show himself in that
palace.2 He was heard shouting rather than speaking, in
1 Archduke Albert to Pecquius, 18 Feb. 1610, in Henrard.
* Ibid.
1610. STRANGE SCENE AT THE ARCHDUKE'S PALACE. 143
furious language against the King, against Coeuvres, against
Berny, and bitterly bewailing his misfortunes, as if his wife
were already in Paris instead of Brussels.1
Upstairs in her own apartment which she had kept for
some days on pretext of illness sat the Princess Mar-
garet, in company2 of Madame de Berny, wife of the
French minister, and of the Marquis de Coeuvres, Henry's
special envoy, and a few other Frenchmen. She was pas-
sionately fond of dancing. The adoring cardinal described
her as marvellously graceful and perfect in that accomplish-
ment. She had begged her other adorer, the Marquis
Spinola, " with sweetest words," that she might remain a few
days longer in the Nassau Palace before removing to the
Archduke's residence, and that the great general, according
to the custom in France and Flanders, would be the one
to present her with the violins. But Spinola, knowing the
artifice concealed beneath these " sweetest words," had sum-
moned up valour enough to resist her blandishments, and
had refused a second entertainment.3
It was not, therefore, the disappointment at losing her ball
that now made the Princess sad. She and her companions
saw that there had been a catastrophe ; a plot discovered.
There was bitter disappointment and deep dismay upon their
faces. The plot had been an excellent one. De Coeuvres had
arranged it all, especially instigated thereto by the father
of the Princess acting in concurrence with the King.4 That
night when all was expected to be in accustomed quiet, the
Princess, wrapped in her mantilla, was to have stolen down
into the garden, accompanied only by her maid the adven-
turous and faithful Philipotte, to have gone through a
breach which led through a garden wall to the city
ramparts,5 thence across the foss to the counterscarp, where
1 Bent. ' Rcl. dclla Fuga,' 100.
• Ibid.
» Ibid.
4 Daniel, xii. 547.
5 Daniel, ubi sup-
144
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. III.
a number of horsemen under trustworthy commanders were
waiting. Mounting on the crupper behind one of the officers
of the escort, she was then to fly to the frontier, relays of
horses having been provided at every stage until she should
reach Bocroy, the first pausing place within French ter-
ritory ; 1 a perilous adventure for the young and delicate
Princess in a winter of almost unexampled severity.2
On the very morning of the day assigned for the adven-
ture, despatches brought by special couriers from the
Nuncius and the Spanish ambassador at Paris gave notice
of the plot to the Archdukes and to Conde, although up to
that moment none knew of it in Brussels. Albert, having
been apprised that many Frenchmen had been arriving
during the past few days, and swarming about the hostelries
of the city and suburbs, was at once disposed to believe in
the story. When Conde came to him, therefore, with con-
firmation from his own letters, and demanding a detachment
of the body-guard in addition to the burgher militiamen
already granted by the magistrates, he made no difficulty
in granting the request.3 It was as if there had been a
threatened assault of the city, rather than the attempted
elopement of a young lady escorted by a handful of cavaliers.
The courtyard of the Nassau Palace was filled with
cavalry sent by the Archduke, while five hundred burgher
guards sent by the magistrates were drawn up around the
gate. The noise and uproar, gaining at every moment
more mysterious meaning by the darkness of night, soon
spread through the city. The whole population was awake,
and swarming through the streets. Such a tumult had not
for years been witnessed in Brussels, and the rumour flew
1 Daniel, xii. 547. It is singular
that this proposed first resting-place
in the flight of the Princess should
be the spot made so memorable after-
wards by the victory of her son, the
great Prince of Conde.
2 L'Estoile, iii. 378.
3 Archdukes to Pecquius, 13 Feb.
1610, in Henrard.
1610. HENRY'S PLOT FRUSTRATED. 145
about and was generally believed that the King of France at
the head of an army was at the gates of the city determined to
carry off the Princess by force.1 But although the superfluous
and very scandalous explosion might have been prevented,
there could be no doubt that the stratagem had been defeated.
Nevertheless, the effrontery and ingenuity of de Coeuvres
became now sublime. Accompanied by his colleague, the
resident minister, de Berny, who was sure not to betray the
secret because he had never known it2 — his wife alone
having been in the confidence of the Princess — he proceeded
straightway to the Archduke's palace, and, late in the night
as it was, insisted on an audience.
Here putting on his boldest face when admitted to the
presence, he complained loudly of the plot, of which he had
just become aware, contrived by the Prince of Conde to
carry off his wife to Spain against her will, by main force,
and by assistance of Flemish nobles, archiducal body-guard,
and burgher militia.
It was all a plot of Conde, he said, to palliate still more
his flight from France. Every one knew that the Princess
could not fly back to Paris through the air. To take her
out of a house filled with people, to pierce or scale the walls
of the city, to arrange her journey by ordinary means, and
to protect the whole route by stations of cavalry, reaching
from Brussels to the frontier, and to do all this in profound
secrecy, was equally impossible. Such a scheme had never
been arranged nor even imagined, he said. The true plotter
was Conde, aided by ministers in Flanders hostile to France,
and as the honour of the King and the reputation of the
Princess had been injured by this scandal, the Ambassador
loudly demanded a thorough investigation of the affair in
order that vengeance might fall where it was due.3
1 Bent. 'Rel. della Fuga,' 161. » Daniel xii. 548.
1 Bent. 161.
VOL. I. L
146 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IIL
The prudent Albert was equal to the occasion. Not wish-
ing to state the full knowledge which he possessed of de
Coeuvres' agency and the King's complicity in the scheme
of abduction to France, he reasoned calmly with the excited
marquis, while his colleague looked and listened in dumb
amazement, having previously been more vociferous and
infinitely more sincere than his colleague in expressions of
indignation.
The Archduke said that he had not thought the plot
imputed to the King and his ambassador very probable.
Nevertheless, the assertions of the Prince had been so posi-
tive as to make it impossible to refuse the guards requested
by him. He trusted, however, that the truth would soon be
known, and that it would leave no stain on the Princess, nor
give any offence to the King.1
Surprised and indignant at the turn given to the ad-
venture by the French envoys, he nevertheless took care to
conceal these sentiments, to abstain from accusation, and
calmly to inform them that the Princess next morning
would be established under his own roof, and enjoy the
protection of the Archduchess.
For it had been arranged several days before that Mar-
garet should leave the palace of Nassau for that of Albert
and Isabella on the 14th, and the abduction had been fixed
for the night of the 13th precisely because the conspirators
wished to profit by the confusion incident on a change of
domicile.
The irrepressible de Coeuvres, even then hardly willing
to give up the whole stratagem as lost, was at least deter-
mined to discover how and by whom the plot had been
revealed. In a cemetery piled three feet deep with snow
on the evening following that mid-winter's night which
had been fixed for the Princess's flight, the unfortunate
1 Bentivoglio, ubi sup.
1610.
HENRY'S PLOT FRUSTRATED.
147
ambassador waited until a certain Vallobre, a gentleman of
Spinola's, who was the go-between of the enamoured Genoese
and the Princess, but whom de Coeuvres had gained over,
came at last to meet him by appointment;1 When he arrived,
it was only to inform him of the manner in which he had
been baffled, to convince him that the game was up, and
that nothing was left him but to retreat utterly foiled in
his attempt, and to be stigmatized as a blockhead by his
enraged sovereign.
Next day the Princess removed her residence to the
palace of the Archdukes,2 where she was treated with dis-
tinguished honour by Isabella, and installed ceremoniously
in the most stately, the most virtuous, and the most dismal of
courts. Her father and aunt professed themselves as highly
pleased with the result, and Pecquius wrote that " they were
glad to know her safe from the importunities of the old fop
who seemed as mad as if he had been stung by a tarantula." 3
And how had the plot been revealed ? Simply through the
incorrigible garrulity of the King himself. Apprised of the
arrangement in all its details by the Constable,4 who had
first received the special couriers of de Coeuvres, he could
not keep the secret to himself for a moment, and the person
of all others in the world to whom he thought good to con-
fide it was the Queen herself.5 She received the information
with a smile, but straightway sent for the Nuncius Ubaldini,
who at her desire instantly despatched a special courier to
Spinola with full particulars of the time and mode of the
proposed abduction.*5
Nevertheless the ingenuous Henry, confiding in the
capacity of his deeply offended queen to keep the secret
which he had himself divulged, could scarcely contain
1 Daniel, xii. 549.
* Archdukes to Pecquiaa, 15 Feb.
1610, in Henrard.
J Pecquius to Praets. 18 Feb. 1010,
in TTonrard.
4 Daniel, xii. 547.
8 Ibid.
« Ibid. 548.
148 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IIL
himself for joy. Off he went to Saint-Germain with a train
of coaches, impatient to get the first news from de Coeuvres
after the scheme should have been carried into effect, and
intending to travel post towards Flanders to meet and
welcome the Princess.
" Pleasant farce for Shrove Tuesday/' wrote the secretary
of Pecquius, "is that which the Frenchmen have been
arranging down there ! He in whose favour the abduction
is to be made was seen going out the same day spangled
and smart, contrary to his usual fashion, making a gambado
towards Saint-Germain-en-Laye with four carriages and four
to meet the nymph." *
Great was the King's wrath and mortification at this
ridiculous exposure of his detestable scheme. Vociferous
were Villeroy's expressions of Henry's indignation at being
supposed to have had any knowledge of or complicity in the
affair. " His Majesty cannot approve of the means one has
taken to guard against a pretended plot for carrying off the
Princess," said the Secretary of State ; " a fear which was
simulated by the Prince in order to defame the King." He
added that there was no reason to suspect the King, as he
had never attempted anything of the sort in his life, and
that the Archduke might have removed the Princess to his
palace without sending an army to the hotel of the Prince
of Orange, and causing such an alarm in the city, firing
artillery on the rampart as if the town had been full of
Frenchmen in arms, whereas one was ashamed next morning
to find that there had been but fifteen in all. " But it was
all Marquis Spinola's fault," he said, " who wished to show
himself off as a warrior." 2
The King, having thus through the mouth of his secretary
1 J. Simon to Praets, 20 Feb. 1610,
in Henrard. Comp. Pecquius to Arcli-
dnke Albert, 18 Feb. 1610.
* Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 18
Feb. 1610, in Henrard. Same to
same, 23 Feb. 1610. Same to Praets,
same date.
1610.
HENRY'S TRIUMPH CHANGED TO DESPAIR.
149
of state warmly protested against his supposed implication
in the attempted abduction, began as furiously to rail at
de Coeuvres for its failure ; telling the Due de Vendome 1
that his uncle was an idiot,2 and writing that unlucky
envoy most abusive letters for blundering in the scheme
which had been so well concerted between them. Then he
sent for Malherbe, who straightway perpetrated more poems
to express the King's despair, in which Henry was made to
liken himself to a skeleton with a dried skin, and likewise
to a violet turned up by the ploughshare and left to wither.3
He kept up through Madame de Berny a correspondence
with " his beautiful angel," as he called the Princess, whom
he chose to consider a prisoner and a victim ; while she,
wearied to death with the frigid monotony and sepulchral
gaieties of the archiducal court, which she openly called her
dungeon,4 diverted herself with the freaks and fantasies of
her royal adorer, called him in very ill-spelled letters " her
chevalier, her heart, her all the world," 5 and frequently wrote
to beg him, at the suggestion of the intriguing Chateau Vert,
to devise some means of rescuing her from prison.6
The Constable and Duchess meanwhile affected to be
sufficiently satisfied with the state of things. Conde, how-
ever, received a letter from the King, formally summoning
him to return to France, and, in case of refusal, declaring
him guilty of high- treason for leaving the kingdom without
the leave and against the express commands of the King.
To this letter brought to him by de Coeuvres, the Prince
1 Son of Henry IV. by Gabrielle,
Duchesse de Beaufort, sister of de
Coeuvres.
* Pecquius to Praets, 1 March 1610,
in Henrard.
3 '(Euvres de Francois de Malherbe'
(ed. 1723), t. i. 146.
" Anxni (>nls jc an pquclctte
Et la viofette
Qu'uu froid bore do salson
On le BOC a touchfio
De ma peau p6chec
Est la comparaison."
4 Bent. 'Rel. della Fujrn,' 168.
Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 19
March 1610.
5 Tallemant des Reaux, i. 180.
• Archdukes to Pecquius, 9 March
1610, in Henrard.
150
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. III.
replied by a paper, drawn up and served by a notary of
Brussels, to the effect that he had left France to save his
life and honour ; that he was ready to return when guarantees
were given him for the security of both. He would live
and die, he said, faithful to the King. But when the King,
departing from the paths of justice, proceeded through those
of violence against him, he maintained that every such act
against his person was null and invalid.1 Henry had even
the incredible meanness and folly to request the Queen to
write to the Archdukes, begging that the Princess might be
restored to assist at her coronation. Mary de' Medici
vigorously replied once more that, "although obliged to
wink at the King's amours, she declined to be his pro-
curess." 2 Conde then went off to Milan very soon after the
scene at the Nassau Palace and the removal of the Princess
to the care of the Archdukes. He was very angry with his
wife, from whom he expressed a determination to be
divorced, and furious with the King, the validity of whose
second marriage and the legitimacy of whose children he
proposed with Spanish help to dispute.
The Constable was in favour of the divorce, or pretended
to be so, and caused importunate letters to be written, which
he signed, to both Albert and Isabella, begging that his
daughter might be restored to him to be the staff of his old
age, and likewise to be present at the Queen's coronation.3
The Archdukes, however, resolutely refused to permit her
>to leave their protection without Conde's consent, or until
after a divorce had been effected, notwithstanding that the
father and aunt demanded it.4 The Constable and Duchess
1 Bent. 162. See also Aerssens'
notes ; also Henrard.
* Pecquius to the Archdukes, 27
March 1610. in Henrard.
8 Constable de Montmorency to
Archduke Albert ; same to the In-
fanta Isabella, 18 March and 20 April
1610, in Henrard. Henry IV. to
Archduke Albert and to the Infanta,
19 April 1610, in Henrard.
4 Archdukes to Pecquius, 22 Feb.
1610, in Henrard.
1610.
HENRY'S TRIUMPH CHANGED TO DESPAIR.
151
however, acquiesced in the decision, and expressed immense
gratitude to Isabella.
" The father and aunt have been talking to Pecquius," said
Henry very dismally ; " but they give me much pain. They
are even colder than the season, but my fire thaws them as
soon as I approach.
" P. S. — I am so pining away in my anguish that I am
nothing but skin and bones. Nothing gives me pleasure. I
fly from company, and if in order to comply with the law of
nations I go into some assembly or other, instead of enliven-
ing, it nearly kills me." 1
And the King took to his bed. Whether from gout, fever,
or the pangs of disappointed love, he became seriously ill.
Furious with every one, with Conde, the Constable, de
Coeuvres, the Queen, Spinola, with the Prince of Orange,2
whose councillor Keeremans had been encouraging Conde
in his rebellion and in going to Spain with Spinola, he was
now resolved that the war should go on. Aerssens, cautious
of saying too much on paper of this very delicate affair,
always intimated to Barneveld that, if the Princess could be
restored, peace was still possible, and that by moving an
inch ahead of the King in the Cleve matter the States at
the last moment might be left in the lurch. He distinctly
told the Advocate, on his expressing a hope that Henry
might consent to the Prince's residence in some neutral
place until a reconciliation could be effected, that the pinch
of the matter was not there, and that van der Myle, who
knew all about it, could easily explain it.3
Alluding to the project of reviving the process against
the Dowager, and of divorcing the Prince and Princess, he
said these steps would do much harm, as they would too
1 ' Lcttrea missives de Henri IV,'
vii. 834.
9 Aeresens to Prince of Orango, 20
Feb. 1610 ; same to Keeremans, same
date. (Haj?ue Archives MS.)
3 Same to Barneveld, 20 Feb. 1610.
(MS.)
152 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. 11L
much justify the true cause of the retreat of the Prince,
who was not believed when he merely talked of his right of
primogeniture. " The matter weighs upon us very heavily/'
he said, " but the trouble is that we don't search for the true
remedies. The matter is so delicate that I don't dare to
discuss it to the very bottom." 1
The Ambassador had a long interview with the King as he
lay in his bed feverish and excited. He was more impatient
than ever for the arrival of the States' special embassy,
reluctantly acquiesced in the reasons assigned for the delay,
but trusted that it would arrive soon with Barneveld at the
head, and with Count Lewis William as a member for " the
sword part of it."
He railed at the Prince of Orange, not believing that
Keeremans would have dared to do what he had done but
with the orders of his master. He said that the King of
Spain would supply Concle with money and with everything
he wanted, knowing that he could make use of him to trouble
his kingdom. It was strange, he thought, that Philip should
venture to these extremities with his affairs in such con-
dition, and when he had so much need of repose. He recalled
all his ancient grievances against Spain, his rights to the
Kingdom of Navarre and the County of St. Pol violated ;
the conspiracy of Biron, the intrigues of Bouillon, the plots
of the Count of Auvergne and the Marchioness of Verneuil,
the treason of Meragne, the corruption of L'Hoste, and an
infinity of other plots of the King and his ministers ; of deep
injuries to him and to the public repose, not to be tolerated
by a mighty king like himself, with a grey beard. He
would be revenged, he said, for this last blow, and so for
all the rest. He would not leave a troublesome war on the
hands of his young son. The occasion was favourable. It
was just to defend the oppressed princes with the promptly
1 Aerssens to Baroeveld, 7 Feb. 1610. (MS,)
CONVERSATION OF DUTCH AMBASSADOR WITH HENRY. 153
accorded assistance of the States-General. The King of
Great Britain was favourable. The Duke of Savoy was
pledged. It was better to begin the war in his green old
age than to wait the pleasure and opportunity of the King
of Spain.
All this he said while racked with fever, and dismissed
the Envoy at last, after a long interview, with these words :
"Mr. Ambassador — I have always spoken roundly and
frankly to you, and you will one day be my witness that I
have done all that I could to draw the Prince out of the
plight into which he has put himself. But he is struggling
for the succession to this crown under instructions from the
Spaniards, to whom he has entirely pledged himself. He
has already received 6000 crowns for his equipment.
I know that you and my other friends will work for the
conservation of this monarchy, and will never abandon me
in my designs to weaken the power of Spain. Pray God for
my health." 1
The King kept his bed a few days afterwards, but soon
recovered. Yilleroy sent word to Barneveld in answer to
his suggestions of reconciliation that it was too late, that
Conde was entirely desperate and Spanish. The crown of
France was at stake, he said, and the Prince was promising
himself miracles and mountains with the aid of Spain, loudly
declaring the marriage of Mary de' Medici illegal, and him-
self heir to the throne. The Secretary of State professed
himself as impatient as his master for the arrival of the
embassy ; the States being the best friends France ever had
and the only allies to make the war succeed.
Jeannin, who was now never called to the council, said
that the war was not for Germany but for Conde, and that
Henry could carry it on for eight years. He too was most
anxious for Barneveld's arrival, and was of his opinion that
1 Letter of Acrsscns, 20 Feb. 1010, before cited. (MS.)
154
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IIL
it would have been better for Conde to be persuaded to
remain at Breda and be supported by his brother-in-law, the
Prince of Orange. The impetuosity of the King had how-
ever swept everything before it, and Condc had been driven
to declare himself Spanish and a pretender to the crown.
There was no issue now but war.1
Boderie, the King's envoy in Great Britain, wrote that
James would be willing to make a defensive league for the
affairs of Cleve and Julich only, which was the slenderest
amount of assistance ; but Henry always suspected Master
Jacques of intentions to baulk him if possible and traverse
his designs. But the die was cast. Spinola had carried off
Conde in triumph ; the Princess was pining in her gilt cage
in Brussels, and demanding a divorce for desertion and cruel
treatment ; the King considered himself as having done as
much as honour allowed him to effect a reconciliation, and
it was obvious that, as the States' ambassador said, he could
no longer retire from the war without shame, which would
be the greatest danger of all.2
" The tragedy is ready to begin," said Aerssens. " They
are only waiting now for the arrival of our ambassadors." 3
On the 9th March the King before going to Fontainebleau
for a few days summoned that envoy to the Louvre.4 Im-
patient at a slight delay in his arrival, Henry came down
into the courtyard as he was arriving and asked eagerly if
Barneveld was coming to Paris. Aerssens replied that the
Advocate had been hastening as much as possible the de-
parture of the special embassy, but that the condition of
affairs at home was such as not to permit him to leave the
country at that moment. Yan der Myle, who would be one
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 2 March
1610. (MS.)
8 Ibid. Same to Digart, 1 March
1G10. (MS.)
3 Ibid.
4 Same to Barneveld, 9 March
1610. (MS.)
1610.
THE WAR DETERMINED UPON.
155
of the ambassadors, would more fully explain this by word
of mouth.
The King manifested infinite annoyance and disappoint-
ment that Barneveld was not to make part of the embassy.1
" He says that he reposes such singular confidence in your
authority in the state, experience in affairs, and affection for
himself," wrote Aerssens, " that he might treat with you in
detail and with open heart of all his designs. He fears now
that the ambassadors will be limited in their powers and
instructions, and unable to reply at once on the articles
which at different times have been proposed to me for our
enterprise. Thus much valuable time will be wasted in
sending backwards and forwards."
The King r.lso expressed great anxiety to consult with
Count Lewis William in regard to military details, but his
chief SOITOW was in regard to the Advocate. " He acquiesced
only with deep displeasure and regret in your reasons," said
the Ambassador, " and says that he can hope for nothing firm
now that you refuse to come." 2
Villeroy intimated that Barneveld did not come for fear
of exciting the jealousy of the English.3
1 " S. M. m'a temoigne d'estre in-
finement marry que vous ne seriez
pas du nombre des ainbassadeurs,"
&c. — Letter of Aerssens last cited.
9 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
156 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
CHAPTEE IV.
Difficult Position of Barneveld — Insurrection at Utrecht subdued by the
States' Army — Special Embassies to England and France — Anger of the
King with Spain and the Archdukes — Arrangements of Henry for the
coming War — Position of Spain — Anxiety of the King for the Presence
of Barneveld in Paris — Arrival of the Dutch Commissioners in France
and their brilliant Reception — Their Interview with the King and his
Ministers — Negotiations — Delicate Position of the Dutch Government
— India Trade — Simon Danzer, the Corsair — Conversations of Henry
•with the Dutch Commissioners — Letter of the King to Archduke Albert
— Preparations for the Queen's Coronation and of Henry to open the
Campaign in person — Perplexities of Henry — Forebodings and Warnings
— The Murder accomplished — Terrible Change in France — Triumph of
Concini and of Spain — Downfall of Sully — Disputes of the Grandees
among themselves — Special Mission of Condolence from the Republic —
Conference on the great Enterprise — Departure of van der Myle from
Paris.
THERE were reasons enough why the Advocate could not
go to Paris at this juncture. It was absurd in Henry to
suppose it possible. Everything rested on Barneveld's
shoulders. During the year which had just passed he had
drawn almost every paper, every instruction in regard to the
peace negotiations, with his own hand, had assisted at every
conference, guided and mastered the whole course of a most
difficult and intricate negotiation, in which he had not only
been obliged to make allowance for the humbled pride and
baffled ambition of the ancient foe of the Netherlands, but
to steer clear of the innumerable jealousies, susceptibilities,
cavillings, and insolences of their patronizing friends.
It was his brain that worked, his tongue that spoke, his
restless pen that never paused. His was not one of those
easy posts, not unknown in the modern administration of
1610. DIFFICULT POSITION OF BARNEVELD. 157
great affairs, where the subordinate furnishes the intellect,
the industry, the experience, while the bland superior, grati-
fying the world with his sign-manual, appropriates the
applause. So long as he lived and worked, the States-
General and the States of Holland were like a cunningly
contrived machine, which seemed to he alive because one
invisible but mighty mind vitalized the whole.
And there had been enough to do. It was not until mid-
summer of 1609 that the ratifications of the Treaty of Truce,
one of the great triumphs in the histoiy of diplomacy,
had been exchanged, and scarcely had this period been put
to the eternal clang of arms when the death of a lunatic
threw the world once more into confusion. It was obvious
to Barneveld that the issue of the Cleve-Jiilich affair, and
of the tremendous religious fermentation in Bohemia, Mo-
ravia, and Austria, must sooner or later lead to an immense
war. It was inevitable that it would devolve upon the
States to sustain their great though vacillating, their
generous though encroaching, their sincere though most irri-
tating, ally. And yet, thoroughly as Barneveld had mas-
tered all the complications and perplexities of the religious
and political question, carefully as he had calculated the
value of the opposing forces which were shaking Christen-
dom, deeply as he had studied the characters of Matthias
and Rudolph, of Charles of Denmark and Ferdinand of
Graz, of Anhalt and Maximilian, of Brandenburg and Neu-
burg, of James and Philip, of Paul V. and Charles Emmanuel,
of Sully and Villeroy, of Salisbury and Bacon, of Lerma and
Infantado ; adroitly as he could measure, weigh, and analyse
all these elements in the great problem which was forcing
itself on the attention of Europe — there was one factor with
which it was difficult for this austere republican, this cold,
unsusceptible statesman, to deal : the intense and imperious
passion of a greybeard for a woman of sixteen.
158 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. IV.
For out of the cauldron where the miscellaneous elements
of universal war were bubbling rose perpetually the fantastic
image of Margaret Montmorency : the fatal beauty at whose
caprice the heroic sword of Ivry and Cahors was now up-
lifted and now sheathed.
Aerssens was baffled, and reported the humours of the court
where he resided as changing from hour to hour. To the
last he reported that all the mighty preparations then nearly
completed " might evaporate in smoke " if the Princess of
Conde should come back. Every ambassador in Paris was
baffled. Peter Pecquius was as much in the dark as Don
Inigo de Cardenas, as Ubaldini or Edmonds. No one save
Sully, Aerssens, Barneveld, and the King knew the exten-
sive arrangements and profound combinations which had
been made for the war. Yet not Sully, Aerssens, Barneveld,
or the King, knew whether or not the war would really be
made.
Barneveld had to deal with this perplexing question day
by day. His correspondence with his ambassador at Henry's
court was enormous, and we have seen that the Ambassador
was with the King almost daily ; sleeping or waking ; at
dinner or the chase ; in the cabinet or the courtyard.
But the Advocate was also obliged to carry in his arms,
as it were, the brood of snarling, bickering, cross-grained
German princes, to supply them with money, with arms,
with counsel, with brains ; to keep them awake when they
went to sleep, to steady them in their track, to teach them
to go alone. He had the congress at Hall in Suabia to super-
vise and direct ; he had to see that the ambassadors of the
new republic, upon which they in reality were already half
dependent and chafing at their dependence, were treated
with the consideration due to the proud position which the
Commonwealth had gained. Questions of etiquette were
at that moment questions of vitality. He instructed his
1610. DIFFICULT POSITION OF BARNEVELD. 159
ambassadors to leave the congress on the spot if they were
ranked after the envoys of princes who were only feudatories
of the Emperor. The Dutch ambassadors, " recognising and
relying upon no superiors but God and their sword," placed
themselves according to seniority with the representatives
of proudest kings.1
He had to extemporize a system of free international com-
munication with all the powers of the earth — with the Turk
at Constantinople, with the Czar of Muscovy; with the
potentates of the Baltic, with both the Indies. The routine
of a long established and well organized foreign office in a
time-honoured state running in grooves ; with well-balanced
springs and well oiled wheels, may be a luxury of civiliza-
tion ; but it was a more arduous task to transact the greatest
affairs of a state springing suddenly into recognized existence
and mainly dependent for its primary construction and prac-
tical working on the hand of one man.
Worse than all, he had to deal on the most dangerous and
delicate topics of state with a prince who trembled at danger
and was incapable of delicacy ; to show respect for a cha-
racter that was despicable, to lean on a royal word falser
than water, to inhale almost daily the effluvia from a court
compared to which the harem of Henry was a temple of
vestals. The spectacle of the slobbering James among his
Kars and Hays and Villiers's and other minions is one
at which history covers her eyes and is dumb ; but the
republican envoys, with instructions from a Barneveld, were
obliged to face him daily, concealing their disgust, and
bowing reverentially before him as one of the arbiters of
their destinies and the Solomon of his epoch.
A special embassy was sent early in the year to England
to convey the solemn thanks of the Republic to the King
for his assistance in the truce negotiations, and to treat of
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 9 Feb. 1610. (MS.)
1GO THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
the important matters then pressing on the attention of both
powers. Contemporaneously was to be despatched the
embassy for which Henry was waiting so impatiently at
Paris.
Certainly the Advocate had enough with this and other
'important business already mentioned to detain him at his
post. Moreover the first year of peace had opened disas-
trously in the Netherlands. Tremendous tempests such as
had rarely been recorded even in that land of storms had
raged all the winter. The waters everywhere had burst
their dykes, and inundations, which threatened to engulph
the whole country, and which had caused enormous loss of
property and even of life, were alarming the most courageous.1
It was difficult in many districts to collect the taxes for
the every-day expenses of the community, and yet the
Advocate knew that the Kepublic would soon be forced to
renew the war on a prodigious scale.
Still more to embarrass the action of the government and
perplex its statesmen, an alarming and dangerous insurrection
broke out in Utrecht.
In that ancient seat of the hard-fighting, imperious, and
opulent sovereign archbishops of the ancient church an
important portion of the population had remained Catholic.
Another portion complained of the abolition of various
privileges which they had formerly enjoyed ; among others
that of a monopoly of beer-brewing for the province. All
the population, as is the case with all populations in all
c rantries and all epochs, complained of excessive taxation.
A clever politician, Dirk Kanter by name, a gentleman by
birth, a scholar and philosopher by pursuit and education,
and a demagogue by profession, saw an opportunity of taking
an advantage of this state of things. More than twenty
years before he had been burgomaster of the city, and had
1 See reports of embassies hereafter to be cited.
1610. INSURRECTION AT UTRECHT. 161
much enjoyed himself in that position. He was tired of the
learned leisure to which the ingratitude of his fellow-citizens
had condemned him. He seems to have been of easy virtue
in the matter of religion, a Catholic, an Arminian, an ultra-
orthodox Contra-Remonstrant by turns. He now persuaded
a number of determined partisans that the time had come
for securing a church for the public worship of the ancient
faith, and at the same time for restoring the beer brewery,
reducing the taxes, recovering lost privileges, and many
other good things. Beneath the whole scheme lay a deep
design to effect the secession of the city and with it of the
opulent and important province of Utrecht from the Union.
Kanter had been heard openly to avow that after all the
Netherlands had flourished under the benign sway of the
House of Burgundy, and that the time would soon come for
returning to that enviable condition.
By a concerted assault the city hall was taken possession
of by main force, the magistracy was overpowered, Feb 9
and a new board of senators and common council- 1G1°-
men appointed, Kanter and a devoted friend of his, Hel-
dingen by name, being elected burgomasters.1
The States-Provincial of Utrecht, alarmed at these pro-
ceedings in the city, appealed for protection against violence
to the States-General under the 3rd Article of the Union,
the fundamental pant which bore the name of Utrecht itself.
Prince Maurice proceeded to the city at the head of a
detachment of troops to quell the tumults. Kanter and his
friends were plausible enough to persuade him of the
legality and propriety of the revolution which they had
effected, and to procure his formal confirmation of the new
magistracy. Intending to turn his military genius and the
splendour of his name to account, they contrived to keep him
for a time at least in an amiable enthralment, and induced him
1 Wagenaar, x. 25-32. Brill, Continuation of Arcnd, iii. d. ii. stuk, 420, tqq.
VOL. I. M
162 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
to contemplate in their interest the possibility of renouncing
the oath which subjected him to the authority of the States
of Utrecht. But the far-seeing eye of Barneveld could not
be blind to the danger which at this crisis beset the Stad-
holder and the whole republic. The Prince was induced
to return to the Hague, but the city continued by armed
revolt to maintain the new magistracy. They proceeded to
reduce the taxes, and in other respects to carry out the
measures on the promise of which they had come into
power. Especially the Catholic party sustained Kanter and
his friends, and promised themselves from him and from his
influence over Prince Maurice to obtain a power of which
they had long been deprived.
The States-General now held an assembly at Woerden, and
summoned the malcontents of Utrecht to bring before that
body a statement of their grievances. This was done, but
there was no satisfactory arrangement possible, and the depu-
tation returned to Utrecht, the States-General to the Hague.
The States-Provincial of Utrecht urged more strongly than
ever upon the assembly of the Union to save the city from
the hands of a reckless and revolutionary government. The
States-General resolved accordingly to interfere by force. A
considerable body of troops was ordered to march at once
upon Utrecht and besiege the city. Maurice, in his capa-
city of captain-general and stadholder of the province, was
summoned to take charge of the army. He was indisposed
to do so, and pleaded sickness. The States, determined that
the name of Nassau should not be used as an encouragement
to disobedience and rebellion, then directed the brother of
Maurice, Frederic Henry, youngest son of William the
Silent, to assume the command. Maurice insisted that his
brother was too young, and that it was unjust to allow
so grave a responsibility to fall upon his shoulders. The
States, not particularly pleased with the Prince's atti-
1610. SUBDUED BY THE STATES' ARMY. 163
tilde at tliis alarming juncture, and made anxious by the
glamour which seemed to possess him since his conferences
with the revolutionary party at Utrecht, determined not
to yield.
The army marched forth and laid siege to the city, Prince
Frederic Henry at its head. He was sternly instructed by
the States-General, under whose orders he acted, to take
possession of the city at all hazards. He was to insist on
placing there a garrison of 2000 foot and 300 horse, and
to permit not another armed man within the walls. The
members of the council of state and of the States of Utrecht
accompanied the army. For a moment the party in power
was disposed to resist the forces of the Union. Dick Kanter
and his friends were resolute enough ; the Catholic priests
turned out among the rest with their spades and worked
on the entrenchments. The impossibility of hold- April 6
ing the city against the overwhelming power of 161°-
the States was soon obvious, and the next day the gates
were opened, and easy terms were granted. The new
magistracy was set aside, the old board that had May 6,
been deposed by the rebels reinstated. The revo- 1G1°-
lution and the counter-revolution were alike bloodless, and
it was determined that the various grievances of which the
discontented party had complained should be referred to the
States-General, to Prince Maurice, to the council of state, and
to the ambassadors of France and England. Amnesty was
likewise decreed on submission.1
The restored government was Arminian in its inclinations,
the revolutionary one was singularly compounded both of
Catholic and of ultra-orthodox elements. Quiet was on the
whole restored, but the resources of the city were crippled.
The event occurring exactly at the crisis of the Cleve and
Julich expedition angered the King of France.
1 Wagenaar, Brill, ubi sup.
164
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
"The trouble of Utrecht," wrote Aerssens to Barne-
veld,1 " has been turned to account here marvellously,
the Archdukes and Spaniards boasting that many more
revolts like this may be at once expected. I have ex-
plained to his Majesty, who has been very much alarmed
about it, both its source and the hopes that it will
be appeased by the prudence of his Excellency Prince
Maurice and the deputies of the States. The King desires
that everything should be pacified as soon as possible, so
that there may be no embarrassment to the course of public
aifairs. But he fears, he tells me, that this may create some
new jealousy between Prince Maurice and yourself. I don't
comprehend what he means, although he held this language
to me very expressly and without reserve. I could only
answer that you were living on the best of terms together
in perfect amity and intelligence. If you know if this talk
of his has any other root, please to enlighten me, that I may
put a stop to false reports, for I know nothing of affairs
except what you tell me."
King James, on the other hand, thoroughly approved the
promptness of the States-General in suppressing the tumult.
Nothing very serious of a like nature occurred in Utrecht
until the end of the year, when a determined and secret con-
spiracy was discovered, having for its object to overpower
the garrison and get bodily possession of Colonel John Ogle,
the military commander of the town. At the bottom of the
movement were the indefatigable Dirk Kanter and his friend
Heldingen. The attempt was easily suppressed, and the
two were banished from the town. Kanter died subsequently
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 9 March
1610. (MS.)
* A little later Henry expressed
great disapprobation of the proceed-
ings of the States against Utrecht,
Baying that such imprudence might
upset the Commonwealth if pains
were not taken to prevent the siege.
He blamed his ambassadors for not
preventing it, and asked Aerssens
if there were not time enough to
send some one " pour faire le hola." —
Same to same, 5 April, 1610. (MS.)
1610. RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES. 165
in North Holland, in the odour of ultra-orthodoxy. Four of
the conspirators — a post-master, two shoemakers, and a
sexton, who had bound themselves by oath to take the
lives of two eminent Arminian1 preachers, besides other
desperate deeds — were condemned to death, but pardoned
on the scaffold. Thus ended the first revolution at
Utrecht.2
Its effect did not cease, however, with the tumults which
were its original manifestations. This earliest insurrection
in organized shape against the central authority of the
States-General ; this violent though abortive effort to dis-
solve the Union and to nullify its laws ; this painful neces-
sity for the first time imposed upon the federal government
to take up arms against misguided citizens of the Kepublic,
in order to save itself from disintegration and national
death, were destined to be followed by far graver convulsions
on the self-same spot. Keligious differences and religious
hatreds were to mingle their poison with antagonistic po-
litical theories and personal ambitions, and to develop on a
wide scale the danger ever lurking in a constitution whose
fundamental law was unstable, ill defined, and liable to con-
tradictory interpretations. For the present it need only be
noticed that the States-General, guided by Barneveld, most
vigorously suppressed the local revolt and the incipient
secession, while Prince Maurice, the right arm of the execu-
tive, the stadholder of the province, and the representative of
the military power of the Commonwealth, was languid in the
exertion of that power, inclined to listen to the specious
arguments of the Utrecht rebels, and accused at least of
tampering with the fell spirit which the Advocate was
resolute to destroy. Yet there was no suspicion of treason,
1 One of whom was Tnuriuus, au- * Wagenaar, tibi sup. Manuscripts
thor of a famous pamphlet, to which in the Hague Archives relating to the
allusion will be made later | tumults at Utrecht, passim.
166
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
no taint of rebellion, no accusation of unpatriotic motives
uttered against the Stadholder.
There was a doubt as to the true maxims by which the
Confederacy was to be governed, and at this moment, cer-
tainly, the Prince and the Advocate represented opposite
ideas. There was a possibility, at a future day, when the
religious and political parties might develop themselves on
a wider scale and the struggles grow fiercer, that the two
great champions in the conflict might exchange swords and
inflict mutual and poisoned wounds. At present the party
of the Union had triumphed, with Barneveld at its head.
At a later but not far distant day, similar scenes might be
enacted in the ancient city of Utrecht, but with a strange
difference and change in the cast of parts and with far more
tragical results.
For the moment the moderate party in the Church, those
more inclined to Arminianism and the supremacy of the
civil authority in religious matters, had asserted their
ascendency in the States-General, and had prevented the
threatened rupture.1
Meantime it wras doubly necessary to hasten the special
embassies to France and to England, in both which countries
much anxiety as to the political health and strength of the
new republic had been excited by these troubles in Utrecht.
It was important for the States-General to show that they
were not crippled, and would not shrink from the coming
^conflict, but would justify the reliance placed on them by
their allies.
Thus there were reasons enough why Barneveld could
not himself leave the country in the eventful spring of 1610.
It must be admitted, however, that he was not backward in
1 There is a great mass of manu-
scripts in the Archives of the Hague
relative to these troubles of Utrecht,
the greater part of them in the
handwriting of Barneveld. As much
of their substance as now possesses
vital interest has been given in our
narrative.
1610. SPECIAL EMBASSIES TO ENGLAND AND FRANCE. 167
placing his nearest relatives in places of honour, trust, and
profit.
His eldest son Keinier, Seignior of Groeneveld, had been
knighted by Henry IV.; his youngest, William, afterwards
called Seignior of Stoutenburg, but at this moment bearing
the not very mellifluous title of Craimgepolder, was a
gentleman-in-waiting at that king's court, with a salary
of 3000 crowns a year.1 He was rather a favourite with
the easy-going monarch, but he gave infinite trouble to the
Dutch ambassador Aerssens, who, feeling himself under
immense obligations to the Advocate and professing for him
boundless gratitude, did his best to keep the idle, turbulent,
extravagant, and pleasure-loving youth up to the strict line
of his duties.
" Your son is in debt again," wrote Aerssens, on one occa-
sion, " and troubled for money. He is in danger of going to
the usurers. He says he cannot keep himself for less than
200 crowns a month. This is a large allowance, but he
has spent much more than that. His life is not irregular
nor his dress remarkably extravagant. His difficulty is that
he will not dine regularly with me nor at court. He will
keep his own table and have company to dinner. That is
what is ruining him. He comes sometimes to me, not for
the dinner nor the company, but for tennis, which he finds
better in my faubourg than in town. His trouble comes
from the table, and I tell you frankly that you must regulate
his expenses or they will become very onerous to you. I am
ashamed of them and have told him so a hundred times,
more than if he had been my own brother. It is all for love
of you .... I have been all to him that could be expected
of a man who is under such vast obligations to you ; and I so
much esteem the honour of your friendship that I should
always neglect my private affairs in order to do everything
» See Vrcede, • Inl. Ned. Dipl.'
1G8
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
for your service and meet your desires If M. de
Craimgepolder comes back from his visit home, you must
restrict him in two things, the table and tennis, and you can
do this if you require him to follow the King assiduously as
his service requires." l
Something at a future day was to be heard of William
of Barneveld, as well as of his elder brother Reinier,
and it is good, therefore, to have these occasional glimpses
of him while in the service of the King and under the
supervision of one who was then his father's devoted friend,
Francis Aerssens. There were to be extraordinary and
tragical changes in the relations of parties and of individuals
ere many years should go by.
Besides the sons of the Advocate, his two sons-in-law,
Brederode, Seignior of Yeenhuizen, and Cornells van der
Myle, were constantly employed in important embassies.
Van der Myle had been the first ambassador to the great
Venetian republic, and was now placed at the head of the
embassy to France, an office which it was impossible at that
moment for the Advocate to discharge. At the same critical
moment Barneveld's brother Elias, Pensionary of Rotter-
dam, was appointed one of the special high commissioners to
the King of Great Britain.
It is necessary to give an account of this embassy.
They were provided with luminous and minute instruc-
tions from the hand of the Advocate.2
They were, in the first place, and ostensibly, to thank the
King for his services in bringing about the truce, which, truly,
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 5 March
1609. (MS.) Same to same, 28
March 1609. (MS.)
* ' Rapport van den Heeren Gecom-
mitteerdengeweesthebbendeinEnge-
landtinder Jaerel610.' (MS. Hague
Archives.) Many citations will be
made from this important report,
which haa never been published.
The members of the embassy were :
John van Duivenvoorde, Seignior of
Warmond; John Berck, Pensionary of
Dordrecht ; Albert de Veer, Pension-
ary of Amsterdam ; Elias van Olden-
barneveld, Pensionary of Rotterdam ;
and Albert Joachimi, deputy from
Zealand to the States-General
1610. SPECIAL EMBASSY TO ENGLAND. 169
had been of the slightest, as was very well known. They
were to explain, on the part of the States, their delay in
sending this solemn commission, caused by the tardiness of
the King of Spain in sending his ratification to the treaty,
and by the many disputations caused by the irresolutions of
the Archdukes and the obstinacy of their commissioners in
regard to their many contraventions of the treaty. After
those commissioners had gone, further hindrances had
been found in the " extraordinary tempests, high floods,
rising of the waters, both of the ocean and the rivers, and
the very disastrous inundations throughout nearly all the
United Provinces, with the immense and exorbitant damage
thus inflicted, both on the public and on many individuals ;
in addition to all which were to be mentioned the troubles
in the city of Utrecht."
They were, in almost hyperbolical language, directed to
express the eternal gratitude of the States for the constant
favours received by them from the crown of England, and
their readiness to stand forth at any moment with sincere
affection and to the utmost of their power, at all times and
seasons, in resistance of any attempts against his Majesty's
person or crown, or against the Prince of Wales or the royal
family. They were to thank him for his " prudent, heroic,
and courageous resolve to suffer nothing to be done under
colour of justice, authority, or any other pretext, to the
hindrance of the Elector of Brandenburg and Palatine of
Neuburg, in the maintenance of their lawful rights and
possession of the principalities of Julich, Cleve, and Berg,
and other provinces."
By this course his Majesty, so the commissioners were to
state, would put an end to the imaginations of those who
thought they could give the law to everybody according
to their pleasure.
They were to assure the King that the States-General
170 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. IV.
would exert themselves to the utmost to second his heroic
resolution, notwithstanding the enormous burthens of their
everlasting war, the very exorbitant damage caused by the
inundations, and the sensible diminution in the contributions
and other embarrassments then existing in the country.
They were to offer 2000 foot and 500 horse for the
general purpose under Prince Henry of Nassau, besides
the succours furnished by the King of France and the
electors and princes of Germany. Further assistance in
men, artillery, and supplies were promised under certain
contingencies, and the plan of the campaign on the Meuse
in conjunction with the King of France was duly mapped.
They were to request a corresponding promise of men and
money from the King of Great Britain, and they were to
propose for his approval a closer convention for mutual
assistance between his Majesty, the United Netherlands, the
King of France, the electors and princes and other powers
of Germany ; as such close union would be very beneficial to
all Christendom. It would put a stop to all unjust occu-
pations, attempts, and intrigues, and if the King was thereto
inclined, he was requested to indicate time and place for
making such a convention.
The commissioners were further to point out the various
contraventions on the part of the Archdukes of the Treaty
of Truce, and were to give an exposition of the manner
in which the States-General had quelled the tumults at
Utrecht, and reasons why such a course had of necessity
been adopted.
They were instructed to state that, " over and above the
great expenses of the late war and the necessary main-
tenance of military forces to protect their frontiers against
their suspected new friends or old enemies, the Provinces
were burthened with the cost of the succour to the Elector
of Brandenburg and Palatine of Neuburg, and would be
1610. SPECIAL EMBASSY TO ENGLAND. 171
therefore incapable of furnishing the payments coming due
to his Majesty. They were accordingly to sound his Majesty
as to whether a good part of the debt might not be remitted
or at least an arrangement made by which the terms should
begin to run only after a certain number of years."
They were also directed to open the subject of the fisheries
on the coasts of Great Britain, and to remonstrate against
the order lately published by the King forbidding all
foreigners from fishing on those coasts. This was to be set
forth as an infringement both of natural law and of ancient
treaties, and as a source of infinite danger to the inhabitants
of the United Provinces.1
The Seignior of Wannond, chief of the commission, died
on the 15th April. His colleagues met at Brielle on the
16th, ready to take passage to England in the ship- A ril 15
of war, the Hound. They were, however, detained 161°-
there six days by head winds and great storms, and it was
not until the 22nd that they were able to put to sea. The
following evening their ship cast anchor in Gravesend. Half
an hour before, the Duke of Wurtemberg had arrived from
Flushing in a ship of war brought from France by the
Prince of Anhalt.
Sir Lewis Lewkener, master of ceremonies, had been
waiting for the ambassadors at Gravesend, and informed
them that the royal barges were to come next morning from
London to take them to town. They remained that night
on board the Hound, and next morning, the wind blowing up
the river, they proceeded in their ship as for as Blackwall,
where they were formally received and bade welcome in the
name of the King by Sir Thomas Cornwallis and Sir George
Carew, late ambassador in France. Escorted by them and
Sir Lewis, they were brought in the court barges to Tower
Wharf. Here the royal coaches were waiting, in which they
1 Instructions, dated 31 March 1010, in tho Report already cited. (MS.)
172 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
were taken to lodgings provided for them in the city at the
house of a Dutch merchant. Noel de Caron, Seignior of
Schonewal, resident ambassador of the States in London, was
likewise there to greet them. This was Saturday night.
On the following Tuesday they went by appointment to the
April 27, Palace of Whitehall in royal carriages for their first
i6io. audience. Manifestations of as entire respect and
courtesy had thus been made to the Republican envoys
as could be shown to the ambassadors of the greatest sove-
reigns. They found the King seated on his throne in the
audience chamber, accompanied by the Prince of Wales, the
Duke of York, the Lord High Treasurer and Lord High
Admiral, the Duke of Lenox, the Earls of Arundel and
Northampton, and many other great nobles and dignitaries.
James rose from his seat, took off his hat, and advanced
several paces to meet the ambassadors, and bade them
courteously and respectfully welcome. He then expressed
his regret at the death of the Seignior of Warmond, and
after the exchange of a few commonplaces listened, still
with uncovered head, to the opening address.1
The spokesman, after thanking the King for his con-
dolences on the death of the chief commissioner, whom, as
was stated with whimsical simplicity, " the good God had
called to Himself after all his luggage had been put on
board ship," 2 proceeded in the French language to give a
somewhat abbreviated paraphrase of Barneveld's instructions.
When this was done and intimation made that they would
confer more fully with his Majesty's council on the subjects
committed to their charge, the ambassadors were conducted
home with the same ceremonies as had accompanied their
arrival. They received the same day the first visit from the
ambassadors of France and Venice, Boderie and Carrero,
and had a long conference a few days afterwards with the
High Treasurer, Lord Salisbury.
1 MS. before cited « Ibid.
1610. SPECIAL EMBASSY TO ENGLAND. 173
On the 3rd May they were invited to attend the pompous
celebration of the festival of St. George in the palace at West-
minster, where they were placed together with the May 8,
French ambassador in the King's oratorium ; the 1610<
Dukes of Wiirtemberg and Brunswick being in that of the
Queen.
These details are especially to be noted, and were at the
moment of considerable importance, for this was the first
solemn and extraordinary embassy sent by the rebel Nether-
landers, since their independent national existence had been
formally vindicated, to Great Britain, a power which a quarter
of a century before had refused the proffered sovereignty
over them. Placed now on exactly the same level with the
representatives of emperors and kings, the Kepublican envoys
found themselves looked upon by the world with different
eyes from those which had regarded their predecessors
askance, and almost with derision, only seven years before.
At that epoch the States' commissioners, Barneveld himself
at the head of them, had gone solemnly to congratulate
King James on his accession, had scarcely been admitted to
audience by king or minister, and had found themselves on
great festivals unsprinkled with the holy water of the court,
and of no more account than the crowd of citizens and
spectators who thronged the streets, gazing with awe at the
distant radiance of the throne.1
But although the ambassadors were treated with every
external consideration befitting their official rank, they were
not likely to find themselves in the most genial atmosphere
when they should come to business details. If there was
one thing in the world that James did not intend to do, it
was to get himself entangled in war with Spain, the power
of all others which he most revered and loved. His " heroic
and courageous resolve " to defend the princes, on which the
commissioners by instructions of the Advocate had so highly
1 ' Hist. United Netherlands,' vol. iv. chap. xli.
174 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
complimented him, was not strong enough to cany him
much beyond a vigorous phraseology. He had not awoke
from the delusive dream of the Spanish marriage which had
dexterously been made to flit before him, and ho was not
inclined, for the sake of the Kepublic which he hated the
more because obliged to be one of its sponsors, to risk
the animosity of a great power which entertained the most
profound contempt for him. He was destined to find himself
involved more closely than he liked, and through family ties,
with the great Protestant movement in Germany, and the
unfortunate " Winter King" might one day find his father-
in-law as unstable a reed to lean upon as the States had
found their godfather, or the Brandenburgs and Neuburgs
at the present juncture their great ally. Meantime, as the
Bohemian troubles had not yet reached the period of actual
explosion, and as Henry's wide-reaching plan against the
House of Austria had been strangely enough kept an in-
violable secret by the few statesmen, like Sully and Barne-
veld, to whom they had been confided, it was necessary for
the King and his ministers to deal cautiously and plausibly
with the Dutch ambassadors. Their conferences were mere
dancing among eggs, and if no actual mischief were done, it
was the best result that could be expected.
On the 8th of May, the commissioners met in the council
chamber at Westminster, and discussed all the matters
May 8, contained in their instructions with the members
1610. of ^.]ie counci;[ • the Lord Treasurer Salisbury, Earl
of Northampton, Privy Seal and Warden of the Cinque Ports,
Lord Nottingham, Lord High Admiral, the Lord Chamber-
lain, Earl of Suffolk, Earls of Shrewsbury, Worcester, and
several others being present.
The result was not entirely satisfactory. In regard to the
succour demanded for the possessory princes, the commis-
sioners were told that they seemed to come with a long
1610. SPECIAL EMBASSY TO ENGLAND. 175
narrative of their great burthens during the war, damage
from inundations, and the like, to excuse themselves from
doing their share in the succour, and thus the more to over-
load his Majesty, who was not much interested in the matter,
and was likewise greatly encumbered by various expenses.
The King had already frankly declared his intention to
assist the princes with the payment of 4000 men, and to
send proportionate artillery and powder from England. As
the States had supplies in their magazines enough to move
12,000 men, he proposed to draw upon those, reimbursing
the States for what was thus consumed by his contingent.
With regard to the treaty of close alliance between France,
Great Britain, the princes, and the Kepublic, which the
ambassadors had proposed, the Lord Treasurer and his
colleagues gave a reply far from gratifying. His Majesty
had not yet decided on this point, they said. The King of
France had already proposed to treat for such an alliance,
but it did not at present seem worth while for all to nego-
tiate together.
This was a not over-courteous hint that the Republic was
after all not expected to place herself at the council-board of
kings on even terms of intimacy and fraternal alliance
What followed was even less flattering. If his Majesty,
it was intimated, should decide to treat with the King of
France, he would not shut the door on their High Mighti-
nesses ; but his Majesty was not yet exactly informed whether
his Majesty had not certain rights over the provinces in
petitorio.1
This was a scarcely veiled insinuation against the sove-
reignty of the States, a sufficiently broad hint that they
were to be considered in a certain degree as British pro-
vinces. To a soldier like Maurice, to a statesman like
Barneveld, whose sympathies already were on the side of
1 MS. Report.
176 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV
France, such rebuffs and taunts were likely to prove un-
palatable. Tbe restiveness of the States at the continual
possession by Great Britain of those important sea-ports the
cautionary towns, a fact which gave colour to these innuendoes,
was sure to be increased by arrogant language on the part
of the English ministers. The determination to be rid of
their debt to so overbearing an ally, and to shake off the
shackles imposed by the costly mortgages, grew in strength
from that hour.
In regard to the fisheries, the Lord Treasurer and his
colleagues expressed amazement that the ambassadors should
consider the subjects of their High Mightinesses to be so
much beloved by his Majesty. Why should they of all
other people be made an exception of, and be exempt from,
the action of a general edict ? The reasons for these orders
in council ought to be closely examined. It would be very
difficult to bring the opinions of the English jurists into
harmony with those of the States. Meantime it would be
well to look up such treaties as might be in existence, and
have a special joint commission to confer together on the
subject. It was very plain, from the course of the conversa-
tion, that the Netherland fishermen were not to be allowed,
without paying roundly for a license, to catch herrings on
the British coasts as they had heretofore done.
Not much more of importance was transacted at this first
interview between the ambassadors and the King's ministers.
Certainly they had not yet succeeded in attaining their great
object, the formation of an alliance offensive and defensive
between Great Britain and the Eepublic in accordance
with the plan concerted between Henry and Barneveld.
They could find but slender encouragement for the warlike
plans to which France and the States were secretly com-
mitted ; nor could they obtain satisfactory adjustment of
affairs more pacific and commercial in their tendencies. The
1610. SPECIAL EMBASSY TO ENGLAND. 177
English ministers rather petulantly remarked that, while
last year everybody was talking of a general peace, and in
the present conjuncture all seemed to think, or at least to
speak, of nothing but a general war, they thought best to defer
consideration of the various subjects connected with duties
on the manufactures and products of the respective countries,
the navigation laws, the " entrecours" and other matters of
ancient agreement and controversy, until a more convenient
season.1
After the termination of the verbal conference, the am-
bassadors delivered to the King's government, in writing, to
be pondered by the council and recorded in the archives, a
summary of the statements which had been thus orally
treated. The document was in French, and in the main a
paraphrase of the Advocate's instructions, the substance of
which has been already indicated. In regard, however, to
the far-reaching designs of Spain, and the corresponding
attitude which it would seem fitting for Great Britain to
assume, and especially the necessity of that alliance the
proposal for which had in the conference been received so
haughtily, their language was far plainer, bolder, and more
vehement than that of the instructions.
" Considering that the effects show," they said, " that
those who claim the monarchy of Christendom, and indeed
of the whole world, let slip no opportunity which could in
any way serve their designs, it is suitable to the grandeur of
his Majesty the King, and to the station in which by the
grace of the good God he is placed, to oppose himself thereto
for the sake of the common liberty of Christendom, to which
end, and in order the better to prevent all unjust usurpations,
there could be no better means devised than a closer alliance
between his Majesty and the Most Christian King, My Lords
the States-General, and the electors, princes, and states of
1 " Rapport," &c.
VOL. I. N
178
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
Germany. Their High Mightinesses would therefore be
most glad to learn that his Majesty was inclined to such a
course, and would be glad to discuss the subject when and
wherever his Majesty should appoint, or would readily enter
into such an alliance on reasonable conditions." 1
This language and the position taken up by the ambas-
sadors were highly approved by their government, but it
was fated that no very great result was to be achieved by
this embassy. Very elaborate documents, exhaustive in
legal lore, on the subject of the herring fisheries, and of the
right to fish in the ocean and on foreign coasts, fortified by
copious citations from the 'Pandects' and 'Institutes' of
Justinian, were presented for the consideration of the British
government, and were answered as learnedly, exhaustively,
and ponderously. The English ministers were also reminded
that the curing of herrings had been invented in the fifteenth
century by a citizen of Biervliet, the inscription on whose
tombstone recording that fact might still be read in the
church of that town.
All this did not prevent, however, the Dutch herring
fishermen from being excluded from the British waters unless
they chose to pay for licenses.
The conferences were however for a season interrupted,
and a new aspect was given to affairs by an unforeseen and
terrible event.
Meanwhile it is necessary to glance for a moment at the
doings of the special embassy to France, the instructions for
which were prepared by Barneveld almost at the same
moment at which he furnished those for the commission to
England.
The ambassadors were Walraven, Seignior of Brederode,
1 " Raisons que les Ambassadeurs
de Mess™ les Etats-gen* des Pro-
vinces-Unies pensent militer pour la
conservation et maintenement du
droit de la pecherie." — Art. xsiil
" Rapport," &c. ubi sup. (MS.)
1010. SPECIAL EMBASSY TO FRANCE. 179
Cornells van der Myle, son-in-law of the Advocate, and
Jacob van Maldere. Remembering how impatient the
King of France had long been for their coming, and that all
the preparations and decisions for a great war were kept in
suspense until the final secret conferences could be held with
the representatives of the States-General, it seems strange
enough to us to observe the extreme deliberation with which
great affairs of state were then conducted and the vast
amount of time consumed in movements and communications
which modern science has either annihilated or abridged
from days to hours. While Henry was chafing with anxiety
in Paris, the ambassadors, having received Barneveld's
instructions dated 31st March, set forth on the 8th April
from the Hague, reached Rotterdam at noon, and slept at
Dordrecht. Next day they went to Breda, where the Prince
of Orange insisted upon their passing a couple of days with
him in his castle, Easter-day being llth April. He then
provided them with a couple of coaches and pair in which
they set forth on their journey, going by way of Antwerp,
Ghent, Courtray, Ryssel, to Arras, making easy stages,
stopping in the middle of the day to bait, and sleeping at
each of the cities thus mentioned, where they duly received
the congratulatory visit and hospitalities of their respective
magistracies.1
While all this time had been leisurely employed in the
Netherlands in preparing, instructing, and despatching the
commissioners, affairs were reaching a feverish crisis in
France. '
The States' ambassador resident thought that it would have
been better not to take such public offence at the retreat of
1 " Rapport ofto Verhael van 't
gene datin de Legatie aen den aller-
christelyksten Koninck by don Wel-
ge'.x>ren Hcnr Walraven, Hccr tot
Bredcrodc, Viannn etc. cndo de Ilcer
Cornelius van dcr Myle en Jacques
van Malderen is geproponecrt, gehnn-
delt etc. tot afschrift gegeven." (Ar-
chives at the Hague, MS.) Several
citations will be made from this im-
portant and unpublished document.
180
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV
the Prince of Conde. The King had enough of life and
vigour in him ; he could afford to leave the Dauphin to
grow up, and when he should one day be established on the
throne, he would be able to maintain his heritage. " But,"
said Aerssens, " I fear that our trouble is not where we say it
is, and we don't dare to say where it is." * Writing to Carew,
former English ambassador in Paris, whom we have just
seen in attendance on the States' commissioners in London,
he said : " People think that the Princess is wearying herself
much under the protection of the Infanta, and very impatient
at not obtaining the dissolution of her marriage, which the
Duchess of Angouleme is to go to Brussels to facilitate.
This is not our business, but I mention it only as the conti-
nuation of the Tragedy which you saw begin. Nevertheless
I don't know if the greater part of our deliberations is not
founded on this matter." 2
It had been decided to cause the Queen to be solemnly
crowned after Easter. She had set her heart with singular
persistency upon the ceremony, and it was thought that so
public a sacrament would annihilate all the wild projects
attributed to Spain through the instrumentality of Conde to
cast doubts on the validity of her marriage and the legi-
timacy of the Dauphin. The King from the first felt and
expressed a singular repugnance, a boding apprehension in
regard to the coronation, but had almost yielded to the
Queen's importunity. He told her he would give his consent
provided she sent Concini to Brussels to invite in her own
name the Princess of Conde to be present on the occasion.
Otherwise he declared that at least the festival should be
postponed till September.3
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 9 March
1610. (MS.)
* Same to Carew, 10 March 1610.
(MS.)
8 "... eur les tres-expres desir qu'il
soit au mois de Mai, mais a condition
que le Sr Concini en son nom aille
querir la princesse de Conde a Brux-
elles pour y assister," &c. — Aerssens
to Barneveld, 30 March 1610. (MS.)
1610. ANGER OF THE KING WITH SPAIN. 181
The Marquis de Coeuvres remained in disgrace after the
failure of his mission, Henry believing that like all the
world he had fallen in love with the Princess, and had only
sought to recommend himself, not to further the suit of his
sovereign.1
Meanwhile Henry had instructed his ambassador in Spain,
M. de Vaucelas, to tell the King that his reception of Conde
within his dominions would be considered an infraction of
the treaty of Vervins and a direct act of hostility. The
Duke of Lerma answered with a sneer2 that the Most
Christian King had too greatly obliged his Most Catholic
Majesty by sustaining his subjects in their rebellion and by
aiding them to make their truce to hope now that Conde
would be sent back. France had ever been the receptacle
of Spanish traitors and rebels from Antonio Perez down, and
the King of Spain would always protect wronged and
oppressed princes like Conde. France had just been breaking
up the friendly relations between Savoy and Spain and
goading the Duke into hostilities.
On the other hand the King had more than one stormy
interview with Don Inigo de Cardenas in Paris. That ambas-
sador declared that his master would never abandon his only
sister the most serene Infanta, such was the affection he bore
her, whose dominions were obviously threatened by these
French armies about to move to the frontiers. Henry replied
that the friends for whom he was arming had great need of his
assistance ; that his Catholic Majesty was quite right to love
his sister, whom he also loved ; but that he did not choose that
his own relatives should be so much beloved in Spain as they
were. " What relatives ? " asked Don Inigo. " The Prince
of Conde," replied the King, in a rage, " who has been de-
bauched by the Spaniards just as Marshal Biron was, and tho
1 Aeresens to Barnevcld, 30 March 1610. (MS.)
* Same to same, 9 March 1610. (MS.)
182 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
Marchioness Verneuil, and so many others. There are none
left for them to debauch now but the Dauphin and his
brothers." The Ambassador replied that, if the King had
consulted him about the affair of Conde, he could have
devised a happy issue from it. Henry rejoined that he had
sent messages on the subject to his Catholic Majesty, who
had not deigned a response, but that the Duke of Lerma had
given a very indiscreet one to his ambassador. Don Inigo
professed ignorance of any such reply. The King said it was
a mockery to affect ignorance of such matters. Thereupon
both grew excited and very violent in their discourses ; the
more so as Henry knowing but little Spanish and the Envoy
less French they could only understand from tone and
gesture that each was using exceedingly unpleasant
language. At last Don Inigo asked what he should write
to his sovereign. "Whatever you like," replied the King,
and so the audience terminated, each remaining in a tower-
ing passion.1
Subsequently Villeroy assured the Archduke's ambassador
that the King considered the reception given to the Prince
in the Spanish dominions as one of the greatest insults and
injuries that could be done to him. Nothing could excuse it,
said the Secretary of State, and for this reason it was very
difficult for the two kings to remain at peace with each
other, and that it would be wiser to prevent at once the evil
designs of his Catholic Majesty than to leave leisure for the
» plans to be put into execution, and the claims of the Dauphin
to his father's crown to be disputed at a convenient season.
He added that war would not be made for the Princess, but
for the Prince, and that even the war in Germany, although
Spain took the Emperor's side and France that of the pos-
sessory princes, would not necessarily produce a rupture
between the two kings if it were not for this affair of the
1 Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 7 April 1610, in Henrard.
1610. ANGER OF THE KING WITH THE ARCHDUKES. 183
Prince — true cause of the disaster now hanging over Chris-
tianity. Pecquius replied by smooth commonplaces in favour
of peace with which Villeroy warmly concurred ; both sadly
expressing the conviction however that the wrath divine had
descended on them all on account of their sins.1
A few days later, however, the Secretary changed his tone.
" I will speak to you frankly and clearly," he said
to Pecquius, "and tell you as from myself that there is
passion, and if one is willing to arrange the affair of the
Princess, everything else can be accommodated and appeased.
But if the Princess remain where she is, we are on the eve of
a rupture which may set fire to the four corners of Christen-
dom." Pecquius said he liked to talk roundly, and
was glad to find that he had not been mistaken in his
opinion, that all these commotions were only made for the
Princess, and if all the world was going to war, she would be
the principal subject of it. He could not marvel sufficiently,
he said, at this vehement passion which brought in its train
so great and horrible a conflagration ; adding many argu-
ments to show that it was no fault of the Archdukes, but
that he who was the cause of all might one day have reason
to repent.
Villeroy replied that " the King believed the Princess to
be suffering and miserable for love of him, and that there-
fore he felt obliged to have her sent back to her father."
Pecquius asked whether in his conscience the Secretary of
State believed it right or reasonable to make war for such
a cause. Villeroy replied by asking " whether even admit-
ting the negative, the Ambassador thought it were wisely
done for such a trifle, for a formality, to plunge into extre-
mities and to turn all Christendom upside down." Pecquius,
not considering honour a trifle or a formality, said that " for
nothing in the world would his Highness the Archduke
1 Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 7 April 1010, in Henrord.
184 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
descend to a cowardly action or to anything that would sully
his honour." Villeroy said that the Prince had compelled
his wife, pistol in hand, to follow him to the Netherlands, and
that she was no longer bound to obey a husband who forsook
country and king. Her father demanded her, and she said
" she would rather be strangled than ever to return to the
company of her husband/' The Archdukes were not justified
in keeping her against her will in perpetual banishment. He
implored the Ambassador in most pathetic terms to devise
some means of sending back the Princess, saying that he
who should find such expedient would do the greatest good
that was ever done to Christianity, and that otherwise there
was no guarantee against a universal war. The first design
of the King had been merely to send a moderate succour to
the Princes of Brandenburg and Neuburg, which could have
given no umbrage to the Archdukes, but now the bitterness
growing out of the affairs of the Prince and Princess had
caused him to set on foot a powerful army to do worse. He
again implored Pecquius to invent some means of sending
back the Princess, and the Ambassador besought him
ardently to divert the King from his designs. Of this the
Secretary of State left little hope and they parted, both
very low and dismal in mind. Subsequent conversations
with the leading councillors of state convinced Pecquius that
these violent menaces were only used to shake the constancy
of the Archduke, but that they almost all highly disapproved
the policy of the King. " If this war goes on, we are all
ruined," said the Duke d'Epernon to the Nuncius.1
Thus there had almost ceased to be any grimacing between
the two kings, although it was still a profound mystery
where or when hostilities would begin, and whether they
would break out at all. Henry frequently remarked that
the common opinion all over Europe was working in his
1 Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 19 April 1610. (MS.)
1610. ARRANGEMENTS OP HENRY FOR THE WAR. 185
favour. Few people in or out of France believed that he
meant a rupture, or that his preparations were serious. Thus
should he take his enemies unawares and unprepared.1
Even Aerssens, who saw him almost daily, was sometimes
mystified, in spite of Henry's vehement assertions that he was
resolved to make war at all hazards and on all sides, provided
My Lords the States would second him as they ought, their
own existence being at stake.
" For God's sake," cried the King, " let us take the bit
into our mouths. Tell your masters that I am quite re-
solved, and that I am shrieking loudly at their delays."
He asked if he could depend on the States, if Barneveld
especially would consent to a league with him. The Am-
bassador replied that for the affair of Cleve and Julich he
had instructions to promise entire concurrence, that Bar-
neveld was most resolute in the matter, and had always
urged the enterprise and wished information as to the levies
making in France and other military preparations.2
" Tell him," said Henry, " that they are going on exactly
as often before stated, but that we are holding everything in
suspense until I have talked with your ambassadors, from
whom I wish counsel, safety, and encouragement for doing
much more than the Jiilich business. That alone does not
require so great a league and such excessive and unnecessary
expense."
The King observed however that the question of the
duchies would serve as just cause and excellent pretext to
remove those troublesome fellows for ever from his borders
and those of the States. Thus the princes would be esta-
blished safely in their possession and the Republic as well
as himself freed from the perpetual suspicions which the
Spaniards excited by their vile intrigues, and it was on this
1 Pecquiu-3 to Archduke Albert, 20 March 1610. (MS.)
» Aerescns to Barneveld , 9 March 1610. (MS.)
186 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
general subject that he wished to confer with the special
commissioners. It would not be possible for him to throw
succour into Jiilich without passing through Luxemburg in
arms. The Archdukes would resist this, and thus a cause of
war would arise. His campaign on the Mouse would help
the princes more than if he should only aid them by the
contingent he had promised. Nor could the jealousy of
King James be excited since the war would spring out of
the Archdukes' opposition to his passage towards the duchies,
as he obviously could not cut himself off from his supplies,
leaving a hostile province between himself and his kingdom.
Nevertheless he could not stir, he said, without the consent
and active support of the States, on whom he relied as his
principal buttress and foundation.
The levies for the Milanese expedition were waiting until
Marshal do Lesdiguieres could confer personally with the
Duke of Savoy. The reports as to the fidelity of that
potentate were not to be believed. He was trifling with
the Spanish ambassadors, so Henry was convinced, who
were offering him 300,000 crowns a year besides Piom-
bino, Monaco, and two places in the Milanese, if he would
break his treaty with France. But he was thought to
be only waiting until they should be gone before making
his arrangements with Lesdiguieres. " He knows that he
can put no trust in Spain, and that he can confide in me,"
said the King. " I have made a great stroke by thus en-
tangling the King of Spain by the use of a few troops in Italy.
But I assure you that there is none but me and My Lords
the States that can do anything solid. Whether the Duke
breaks or holds fast will make no difference in our first and
great designs. For the honour of God I beg them to lose
no more time, but to trust in me. I will never deceive them,
never abandon them." 1
1 Aeresens to Barneveld, 36 March 1610. (MS.)
1610. POSITION OF SPAIN, 187
At last 25,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry were already in
marching order, and indeed had begun to move towards
the Luxemburg frontier, ready to co-operate with the States'
army and that of the possessory princes for the campaign
of the Meuse and Rhine.
Twelve thousand more French troops under Lesdiguieres
were to act with the Duke of Savoy, and an army as large
was to assemble in the Pyrenees and to operate on the
Spanish frontier, in hope of exciting and fomenting an insur-
rection caused by the expulsion of the Moors.1 That
gigantic act of madness by which Spain thought good at
this juncture to tear herself to pieces, driving hundreds of
thousands of the most industrious, most intelligent, and most
opulent of her population into hopeless exile, had now been
accomplished, and was to stand prominent for ever on the
records of human fatuity.8
Twenty-five thousand Moorish families had arrived at
Bayonne, and the Viceroy of Canada had been consulted as
to the possibility and expediency of establishing them in
that province,3 although emigration thither seemed less
tempting to them than to Virginia. Certainly it was not
unreasonable for Henry to suppose that a kingdom thus torn
by internal convulsions might be more open to a well
organized attack than capable of carrying out at that
moment fresh projects of universal dominion.
As before observed, Sully was by no means in favour of
this combined series of movements, although at a later day,
when dictating his famous memoirs to his secretaries, he
seems to describe himself as enthusiastically applauding and
almost originating them. But there is no doubt at all that
throughout this eventful spring he did his best to con-
centrate the whole attack on Luxemburg and the Meuse
1 Van Meteren, b. xxxi. C93, 094. ' Mt'm. do Bassompiorre,' i. 454, 455.
* Van Meteren, ubi sup. 8 Acrssens to Carcw, 10 March 1G10. (MS.)
188
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
districts, and wished that the movements in the Milanese
and in Provence should be considered merely a slight acces-
sory, as not much more than a diversion to the chief design,
while Villeroy and his friends chose to consider the Duke
of Savoy as the chief element in the war.1 Sully thoroughly
distrusted the Duke, whom he deemed to be always put
up at auction between Spain and France and incapable of
a sincere or generous policy. He was entirely convinced
that Villeroy and Epernon and Jeannin and other earnest
Papists in France were secretly inclined to the cause of
Spain, that the whole faction of the Queen, in short, were
urging this scattering of the very considerable forces now
at Henry's command in the hope of bringing him into a
false position, in which defeat or an ignominious peace
would be the alternative.2 To concentrate an immense
attack upon the Archdukes in the Spanish Netherlands
and the debateable duchies would have for its immediate
effect the expulsion of the Spaniards out of all those pro-
vinces and the establishment of the Dutch commonwealth
on an impregnable basis. That this would be to strengthen
infinitely the Huguenots in France and the cause of Pro-
testantism in Bohemia, Moravia and Austria, was unques-
tionable. It was natural, therefore, that the stern and
ardent Huguenot should suspect the plans of the Catholics
with whom he was in daily council. One day he asked
the King plumply in the presence of Villeroy if his Ma-
jesty meant anything serious by all these warlike prepa-
rations. Henry was wroth, and complained bitterly that
one who knew him to the bottom of his soul should doubt
him.3 But Sully could not persuade himself that a great
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 9 March
1G10. Same to same, 24 March 1610.
Same to same, 9 Feb. 1610. (MSS.)
2 Same to same, 31 Jan. 1610.
Same to same, 25 Dec. 1609. Same
to same, 7 Feb. 1610. Same to
Digart, 3 Feb. 1610. (MSS.)
8 Letter of Aerssens, 24 March
1610.
ANXIETY OF THE KING FOR BARNEVELD'S PRESENCE. 189
and serious war would be carried on both in the Netherlands
and in Italy.
As much as his sovereign he longed for the personal
presence of Barneveld, and was constantly urging the
States' ambassador to induce his coming to Paris. " You
know," said Aerssens, writing to the French ambassador at
the Hague, de Russy, " that it is the Advocate alone that
has the universal knowledge of the outside and the inside
of our commonwealth." *
Sully knew his master as well as any man knew him,
but it was difficult to fix the chameleon hues of Henry
at this momentous epoch. To the Ambassador expressing
doubts as to the King's sincerity the Duke asserted that
Henry was now seriously piqued with the Spaniard on
account of the Conde business. Otherwise Anhalt and
the possessory princes and the affair of Cleve might have
had as little effect in driving him into war as did the
interests of the Netherlands in times past. But the bold
demonstration projected would make the " whole Spanish
party bleed at the nose ; 2 a good result for the public
peace."
Therefore Sully sent word to Barneveld, although he
wished his name concealed, that he ought to come him-
self, with full powers to do everything, without referring to
any superiors or allowing any secrets to be divulged.3 The
King was too far committed to withdraw, unless coldness on
part of the States should give him cause. The Advocate
nuiust come prepared to answer all questions ; to say how
much in men and money the States would contribute, and
whether they would go into the war with the King as their
only ally. He must come with the bridle on his neck. All
1 Aerssens to de Russy, 10 March
1610. (MS.)
9 Same to Barneveld, 25 Dec.
1009. (MS.)
8 Ibid. Also same to same, 24 Jan.
1010. (MS.)
190 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
that Henry feared was being left in the lurch by the States ;
otherwise he was not afraid of Home. Sully was urgent that
the Provinces should now go vigorously into the war without
stumbling at any consideration. Thus they would confirm
their national power for all time, but if the opportunity were
now lost, it would be their ruin, and posterity would most
justly blame them.1 The King of Spain was so stripped of
troops and resources, so embarrassed by the Moors, that in
ten months he would not be able to send one man to the
Netherlands.
Meantime the Nuncius in Paris was moving heaven and
earth ; storming, intriguing, and denouncing the course of
the King in protecting heresy, when it would have been
so easy to extirpate it, encouraging rebellion and disorder
throughout Christendom, and embarking in an action against
the Church and against his conscience. A new legate was
expected daily with the Pope's signature to the new league,
and a demand upon the King to sign it likewise, and to
pause in a career of which something was suspected, but
very little accurately known. The preachers in Paris and
throughout the kingdom delivered most vehement sermons
against the King, the government, and the Protestants, and
seemed to the King to be such "trumpeters of sedition"
that he ordered the seneschals and other officers to put a
stop to these turbulent discourses, censure their authors, and
compel them to stick to their texts.2
But the preparations were now so far advanced and
going on so warmly that nothing more was wanting than,
in the words of Aerssens, " to uncouple the dogs and let
them run." 3 Recruits were pouring steadily to their places
of rendezvous ; their pay having begun to run from the
1 Letter of Aerssens, 25 Dec. 1609.
* Aerssens to Digart, 11 March
1610. Same to Barneveld, 22 Dec
1609. Same to same, 24 Jan. 1G10.
(MSS.)
3 Same to same, 24 March 1610.
(MS.)
1610. PREPARATIONS FOR DUTCH COMMISSIONERS. 191
25th March at the rate of eight sous a day for the private
foot soldier and ten sous for a corporal. They were moved
in small parties of ten, lodged in the wayside inns, and
ordered, on pain of death, to pay for everything they con-
sumed.1
It was growing difficult to wait much longer for the arrival
of the special ambassadors, when at last they were known
to be on their way. Aerssens obtained for their use the
Hotel Gondy, formerly the residence of Don Pedro de Toledo,
the most splendid private palace in Paris, and recently pur-
chased by the Queen. It was considered expedient that the
embassy should make as stately an appearance as that of
royal or imperial envoys. He engaged an upholsterer by
the King's command to furnish, at his Majesty's expense, the
apartments, as the Baron de Gondy, he said, had long since
sold and eaten up all the furniture. He likewise laid in
six pieces of wine and as many of beer, " tavern drinks "
being in the opinion of the thrifty ambassador " both dear
and bad."
He bought a carriage lined with velvet for the commis-
sioners, and another lined with broadcloth for the principal
persons of their suite, and with his own coach as a third he
proposed to go to Amiens to meet them. They could not
get on with fewer than these, he said, and the new carriages
would serve their purpose in Paris. He had paid 500
crowns for the two, and they could be sold, when done with,
at a slight loss. He bought likewise four dapple-grey
horses, which would be enough, as nobody had more than two
horses to a carriage in town, and for which he paid 312
crowns — a very low price, he thought, at a season when
every one was purchasing. He engaged good and experienced
coachmen at two crowns a month, and, in short, made all
1 Aerescns to Barncvcld, 24 March 1610. (MS.)
» Ibid.
192 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
necessary arrangements for their comfort and the honour of
the state.1
The King had been growing more and more displeased at
the tardiness of the commission, petulantly ascribing it to a
design on the part of the States to " excuse themselves from
sharing in his bold conceptions," but said that " he could
resolve on nothing without My Lords the States, who were
the only power with which he could contract confidently,
as mighty enough and experienced enough to execute the
designs to be proposed to them ; so that his army was lying
useless on his hands until the commissioners arrived," and
lamented more loudly than ever that Barneveld was not
coming with them. He was now rejoiced, however, to hear
that they would soon arrive, and went in person to the Hotel
Gondy to see that everything was prepared in a manner
befitting their dignity and comfort.2
His anxiety had moreover been increased, as already
stated, by the alarming reports from Utrecht and by his
other private accounts from the Netherlands.
De Hussy expressed in his despatches grave doubts
whether the States would join the king in a war against the
King of Spain, because they feared the disapprobation of
the King of Great Britain, "who had already manifested but
too much jealousy of the power and grandeur of the Kepub-
lic." Pecquius asserted that the Archdukes had received
assurances from the States that they would do nothing
to violate the truce. The Prince of Anhalt, who, as chief
of the army of the confederated princes, was warm in his
demonstrations for a general war by taking advantage of the
Cleve expedition, was entirely at cross purposes with the
States' ambassador in Paris, Aerssens maintaining that
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 24 March
1610. Same to same, 30 March 1610.
Same to van der Myle, 26 March
1610. (MSS.)
2 Same to Barneveld, 26 March
1610. (MS.) "Rapport" of the
special ambassadors. (MS. before
cited.)
1610. ANSWER OF THE ARCHDUKE ALBERT. 193
the forty- three years' experience in their war justified the
States in placing no dependence on German princes except
with express conventions. They had no such conventions
now, and if they should be attacked by Spain in consequence
of their assistance in the Clove business, what guarantee of
aid had they from those whom Anhalt represented ? Anhalt
was loud in expressions of sympathy with Henry's designs
against Spam, but said that he and the States meant a war
of thirty or forty years, while the princes would finish what
they meant to do in one.1
A more erroneous expression of opinion, when viewed in
the light of subsequent events, could hardly have been
hazarded. Villeroy made as good use as he could of these
conversations to excite jealousy between the princes and the
States for the furtherance of his own ends, while affecting
warm interest in the success of the King's projects.
Meantime Archduke Albert had replied manfully and
distinctly to the menaces of the King and to the pathetic
suggestions made by Villeroy to Pecquius as to a device for
sending back the Princess. Her stay at Brussels being
the chief cause of the impending war, it would be better,
he said, to procure a divorce or to induce the Constable to
obtain the consent of the Prince to the return of his wife
to her father's house. To further either of these expedients,
the Archduke would do his best. " But if one expects by
bravados and threats," he added, " to force us to do a thing
against our promise, and therefore against reason, our repu-
tation, and honour, resolutely we will do nothing of the kind.
And if the said Lord King decided on account of this mis-
understanding for a rupture and to make war upon us, we
will do our best to wage war on him. In such case, however,
we shall be obliged to keep the Princess closer in our own
house, and probably to send her to such parts as may bo
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 5 April 1610. (MS.)
VOL. I. O
194 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
most convenient in order to remove from us an instrument
of the infinite evils which this war will produce." 1
Meantime the special commissioners whom we left at
Arras had now entered the French kingdom.
On the 17th April, Aerssens with his three coaches met
them on their entrance into Amiens, having been waiting
there for them eight days. As they passed through the
gate, they found a guard of soldiers drawn up to receive
them with military honours, and an official functionary
to apologize for the necessary absence of the governor,
who had gone with most of the troops stationed in the town
to the rendezvous in Champagne. He expressed regret,
therefore, that the King's orders for their solemn reception
could not be literally carried out. The whole board of
magistrates, however, in their costumes of ceremony, with
sergeants bearing silver maces marching before them, came
forth to bid the ambassadors welcome. An advocate made a
speech in the name of the city authorities, saying that they
were expressly charged by the King to receive them as
coming from his very best friends, and to do them all honour.
He extolled the sage government of their High Mightinesses
and the valour of the Kepublic, which had become known to
the whole world by the successful conduct of their long and
mighty war.
The commissioners replied in words of compliment, and
the magistrates then offered them, according to ancient
usage, several bottles of hippocras.
Next day, sending back the carriages of the Prince of
Orange, in which they had thus far performed the journey,
April is, they set forth towards Paris, reaching Saint-Denis
1610< at noon of the third day. Here they were met
by de Bonoeil, introducer of ambassadors, sent thither
1 Archdukes to Pecquius, 22 April 1610, in Henrard.
* " Rapport ofte Verhael." (MS. before cited.)
BRILLIANT RECEPTION OF DUTCH COMMISSIONERS. 195
by the King to give them welcome, and to say that they
would be received on the road by the Duke of April 20,
Vendome, eldest of the legitimatized children of 161°-
the King. Accordingly before reaching the Saint-Denis gate
of Paris, a splendid cavalcade of nearly five hundred noble-
men met them, the Duke at their head, accompanied by
two marshals of France, de Brissac and Boisdaulphin. The
three instantly dismounted, and the ambassadors alighted
from their coach. The Duke then gave them solemn and
cordial welcome, saying that he had been sent by his father
the King to receive them as befitted envoys of the best and
most faithful friends he possessed in the world.1
The ambassadors expressed their thanks for the great and
extraordinary honour thus conferred on them, and they were
then requested to get into a royal carriage which had been sent
out for that purpose. After much ceremonious refusal they
at last consented and, together with the Duke of Vendome,
drove through Paris in that vehicle into the Faubourg Saint-
Germain. Arriving at the Hotel Gondy, they were, notwith-
standing all their protestations, escorted up the staircase
into the apartments by the Duke.
" This honour is notable," said the commissioners in their
report to the States,2 " and never shown to anyone before, so
that our ill-wishers are filled with spite."
And Peter Pecquius was of the same opinion. "Everyone
is grumbling here," about the reception of the States'
ambassadors, "because such honours were never paid to
any ambassador whatever, whether from Spain, England,
or any other country." 3
And there were many men living and employed in great
affairs of State, both in France and in the Republic — the
King and Villeroy, Barncveld and Maurice — who could re-
1 " Rapport oftc VerhacL" (MS. before cited.) « Ibid.
8 Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 22 April 1G10, in Ilenrard.
196 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV
member how twenty-six years before a solemn embassy from
the States had proceeded from the Hague to France to offer
the sovereignty of their country to Henry's predecessor, had
been kept ignominiously and almost like prisoners four
weeks long in Rouen, and had been thrust back into
the Netherlands without being admitted even to one audience
by the monarch. Truly time, in the course of less than one
generation of mankind, had worked marvellous changes in
the fortunes of the Dutch Republic.1
President Jeannin came to visit them next day, with
friendly proffers of service, and likewise the ambassador of
Venice and the charge d'affaires of Great Britain.
On the 22nd the royal carriages came by appointment to
the Hotel G-ondy, and took them for their first audience
April 23, *° the Louvre. They were received at the gate
1610. by a guard Of honour, drums beating and arms
presented, and conducted with the greatest ceremony to an
apartment in the palace. Soon afterwards they were ushered
into a gallery where the King stood, surrounded by a number
of princes and distinguished officers of the crown. These
withdrew on the approach of the Netherlanders, leaving the
King standing alone. They made their reverence, and
Henry saluted them all with respectful cordiality. Begging
them to put on their hats again, he listened attentively to
their address.
The language of the discourse now pronounced was similar
in tenour to that almost contemporaneously held by the
States' special envoys in London. Both documents, when
offered afterwards in writing, bore the unmistakable imprint
of the one hand that guided the whole political machine. In
various passages the phraseology was identical, and, indeed,
the Advocate had prepared and signed the instructions for
both embassies on the same day.
1 See ' History of the United Netherlands/ vol. i. ch. ii.
1610. THEIR FIRST INTERVIEW WITH THE KING. 197
The commissioners acknowledged in the strongest pos-
sible terms the great and constant affection, quite without ex-
ample, that Henry had manifested to the Netherlands during
the whole course of their war. They were at a loss to find
language adequately to express their gratitude for that
friendship, and the assistance subsequently afforded them in
the negotiations for truce. They apologized for the tardi-
ness of the States in sending this solemn embassy of thanks-
giving, partly on the ground of the delay in receiving the
ratifications from Spain, partly by the protracted contraven-
tions by the Archdukes of certain articles in the treaty, but
principally by the terrible disasters occasioned throughout
their country by the great inundations, and by the com-
motions in the city of Utrecht, which had now been " so
prudently and happily pacified." 1
They stated that the chief cause of their embassy was to
express their respectful gratitude, and to say that never had
prince or state treasured more deeply in memory benefits
received than did their republic the favours of his Majesty,
or could be more disposed to do their utmost to defend his
Majesty's person, crown, or royal family against all attack.
They expressed their joy that the King had with prudence
and heroic courage undertaken the defence of the just rights
of Brandenburg and Neuburg to the duchies of Cleve, Jiilich,
and the other dependent provinces. Thus had he put an end
to the presumption of those who thought they could give
the law to all the world. They promised the co-operation of
the States in this most important enterprise of their ally,
notwithstanding their great losses in the war just concluded,
and the diminution of revenue occasioned by the inundations
by which they had been afflicted ; for they were willing
neither to tolerate so unjust an usurpation as that attempted
by the Emperor nor to fail to second his Majesty in his
1 MS. Report.
198 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
generous designs. They observed also that they had been
instructed to enquire whether his Majesty would not approve
the contracting of a strict league of mutual assistance be-
tween France, England, the United Provinces, and the
princes of Germany.
The King, having listened with close attention, thanked
the envoys in words of earnest and vigorous cordiality for
their expressions of affection to himself. He begged them
to remember that he had always been their good friend, and
that he never would forsake them ; that he had always
hated the Spaniards, and should ever hate them ; and that the
affairs of Jiilich must be arranged not only for the present
but for the future.1 He requested them to deliver their pro-
positions in writing to him, and to be ready to put them-
selves into communication with the members of his council,
in order that they might treat with each other roundly and
without reserve. He should always deal with the Nether-
landers as with his own people, keeping no back-door open,
but pouring out everything as into the lap of his best and
most trusty friends.2
After this interview conferences followed daily between
the ambassadors and Yilleroy, Sully, Jeannin, the Chan-
cellor, and Puysieux.
The King's counsellors, after having read the written
paraphrase of Barneveld's instructions, the communication
of which followed their oral statements, and which, among
other specifications, contained a respectful remonstrance
against the projected French East India Company, as likely
to benefit the Spaniards only, while seriously injuring the
States, complained that "the representations were too
general, and that the paper seemed to contain nothing
but compliments."
The ambassadors, dilating on the various points and
1 "Rapport," &c. (MS.) s Ibid.
1610. NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIS MINISTERS. 199
articles, maintained warmly that there was much more than
compliments in their instructions. The ministers wished to
know what the States practically were prepared to do in the
affair of Cleve, which they so warmly and encouragingly
recommended to the King. They asked whether the States'
army would march at once to Diisseldorf to protect the
princes at the moment when the King moved from Mezieres,
and they made many enquiries as to what amount of sup-
plies and munitions they could depend upon from the States'
magazines.
The envoys said that they had no specific instructions on
these points, and could give therefore no conclusive replies.
More than ever did Henry regret the absence of the great
Advocate at this juncture. If he could have come, with the
bridle on his neck, as Henry had so repeatedly urged upon
the resident ambassador, affairs might have marched more
rapidly. The despotic king could never remember that
Barneveld was not the unlimited sovereign of the United
States, but only the seal-keeper of one of the seven pro-
vinces and the deputy of Holland to the General Assembly.
His indirect power, however vast, was only great because it
was so carefully veiled.
It was then proposed by Villeroy and Sully, and agreed
to by the commissioners, that M. de Bethune, a relative of
the great financier, should be sent forthwith to the Hague,
to confer privately with Prince Maurice and Barneveld
especially, as to military details of the coming campaign.
It was also arranged that the envoys should delay their de-
parture until de Bethune's return. Meantime Henry and the
Nuncius had been exchanging plain and passionate language.
Ubaldini reproached the King with disregarding all the ad-
monitions of his Holiness, and being about to plunge Chris-
tendom into misery and war for the love of the Princess of
Conde. He held up to him the enormity of thus converting
200 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
the King of Spain and the Archdukes into his deadly ene-
mies, and warned him that he would by such desperate
measures make even the States-General and the King of
Britain his foes, who certainly would never favour such
schemes. The King replied that "he trusted to his own
forces, not to those of his neighbours, and even if the Hol-
landers should not declare for him still he would execute his
designs. On the 15th of May most certainly he would put
himself at the head of his army, even if he was obliged to
put off the Queen's coronation till October, and he could not
consider the King of Spain nor the Archdukes his friends
unless they at once made him some demonstration of friend-
ship. Being asked by the Nuncius what demonstration he
wished, he answered flatly that he wished the Princess to be
sent back to the Constable her father, in which case the
affair of Jiilich could be arranged amicably, and, at all
events, if the war continued there, he need not send more
than 4000 men." '
Thus, in spite of his mighty preparations, vehement
demands for Barneveld, and profound combinations re-
vealed to that statesman, to Aerssens, and to the Duke of
Sully only, this wonderful monarch was ready to drop his
sword on the spot, to leave his friends in the lurch, to em-
brace his enemies, the Archduke first of all, instead of
bombarding Brussels 2 the very next week, as he had been
threatening to do, provided the beautiful Margaret could
be restored to his arms through those of her venerable
father.
He suggested to the Nuncius his hope that the Archduke
would yet be willing to wink at her escape, which he was
now trying to arrange through de Preaux at Brussels, while
Ubaldini, knowing the Archduke incapable of anything so
dishonourable, felt that the war was inevitable.
1 Pecquius to Archduke Albert, 28 April 1610, in Henrard. * Ibid,
1610. DELICATE POSITION OF DUTCH GOVERNMENT. 201
At the very same time too, Father Cotton, who was only
too ready to betray the secrets of the confessional when there
was an object to gam, had a long conversation with the
Archduke's ambassador, in which the holy man said that
the King had confessed to him that he made the war ex-
pressly to cause the Princess to be sent back to France, so
that as there could be no more doubt on the subject the
father-confessor begged Pecquius, in order to prevent so great
an evil, to devise " some prompt and sudden means to induce
his Highness the Archduke to order the Princess to retire
secretly to her own country." The Jesuit had different
notions of honour, reputation, and duty from those which
influenced the Archduke. He added that "at Easter the
King had been so well disposed to seek his salvation that he
could easily have forgotten his affection for the Princess,
had she not rekindled the fire by her letters, in which she
caressed him with amorous epithets, calling him { my heart/
'my chevalier/ and similar terms of endearment." Father
Cotton also drew up a paper, which he secretly conveyed to
Pecquius, " to prove that the Archduke, in terms of con-
science and honour, might decide to permit this escape, but
he most urgently implored the Ambassador that for the love
of God and the public good he would influence his Serene
Highness to prevent this from ever coming to the knowledge
of the world, but to keep the secret inviolably." 1
Thus, while Henry was holding high council with his own
most trusted advisers, and with the most profound statesmen
of Europe, as to the opening campaign within a fortnight
of a vast and general war, he was secretly plotting with his
father-confessor to effect what he avowed to be the only pur-
1 Pecqnias to Archduke Albert, 28
April 1610. in Henrard. The Chan-
cellor (Sillery) also urjjed Pecquius to
induce his master "to prive up me mer-
chandize which he held in deposit,
and s ) to extinguish the torch about
to blaze through Christendom. lie
who could induce the Archduke to
consent would do the most salutary
work that had been done for a hun-
dred years." — Pecquius to Archduke
Albert, 30 April 1610.
202 THE LIFE OP JOHN OP BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
pose of that war, by Jesuitical bird-lime to be applied to the
chief of his antagonists. Certainly Barneveld and his col-
lea<mes were justified in their distrust. To move one step in
advance of their potent but slippery ally might be a step on7
a precipice.
On the 1st of May, Sully made a long visit to the com-
missioners. He earnestly urged upon them the necessity
Mayi, °f making the most of the present opportunity.
1610. There were people in plenty, he said, who would
gladly see the King take another course, for many influential
persons about him were altogether Spanish in their inclina-
tions.
The King had been scandalized to hear from the Prince
of Anhalt, without going into details, that on his recent
passage through the Netherlands he had noticed some
change of feeling, some coolness in their High Mightinesses.
The Duke advised that they should be very heedful, that
they should remember how much more closely these matters
regarded them than anyone else, that they should not de-
ceive themselves, but be firmly convinced that unless they
were willing to go head foremost into the business the
French would likewise not commit themselves. Sully spoke
with much earnestness and feeling, for it was obvious that
both he and his master had been disappointed at the cautious
and limited nature of the instructions given to the ambas-
sadors.1
An opinion had indeed prevailed, and, as we have seen,
was to a certain extent shared in by Aerssens, and even by
Sully himself, that the King's military preparations were
after all but a feint, and that if the Prince of Conde, and
with him the Princess, could be restored to France, the
whole war cloud would evaporate in smoke.2
It was even asserted that Henry had made a secret treaty
'"Rapport." (MS. before cited.) Letters of Aerssens, passim.
1610. DELICATE POSITION OF DUTCH GOVERNMENT. 203
with the enemy, according to which, while apparently ready
to burst upon the House of Austria with overwhelming force,
he was in reality about to shake hands cordially with that
power, on condition of being allowed to incorporate into his
own kingdom the very duchies in dispute, and of receiving
the Prince of Conde and his wife from Spain. He was thus
suspected of being about to betray his friends and allies in
the most ignoble manner and for the vilest of motives. The
circulation of these infamous reports no doubt paralysed for
a time the energy of the enemy who had made no requisite
preparations against the threatened invasion, but it sickened
his friends with vague apprehensions, while it cut the King
himself to the heart and infuriated him to madness.1
He asked the Nuncius one day what people thought in
Rome and Italy of the war about to be undertaken. Ubal-
dini replied that those best informed considered the Princess
of Condu as the principal subject of hostilities ; they thought
that he meant to have her back. " I do mean to have her
back," cried Henry, with a miglity oath, and foaming with
rage, " and I shall have her back. No one shall prevent it,
not even the Lieutenant of God on earth." 2
But the imputation of this terrible treason weighed upon
his mind and embittered every hour.
The commissioners assured Sully that they had no know-
ledge of any coolness or change such as Anhalt had reported
on the part of their principals, and the Duke took his
leave.
It will be remembered that Villeroy had, it was thought,
been making mischief between Anhalt and the States by
reporting and misreporting private conversations between
that Prince and the Dutch ambassador.
1 'Memoires do Sully,' vii. liv. xxvii. 399.
* Ibid. Notes for 'Memoires pour servir a 1'Hist. do France.'
» MS. Report, &c.
204 THE LIFE OF JOHN OP BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
As soon as Sully had gone, van der Myle waited upon
Villeroy to ask, in name of himself and colleagues, for
audience of leave-taking, the object of their mission having
been accomplished. The Secretary of State, too, like Sully,
urged the importance of making the most of the occasion.
The affair of Cleve, he said, did not very much concern the
King, but his Majesty had taken it to heart chiefly on
account of the States and for their security. They were
bound, therefore, to exert themselves to the utmost, but
more would not be required of them than it would be
possible to fulfil.
Van der Myle replied that nothing would be left undone
by their High Mightinesses to support the King faithfully
and according to their promise.
On the 5th, Yilleroy came to the ambassadors, bringing
Mays, with him a letter from the King for the States-
161°- General, and likewise a written reply to the de-
clarations made orally and in writing by the ambassadors
to his Majesty.
The letter of Henry to " his very dear and good friends,
allies, and confederates," was chiefly a complimentary ac-
knowledgment of the expressions of gratitude made to him
on part of the States-General, and warm approbation of their
sage resolve to support the cause of Brandenburg and Neu-
burg. He referred them for particulars to the confidential'
conferences held between the commissioners and himself.
They would state how important he thought it that this
matter should be settled now so thoroughly as to require no
second effort at any future time when circumstances might
not be so propitious ; and that he intended to risk his person,
at the head of his army, to accomplish this result.
To the ambassadors he expressed his high satisfaction at
their assurances of affection, devotion, and gratitude on the
1 MS. Report, &c.
1610. DELICATE POSITION OF DUTCH GOVERNMENT. 205
part of the States. He approved and commended their
resolution to assist the Elector and the Palatine in the affair
of the duchies. He considered this a proof of their prudence
and good judgment, as showing their conviction that they
were more interested and bound to render this assistance
than any other potentates or states, as much from the con-
venience and security to bo derived from the neighbourhood
of princes who were their friends as from dangers to be
apprehended from other princes who were seeking to ap-
propriate those provinces. The King therefore begged the
States to move forward as soon as possible the forces which
they offered for this enterprise according to his Majesty's
suggestion sent through de Bethune. The King on his part
would do the same with extreme care and diligence, from
the anxiety he felt to prevent My Lords the States from
receiving detriment in places so vital to their preservation.
He begged the States likewise to consider that it was
meet not only to make a first effort to put the princes into
entire possession of the duchies, but to provide also for the
durable success of the enterprise ; to guard against any
invasions that might be made in the future to eject those
princes. Otherwise all their present efforts would be useless ;
and his Majesty therefore consented on this occasion to enter
into the new league proposed by the States with all the
princes and states mentioned in the memoir of the ambas-
sadors for mutual assistance against all unjust occupations,
attempts, and baneful intrigues.
Having no special information as to the infractions by the
Archdukes of the recent treaty of truce, the King declined
to discuss that subject for the moment, although holding
himself bound to all required of him as one of the guarantees
of that treaty.
In regard to the remonstrance made by the ambassadors
concerning the trade of the East Indies, his Majesty dls-
206 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. IV.
claimed any intention of doing injury to the States in per-
mitting his subjects to establish a company in his kingdom
for that commerce. He had deferred hitherto taking action
in the matter only out of respect to the States, but he could
no longer refuse the just claims of his subjects if they
should persist in them as urgently as they had thus far
been doing. The right and liberty which they demanded
was common to all, said the King, and he was certainly
bound to have as great care for the interests of his subjects
as for those of his friends and allies.1
Here, certainly, was an immense difference in tone and in
terms towards the Kepublic adopted respectively by their
great and good friends and allies the Kings of France and
Great Britain. It was natural enough that Henry, having
secretly expressed his most earnest hope that the States
would move at his side in his broad and general assault
upon the House of Austria, should impress upon them his
conviction, which was a just one, that no power in the world
was more interested in keeping a Spanish and Catholic
prince out of the duchies than they were themselves. But
while thus taking a bond of them as it were for the entire
fulfilment of the primary enterprise, he accepted with cor-
diality, and almost with gratitude, their proposition of a
close alliance of the Kepublic with himself and with
the Protestant powers which James had so superciliously
rejected.
It would have been difficult to inflict a more petty and
more studied insult upon the Republic than did the King of
Great Britain at that supreme moment by his preposterous
claim of sovereign rights over the Netherlands. He would
make no treaty with them, he said, but should he find it
worth while to treat with his royal brother of France, he
should probably not shut the door in their faces.
1 Letter of King, 5 May 1610, in the MS. Report.
1610. INDIA TRADE— SIMON DANZER. 207
Certainly Henry's reply to the remonstrances of the am-
bassadors in regard to the India trade was as moderate as
that of James had been haughty and peremptory in regard
to the herring fishery. It is however sufficiently amusing
to see those excellent Hollanders nobly claiming that " the
sea was as free as air " when the right to take Scotch pil-
chards was in question, while at the very same moment they
were earnest for excluding their best allies and all the world
besides from their East India monopoly. But Isaac Le Maire
and Jacques Le Koy had not lain so long disguised in Zamet's
house hi Paris for nothing, nor had Aerssens so completely
"broke the 'neck of the French East India Company "as
he supposed. A certain Dutch freebooter, however, Simon
Danzer by name, a native of Dordrecht, who had been alter-
nately in the service of Spain, France, and the States, but
a general marauder upon all powers, was exercising at that
moment perhaps more influence on the East India trade than
any potentate or commonwealth.
He kept the seas just then with four swift-sailing and
well-armed vessels, that potent skimmer of the ocean, and
levied tribute upon Protestant and Catholic, Turk or Chris-
tian, with great impartiality. The King of Spain had sent
him letters of amnesty and safe-conduct, with large pecu-
niary offers, if he would enter his service. The King of
France had outbid his royal brother and enemy, and im-
plored him to sweep the seas under the white flag.
The States' ambassador begged his masters to reflect whether
this "puissant and experienced corsair" should be permitted
to serve Spaniard or Frenchman, and whether they could
devise no expedient for turning him into another track.
" He is now with his fine ships at Marseilles," said Aerssens.
" He is sought for in all quarters by the Spaniard and by
the directors of the new French East India Company, private
persons who equip vessels of war. If he is not satisfied with
208 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
this king's offers, he is likely to close with the King of
Spain, who offers him 1000 crowns a month. Avarice tickles
him, but he is neither Spaniard nor Papist, and I fear will
be induced to serve with his ships the East India Com-
pany, and so will return to his piracy, the evil of which will
always fall on our heads. If My Lords the States will send
me letters of abolition far him, in imitation of the French
king, on condition of his returning to his home in Zealand
and quitting the sea altogether, something might be done.
Otherwise he will be off to Marseilles again, and do more
harm to us than ever. Isaac Le Maire is doing as much evil
as he can, and one holds daily council with him here." *
Thus the slippery Simon skimmed the seas from Marseilles
to the Moluccas, from Java to Mexico, never to be held
firmly by Philip, or Henry, or Barneveld. A dissolute
but very daring ship's captain, born in Zealand, and for-
merly in the service of the States, out of which he had
been expelled for many evil deeds, Simon Danzer had now
become a professional pirate, having his head-quarters chiefly
at Algiers. His English colleague Warde stationed himself
mainly at Tunis, and both acted together in connivance with
the pachas of the Turkish government. They with their
considerable fleet, one vessel of which mounted sixty guns,
were the terror of the Mediterranean, extorted tribute from
the commerce of all nations indifferently, and sold licenses
to the greatest governments of Europe. After growing
rich with his accumulated booty, Simon was inclined to
become respectable, a recourse which was always open to
him — France, England, Spain, the United Provinces, vicing
with each other to secure him by high rank and pay as an
honoured member of their national marine. He appears
however to have failed in his plan of retiring upon his
1 "Rapport." (MS.) Aerssens to Barneveld, 6 Sept. 1609. Same to same,
1 Nov. 1609. Same to same, 22 Dec. 1609. (MSS.)
CONVERSATIONS OF HENRY WITH COMMISSIONERS. 209
laurels, having been stabbed in Paris by a man whom he
had formerly robbed and ruined.1
Villeroy, having delivered the letters with his own hands
to the ambassadors, was asked by them when and where it
would be convenient for the King to arrange the convention
of close alliance. The Secretary of State — in his secret heart
anything but kindly disposed for this loving union with a
republic he detested and with heretics whom he would have
burned — answered briefly that his Majesty was ready at any
time, and that it might take place then if they were provided
with the necessary powers. He said in parting that the
States should " have an eye to everything, for occasions like
the present were irrecoverable." He then departed, saying
that the King would receive them in final audience on the
following day.2
Next morning accordingly Marshal de Boisdaulphin and
de Bonoeil came with royal coaches to the Hotel Gondy
and escorted the ambassadors to the Louvre. On May 6j
the way they met de Bethune, who had returned 161°-
from the Hague bringing despatches for the King and for
themselves. While in the antechamber, they had oppor-
tunity to read their letters from the States-General, his
Majesty sending word that he was expecting them with
impatience, but preferred that they should read the des-
patches before the audience.
They found the King somewhat out of humour. He
expressed himself as tolerably well satisfied with the general
tenour of the despatches brought by de Bethune, but com>
plained loudly of the request now made by the States, that
the maintenance and other expenses of 4000 French in the
States' service should be paid in the coming campaign
out of the royal exchequer. He declared that this pro-
1 Meteren, 'Ned. Hist.' book xxxi. p. 673. Ibid. b. xxxii. 584, 639.
Wagenaar, x. 51. * " Rapport " of the Ambassadors, before cited.
VOL. I. P
210 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV
position was " a small manifestation of ingratitude," that my
Lords the States were " little misers/' and that such pro-
ceedings were " little avaricious tricks " such as he had not
expected of them.1
So far as England was concerned, he said there was a great
difference. The English took away what he was giving.
He did cheerfully a great deal for his friends, he said, and
was always ready doubly to repay what they did for him.
If, however, the States persisted in this course, he should
call his troops home again.
The King, as he went on, became more and more excited,
and showed decided dissatisfaction in his language and
manner. It was not to be wondered at, for we have seen how
persistently he had be.en urging that the Advocate should
come in person with " the bridle on his neck," and now he
had sent his son-in-law and two colleagues tightly tied up
by stringent instructions. And over and above all this,
while he was contemplating a general war with intention to
draw upon the States for unlimited supplies, behold, they
were haggling for the support of a couple of regiments which
were virtually their own troops.
There were reasons, however, for this cautiousness besides
those unfounded, although not entirely chimerical, suspicions
as to the King's good faith, to which we have alluded. It
should not be forgotten that, although Henry had conversed
secretly with the States' ambassador at full length on his
far-reaching plans, with instructions that he should con-
fidentially inform the Advocate and demand his co-opera-
tion, not a word of it had been officially propounded to the
States-General, nor to the special embassy with whom he
was now negotiating. No treaty of alliance offensive or
defensive existed between the Kingdom and the Republic
* "Rapport" of the Ambassadors, before cited : " petit temoigna^e d'ia
gratitude " — " petits avaricieux " — " petits avarices."
CONVERSATIONS OF HENRY WITH COMMISSIONERS. 211
or between the Republic and any power whatever. It would
have been culpable carelessness therefore at this moment for
the prime minister of the States to have committed his
government in writing to a full participation in a general
assault upon the House of Austria ; the first step in which
would have been a breach of the treaty just concluded and
instant hostilities with the Archdukes Albert and Isabella.
That these things were in the immediate future was as
plain as that night would follow day, but the hour had not
yet struck for the States to throw down the gauntlet.
Hardly twro months before, the King, in his treaty with the
princes at Hall, had excluded both the King of Great Britain
and the States-General from participation in those arrange-
ments, and it was grave matter for consideration, therefore,
for the States whether they should allow such succour as
they might choose to grant the princes to be included in
the French contingent. The opportunity for treating as a
sovereign power with the princes and making friends with
them was tempting, but it did not seem reasonable to the
States that France should make use of them in this war
without a treaty, and should derive great advantage from
the alliance, but leave the expense to them.
Henry, on the other hand, forgetting, when it was con-
venient to him, all about the Princess of Conde, his hatred
of Spam, and his resolution to crush the House of Austria,
chose to consider the war as made simply for the love of the
States-General and to secure them for ever from danger.
The ambassadors replied to the King's invectives with
great respect, and endeavoured to appease his anger. They
had sent a special despatch to their government, they said,
in regard to all those matters, setting forth all the difficulties
that had been raised, but had not wished to trouble his
Majesty with premature discussions of them. They did not
1 Aeresens to Baroeveld, 22 Feb. 1610. (MS.)
212 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
doubt, however, that their High Mightinesses would so
conduct this great affair as to leave the King no ground of
complaint.
Henry then began to talk of the intelligence brought by
de Bethune from the Hague, especially in regard to the send-
ing of States' troops to Diisseldorf and the supply of food for
the French army. He did not believe, he said, that the Arch-
dukes would refuse him the passage with his forces through
their territory, inasmuch as the States' army would be on the
way to meet him. In case of any resistance, however, he
declared his resolution to strike his blow and to cause people
to talk of him. He had sent his quartermaster-general to
examine the passes, who had reported that it would be
impossible to prevent his Majesty's advance. He was also
distinctly informed that Marquis Spinola, keeping his places
garrisoned, could not bring more than 8000 men into
the field. The Duke of Bouillon, however, was sending
advices that his communications were liable to be cut off,
and that for this purpose Spinola could set on foot about
16,000 infantry and 4000 horse.
If the passage should be allowed by the Archdukes, the
King stated his intention of establishing magazines for his
troops along the whole line of march through the Spanish
Netherlands and neighbouring districts, and to establish and
fortify himself everywhere in order to protect his supplies
and cover his possible retreat. He was still in doubt, he
said, whether to demand the passage at once or to wait until
he had began to move his army. He was rather inclined to
make the request instantly in order to gain time, being
persuaded that he should receive no answer either of consent
or refusal.
Leaving all these details, the King then frankly observed
that the affair of Cleve had a much wider outlook than
1 MS. Report, before cited.
CONVERSATIONS OF HENRY WITH COMMISSIONERS. 213
people thought. Therefore the States must consider well
what was to be done to secure the whole work as soon as the
Cleve business had been successfully accomplished. Upon
this subject it was indispensable that he should consult
especially with his Excellency (Prince Maurice) and some
members of the General Assembly, whom he wished that
My Lords the States-General should depute to the army.
" For how much good will it do," said the King, " if we
drive off Archduke Leopold without establishing the princes
in security for the future ? Nothing is easier than to put
the princes in possession. Every one will yield or run away
before our forces, but two months after we have withdrawn
the enemy will return and drive the princes out again. I
cannot always be ready to spring out of my kingdom, nor
to assemble such great armies. I am getting old, and my
army moreover costs me 400,000 crowns a month, which
is enough to exhaust all the treasures of France, Spain,
Venice, and the States-General together." 1
He added that, if the present occasion were neglected, the
States would afterwards bitterly lament and never recover
it. The Pope was very much excited, and was sending out
his ambassadors everywhere. Only the previous Saturday
the new nuncius destined for France had left Borne. If My
Lords the States would send deputies to the camp with full
powers, he stood there firm and unchangeable, but if they
remained cool in the business, he warned them that they
would enrage him.
The States must seize the occasion, he repeated. It was
bald behind, and must be grasped by the forelock. It was
not enough to have begun welL One must end well. "Finis
coronat opus." It was very easy to speak of a league, but a
league was not to be made in order to sit with arms tied, but
D *
to do good work. The States ought not to suffer that the
1 MS. " Rapport," &c.
214 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
Germans should prove themselves more energetic, more
courageous, than themselves.
And again the King vehemently urged the necessity of
his Excellency and some deputies of the States coming to
Mm " with absolute power " to treat. He could not doubt
in that event of something solid being accomplished.1
" There are three things/' he continued, " which cause me
to speak freely. I am talking with my friends whom I hold
dear — yes, dearer, perhaps, than they hold themselves. I
am a great king, and say what I choose to say. I am old,
and know by experience the ways of this world's affairs. I
tell you, then, that it is most important that you should
come to me resolved and firm on all points.2
He. then requested the ambassadors to make full report of
all that he had said to their masters, to make the journey as
rapidly as possible, in order to encourage the States to the
great enterprise and to meet his wishes. He required from
them, he said, not only activity of the body, but labour of
the intellect.
He was silent for a few moments, and then spoke again.
" I shall not always be here," he said, " nor will you always
have Prince Maurice, and a few others whose knowledge of
your commonwealth is perfect. My Lords the States must
be up and doing while they still possess them. Next Tues-
day I shall cause the Queen to be crowned at Saint-Denis ;
the following Thursday she will make her entry into Paris.
1 Next day, Friday, I shall take my departure. At the end
of this month I shall cross the Meuse at Mezieres or in that
neighbourhood." 3
He added that he should write immediately to Holland,
to urge upon his Excellency and the States to be ready to
make the junction of their army with his forces without
delay. He charged the ambassadors to assure their High
1 MS. " Rapport," &c. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.
CONVERSATIONS OF HENRY WITH COMMISSIONERS. 215
Mightinesses that he was and should remain their truest
friend, their dearest neighbour. He then said a few gracious
and cordial words to each of them, warmly embraced each,
and bade them all farewell.1
The next day was passed by the ambassadors in paying
and receiving farewell visits, and on Saturday, the May 8,
8th, they departed from Paris, being escorted out 161°-
of the gate by the Marshal de Boisdaulphin, with a caval-
cade of noblemen. They slept that night at Saint-
Denis, and then returned to Holland by the way of
Calais and Rotterdam, reaching the Hague on the 16th of
May.
I make no apology for the minute details thus given of
the proceedings of this embassy, and especially of the con-
versations of Henry.
The very words of those conversations were taken down
on the spot by the commissioners who heard them, and were
carefully embodied in their report made to the States-
General on their return, from which I have transcribed them.
It was a memorable occasion. The great king — for
great he was, despite his numerous vices and follies —
stood there upon the threshold of a vast undertaking, at
which the world, still half incredulous, stood gazing, half
sick with anxiety. He relied on his own genius and valour
chiefly, and after these on the brain of Barneveld and the
sword of Maurice. Nor was his confidence misplaced.
But let the reader observe the date of the day when those
striking utterances were made, and which have never before
been made public. It was Thursday, the 6th May. " I shall
not always be here," said the King. ... "I cannot be
ready at any moment to spring out of my kingdom." . . .
" Friday of next week I take my departure."
How much of heroic pathos in Henry's attitude at this
1 MS. " Rapport," &c.
216 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
supreme moment ! How mournfully ring those closing
words of his address to the ambassadors !
The die was cast. A letter drawn up by the Due de Sully
was sent to Archduke Albert by the King.
" My brother," he said ; " Not being able to refuse my best
allies and confederates the help which they have asked of
me against those who wish to trouble them in the succes-
sion to the duchies and counties of Cleve, Julich, Mark,
Berg, Ravensberg, and Ravenstein, I am advancing towards
them with my army. As my road leads me through your
country, I desire to notify you thereof, and to know whether
or not I am to enter as a friend or enemy."
Such was the draft as delivered to the Secretary of State ;
"and as such it was sent," said Sully, "unless Villeroy
changed it, as he had a great desire to do." *
Henry was mistaken in supposing that the Archduke
would leave the letter without an answer. A reply was sent
in due time, and the permission demanded was not refused.
For although France was now full of military movement,
and the regiments everywhere were hurrying hourly to the
places of rendezvous, though the great storm at last was
ready to burst, the Archdukes made no preparations for
resistance, and lapped themselves in fatal security that
nothing was intended but an empty demonstration.2
Six thousand Swiss newly levied, with 20,000 French
infantry and 6000 horse, were waiting for Henry to place
himself at their head at Mezieres. Twelve thousand foot
and 2000 cavalry, including the French and English con-
tingents— a splendid army, led by Prince Maurice — were
ready to march from Holland to Diisseldorf. The army of
the princes under Prince Christian of Anhalt numbered
10,000 men. The last scruples of the usually unscrupulous
Charles Emmanuel had been overcome, and the Duke was
1 ' Memoires de Sully,' vii. 875. * Ibid. 360, notes.
1610.
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
217
quite ready to act, 25,000 strong, with Marshal de Les-
diguieres, in the Milanese ; while Marshal de la Force was
already at the head of his forces in the Pyrenees, amounting
to 12,000 foot and 2000 horse.
Sully had already despatched his .splendid trains of artil-
lery to the frontier. "Never was seen in France, and
perhaps never will be seen there again, artillery more com-
plete and better furnished," 1 said the Duke, thinking pro-
bably that artillery had reached the climax of perfect de-
structiveness in the first decade of the seventeenth century.
His son, the Marquis de Rosny, had received the post of
grand master of artillery, and placed himself at its head.
His father was to follow as its chief, carrying with him as
superintendent of finance a cash-box of eight millions.
The King had appointed his wife, Mary de' Medici,
regent, with an eminent council.2
The new nuncius had been requested to present himself with
his letters of credence in the camp. Henry was unwilling
that he should enter Paris, being convinced that he came
to do his best, by declamation, persuasion, and intrigue, to
paralyse the enterprise. Sull/s promises to Ubaldini, the
former nuncius, that his Holiness should be made king,
however flattering to Paul V., had not prevented his repre-
sentatives from vigorously denouncing Henry's monstrous
scheme to foment heresy and encourage rebellion.3
The King's chagrin at the cautious limitations imposed
upon the States' special embassy was, so he hoped, to be
removed by full conferences in the camp. Certainly he had
shown in the most striking manner the respect he felt for
the States, and the confidence he reposed in them.
1 'Memoires do Sully,' vii. 874.
* It consisted of the Cardinals do
Joyeusf) and da Perron, the Dukes of
Mayenr.e, Montmorcticv, and Mont-
baron, the Marshals dc Brissac and do
Ferraques.with Chateanncnf, Ilarlay,
Nicolay, Chateauvieux, do Liancourt,
do Pontcarre, de Qevrcs, de Villemon-
to«. «md de Maupeon.
s Ibid. 357.
218 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. IV.
" In the reception of your embassy," wrote Aerssens to the
Advocate, " certainly the King has so loosened the strap of
his affection that he has reserved nothing by which he could
put the greatest king in the world above your level." *
He warned the StateSj however, that Henry had not found
as much in their propositions as the common interest had
caused him to promise himself. " Nevertheless he informs
me in confidence," said Aerssens, " that he will engage him-
self in nothing without you ; nay, more, he has expressly
told me that he could hardly accomplish his task without
your assistance, and it was for our sakes alone that he has put
himself into this position and incurred this great expense." 2
Some days later he informed Barneveld that he would
leave to van der Myle and his colleagues the task of
describing the great dissatisfaction of the King at the letters
brought by de Bethune. He told him in confidence that
the States must equip the French regiments and put them
in marching order if they wished to preserve Henry's friend-
ship. He added that since the departure of the special
embassy the King had been vehemently and seriously
urging that Prince Maurice, Count Lewis William, Barne-
veld, and three or four of the most qualified deputies
of the States-General, entirely authorized to treat for the
common safety, should meet with him in the territory of
Jiilich on a fixed day.3
The crisis was reached. The King stood fully armed,
thoroughly prepared, with trustworthy allies at his side,
disposing of overwhelming forces ready to sweep down with
irresistible strength upon the House of Austria, which, as he
said and the States said, aspired to give the law to the whole
world. Nothing was left to do save, as the Ambassador said,
to " uncouple the dogs of war and let them run."
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 26 April 1610. (MS.) 2 Ibid.
3 Same to same, 11 May 1610. (MS.)
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE QUEEN'S CORONATION. 219
What preparations had Spain and the Empire, the Pope
and the League, set on foot to beat back even for a moment
the overwhelming onset ? None whatever. Spinola in the
Netherlands, Fuentes in Milan, Bucquoy and Lobkowitz and
Liechtenstein in Prague, had hardly the forces of a moderate
peace establishment at their disposal, and all the powers
save France and the States were on the verge of bankruptcy.
Even James of Great Britain — shuddering at the vast
thundercloud which had stretched itself over Christendom
growing blacker and blacker, precisely at this moment, in
which he had proved to his own satisfaction that the peace
just made would perpetually endure — even James did not
dare to traverse the designs of the king whom he feared,
and the republic which he hated, in favour of his dearly
loved Spain, Sweden, Donm:irk, the Hanse Towns, were in
harmony with France, Holland, Savoy, and the whole Pro-
testant force of Germany — a majority both in population
and resources of the whole empire. What army, what com-
bination, what device, what talisman, could save the House
of Austria, the cause of Papacy, from the impending ruin ?
A sudden, rapid, conclusive victory for the allies seemed
as predestined a result as anything could be in the future of
human affairs.
On the 14th or 15th day of May, as he had just been
informing the States' ambassadors, Henry meant May 14,
to place himself at the head of his army. That 161°-
was the moment fixed by himself for " taking his de-
parture."
And now the ides of May had come — but not gone.
In the midst of all the military preparations with which
Paris had been resounding, the arrangements for the Queen's
coronation had been simultaneously going forward. Partly
to give check in advance to the intrigues which would
probably at a later date be made by Conde, supported by
220 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BABNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
the power of Spain, to invalidate the legitimacy of the
Dauphin, but more especially perhaps to further and to con-
ceal what the faithful Sully called the " damnable artifices "
of the Queen's intimate councillors — sinister designs too dark
to be even whispered 1 at that epoch, and of which history,
during the lapse of more than two centuries and a half, has
scarcely dared to speak above its breath — it was deemed all
important that the coronation should take place.
A certain astrologer, Thomassin byname, was said to have
bidden the King to beware the middle of the next month of
May. Henry had tweaked the soothsayer by the beard and
made him dance twice or thrice about the room.2 To the
Due de Vendome expressing great anxiety in regard to
Thomassin, Henry replied, "The astrologer is an old fool, and
you are a young fool." A certain prophetess called Pasithea
had informed the Queen that the King could not survive
his fifty-seventh year. She was much in the confidence of
Mary de' Medici, who had insisted this year on her returning
to Paris.3 Henry, who was ever chafing and struggling to
escape the invisible and dangerous net which he felt closing
about him, and who connected the sorceress with all whom
he most loathed among the intimate associates of the Queen,
swore a mighty oath that she should not show her face again
at court. " My heart presages that some signal disaster will
befall me on this coronation. Concini and his wife are
urging the Queen obstinately to send for this fanatic. If
she should come, there is no doubt that my wife and I shall
squabble well about her. If I discover more about these
private plots of hers with Spain, I shall be in a mighty
passion." And the King then assured the faithful minister
of his conviction that all the jealousy affected by the Queen
in regard to the Princess of Conde was but a veil to cover
1 ' Memoires de Sully,' vii. 175.
8 L'Estoile, iii. 433. Sully, ' Mem.' vii. 381. 3 Ibid. 175.
1610. PERPLEXITIES OF HENRY. 221
dark designs. It was necessary in the opinion of those who
governed her, the vile Concini and his wife, that there
should be some apparent and flagrant cause of quarrel. The
public were to receive payment in these pretexts for want of
better coin. Henry complained that even Sully and all the
world besides attributed to jealousy that which was really
the effect of a most refined malice.1
And the minister sometimes pauses in the midst of these
revelations made in his old age, and with self-imposed and
shuddering silence intimates that there are things he could
tell which are too odious and dreadful to be breathed.
Henry had an invincible repugnance to that coronation
on which the Queen had set her heart. Nothing could be
more pathetic than the isolated position in which he found
himself, standing thus as he did on the threshold of a mighty
undertaking in which he was the central figure, an object for
the world to gaze upon with palpitating interest. At his
hearth in the Louvre were no household gods. Danger
lurked behind every tapestry in that magnificent old palace.
A nameless dread dogged his footsteps through those
resounding corridors.
And by an exquisite refinement in torture the possible
father of several of his children not only dictated to the
Queen perpetual outbreaks of frantic jealousy against her
husband, but moved her to refuse with suspicion any food
and drink offered her by his hands. The Concini's would
even with unparalleled and ingenious effrontery induce her tc
make use of the kitchen arrangements in their apartments
for the preparation of her daily meals.2
Driven from house and home, Henry almost lived at the
Arsenal. There he would walk for hours in the long alleys
of the garden, discussing with the great financier and soldier
his vast, dreamy, impracticable plans. Strange combina-
1 Sully, vii. 175. * Ibid. 177, 178.
222 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
tion of the hero, the warrior, the voluptuary, the sage, and
the schoolboy — it would be difficult to find in the whole
range of history a more human, a more attractive, a more
provoking, a less venerable character.
Haunted by omens, dire presentiments, dark suspicions
with and without cause, he was especially averse from the
coronation to which in a moment of weakness he had given
his consent.
Sitting in Sully's cabinet, in a low chair which the Duke
had expressly provided for his use, tapping and drumming
on his spectacle case, or starting up and smiting himself on
the thigh, he would pour out his soul hours long to his one
confidential minister. " Ah, my friend, how this sacrament
displeases me," he said ; * " I know not why it is, but my
heart tells me that some misfortune is to befall me. By God !
I shall die in this city, I shall never go out of it ; I see very
well that they are finding their last resource in my death. Ah,
accursed coronation ! thou wilt be the cause of my death."
So many times did he give utterance to these sinister
forebodings that Sully implored him at last for leave to
countermand the whole ceremony notwithstanding the great
preparations which had been made for the splendid festival.
" Yes, yes," replied the King, " break up this coronation at
once. Let me hear no more of it. Then I shall have my
mind cured of all these impressions. I shall leave the town
and fear nothing."
He then informed his friend that he had received intima-
tions that he should lose his life at the first magnificent
festival he should give, and that he should die in a carriage.
Sully admitted that he had often, when in a carriage with him,
been amazed at his starting and crying out at the slightest
shock, having so often seen him intrepid among guns and
cannon, pikes and naked swords.2
1 Sully, vii. 383. s Ibid.
1610. FOREBODINGS AND WARNINGS. 223
The Duke went to the Queen three days in succession,
and with passionate solicitations and arguments and almost
upon his knees implored her to yield to the King's earnest
desire, and renounce for the time at least the coronation.
In vain. Mary de' Medici was obdurate as marble to his
prayers.1
The coronation was fixed for Thursday, the 13th May, two
days later than the time originally appointed when the
King conversed with the States' ambassadors. On the fol-
lowing Sunday was to be the splendid and solemn entrance
of the crowned Queen. On the Monday, Henry, postponing
likewise for two days his original plan of departure, would
leave for the army.
Meantime there were petty annoyances connected with
the details of the coronation. Henry had set his heart on
having his legitimatized children, the offspring of the fair
Gabrielle, take their part in the ceremony on an equal
footing with the princes of the blood. They were not
entitled to wear the lilies of France upon their garments,
and the King was solicitous that " the Count " — as Soissons,
brother of Prince Conti and uncle of Conde, was always
called — should dispense with those ensigns for his wife upon
this solemn occasion, and that the other princesses of the
blood should do the same. Thus there would be no appear-
ance of inferiority on the part of the Duchess of Vendome.2
The Count protested that he would have his eyes torn out
of his head rather than submit to an arrangement which
would do him so much shame. He went to the Queen and
urged upon her that to do this would likewise be an injury
to her children, the Dukes of Orleans and of Anjou. He
refused flatly to appear or allow his wife to appear except in
the costume befitting their station. The King on his part
was determined not to abandon his purpose. He tried to
1 Sully, vii. 383. • Aeresens to Barncveld, 11 May 1610. (MS.)
224 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. . CHAP. IV.
gain over the Count by the most splendid proposals, offering
him the command of the advance-guard of the army, or the
lieutenancy-general of France in the absence of the King,
30,000 crowns for his equipment and an increase of his
pension if he would cause his wife to give up the fleurs-
de-lys on this occasion. The alternative was to be that, if
she insisted upon wearing them, his Majesty would never
look upon him again with favourable eyes.
The Count never hesitated, but left Paris, refusing to
appear at the ceremony. The King was in a towering
passion, for to lose the presence of this great prince of the
blood at a solemnity expressly intended as a demonstration
against the designs hatching by the first of all the princes
of the blood under patronage of Spain was a severe blow to
his pride and a check to his policy.1
Yet it was inconceivable that he could at such a moment
commit so superfluous and unmeaning a blunder. He had
forced Conde into exile, intrigue with the enemy, and
rebellion, by open and audacious efforts to destroy his
domestic peace, and now he was willing to alienate one of
his most powerful subjects in order to place his bastards on
a level with royalty. While it is sufficiently amusing to
contemplate this proposed barter of a chief command in a
great army or the lieutenancy-general of a mighty kingdom
at the outbreak of a general European war against a bit of
embroidery on the court dress of a lady, yet it is impossible
not to recognize something ideal and chivalrous from his
own point of view in the refusal of Soissons to renounce
those emblems of pure and high descent, those haughty lilies
of St. Louis, against any bribes of place and pelf however
dazzling.
The coronation took place on Thursday, 13th May, with the
pomp and glitter becoming great court festivals ; the more
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 11 May 1610. (MS.)
1610. THE MURDER ACCOMPLISHED. 225
pompous and glittering the more the monarch's heart was
wrapped in gloom. The representatives of the great powers
were conspicuous in the procession ; Aerssens, the Dutch
ambassador, holding a foremost place. The ambassadors of
Spam and Venice as usual squabbled about precedence and
many other things, and actually came to fisticuffs, the fight
lasting a long time and ending somewhat to the advantage
of the Venetian.1 But the sacrament was over, and Mary de'
Medici was crowned Queen of France and Eegent of the
Kingdom during the absence of the sovereign with his army.
Meantime there had been mysterious warnings darker and
more distinct than the babble of the soothsayer Thomassin
or the ravings of the lunatic Pasithea. Count Schomberg,
dining at the Arsenal with Sully, had been called out to
converse with Mademoiselle de Gournay, who implored that
a certain Madame d'Escomans might be admitted to audience
of the King.2 That person, once in direct relations with the
Marchioness of Verneuil, the one of Henry's mistresses who
most hated him, affirmed that a man from the Duke of
Epernon's country was in Paris, agent of a conspiracy seeking
the King's life.
The woman not enjoying a very reputable character found
it impossible to obtain a hearing, although almost frantic
with her desire to save her sovereign's life. The Queen
observed that it was a wicked woman, who was accusing all
the world, and perhaps would accuse her too.3
The fatal Friday came. Henry drove out in his carriage
to see the preparations making for the triumphal May 14>
entrance of the Queen into Paris on the following 1G1°-
Sunday. What need to repeat the tragic, familiar tale ? The
1 Aeresens to Barn c veld, 15 May
1610. (MS.) " . . . lo Jeudi so bat-
tirent longuement a coups do points
los ambassadeurs d'Espagne ct Ve-
nice pour 1'oxcellence et illustris-
Ce seroit une belle comedio sans cette
sanglante tragt'die quo ne cesserai
oncques de pleurer," &c.
» Stilly, vii. 387, sqq.
3 ' Mi'm. pour servir it 1'hist. do
Bime. Lo Venitien cut 1'avantage. France,' 857. Sully, vil. 889, note.
VOL. I.
226
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF EARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
coach was stopped by apparent accident in the narrow street
de la Feronniere, and Francis Ravaillac, standing on the
wheel, drove his knife through the monarch's heart. The
Duke of Epernon, sitting at his side, threw his cloak over the
body and ordered the carriage back to the Louvre.
"They have killed him, e ammazato," cried Concini (so
says tradition), thrusting his head into the Queen's bed-
chamber.1
That blow had accomplished more than a great army
could have done, and Spain now reigned in Paris. The
House of Austria, without making any military preparations,
had conquered, and the great war of religion and politics
was postponed for half a dozen years.
This history has no immediate concern with solving the
mysteries of that stupendous crime. The woman who had
sought to save the King's life now denounced Epernon as
the chief murderer, and was arrested, examined, accused of
lunacy, proved to be perfectly sane, and, persisting in her
statements with perfect coherency, was imprisoned for life
for her pains ; the Duke furiously demanding her instant
execution.
The documents connected with the process were carefully
suppressed. The assassin, tortured and torn by four horses,
was supposed to have revealed nothing and to have denied
the existence of accomplices.
The great accused were too omnipotent to be dealt with
by humble accusers or by convinced but powerless tribunals.
The trial was all mystery, hugger-mugger, horror. Yet the
1 Michelet, 197. It is not pro-
bable that the documents concerning
the trial, having been so carefully
suppressed from thebeginning, especi-
ally theconfession dictatedto Voisin—
who wrote it kneeling on the ground,
and was perhaps so appalled at its
purport that he was afraid to write it
legibly — will ever see the light. I
add in the Appendix some contem-
porary letters of persons, as likely
as any one to know what could be
known, which show how dreadful
were the suspicions which men enter-
tained, and which they hardly ven-
tured to whisper to each other.
1610.
TERRIBLE CHANGE IN FRANCE.
227
murderer is known to have dictated to the Greffier Voisin,
just before expiring on the Greve, a declaration which that
functionary took down in a handwriting perhaps purposely
illegible.
Two centuries and a half have passed away, yet the illegible
original record is said to exist, to have been plainly read, and
to contain the names of the Queen and the Duke of Epernon.1
Twenty-six years before, the pistol of Balthasar Gerard
had destroyed the foremost man in Europe and the chief of
a commonwealth just straggling into existence. Yet Spain
and Borne, the instigators and perpetrators of the crime,
had not reaped the victory which they had the right to
expect. The young republic, guided by Barneveld and loyal
to the son of the murdered stadholder, was equal to the
burthen suddenly descending upon its shoulders. Instead
of despair there had been constancy. Instead of distracted
counsels there had been heroic union of heart and hand.
Bather than bend to Borne and grovel to Philip, it had taken
its sovereignty in its hands, offered it successively, without
a thought of self-aggrandizement on the part of its children,
to the crowns of France and Great Britain, and, having been
repulsed by both, had learned after fiery trials and incredible
exertions to assert its own high and foremost place among
the independent powers of the world.
And now the knife of another priest-led fanatic, the
wretched but unflinching instrument of a great conspiracy,
had at a blow decapitated France. No political revolution
could be much more thorough than that \vhich had been
accomplished in a moment of time by Francis Bavaillac.
On the 14th of May, France, while in spiritual matters
1 See 'Memoiros de Sully,' t. vii.
(ed. cit. 1747), 857, 8K6-440. and the
notoa See also le P<-rc Daniel, ' Hist,
de la Franco ' (ed. cit.), t. xii. 644-050,
sqq. ; t. xiii. 51-53. See especially
the remarkable volume of the creat
historian Michelet, ' Henry IV et
Richelieu,' chs. xii. and xiii. passim,
pp. 209 and 225.
228
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
obedient to the Pope, stood at the head of the forces of Pro-
testantism throughout Europe, banded together to effect the
downfall of the proud house of Austria, whose fortunes and
fate were synonymous with Catholicism. The Baltic powers,
the majority of the Teutonic races, the Kingdom of Britain,
the great Eepublic of the Netherlands, the northernmost
and most warlike governments of Italy, all stood at the
disposition of the warrior-king. Venice, who had hitherto,
in the words of a veteran diplomatist, "shunned to look
a league or a confederation in the face, if there was any
Protestant element in it, as if it had been the head of
Medusa," * had formally forbidden the passage of troops
northwards to the relief of the assailed power. Savoy, after
direful hesitations, had committed herself body and soul to
the great enterprise. Even the Pope,2 who feared the over-
shadowing personality of Henry, and was beginning to
believe his house's private interests more likely to flourish
under the protection of the French than the Spanish king,
was wavering in his fidelity to Spain and tempted by French
promises. If he should prove himself incapable of effecting
a pause in the great crusade, it was doubtful on which side
he would ultimately range himself ; for it was at least cer-
tain that the new Catholic League, under the chieftainship
of Maximilian of Bavaria, was resolved not to entangle its
fortunes inextricably with those of the Austrian house.
The great enterprise, first unfolding itself with the episode
of Cleve and Berg and whimsically surrounding itself with
the fantastic idyl of the Princess of Conde, had attained vast
1 ' Letters from and to Sir Dudley
Carleton' (London, 1757), p. 384.
8 " ' Dominus exercituum fecit hoc/
thus moralized his Holiness on hear-
ing of the murder, ' etquia erat datus
in reprobum sensum,' through the
blindness of love and the instigations
of the Duke of Savoy, both being re-
solved to disturb the repose of Italy.
Now, therefore, his Holiness was re-
presented as 'hoping a change for
the better in public affairs. ' " — Ortem-
berg, ambassador at Rome, to the
Archdukes. 29 Ma? 1610, in Hen-
rard.
1610. TEKRIBLE CHANGE IN FRANCE. 229
and misty proportions in the brain of its originator. Few
political visions are better known in history than the
" grand design " of Henry for rearranging the map of the
•world at the moment when, in the middle of May, he was
about to draw his sword. Spain reduced to the Medi-
terranean and the Pyrenees, but presented with both the
Indies, with all America and the whole Orient in fee ; the
Empire taken from Austria and given to Bavaria ; a con-
stellation of States in Italy, with the Pope for president-
king ; throughout the rest of Christendom a certain number
of republics, of kingdoms, of religions — a great confederation
of the world, in short — with the most Christian king for its
dictator and protector, and a great Amphictyonic council
to regulate all disputes by solemn arbitration, and to make
war in the future impossible, such in little was his great
design.
Nothing could be more humane, more majestic, more
elaborate, more utterly preposterous. And all this gigantic
fabric had passed away in an instant — at one stroke of a
broken table knife sharpened on a carriage wheel.
Most pitiful was the condition of France on the day after,
and for years after, the murder of the King. Not only was
the kingdom for the time being effaced from the roll of
nations, so far as external relations were concerned, but it
almost ceased to be a kingdom. The ancient monarchy of
Hugh Capet, of Saint-Louis, of Henry of France and Navarre,
was transformed into a turbulent, self-seeking, quarrelsome,
pillaging, pilfering democracy of grandees. The Queen-
Regent was tossed hither and thither at the sport of the
winds and waves which shifted every hour in that tem-
pestuous court.
No man pretended to think of the State. J^very man
thought only of himself. The royal exchequer was plun-
dered with a celerity and cynical recklessness sucb as have
230
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
been rarely seen in any age or country. The millions so
carefully hoarded by Sully, and exhibited so dramatically
by that great minister to the enraptured eyes of his sove-
reign ; that treasure in the Bastille on which Henry relied
for payment of the armies with which he was to transform
the world, all disappeared in a few weeks to feed the
voracious maw of courtiers, paramours, and partisans.1
The Queen showered gold like water upon her beloved Con-
cini that he might purchase his Marquisate of Ancre, and the
charge of first gentleman of the court from Bouillon ; that
he might fit himself for the government of Picardy ; that
he might elevate his marquisate into a dukedom. Conde,
having no further reason to remain in exile, received as a
gift from the trembling Mary de' Medici the magnificent
Hotel Gondy, where the Dutch ambassadors had so recently
been lodged, for which she paid 65,000 crowns, together
with 25,000 crowns to furnish it, 50,000 crowns to pay his
debts, 50,000 more as yearly pension.2
He claimed double, and was soon at sword's point with the
Queen in spite of her lavish bounty.
Epernon, the true murderer of Henry, trampled on courts
of justice 3 and councils of ministers, frightened the court
by threatening to convert his possession of Metz into an in-
dependent sovereignty, as Balagny had formerly seized upon
Cambray, smothered for ever the process of Kavaillac,
caused those to be put to death or immured for life in dun-
geons who dared to testify to his complicity in the great
crime, and strode triumphantly over friends and enemies
throughout France, although so crippled by the gout that
he could scarcely walk up stairs.
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 29 July
1610 (MS.), et passim.
8 Aerssens, iM sup. J. Simons to
Prats, 6 Aug. 1610, in Henrard.
3 P. Pecquius to Archduke Albert,
28 Jan. 1611. Same to same, 2 Feb.
1611. (Archives of Belgium, at Brus-
sels, MSS.) Aerssens to Barneveld,
Jan., Feb., and March 1611. (Hague
Archives MS.)
1610.
TEIUMPH OP CONCENI AND OF SPAIN.
231
There was an end to the triumvirate. Siilly's influence
was gone for ever. The other two dropped the mask. The
Chancellor and Villeroy revealed themselves to be what
they secretly had always been — humble servants and stipen-
diaries of Spain.1 The formal meetings of the council
were of little importance, and were solemn, tearful, and
stately ; draped in woe for the great national loss. In the
private cabinet meetings in the entresol of the Louvre, where
the Nuncius and the Spanish ambassador held counsel with
Epemon and Villeroy and Jeannin and Sillery, the tone
was merry and loud ; the double Spanish marriage and con-
fusion to the Dutch being the chief topics of consultation.
But the anarchy grew day by day into almost hopeless
chaos. There was no satisfying the princes of the blood nor
the other grandees. Conde, whose reconciliation with the
Princess followed not long after the death of Henry and his
own return to France, was insatiable in his demands for
money, power, and citadels of security. Soissons, who might
formerly have received the lieutenancy-general of the
kingdom by sacrificing the lilies on his wife's gown, now
disputed for that office with his elder brother Conti, the
Prince claiming it by right of seniority, the Count de-
nouncing Conti as deaf, dumb, and imbecile, till they drew
poniards on each other in the very presence of the Queen ; 2
while Conde on one occasion, having been refused the cita-
dels which he claimed, Blaye and Chateau Trompette, threw
his cloak over his nose and put on his hat while the Queen
was speaking, and left the council in a fury, declaring that
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 16 Nov.
1610. (MS.): "Etant plus que no-
toirc que Messrs. Ic chancelier et de
Villeroy sont de tous points Espa-
gnols et le lonp temps pensionnaires
d'Espagne." Same to same, 6 Dec.
1610: "la faibles.se de la Reine lui
pet
&c.
Rrmft (Villeroy) a lever le masque,"
c. " Villeroy, quiscul,posscdetoutea
les affaires du royaume avec une ja-
lousie incroyable de tous les grands
et petits Rome gouverne tout et
1'Espagne grande part aux affaires."
—Same to same, 8 Sept. 1610. (H.
Archives MS.)
* Same to Jacques v. Maldere, 8
Aug. 1610. (MS.)
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
Villeroy and the Chancellor were traitors, and that he would
have them both soundly cudgelled.1 Guise, Lorraine, Eper-
non, Bouillon, and other great lords always appeared in
the streets of Paris at the head of three, four, or five hun-
dred mounted and armed retainers ; while the Queen in
her distraction gave orders to arm the Paris mob to the
number of fifty thousand, and to throw chains across the
streets to protect herself and her son against the turbulent
nobles.2
Sully, hardly knowing to what saint to burn his candle,
being forced to resign his great posts, was found for a time
in strange political combination with the most ancient foes
of his party and himself. The kaleidoscope whirling with
exasperating quickness showed ancient Leaguers and Lor-
rainers banded with and protecting Huguenots against the
Crown, while princes of the blood, hereditary patrons and
chiefs of the Huguenots, became partisans and stipendiaries!
of Spain.
It is easy to see that circumstances like these rendered
the position of the Dutch commonwealth delicate and
perilous.
Sully informed Aerssens and van der Myle, who had been
sent back to Paris on special mission very soon after the
death of the King, that it took a hundred hours now to
accomplish a single affair, whereas under Henry a hundred
affairs were transacted in a single hour. But Sully 's sun
had set, and he had few business conferences now with the
ambassadors.3
Villeroy and the Chancellor had fed fat their ancient
grudge to the once omnipotent minister, and had sworn his
political ruin. The old secretary of state had held now coni-
1 Aerssens to Jacques v. Maldere
U Dec. 1610. (MS.)
» Ibid.
3 Same to Barneveld, 14 June
1610. (MS.) Van der Myle, Report
of the Special Embassy. (MS.)
1610. DOWNFALL OP SULLY. 233
plete control of the foreign alliances and combinations of
France, and the Dutch ambassadors could be under no
delusion as to the completeness of the revolution.
" You will find a passion among the advisers of the
Queen," said Villeroy to Aerssens and van der Myle, " to
move in diametrical opposition to the plans of the late
king." * And well might the ancient Leaguer and present
pensionary of Spain reveal this foremost fact in a policy
of which he was in secret the soul. He wept profusely
when he first received Francis Aerssens, but after these
" useless tears," as the Envoy called them, he soon made it
manifest that there was no more to be expected of France,
in the great project which its government had so elaborately
set on foot.2
Villeroy was now sixty-six years of age, and had been
secretary of state during forty-two years and under four
kings. A man of delicate health, frail body, methodical
habits, capacity for routine, experience in political intrigue,
he was not personally as greedy of money as many of his
contemporaries, and was not without generosity; but he
loved power, the Pope, and the House of Austria. He was
singularly reserved in public, practised successfully the
talent of silence, and had at last arrived at the position
he most coveted, the virtual presidency of the council, and
saw the men he most hated beneath his feet.
At the first interview of Aerssens with the Queen-Regent
she was drowned in tears, and could scarcely articulate an
intelligible sentence. So far as could be understood she
expressed her intention of carrying out the King's plans,
of maintaining the old alliances, of protecting both reli-
gions. Nothing, however, could be more preposterous than
such phrases. Villeroy, who now entirely directed the
foreign affairs of the kingdom, assured the Ambassador that
1 Aerseens' letter last cited. * Ibid.
234 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
France was much more likely to apply to the States for
assistance than render them aid in any enterprise whatever.
" There is no doubt," said Aerssens, " that the Queen is
entirely in the hands of Spain and the priests." Villeroy,
whom Henry was wont to call the pedagogue of the council,
went about sighing dismally, wishing himself dead, and
perpetually ejaculating, " Ho ! poor France, how much hast
thou still to suffer ! " In public he spoke of nothing but of
union, and of the necessity of carrying out the designs
of the King, instructing the docile Queen to hold the same
language. In private he was quite determined to crush
those designs for ever, and calmly advised the Dutch
government to make an amicable agreement with the
Emperor in regard to the Cleve affair as soon as possible ;
a treaty which would have been shameful for France and
the possessory princes, and dangerous, if not disastrous,
for the States-General. "Nothing but feverish and sick
counsels," he said, "could be expected from France,
which had now lost its vigour and could do nothing but
groan." 1
Not only did the French council distinctly repudiate the
idea of doing anything more for the princes than had been
stipulated by the treaty of Hall — that is to say, a contingent
of 8000 foot and 2000 horse — but many of them vehemently
maintained that the treaty, being a personal one of the
late king, was dead with him.2 The duty of France was
now in their opinion to withdraw from these mad schemes
as soon as possible, to make peace with the House of
Austria without delay, and to cement the friendship by
the double marriages.3
1 Aeresens to Barneveld, 26 May
1610. Same to same, 5 June 1610.
Same to same, 19 May 1610. Same
to van Maldere, 25 May 1610. (MSS.)
8 Van der Myle, MS. Report. Vil-
leroy took this ground, saying, " dat
hare M' hierinne niet gehouden en
waeren de beloften vand' overleden
Coninck personeel zynde," &c.
3 Aerssens to Prince Maurice, 14
June 1610. (MS.) Van der Myle,
MS. Report.
1610.
DISPUTES OF THE GRANDEES.
235
Bouillon, who at that moment hated Sully as much as the
most vehement Catholic could do, assured the Dutch envoy
that the government was, under specious appearances,
attempting to deceive the States ; a proposition which it
needed not the evidence of that most intriguing duke to
make manifest to so astute a politician ; particularly as there
was none more bent on playing the most deceptive game
than Bouillon.1 There would be no troops to send, he said,
and even if there were, there would be no possibility of
agreeing on a chief. The question of religion would at
once arise. As for himself, the Duke protested that he would
not accept the command if offered him. He would not agree
to serve under the Prince of Anhalt, nor would he for any
consideration in the world leave the court at that moment.
At the same time Aerssens was well aware that Bouillon,
in his quality of first marshal of France, a Protestant and
a prince having great possessions on the frontier, and the
brother-in-law of Prince Maurice, considered himself entitled
to the command of the troops should they really be sent, and
was very indignant at the idea of its being offered to any
one else.2
He advised earnestly therefore that the States should
make a firm demand for money instead of men, specifying
the amount that might be considered the equivalent of the
number of troops originally stipulated.
It is one of the most singular spectacles in history ; France
sinking into the background of total obscurity in an instant
of time, at one blow of a knife, while the Kepublic, which
1 Aerssens worked assiduously, two
hours long on one occasion, to effect a
reconciliation between the two great
Protestant chiefs, but found Bouil-
lon's demands " so shameful and un-
reasonable " that he felt obliged to
renounce all further attempts. In
losing Sully from the royal councils,
the States' envoy acknowledged that
the Republic had lost every thing that
could be depended on at the French
court. " All the others are time-
serving friends," he said, "or saints
without miracles." — Aersscns to
Barneveld, 11 June, 1010. Sumo
to same, 29 May 1610. (MSB.)
1 Same to same, 31 March 1010.
(MS.)
236 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. IV..
she had been patronizing, protecting, but keeping always
in a subordinate position while relying implicitly upon its
potent aid, now came to the front, and held up on its strong
shoulders an almost desperate cause. -Henry had been wont
to call the States-General " his courage and his right arm/' 1
but he had always strictly forbidden them to move an inch
in advance of him, but ever to follow his lead, and to take
their directions from himself. They were a part, and an
essential one, in his vast designs ; but France, or he who
embodied France, was the great providence, the destiny, the
all-directing, all-absorbing spirit, that was to remodel and
control the whole world. He was dead, and France and her
policy were already in a state of rapid decomposition.
Barnevcld wrote to encourage and sustain the sinking
state. " Our courage is rising in spite and in consequence
of the great misfortune," he said. He exhorted the Queen
to keep her kingdom united, and assured her that My
Lords the States would maintain themselves against all who
dared to assail them. He offered in their name the whole
force of the Kepublic to take vengeance on those who had
procured the assassination, and to defend the young king
and the Queen-Mother against all who might make any
attempt against their authority. He further declared, in
language not to be mistaken, that the States would never
abandon the princes and their cause.2
This was the earliest indication on the part of the Ad-
vocate of the intention of the Republic — so long as it should
be directed by his counsels — to support the cause of the
young king, helpless and incapable as he was, and directed
for the time being by a weak and wicked mother, against
the reckless and depraved grandees, who were doing their
best to destroy the unity and the independence of France,
1 Aerssens to Prince Maurice, 14 June 1610. (MS.)
* Same to Duplessis-Mornay, 27 May 1610. (MS.)
1610. MISSION OF CONDOLENCE FROM THE REPUBLIC. 237
and to convert it into a group of outlying provinces of
Spain.
Cornells van der Myle was sent back to Paris on special
mission of condolence and comfort from the States-General
to the sorely afflicted kingdom.
On the 7th of June, accompanied by Aerssens, he had a
long interview with Villeroy.1 That minister, as usual, wept
profusely, and said that in regard to Cleve it was impos-
sible for France to carry out the designs of the late king.
He then listened to what the ambassadors had to urge, and
continued to express his melancholy by weeping.2 Drying
his tears for a tune, he sought by a long discourse to prove
that France during this tender minority of the King would
be incapable of pursuing the policy of his father. It would
be even too burthcnsome to fulfil the Treaty of Hall. The
friends of the crown, he said, had no occasion to further it,
and it would be much better to listen to propositions for a
treaty. Archduke Albert was content not to interfere in
the quarrel if the Queen would likewise abstain ; Leopold's
forces were altogether too weak to make head r.gainst the
army of the princes, backed by the power of My Lords the
States, and Jiilich was neither strong nor well garrisoned.
He concluded by calmly proposing that the States should
take the matter in hand by themselves alone, in order to
lighten the burthen of France, whose vigour had been cut
in two by that accursed knife.3
A more sneaking and shameful policy was never an-
nounced by the minister of a great kingdom. Surely it
might seem that Ravaillac had cut in twain not the vigour
only but the honour and the conscience of France. But the
1 " Rapport ofte Verhaal van het ' (MS. Hague Archives.)
besoigneerde in dc lepatic die ik van ! 8 Ibid. Acrescns to Barneveld, 7
\vo£o dc II. M. H. Staaten General I June 1610. (MS.)
der V. N. gedaan hel>l>e aan dc Co- J a Ibid. Ibid.
riinckendeConinckinRe<rcntin 1610." i
238 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
envoys, knowing in their hearts that they were talking not
with a French but a Spanish secretary of state, were not dis-
posed to be the dupes of his tears or his blandishments.
They reminded him that the Queen-Regent and her
ministers since the murder of the King had assured the
States-General and the princes of their firm intention to
carry out the Treaty of Hall, and they observed that they
had no authority to talk of any negotiation. The affair of
the duchies was not especially the business of the States,
and the Secretary was well aware that they had promised
their succour on the express condition that his Majesty and
his army should lead the way, and that they should follow.
This was very far from the plan now suggested, that they
should do it all, which would be quite out of the question.
France had a strong army, they said, and it would be better
to use it than to efface herself so pitiably. The proposition
of abstention on the part of the Archduke was a delusion
intended only to keep France out of the field.
Villeroy replied by referring to English affairs. King
James, he said, was treating them perfidiously. His first
letters after the murder had been good, but by the following
ones England seemed to wish to put her foot on France's
throat, in order to compel her to sue for an alliance. The
British ministers had declared their resolve not to carry out
that convention of alliance, although it had been nearly
concluded in the lifetimo of the late king, unless the Queen
would bind herself to make good to the King of Great
Britain that third part of the subsidies advanced by France
to the States which had been furnished on English account.1
This was the first announcement of a grievance devised
by the politicians now governing France to make trouble
for the States with that kingdom and with Great Britain
likewise. According to a treaty made at Hampton Court
1 Van der Myle, " Rapport," ubi sup. Aerssens, ubi sup.
1610. CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT ENTERPRISE. 239
by Sully during his mission to England at the accession of
James, it had been agreed that one-third of the moneys ad-
vanced by France in aid of the United Provinces should be
credited to the account of Great Britain, in diminution
of the debt for similar assistance rendered by Elizabeth to
Henry. In regard to this treaty the States had not been at
all consulted, nor did they acknowledge the slightest obliga-
tion in regard to it. The subsidies in men and in money
provided for them both by France and by England in their
struggle for national existence had always been most grate-
fully acknowledged by the Republic, but it had always been
perfectly understood that these expenses had been incurred
by each kingdom out of an intelligent and thrifty regard
for its own interest. Nothing could be more ridiculous than
to suppose France and England actuated by disinterested
sympathy and benevolence when assisting the Netherland
people in its life-and-death struggle against the dire and
deadly enemy of both crowns.1 Henry protested that, while
adhering to Rome in spiritual matters, his true alliances
and strength had been found in the United Provinces, in
Germany, and in Great Britain. As for the States, he had
spent sixteen millions of livres, he said, in acquiring a
perfect benevolence on the part of the States to his person.
It was the best bargain he had ever made, and he should
take care to preserve it at any cost whatever, for he con-
sidered himself able, when closely united with them, to bid
defiance to all the kings in Europe together.2
Yet it was now the settled policy of the Queen-Regent's
council, so far as the knot of politicians guided by the
Nuncius and the Spanish ambassador in the entresols of the
Louvre could be called a council, to force the States to
refund that third, estimated at something between three
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 25 Dec. 1010. (MS.)
8 Ibid.
240 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
and four million livres, which France had advanced them
on account of Great Britain.
Villeroy told the two ambassadors at this interview that,
if Great Britain continued to treat the Queen-Eegent in
such fashion, she would be obliged to look about for other
allies. There could hardly be doubt as to the quarter in
which Mary de' Medici was likely to look. Meantime, the
Secretary of State urged the envoys " to intervene at once
to mediate the difference." There could be as little doubt
that to mediate the difference was simply to settle an
account which they did not owe.
The whole object of the Minister at this first interview
was to induce the States to take the whole Cleve enter-
prise upon their own shoulders, and to let France off" alto-
gether. The Queen-Regent as then advised meant to wash
her hands of the possessory princes once and for ever. The
envoys cut the matter short by assuring Villeroy that they
would do nothing of the kind. He begged them piteously
not to leave the princes in the lurch, and at the same time
not to add to the burthens of France at so disastrous a
moment.1
So they parted. Next day, however, they visited the
Secretary again, and found him more dismal and flaccid
than ever.
He spoke feebly and drearily about the succour for the
great enterprise, recounted all the difficulties in the way,
and, having thrown down everything that the day before
had been left standing, he tried to excuse an entire change
of policy by the one miserable crime.2
He painted a forlorn picture of the council and of
France. " I can myself do nothing as I wish/' added the
undisputed controller of that government's policy, and then
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 7 June 1610. (MS.)
* " Rapport " of van der Myle.
1010. CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT ENTERPRISE. 241
with a few more tears he concluded by requesting the envoys
to address their demands to the Queen in writing.
This was done with the customary formalities and fine
speeches on both sides ; a dull comedy by which no one
was amused.
Then Bouillon came again, and assured them that there
had been a chance that the engagements of Henry, followed
up by the promise of the Queen-Regent, would be earned
out, but now the fact was not to be concealed that the
continued battery of the Nuncius, of the ambassadors
of Spain and of the Archdukes, had been so effective that
nothing sure or solid was thenceforth to be expected ; the
council being resolved to accept the overtures of the Arch-
duke for mutual engagement to abstain from the Jiilich
enterprise.2
Nothing in truth could be more pitiable than the helpless
drifting of the once mighty kingdom, whenever the men
who governed it withdrew their attention for an instant from
their private schemes of advancement and plunder to cast
a glance at affairs of State. In their secret heart they
could not doubt that France was rushing on its ruin, and
that in the alliance of the Dutch commonwealth, Britain,
and the German Protestants, was its only safety. But they
trembled before the Pope, grown bold and formidable since
the death of the dreaded Henry. To offend his Holiness,
the King of Spain, the Emperor, and the great Catholics
of France, was to make a crusade against the Church.
Gamier, the Jesuit, preached from his pulpit that " to strike
a blow in the Cleve enterprise was no less a sin than to
inflict a stab in the body of our Lord." 3 The Parliament
of Paris having ordered the famous treatise of the Jesuit
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 7 Juno 1610. (MS.)
* Same to same, 11 Juno 1610. (MS.)
» Ibid.
VOL. I.
242 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. IV.
Mariana — -justifying the killing of excommunicated kings
by their subjects — to be publicly burned before Notre
Dame, the Bishop opposed the execution of the decree.
The Parliament of Paris, although crushed by Epcrnon in
its attempts to fix the murder of the King upon himself as
the true culprit, was at least strong enough to cany out this
sentence upon a printed volume recommending the deed,
and the Queen's council could only do its best to mitigate
the awakened wrath of the Jesuits at this exercise of legal
authority.1 At the same time it found on the whole so
many more difficulties in a cynical and shameless with-
drawal from the Treaty of Hall than in a nominal and tardy
fulfilment of its conditions that it resolved at last to furnish
the 8000 foot and 2000 horse promised to the possessory
princes. The next best thing to abandoning entirely even
this little shred, this pitiful remnant, of the splendid designs
of Henry was to so arrange matters that the contingent
should be feebly commanded, and set on foot in so dilatory
a manner that the petty enterprise should on the part of
France be purely perfunctory. The grandees of the king-
dom had something more important to do than to go
crusading in Germany, with the help of a heretic republic,
to set up the possessory princes. They were fighting over
the prostrate dying form of their common mother for their
share of the spoils, stripping France before she was dead,
and casting lots for her vesture.
Soissbns was on the whole in favour of the Cleve ex-
pedition. Epernon was desperately opposed to it, and
maltreated Yilleroy in full council when he affected to say
a word, insincere as the Duke knew it to be, in favour of
executing agreements signed by the monarch, and sealed
with the great seal of France.2 The Duke of Guise, finding
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 11 June 1610. (MS.)
* Same to same, 8 Aug. 1610. (MS.)
1610. CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT ENTERPRISE. 243
himself abandoned by the Queen, and bitterly opposed and
hated by Soissons, took sides with his deaf and dumb and
imbecile brother, and for a brief interval the Duke of Sully
joined this strange combination of the House of Lorraine
and chiefs of ancient Leaguers, who welcomed him with
transport, and promised him security.
Then Bouillon, potent by his rank, his possessions, and his
authority among the Protestants, publicly swore that he would
ruin Sully and change the whole order of the government.
What more lamentable spectacle, what more desolate future
for the cause of religious equality, which for a moment had
been achieved in France, than this furious alienation of the
trusted leaders of the Huguenots, while their adversaries
were carrying everything before them ? At the council
board Bouillon quarrelled ostentatiously with Sully, shook
his fist in his face, and but for the Queen's presence would
have struck him.1 Next day he found that the Queen was
intriguing against himself as well as against Sully, was
making a cat's-paw of him, and was holding secret councils
daily from which he as well as Sully was excluded. At
once he made overtures of friendship to Sully, and went
about proclaiming to the world that all Huguenots were
to be removed from participation in affairs of state.2 His
vows of vengeance were for a moment hushed by the unani-
mous resolution of the council that, as first marshal of
France, having his principality on the frontier, and being
of the Reformed religion, he was the fittest of all to com-
mand the expedition. Surely it might be said that the winds
and tides were not more changeful than the politics of the
Queen's government.3 The Dutch ambassador was secretly
requested by Villeroy to negotiate with Bouillon and offer
him the command of the Jiilich expedition. The Duke
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 8 Aug. 1010. (MS.)
» Ibid. 3 Ibid.
244 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV
affected to make difficulties, although burning to obtain the
post, but at last consented. All was settled. Aerssens
communicated at once with Villeroy, and notice of Bouillon's
acceptance was given to the Queen, when, behold, the very
next day Marshal de la Chatre was appointed to the com-
mand expressly because he was a Catholic. Of course the
Duke of Bouillon, furious with Soissons and ^Ipernon and
the rest of the government, was more enraged than ever
against the Queen. His only hope was now in Conde, but
Conde at the outset, on arriving at the Louvre, offered his
heart to the Queen as a sheet of white paper, ^peraon and
Soissons received him with delight, and exchanged vows of an
eternal friendship of several weeks' duration. And thus all
the princes of the blood, all the cousins of Henry of Navarre,
except the imbecile Conti, were ranged on the side of Spain,
Rome, Mary de' Medici, and Concino Concini, while the son
of the Balafre, the Duke of Mayenne, and all their adherents
were making common cause with the Huguenots. What
better example had been seen before, even in that country
of pantomimic changes, of the effrontery with which Keligion
was made the strumpet of Political Ambition ?
All that day and the next Paris was rife with rumours
that there was to be a general massacre of the Huguenots
to seal the new-born friendship of a Conde with a Medici.1
France was to renounce all her old alliances and publicly to
enter into treaties offensive and defensive with Spain. A
league like that of Bayonne made by the former Medicean
Queen-Regent of France was now, at Villeroy's instigation, to
be signed by Mary de' Medici. Meantime, Marshal de la Chatre,
an honest soldier and fervent Papist, seventy- three years of
age, ignorant of the language, the geography, the politics
of the country to which he was sent, and knowing the
road thither about as well, according to Aerssens, who was
1 Aerssens, ubi sup. Aerssens to Barneveld, 8 Sept. 1610.
1610. DEPARTURE OF VAN DER MYLE FROM PARIS. 245
requested to give him a little preliminary instruction, as he
did the road to India, was to co-operate with Barneveld and
Maurice of Nassau in the enterprise against the duchies.1
These were the cheerful circumstances amid which the
first step in the dead Henry's grand design against the
House of Austria and in support of Protestantism in half
Europe and of religious equality throughout Christendom,
was now to be ventured.
Cornelis van der Myle took leave of the Queen on termi-
nating his brief special embassy, and was fain to content
himself with languid assurances from that corpulent Tuscan,
dame of her cordial friendship for the United Provinces.
Villeroy repeated that the contingent to be sent was fur-
nished out of pure love to the Netherlands, the present
government being in no wise bound by the late king's
promises.2 He evaded the proposition of the States for
renewing the treaty of close alliance by saying that he was
then negotiating with the British government on the subject,
who insisted as a preliminary step on the repayment of the
third part of the sums advanced to the States by the late
king.
He exchanged affectionate farewell greetings and good
wishes with Jeannin and with the dropsical Duke of Mayenne,
who was brought in his chair to his old fellow Leaguer's
apartments at the moment of the Ambassador's parting
interview.3
There was abundant supply of smooth words, in the
plentiful lack of any substantial nutriment, from the repre-
sentatives of each busy faction into which the Medicean
court was divided. Even Epernon tried to say a gracious
word to the retiring envoy, assuring him that he would do
1 Aerssens to Prince Maurice, 14
June 1610. Same to same, 23 July
1010. Same to Barneveld, 1 July
1810. (MSS.)
1 Van der Myle, " Rapport."
already cited.)
» Ibid.
(MS
246 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IV.
as much for the cause as a good Frenchman and lover of his
fatherland could do. He added, in rather a surly way, that
he knew very well how foully he had been described to the
States, but that the devil was not as black as he was painted.
It was necessary, he said, to take care of one's own house
first of all, and he knew very well that the States and all
prudent persons would do the same thing.1
1 Van der Myle, " Rapport." (MS. already cited.)
EFFECT OF HENRY'S DEATH ON THE NETHERLANDS. 247
CHAPTER V.
Interviews between the Dutch Commissioners and King James — Prince
Maurice takes command of the Troops — Surrender of Jiilich — Matthias
crowned King of Bohemia — Death of Rudolph — James's Dream of a
Spanish Marriage — Appointment of Vorstius in place of Arminius at
Leyden — Interview between Maurice and Win wood — Increased Bitter-
ness between Barneveld and Maurice — Projects of Spanish Marriages in
France.
IT is refreshing to escape from the atmosphere of self-
seeking faction, feverish intrigue, and murderous stratagem
in which unhappy France was stifling into the colder and
calmer regions of Netherland policy.
No sooner had the tidings of Henry's murder reached the
States than they felt that an immense responsibility had
fallen on their shoulders. It is to the eternal honour of the
Republic, of Barneveld, who directed her councils, and of
Prince Maurice, who wielded her sword, that she was equal to
the task imposed upon her.
There were open bets on the Exchange in Antwerp, after
the death of Henry, that Maurice would likewise be killed
within- the month. Nothing seemed more probable, and the
States implored the Stadholder to take special heed to him-
self. But this was a kind of caution which the Prince was
not wont to regard. Nor was there faltering, distraction,
cowardice, or parsimony in Republican councils.1
We have heard the strong words of encouragement and
sympathy addressed by the Advocate's instructions to the
1 Van Recs and Brill's Continuation of Arend, i. Ill ; ii. 40G.
248 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
Queen-Kegent and the leading statesmen of France. We
have seen their effects in that lingering sentiment of shame
which prevented the Spanish stipendiaries who governed the
kingdom from throwing down the mask as cynically as they
were at first inclined to do.
Not less manful and statesmanlike was the language held
to the King of Great Britain and his ministers by the
Advocate's directions. The news of the assassination reached
the special ambassadors in London at three o'clock of
Monday, the 17th May. James returoed to Whitehall from
a hunting expedition on the 21st, and immediately signified
his intention of celebrating the occasion by inviting the
high commissioners of the States to a banquet and festival
at the palace.1
Meantime they were instructed by Barneveld to com-
municate the results of the special embassy of the States to
the late king according to the report just delivered to the
Assembly. Thus James was to be informed of the common
resolution and engagement then taken to support the cause
of the princes. He was now seriously and explicitly to be
summoned to assist the princes not only with the stipulated
4000 men, but with a much greater force, proportionate to
the demands for the sejcurity and welfare of Christendom,
endangered by this extraordinary event. He was assured
that the States would exert themselves to the full measure
of their ability to fortify and maintain the high interests
of France, of the possessory princes, and of Christendom, so
that the hopes of the perpetrators of the foul deed would be
confounded.2
" They hold this to be the occasion," said the envoys, " to
show to all the world that it is within your power to rescue
the affairs of France, Germany, and of the United Provinces
1 Report of the Special Ambassadors to England. (MS. before cited.)
2 Ibid.
INTERVIEWS BETWEEN COMMISSIONERS AND JAMES. 249
from the claws of those who imagine for themselves universal
monarchy." l
They concluded by requesting the King to, come to
" a resolution on this affair royally, liberally, and promptly,
in order to take advantage of the time, and not to allow the
adversary to fortify himself in his position " ; and they
pledged the States-General to stand by and second him with
all their power.
The commissioners, having read this letter to Lord Salis-
bury before communicating it to the King, did not find the
Lord Treasurer very prompt or sympathetic in his reply
There had evidently been much jealousy at the English
court of the confidential and intimate relations recently
established with Henry, to which allusions were made in the
documents read at the present conference. Cecil, while ex-
pressing satisfaction in formal terms at the friendly language
of the States, and confidence in the sincerity of their friend-
ship for his sovereign, intimated very plainly that more had
passed between the late king and the authorities of the
Republic than had been revealed by either party to the
King of Great Britain, or than could be understood from
the letters and papers now communicated. He desired
further information from the commissioners, especially in
regard to those articles of their instructions which referred
to a general rupture. They professed inability to give more
explanations than were contained in the documents them-
selves. 'If suspicion was felt, they said, that the French
King had been proposing anything in regard to a general
rupture, either on account of the retreat of Conde, the affair
of Savoy, or anything else, they would reply that the ambas-
sadors in France had been instructed to decline committing
the States until after full communication and advice and
1 Report of tho Special Ambassadors to England, (MS. before cited.)
9 Letter of 24 May 1010, in Report. (MS.)
250 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAEXEVELD. CHAT. V.
ripe deliberation with his British Majesty and council, as
well as the Assembly of the States-General ; and it had been
the intention of the late king to have conferred once more
and very confidentially with Prince Maurice and Count
Lewis William before coming to a decisive resolution.
It was very obvious however to the commissioners that
their statement gave no thorough satisfaction, and that
grave suspicions remained of something important kept
back by them. Cecil's manner was constrained and cold,
and certainly there were no evidences of profound sorrow at
the English court for the death of Henry.
" The King of France/' said the High Treasurer, " meant
to make a master-stroke — a coup de maistre — but he who
would have all may easily lose all. Such projects as these
should not have been formed or taken in hand without pre-
vious communication with his Majesty of Great Britain." 1
All arguments on the part of the ambassadors to induce
the Lord Treasurer or other members of the government to
enlarge the succour intended for the Cleve affair were fruit-
less. The English troops regularly employed in the States'
service might be made use of with the forces sent by the
Republic itself. More assistance than this it was idle to
expect, unless after a satisfactory arrangement with the pre-
sent regency of France. The proposition, too, of the States
for a close and general alliance was coldly repulsed. " No
resolution can be taken as to that," said Cecil ; " the death
of the French king has very much altered such matters." 2
At a little later hour on the same clay the commissioners,
according to previous invitation, dined with the King.
May 24, No one sat at the table but his Majesty and them-
leio. selves, and they all kept their hats on their heads.3
The King was hospitable, gracious, discursive, loquacious,
very theological.
J MS. Report. * Ibid. « Ibid.
INTERVIEWS BETWEEN COMMISSIONERS AND JAMES. 251
He expressed regret for the death of the King of
France, and said that the pernicious doctrine out of
which such vile crimes grew must be uprooted. He asked
many questions in regard to the United Netherlands, en-
quiring especially as to the late commotions at Utrecht, and
the conduct of Prince Maurice on that occasion. He praised
the resolute conduct of the States-General in suppressing
those tumults with force, adding, however, that they should
have proceeded with greater rigour against the ringleaders
of the riot. He warmly recommended the Union of the
Provinces.1
He then led the conversation to the religious controversies
in the Netherlands, and in reply to his enquiries was
informed that the points hi dispute related to predestination
and its consequences.'
" I have studied that subject/' said James, " as well as
anybody, and have come to the conclusion that nothing
certain can be laid down in regard to it. I have myself not
always been of one mind about it, but I will bet that my
opinion is the best of any, although I would not hang my
salvation upon it. My Lords the States would do well to
order their doctors and teachers to be silent on this topic.
I have hardly ventured, moreover, to touch upon the matter
of justification in my own writings, because that also seemed
to hang upon predestination." 2
Thus having spoken with the air of a man who had left
nothing further to be said on predestination or justification,
1 MS. Report.
* " . . . verstaende datter verechil
was int poinct vando predestinatie
ende t' ccene daervan dependecrde
verclaerde Z. M. dat hy dat stuck
eoewel als jcmant andore liaddo ge-
examineert cnde bevonden baddc dat
men daerinne nyet seeckers conde
Btatueren dat hy selffs darinno nyot
altyt van een pevoelen hadde gewcest
dat by wel wilde wedden dat zyu
opinie de bcste was maer nyct dier
dat hy zyn salicheit daeran wilde
hangen, dat d'hecren staten wel
souden doen endo do doctoren en
Leeraers gebieden van die materio te
swyjfon.dat Syne Mat. selffs het stuck
van do Justificatio in zyne grscriftcn
qualyck hadde derven roeren om dat
t' selve oock scheen aen predestinate
te hangen." — MS. " Rapport " of the
Ambassadors.
252
THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP.V.
the King rose, took off his hat, and drank a bumper to the
health of the States-General and his Excellency Prince
Maurice, and success to the affair of Cleve.
After dinner there was a parting interview in the gallery.
The King, attended by many privy councillors and high
functionaries of state, bade the commissioners a cordial
farewell, and, in order to show his consideration for their
government, performed the ceremony of knighthood upon
them, as was his custom in regard to the ambassadors of
Venice. The sword being presented to him by the Lord
Chamberlain, James touched each of the envoys on the
shoulder as he dismissed him. " Out of respect to My Lords
the States," said they in their report, " we felt compelled to
allow ourselves to be burthened with this honour." 1
Thus it became obvious to the States-General that there
was but little to hope for from Great Britain or France.
France, governed by Concini and by Spain, was sure to do
her best to traverse the designs of the Republic, and, while
perfunctorily and grudgingly complying with the letter of
the Hall treaty, was secretly neutralizing by intrigue the
slender military aid which de la Chatre was to bring to
Prince Maurice.3 The close alliance of France and Pro-
testantism had melted into air. On the other hand the new
Catholic League sprang into full luxuriance out of the
grave of Henry, and both Spain and the Pope gave their
hearty adhesion to the combinations of Maximilian of
Bavaria, now that the mighty designs of the French king
were buried with him. The Duke of Savoy, caught in the
trap of his own devising, was fain to send his son to sue to
Spain for pardon for the family upon his knees,3 and expiated
1 " . . . genoodsaeckt geweest ten
respecte van de Ho. Mo. Heeren Sta-
ten ons metdeseEere te laatenbeswae-
ren." — " Rapport," &c.
* " Pendant que vous battcz Juliers
on combat secrStement vos desseins
en cette cour." — Aerssens to Prince
Maurice, 22 Aug. 1610. CMS.)
3 ' Memoires de Sully,' viii. nntea
'Mem. de Nevers/ torn. ii. p. 880.
PRINCE MAURICE TAKES COMMAND OF THE TROOPS. 253
by draining a deep cup of humiliation his ambitious designs
upon the Milanese and the matrimonial alliance with France.
Venice recoiled in horror from the position she found her-
self in as soon as the glamour of Henry's seductive policy
was dispelled, while James of Great Britain, rubbing his
hands with great delight at the disappearance from the
world of the man he so admired, bewailed, and hated, had
no comfort to impart to the States-General thus left in
virtual isolation. The barren burthen of knighthood and a
sermon on predestination were all he could bestow upon the
high commissioners in place of the alliance which he eluded,
and the military assistance which he point-blank refused.
The possessory princes, in whose cause the sword was drawn,
were too quarrelsome and too fainthearted to serve for
much else than an incumbrance either in the cabinet or the
field.
And the States-General were equal to the immense
responsibility. Steadily, promptly, and sagaciously they
confronted the wrath, the policy, and the power of the
Empire, of Spain, and of the Pope. Had the Kepublic not
existed, nothing could have prevented that debateable and
most important territory from becoming provinces of Spain,
whose power thus dilated to gigantic proportions in the very
face of England would have been more menacing than in
the days of the Armada. Had the Kepublic faltered, she
would have soon ceased to exist. But the Republic did not
falter.
On the 13th July, Prince Maurice took command of the
States' forces, 13,000 foot and 3000 horse, with thirty pieces
of cannon, assembled at Schcnkenschans. The juiyi3,
English and French regiments in the regular ser- 1(51°-
vice of the United Provinces were included in these armies,
but there were no additions to them. " The States did seven
times as much," Barneveld justly averred, "as they had
254 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
stipulated to do." Maurice, moving with the precision and
promptness which always marked his military operations,
marched straight upon Jiilich, and laid siege to that impor-
tant fortress. The Archdukes at Brussels, determined to
keep out of the fray as long as possible, offered no oppo-
sition to the passage of his supplies up the Khine, which
might have been seriously impeded by them at Rheinberg.
The details of the siege, as of all the Prince's sieges, possess
no more interest to the general reader than the working
out of a geometrical problem. He was incapable of a flaw
in his calculations, but it was impossible for him quite to
complete the demonstration before the arrival of de la
Chatre. Maurice received with courtesy the Marshal, who
arrived on the 18th August, at the head of his contingent
of 8000 foot and a few squadrons of cavalry, and there was
great show of harmony between them. For any practical
purposes, de la Chatre might as well have remained in
France. For political ends his absence would have been
preferable to his presence.
Maurice would have rejoiced, had the Marshal blundered
longer along the road to the debateable land than he had
done. He had almost brought Jiilich to reduction. A fort-
night later the place surrendered. The terms granted by
the conqueror were equitable. No change was to be made
in the liberty of Koman Catholic worship, nor in the city
magistracy. The citadel and its contents were to be handed
over to the Princes of Brandenburg and Neuburg. Archduke
Leopold and his adherents departed to Prague, to carry out
as he best could his farther designs upon the crown of
Bohemia, this first portion of them having so lamentably
failed, and Sergeant-Major Frederick Pithan, of the regiment
of Count Ernest Casimir of Nassau, was appointed governor
of Jiilich in the interest of the possessory princes.1
1 Van Rees and Brill's Continuation of Arend, iii. ii. p. 410, sqq.
1610. SURRENDER OF JULICH. 255
Thus without the loss of a single life, the Republic,
guided by her consummate statesman and unrivalled
general, had gained an immense victory, had installed the
Protestant princes in the full possession of those splendid
and important provinces, and had dictated her decrees on
German soil to the Emperor of Germany, and had towed,
as it were, Great Britain and France along in her wake,
instead of humbly following those powers, and had accom-
plished all that she had ever proposed to do, even in
alliance with them both.
The King of England considered that quite enough had
been done, and was in great haste to patch up a reconcilia-
tion. He thought his ambassador would soon "have as good
occasion to employ his tongue and his pen as General Cecil
and his soldiers have done their swords and their mattocks."
He had no sympathy with the cause of Protestantism, and
steadily refused to comprehend the meaning of the great
movements in the duchies. " I only wish that I may hand-
somely wind myself out of this quarrel, where the principal
parties do so little for themselves/' he said.1
De la Chatre returned with his troops to France within a
fortnight after his arrival on the scene. A mild proposition
made by the French government through the Mar- Sept 8>
shal, that the provinces should be held in seques- 161°-
tration by France until a decision as to the true sovereignty
could be reached, was promptly declined.2 Maurice of
Nassau had hardly gained so signal a triumph for the
Republic and for the Protestant cause only to hand it over
to Concini and Villeroy for the benefit of Spain. Jiilich was
thought safer in the keeping of Sergeant Pithan.
By the end of September the States' troops had returned
to their own country.
1 Kins to Earl of Salisbury, 1610. (TTatfiVld Archives MS.) See Appendix.
1 Aerssens to Barneveld, 8 Sept. 1010. (MS.)
256 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
Thus the Kepublic, with eminent success, had accom-
plished a brief and brilliant campaign, but no statesman
could suppose that the result was more than a temporary
one. These coveted provinces, most valuable in themselves
and from their important position, would probably not be
suffered peacefully to remain very long under the protection
of the heretic States-General and in the Condominium of two
Protestant princes. There was fear among the Imperialists,
Catholics, and Spaniards, lest the baleful constellation of
the Seven Provinces might be increased by an eighth star.
And this was a project not to be tolerated. It was much
already that the upstart confederacy had defied Pope, Em-
peror, and King, as it were, on their own domains, had dic-
tated arrangements in Germany directly in the teeth of its
emperor, using France as her subordinate, and compelling
the British king to acquiesce in what he most hated.
But it was not merely to surprise Julich, and to get a
foothold in the duchies, that Leopold had gone forth on his
adventure. His campaign, as already intimated, was part
of a wide scheme hi which he had persuaded his emperor-
cousin to acquiesce. Poor Kudolph had been at last goaded
into a feeble attempt at revolt against his three brothers
and his cousin Ferdinand. Peace-loving, inert, fond of his
dinner, fonder of his magnificent collections of gems and
intagli, liking to look out of window at his splendid col-
lection of horses, he was willing to pass a quiet life, afar
from the din of battles and the turmoil of affairs. As he
happened to be emperor of half Europe, these harmless
tastes could not well be indulged. Moon-faced and fat, silent
and slow, he was not imperial of aspect on canvas or coin,
even when his brows were decorated with the conventional
laurel wreath. He had been stripped of his authority and
all but discrowned by his more bustling brothers Matthias
and Max, while the sombre figure of Styrian Ferdinand,
1610. MATTHIAS CROWNED KING OF BOHEMIA. 257
pupil of the Jesuits, and passionate admirer of Philip II.,
stood ever in the background, casting a prophetic shadow
over the throne and over Germany.
The brothers were endeavouring to persuade Rudolph that
he would find more comfort in Innsbruck than in Prague ;
that he required repose after the strenuous labours of
government. They told him, too, that it would be wise to
confer the royal crown of Bohemia upon Matthias, lest, being
elective and also an electorate, the crown and vote of that
country might pass out of the family, and so both Bohemia
and the Empire be lost to the Habsburgs. The kingdom
being thus secured to Matthias and his heirs, the next step,
of course, was to proclaim him King of the Romans. Other-
wise there would be great danger and detriment to Hungary,
and other hereditary states of that conglomerate and anony-
mous monarchy which owned the sway of the great Habsburg
family.
The unhappy emperor was much piqued. He had been
deprived by his brother of Hungary, Moravia, and Austria,
while Matthias was now at Prague with an army, ostensibly to
obtain ratification of the peace with Turkey, but in reality
to force the solemn transfer of those realms and extort the
promise of Bohemia. Could there be a better illustration of
the absurdities of such a system of Imperialism ?
And now poor Rudolph was to be turned out of the
Hradschin, and sent packing with or without his collec-
tions to the Tyrol.1
The bellicose bishop of Strassburg and Passau, brother of
Ferdinand, had little difficulty in persuading the down-
trodden man to rise to vengeance. It had been secretly
agreed between the two that Leopold, at the head of a con-
siderable army of mercenaries which he had contrived to levy,
should dart into Jiilich as the Emperor's representative,
1 Van Meteren, b. xxx. and xxxii. fo. 645, sqq.
VOL. I. S
258
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD.
CHAP. V.
seize the debateable duchies, and hold them in seques-
tration until the Emperor should decide to whom they
belonged, and, then, rushing back to Bohemia, should anni-
hilate Matthias, seize Prague, and deliver Rudolph from
bondage. It was further agreed that Leopold, in requital
of these services, should receive the crown of Bohemia,
be elected King of the Romans, and declared heir to the
Emperor, so far as Rudolph could make him his heir.1
The first point in the program he had only in part
accomplished. He had taken Jiilich, proclaimed the in-
tentions of the Emperor, and then been driven out of his
strong position by the wise policy of the States under the
guidance of Barneveld and by the consummate strategy of
Maurice. It will be seen therefore that the Republic was
playing a world's game at this moment, and doing it with
skill and courage. On the issue of the conflict which had
been begun and was to be long protracted in the duchies,
and to spread over nearly all Christendom besides, would
depend the existence of the United Netherlands and the fate
of Protestantism.
The discomfited Leopold swept back at the head of his
mercenaries, 9000 foot and 3000 horse, through Alsace and
along the Danube to Linz and so to Prague, marauding,
harrying, and black-mailing the country as he went. He
entered the city on the 15th of February 1611, fighting
his way through crowds of exasperated burghers. Sitting
in full harness on horseback in the great square before
the cathedral, the warlike bishop compelled the popu-
lation to make oath to him as the Emperor's commissary.2
The street fighting went on however day by day, poor
Rudolph meantime cowering in the Hradschin. On the
1 Teynagel's Confession. His state-
ments were confirmed by those of
other prisoners, especially Hagenmiil-
ler, Welser, and Count von Zollern
Van Meteren, xxxii. 655.
* Van Meteren, ubi sup.
1010. MATTHIAS CROWNED KING OF BOHEMIA. 259
third day, Leopold, driven out of the town, took up a posi-
tion on the heights, from which he commanded it with his
artillery. Then came a feeble voice from the Hradschin,
telling all men that these Passau marauders and their
episcopal chief were there by the Emperor's orders. The
triune city — the old, the new, and the Jew — was bidden to
send deputies to the palace and accept the Imperial decrees.
No deputies came at the bidding. The Bohemians, espe-
rially the Praguers, being in great majority Protestants
knew very well that Leopold was fighting the cause of the
Papacy and Spain in Bohemia as well as in the duchies.1
And now Matthias appeared upon the scene. The Estates
had already been in communication with him, better hopes,
for the time at least, being entertained from him than
from the flaccid Kudolph. Moreover a kind of compromise
had been made in the autumn between Matthias and the
Emperor after the defeat of Leopold in the duchies. The
real king had fallen at the feet of the nominal one by proxy
of his brother Maximilian. Seven thousand men of the army
of Matthias now came before Prague under command Oct. 9,
of Colonitz. The Passauers, receiving three months' 1G1°-
pay from the Emperor, marched quietly off. Leopold disap-
peared for the time. His chancellor and counsellor in the
duchies, Francis Tcynagel, a Geldrian noble, taken prisoner
and put to the torture, revealed the little plot of the Emperor
in favour of the Bishop, and it was believed that the Pope, the
King of Spain, and Maximilian of Bavaria were friendly to
the scheme. This was probable, for Leopold at lQ.ast made
no mystery of his resolve to fight Protestantism to the
death, and to hold the duchies, if he could, for the cause of
Rome and Austria.
Both Rudolph and Matthias had committed themselves
to the toleration of the Reformed religion. The famous
1 Van Metcrcn, 645-655.
260 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
" Majesty-Letter," freshly granted by the Emperor (1609),
and the Compromise between the Catholic and Protestant
Estates had become the law of the land. Those of the
Bohemian confession, a creed commingled of Hussism,
Lutheranisrn, and Calvinism,1 had obtained toleration. In a
country where nine-tenths of the population were Protestants
it was permitted to Protestants to build churches and
to worship God in them unmolested. But these privileges
had been extorted by force, and there was a sullen, dogged
determination which might be easily guessed at to revoke
them should it ever become possible. The House of Austria,
reigning in Spain, Italy, and Germany, was bound by the
very law of their being to the Roman religion. Toleration
of other worship signified in their eyes both a defeat and a
crime.
Thus the great conflict, to be afterwards known as the
Thirty Years' War, had in reality begun already, and the
Netherlands, in spite of the truce, were half unconsciously
taking a leading part in it. The odds at that moment in
Germany seemed desperately against the House of Austria,
so deep and wide was the abyss between throne and subjects
which religious difference had created. But the reserved
power in Spain, Italy, and Southern Germany was sure
enough to make itself felt sooner or later on the Catholic
side.
Meantime the Estates of Bohemia knew well enough that
the Imperial house was bent on destroying the elective
principle of the Empire, and on keeping the crown of Bo-
hemia in perpetuity. - They had also discovered that Bishop-
Archduke Leopold had been selected by Rudolph as chief
of the reactionary movement against Protestantism. They
could not know at that moment whether his plans were
likely to prove fantastic or dangerous.
1 Gindely, ' Gesch. des dreissigjahr. Kriegs ' (Prag. 1669), b. i. 60-62.
1611. DEATH OF RUDOLPH. 261
So Matthias came to Prague1 at the invitation of the
Estates, entering the city with all the airs of a conqueror.
Rudolph received his brother with enforced polite- March 23
ness, and invited him to reside in the Hradschin. 16n-
This proposal was declined by Matthias, who sent a colonel
however, with six pieces of artillery, to guard and occupy
that palace. The Passau prisoners were pardoned and
released, and there was a general reconciliation. May 23,
A month later,2 Matthias went in pomp to the 1G11-
chapel of the holy Wcnceslaus, that beautiful and barbarous
piece of mediseval, Sclavonic architecture, with its sombre
arches, and its walls encrusted with huge precious stones.
The Estates of Bohemia, arrayed in splendid Zchech cos-
tume, and kneeling on the pavement, were asked whether
they accepted Matthias, King of Hungary, as their lawful
king. Thrice they answered Aye. Cardinal Dietrichstein
then put the historic crown of St. Wenceslaus on the King's
head, and Matthias swore to maintain the laws and privi-
leges of Bohemia, including the recent charters granting
liberty of religion to Protestants. Thus there was tempo-
rary, if hollow, truce between the religious parties, and a
sham reconciliation between the Emperor and his brethren.
The forlorn Eudolph moped away the few months Jan go,
of life left to him in the Hradschin, and died
soon after the new year.3 The House of Austria had not
been divided, Matthias succeeded his brother, Leopold's
visions melted into air, and it was for the future to reveal
whether the Majesty-Letter and the Compromise had been
written on very durable material.
And while such was the condition of affairs in Germany
immediately following the Cleve and Jiilich campaign, the
relations of the Republic both to England and France were
1 Van Metcrcn, G5 j-659. » Ibid.
8 Ibid. 673.
262 THE LIFE OP JOHN OP BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
become rapidly more dangerous than they ever had been.
It was a severe task for Barneveld, and enough to overtax
the energies of any statesman, to maintain his hold on two
such slippery governments as both had become since the
death of their great monarchs. It had been an easier task
for William the Silent to steer his course, notwithstanding
all the perversities, short-comings, brow-beatings, and incon-
sistencies that he had been obliged to endure from Elizabeth
and Henry. Genius, however capricious and erratic at
times, has at least vision, and it needed no elaborate argu-
ments to prove to both those sovereigns that the severance
of their policy from that of the Netherlands was impossible
without ruin to the Eepublic and incalculable danger to
themselves,
But now France and England were both tending towards
Spain through a stupidity on the part of their rulers such
as the gods are said to contend against in vain. Barneveld
was not a god nor a hero, but a courageous and wide-seeing
statesman, and he did his best. Obliged by his position to
affect admiration, or at least respect, where no emotion but
contempt was possible, his daily bread was bitter enough.
It was absolutely necessary to humour those whom he
knew to be traversing his policy and desiring his ruin, for
there was no other way to serve his country and save it from
impending danger. So long as he was faithfully served by
his subordinates, and not betrayed by those to whom he gave
his heart, he could confront external enemies and mould the
policy of wavering allies.
Few things in history are more pitiable than the position
of James in regard to Spain. For seven long years he was
as one entranced, the slave to one idea, a Spanish marriage
for his son. It was in vain that his counsellors argued, Par-
liament protested, allies implored. Parliament was told that
a royal family matter regarded himself alone, and that inter-
1611. JAMES'S DREAM OP A SPANISH MARRIAGE. 263
ference on their part was an impertinence. Parliament's
duty was a simple one, to give him advice if he asked it, and
money when he required it, without asking for reasons. It
was already a great concession that he should ask for it in
person. They had nothing to do with his affairs nor with
general politics. The mystery of government was a science
beyond their reach, and with which they were not to meddle.
" Ne sutor ultra crepidam" said the pedant.1
Upon that one point his policy was made to turn. Spain
held him in the hollow of her hand. The Infanta, with two
million crowns in dowry, was promised, withheld, brought
forward again like a puppet to please or irritate a froward
child. Gondemar, the Spanish ambassador, held him spell-
bound. Did he falter in his opposition to the States — did
he cease to goad them for their policy in the duchies — did
he express sympathy with Bohemian Protestantism, or, as
time went on, did he dare to lift a finger or touch his pocket
in behalf of his daughter and the unlucky Elector-Palatine ;
did he, in short, move a step in the road which England had
ever trod and was bound to tread — the road of determined
resistance to Spanish ambition — instantaneously the Infanta
was withheld, and James was on his knees again. A few
years later, when the great Raleigh returned from his trans-
Atlantic expedition, Gondemar fiercely denounced him to the
King as the worst enemy of Spain. The usual threat was
made, the wand was waved, and the noblest head in England
fell upon the block, in pursuance of an obsolete sentence
fourteen years old.2
It is necessary to hold fast this single clue to the crooked
and amazing entanglements of the policy of James. The
insolence, the meanness, and the prevarications of this royal
toad-eater are only thus explained.
Yet Philip III. declared on his death-bed that he had
1 Rapin, iii. 180. 187. « Ibid. 122.
264 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. V.
never had a serious intention of bestowing his daughter on
the Prince.
The vanity and the hatreds of theology furnished the chief
additional material in the policy of James towards the Pro-
vinces. The diplomacy of his reign so far as the Republic
was concerned is often a mere mass of controversial divinity,
and gloomy enough of its kind. Exactly at this moment
Conrad Vorstius had been called by the University of
Leyden to the professorship vacant by the death of Arminius,
and the wrath of Peter Plancius and the whole orthodox
party knew no bounds. Born in Cologne, Vorstius had been
a lecturer in Geneva, and beloved by Beza. He had written
a book against the Jesuit Belarmino, which he had dedicated
to the States-General. But he was now accused of Arnri-
nianism, Socianism, Pelagianism, Atheism — one knew not
what. He defended himself in writing against these various
charges, and declared himself a believer in the Trinity, in
the Divinity of Christ, in the Atonement.2 But he had
written a book on the Nature of God, and the wrath of
Gomarus and Plancius and Bogerman was as nothing to the
ire of James when that treatise was one day handed to him
on returning from hunting. He had scarcely looked into it
before he was horror-struck, and instantly wrote to Sir Ralph
Winwood, his ambassador at the Hague, ordering him to
insist that this blasphemous monster should at once be
removed from the country.3 Who but James knew any-
thing of the Nature of God, for had he not written a work
in Latin explaining it all, so that humbler beings might read
and be instructed.
Sir Ealph accordingly delivered a long sermon to the
States on the brief supplied by his Majesty, told them that
to have Vorstius as successor to Arminius was to fall out of
1 Rapin, vii. 201. « Van Rees and Brill, iii. 470, sqq.
a Ibid.
161L APPOINTMENT OP VORSTIUS. 265
the frying-pan into the fire,1 and handed them a " cata-
logue " prepared by the King of the blasphemies, heresies,
and atheisms of the Professor. "Notwithstanding that
the man in full assembly of the States of Holland," said
the Ambassador with headlong and confused rhetoric, " had
found the means to palliate and plaster the dung of his
heresies, and thus to dazzle the eyes of good people," yet
it was necessary to protest most vigorously against such an
appointment, and to advise that " his works should be pub-
licly burned in the open places of all the cities."
The Professor never was admitted to perform his functions
of theology, but he remained at Leyden, so Win wood com-
plained, " honoured, recognized as a singularity and orna-
ment to the Academy in place of the late Joseph Scaliger."
" The friendship of the King and the heresy of Vorstius
are quite incompatible," said the Envoy.2
Meantime the Advocate, much distressed at the animosity
of England bursting forth so violently on occasion of the
appointment of a divinity professor at Leyden, and at the
very instant too when all the acuteness of his intellect was
taxed to keep on good or even safe terms with France, did
his best to stem these opposing currents. His private letters
to his old and confidential friend, Noel de Caron, States'
ambassador in London, reveal the perplexities of his soul
and the upright patriotism by which he was guided in these
gathering storms. And this correspondence, as well as that
maintained by him at a little later period with the successor
of Aerssens at Paris, will bo seen subsequently to have had
a direct and most important bearing upon the policy of the
Republic and upon his own fate. It is necessary therefore
that the reader, interested in these complicated afiairs which
were soon to bring on a sanguinary war on a scale even
1 "... tombcr do fif'vrc en chaucl mal." — Winwood'a ' Memorials,' iii. 294.
» Ibid. 304, 309, 317.
266 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
vaster than the one which had been temporarily suspended,
should give close attention to papers never before exhumed
from the musty sepulchre of national archives, although con-
stantly alluded to in the records of important state trials.
It is strange enough to observe the apparent triviality of the
circumstances out of which gravest events seem to follow.
But the circumstances were in reality threads of iron which
led down to the very foundations of the earth.
" I wish to know/' wrote the Advocate to Caron,1 " from
whom the Archbishop of Canterbury received the advices
concerning Vorstius in order to find out what is meant by
all this."
It will be remembered that Whitgift was of opinion that
James was directly inspired by the Holy Ghost, and that as
he affected to deem him the anointed High-priest of England,
it was natural that he should encourage the King in his
claims to be Pontifex maximus for the Netherlands likewise.
" We are busy here," continued Barneveld, " in examining
all things for the best interests of the country and the
churches. I find the nobles and cities here well resolved in
this regard, although there be some disagreements in modo.
Vorstius, having been for many years professor and minister
of theology at Steinfurt, having manifested his learning in
many books written against the Jesuits, and proved himself
pure and moderate in doctrine, has been called to the vacant
professorship at Leyden. This appointment is now counter-
mined by various means. We are doing our best to arrange
everything for the highest good of the Provinces and the
churches. Believe this and believe nothing else. Pay heed
to no other information. Kemember what took place in
Flanders, events so well known to you. It is not for me to
pass judgment in these matters. Do you, too, suspend your
judgment."
1 Barneveld to Caron, 13 Sept. 1611. (Hague Archives MS.)
1611. APPOINTMENT OF VORSTIUS. 267
The Advocate's allusion was to the memorable course
of affairs in Flanders at an epoch when many of the most
inflammatory preachers and politicians of the Reformed
religion, men who refused to employ a footman or a house-
maid not certified to be thoroughly orthodox, subsequently
after much sedition and disturbance went over to Spain and
the Catholic religion.
A few weeks later ! Barneveld sent copies to Caron of the
latest harangues of Winwood in the Assembly and the reply
of My Lords on the Vorstian business ; that is to say, the
freshest dialogue— on predestination between the King and
the Advocate. For as James always dictated word for word
the orations of his envoy, so had their Mightinesses at this
period no head and no mouthpiece save Barneveld alone.
Nothing could be drearier than these controversies, and the
reader shall be spared as much as possible the infliction
of reading them. It will be necessary, however, for the
proper understanding of subsequent events that he should
be familiar with portions of tae Advocate's confidential
letters.
" Sound well the gentleman you wot of," suid Barneveld,
"and other personages as to the conclusive opinions over
there. The course of the propositions docs not harmonize
with what I have myself heard out of the King's mouth at
other times, nor with the reports of former ambassadors. I
cannot well understand that the King should, with such pre-
ciseness, condemn all other opinions save those of Calvin and
Bcza. It is important to the service of this country that
one should know the final intention of his Majesty."
And this was the misery of the position. For it was soon
to appear that the King's definite and final intentions varied
from day to day. It was almost humorous to find him at
that moment condemning all opinions but those of Calvin
1 Barneveld to Caron, 3 Oct. 1011. (Hague Archives MS.)
268 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
and Beza in Holland, while his course to the strictest con-
fessors of that creed in England was so ferocious.
But Vorstius was a rival author to his Majesty on subjects
treated of by both, so that literary spite of the most veno-
mous kind, stirred into theological hatred, was making a
dangerous mixture. Had a man with the soul and sense of
the Advocate sat on the throne which James was regarding
at that moment as a professor's chair, the world's history
would have been changed.
" I fear," continued Barneveld, " that some of our own
precisians have been spinning this coil for us over there,1
and if the civil authority can be thus countermined, things
will go as in Flanders in your time. Pray continue to be
observant, discreet, and moderate."
The Advocate continued to use his best efforts to smooth
the rising waves. He humoured and even flattered the
King, although perpetually denounced by Winwood in his
letters to his sovereign as tyrannical, over-bearing, malignant,
and treacherous.2 He did his best to counsel moderation
and mutual toleration, for he felt that these needless theo-
logical disputes about an abstract and insoluble problem
of casuistry were digging an abyss in which the Republic
might be swallowed up for ever. If ever man worked steadily
with the best lights of experience and inborn sagacity for
the good of his country and in defence of a constitutional
government, horribly defective certainly, but the only legal
one, and on the whole a more liberal polity than any then
existing, it was Barneveld. Courageously, steadily, but
most patiently, he stood upon that position so vital and
daily so madly assailed ; the defence of the civil authority
against the priesthood. He felt instinctively and keenly
that where any portion of the subjects or citizens of
1 " Ick dachte dat eenige van onse precyste ons dit spel aldaer berok-
kenden." (MS. just cited.) * Winwood's ' Memorials/ vol. iii. passim.
1611. APPOINTMENT OF VORSTIUS. 269
a country can escape from the control of government and
obey other head than the lawful sovereignty, whether
monarchical or republican, social disorder and anarchy
must be ever impending.
" We are still tortured by ecclesiastical disputes," he
wrote1 a few weeks later to Caron. "Besides many libels
which have appeared in print, the letters of his Majesty and
the harangues of Winwood have been published ; to what
end you who know these things by experience can judge.
The truth of the matter of Vorstius is that he was legally
called in July 1610, that he was heard last May before My
Lords the States with six preachers to oppose him, and in
the same month duly accepted and placed in office. He has
given no public lectures as yet. You will cause this to
be known on fitting opportunity. Believe and cause to be
believed that his Majesty's letters and Sir B. Winwood's
propositions have been and shall be well considered, and
that I am working with all my strength to that end. You
know the constitution of our country, and can explain every-
thing for the best. Many pious and intelligent people in
this State hold themselves assured that his Majesty accord-
ing to his royal exceeding great wisdom, foresight, and
affection for the welfare of this land will not approve that
his letters and Winwood's propositions should be scattered
by the press among the common people. Believe and cause
to be believed, to your best ability, that My Lords the
States of Holland desire to maintain the true Christian,
Reformed religion as well in the University of Leyden as in
all their cities and villages. The only dispute is on the
high points of predestination and its adjuncts, concerning
which moderation and a more temperate teaching is furthered
by some amongst us. Many think that such is the edifying
practice in England. Pray have the kindness to send mo
1 Barneveld to Caron, 17 Nov 1011. (Hague Archives MS.)
270 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
the English Confession of the year 1572, with the corrections
and alterations up to this year."
But the fires were growing hotter, fanned especially by
Flemish ministers, a brotherhood of whom Barneveld had
an especial distrust, and who certainly felt great animosity
to him. His moderate counsels were but oil to the flames.
He was already depicted by zealots and calumniators as false
to the Keformed creed.
" Be assured and assure others," he wrote again to Caron,1
" that in the matter of religion I am, and by God's grace
shall remain, what I ever have been. Make the same as-
surances as to my son-in-law and brother. We are not a
little amazed that a few extraordinary Puritans, mostly
Flemings and Frisians, who but a short time ago had
neither property nor kindred in the country, and have now
very little of either, and who have given but slender proofs
of constancy or service to the fatherland, could through pre-
tended zeal gain credit over there against men well proved
in all respects. We wonder the more because they are
endeavouring, in ecclesiastical matters at least, to usurp an
extraordinary authority, against which his Majesty, with
very weighty reasons, has so many times declared his opi-
nion founded upon God's Word and upon all laws and prin-
ciples of justice."
It was Barneveld's practice on this as en subsequent
occasions very courteously to confute the King out of his
own writings and speeches, and by so doing to be uncon-
sciously accumulating an undying hatred against himself in
the royal breast. Certainly nothing could be easier than to
show that James, while encouraging in so reckless a manner
the emancipation of the ministers of an advanced sect in
the Reformed Church from control of government, and their
usurpation of supreme authority which had been destroyed
1 Barneveld to Caron, 21 Jan. 1612. (Hague Archives MS.)
1612. APPOINTMENT OF VORSTIUS. 271
in England, was outdoing himself in dogmatism and incon-
sistency. A king-highpriest, who dictated his supreme will
to bishops and ministers as well as to courts and parlia-
ments, was ludicrously employed in a foreign country in
enforcing the superiority of the Church to the State.
" You will give good assurances," said the Advocate,
" upon my word, that the conservation of the true Reformed
religion is as warmly cherished here, especially by me, as at
any time during the war."
He next alluded to the charges then considered very
grave against certain writings of Vorstius, and with equal
fairness to his accusers as he had been to the Professor gave
a pledge that the subject should be examined.
" If the man in question," he said, " bo the author, as per-
haps falsely imputed, of the work De Filiations Christi or
things of that sort, you may be sure that he shall have no
furtherance here." He complained, however, that before
proof the cause was much prejudiced by the circulation
through the press of letters on the subject from important
personages in England. His own efforts to do justice in the
matter were traversed by such machinations. If the Pro-
fessor proved to be guilty of publications fairly to be deemed
atheistical and blasphemous, he should be debarred from
his functions, but the outcry from England was doing more
harm than good.
" The published extract from the letter of the Arch-
bishop," he wrote,1 " to the effect that the King will declare
My Lords the States to be his enemies if they are not willing
to send the man away is doing much harm."
Truly, if it had come to this — that a King of England was
to go to war with a neighbouring and friendly republic
because an obnoxious professor of theology was not instantly
hurled from a university of which his Majesty was not one
1 MS. last cited.
272 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAIINEVELD. CHAP. V.
of the overseers — it was time to look a little closely into the
functions of governments and the nature of public and inter-
national law. Not that the sword of James was in reality
very likely to be unsheathed, but his shriekings and his
scribblings, pacific as he was himself, were likely to arouse
passions which torrents of blood alone could satiate.
" The publishing and spreading among the community/'
continued Barneveld, "of M. Win wood's protestations and
of many indecent libels are also doing much mischief, for
the nature of this people does not tolerate such things.
I hope, however, to obtain the removal according to his
Majesty's desire. Keep me well informed, and send me word
what is thought in England by the tour divines of the book
of Vorstius, De Deo, and of his declarations on the points
sent here by his Majesty. Let me know, too, if there has
been any later confession published in England than that of
the year 1562, and whether the nine points pressed in the
year 1595 were accepted and published in 1603. If so, pray
send them, as they may be made use of in settling our
differences here."
Thus it will be seen that the spirit of conciliation, of a
calm but earnest desire to obtain a firm grasp of the most
reasonable relations between Church and State through
patient study of the phenomena exhibited in other coun-
tries, were the leading motives of the man. Yet he was per-
petually denounced in private as an unbeliever, an atheist, a
tyrant, because he resisted dictation from the clergy within
the Provinces and from kings outside them.
" It was always held here to be one of the chief infractions
of the laws and privileges of this country," he said,1 " that
former princes had placed themselves in matter of religion
in the tutelage of the Pope and the Spanish Inquisition,
and that they therefore on complaint of their good subjects
1 Barneveld to Caron, 21 Jan. 1613. (Hague Archives MS.)
1612. APPOINTMENT OF VORSTIUS. 273
could take no orders on that subject. Therefore it cannot
be considered strange that we are not willing here to fall
into the same obloquy. That one should now choose to turn
the magistrates, who were once so seriously summoned on
their conscience and their office to adopt the Reformation
and to take the matter of religion to heart, into ignorants,
to deprive them of knowledge, and to cause them to see with
other eyes than their own, cannot by many be considered
right and reasonable. Intelligenti pauca." 1
Meantime M. de Refuge, as before stated, was on his way
to the Hague, to communicate the news of the double mar-
riage. He had fallen sick at Rotterdam,2 and the nature of
his instructions and of the message he brought remained un-
known, save from the previous despatches of Aerssens. But
reports were rife that he was about to propose new terms of
alliance to the States, founded on large concessions to the
Roman Catholic religion. Of course intense jealousy was
excited at the English court, and calumny plumed her
wings for a fresh attack upon the Advocate. Of course he
was sold to Spain, the Reformed religion was to be trampled
out in the Provinces, and the Papacy and Holy Inquisition
established on its ruins. Nothing could be more diametri-
cally the reverse of the fact than such hysterical suspicions
as to the instructions of the ambassador extraordinary from
France, and this has already appeared. The Vorstian affair
too was still in the same phase, the Advocate professing a
willingness that justice should be done in the matter, while
courteously but firmly resisting the arrogant pretensions of
James to take the matter out of the jurisdiction of the
States.
It never was burned ; but, innocent
and reasonable as it seems, was made
use of by Barneveld's enemies with
deadly effect.
* Barneveld to Caron, 28 Jan.
1612. (Hague Archives MS.)
1 The interesting letter from which
I have given these copious extracts
was ordered by its writer to be
burned. " Lecta vulcano " was noted
at the end of it, as was not unfre-
quently the case with the Advocate.
VOL. I.
274 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. V.
" I stand amazed," he said,1 " at the partisanship and the
calumnious representations which you tell me of, and can-
not imagine what is thought nor what is proposed. Should
M. de Eefuge make any such propositions as are feared,
believe, and cause his Majesty and his counsellors to believe,
that they would be of no effect. Make assurances upon my
word, notwithstanding all advices to the contrary, that such
things would be flatly refused. If anything is published or
proven to the discredit of Vorstius, send it to me. Believe
that we shall not defend heretics nor schismatics against the
pure Evangelical doctrine, but one cannot conceive here that
the knowledge and judicature of the matter belongs any-
where else than to My Lords the States of Holland, in whose
service he has legally been during four months before his
Majesty made the least difficulty about it. Called hither
legally a year before, with the knowledge and by the order
of his Excellency and the councillors of state of Holland,
he has been countermined by five or six Flemings and
Frisians, who, without recognizing the lawful authority of
the magistrates, have sought assistance in foreign countries
— in Germany and afterwards in England. Yes, they have
been so presumptuous as to designate one of their own
men for the place. If such a proceeding should be at-
tempted in England, I leave it to those whose business
it would be to deal with it to say what would be done. I
hope therefore that one will leave the examination and
judgment of this matter freely to us, without attempting to
make us — against the principles of the Reformation and the
liberties and laws of the land — executors of the decrees of
others, as the man here 2 wishes to obtrude it upon us."
He alluded to the difficulty in raising the ways and
means ; saying that the quota of Holland, as usual, which
1 Barneveld to Caron, 28 Jan. 1612. (Hague Archives MS.)
* To wit, Win-wood.
1612. APPOINTMENT OF VORSTIUS. 275
was more than half the whole, was ready, while other pro-
vinces were in arrears. Yet they were protected, while
Holland was attacked.
"Methinks I am living in a strange world," he said,
" when those who have received great honour from Holland,
and who in their conscience know that they alone have
conserved the Commonwealth, are now traduced with such
great calumnies. But God the Lord Almighty is just, and
will in His own time do chastisement." 1
The affair of Yorstius dragged its slow length along, and
few things are more astounding at this epoch than to see
such a matter, interesting enough certainly to theologians,
to the University, and to the rising generation of students,
made the topic of unceasing and embittered diplomatic con-
troversy between two great nations, who had most press-
ing and momentous business on their hands. But it was
necessary to humour the King, while going to the verge of
imprudence in protecting the Professor. In March he was
heard, three or four hours long, before the Assembly of
Holland, in answer to various charges made against him,2
being warned that " he stood before the Lord God and before
the sovereign authority of the States." Although thought
by many to have made a powerful defence, he was ordered
to set it forth in writing, both in Latin and in the ver-
nacular. Furthermore it was ordained that he should make
a complete refutation ot all the charges already made or
that might be made during the ensuing three months
against him in speech, book, or letter in England, Germany,
the Netherlands, or anywhere else. He was allowed one
year and a half to accomplish this work, and meantime was
to reside not in Leyden, nor the Hague, but in some other
town of Holland, not delivering lectures or practising his
1 MS. last cited.
1 Barneveld to Caron, 28 March 1612. (Hague Archives MS.)
276 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP.V.
profession in any way.1 It might be supposed that sufficient
work had been thus laid out for the unfortunate doctor of
divinity without lecturing or preaching. The question of
jurisdiction was saved. The independence of the civil
authority over the extreme pretensions of the clergy had
been vindicated by the firmness of the Advocate. James
had been treated with overflowing demonstrations of respect,
but his claim to expel a Dutch professor from his chair and
country by a royal fiat had been signally rebuked. Certainly
if the Provinces were dependent upon the British king in
regard to such a matter, it was the merest imbecility for
them to affect independence. Barneveld had carried his
point and served his country strenuously and well in this
apparently small matter which human folly had dilated
into a great one. But deep was the wrath treasured against
him in consequence in clerical and royal minds.
Beturning from Wesel after the negotiations, Sir Ealph
Winwood had an important interview at Arnheim with
April 7, Prince Maurice, in which they confidentially ex-
1613- changed their opinions in regard to the Advo-
cate, and mutually confirmed their suspicions and their
jealousies in regard to that statesman.
The Ambassador earnestly thanked the Prince in the
King's name for his " careful and industrious endeavours for
the maintenance of the truth of religion, lively expressed in
prosecuting the cause against Yorstius and his adherents."
He then said :
" I am expressly commanded that his Majesty conferring
the present condition of affairs of this quarter of the world
with those advertisements he daily receives from his ministers
abroad, together with the nature and disposition of those
men who have in their hands the managing of all business
in these foreign parts, can make no other judgment than this.
1 Barneveld to Caron, 28 March 1612. (Hague Archives MS.)
INTERVIEW BETWEEN MAURICE AND WINWOOD. 277
" There is a general ligue and confederation complotted
for the subversion and ruin of religion upon the subsistence
whereof his Majesty doth judge the main welfare of your
realms and of these Provinces solely to consist.
" Therefore his Majesty has given me charge out of the
knowledge he has of your great worth and sufficiency," con-
tinued Winwood, " and the confidence he reposes in your
faith and affection, freely to treat with you on these points,
and withal to pray you to deliver your opinion what way
would be the most compendious and the most assured to
contrequarr these complots, and to frustrate the malice of
these mischievous designs."
The Prince replied by acknowledging the honour the
King had vouchsafed to do him in holding so gracious an
opinion of him, wherein his Majesty should never be deceived.
" I concur in judgment with his Majesty," continued the
Prince, " that the main scope at which these plots and
practices do aim, for instance, the alliance between France
and Spain, is this, to root out religion, and by consequence
to bring under their yoke all those countries in which
religion is professed.
"The first attempt," continued the Prince, "is doubtless
intended against these Provinces. The means to counter-
mine and defeat these projected designs I take to be these :
the continuance of his Majesty's constant resolution for the
protection of religion, and then that the King would be
pleased to procure a general confederation between the
kings, princes, and commonwealths professing religion,
namely, Denmark, Sweden, the German princes, the Pro-
testant cantons of Switzerland, and our United Provinces.
" Of this confederation, his Majesty must be not only the
director, but the head and protector.
" Lastly, the Protestants of France should be, if not sup-
ported, at least relieved from that oppression which tho
278 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
alliance of Spain doth threaten upon them. This, I insist,"
repeated Maurice with great fervour, " is the only coupe-
gorge of all plots whatever between France and Spain."
He enlarged at great length on these points, which he
considered so vital,
"And what appearance can there be," asked Win wood
insidiously and maliciously, " of this general confederation
now that these Provinces, which heretofore have been
accounted a principal member of the Kefonned Church,
begin to falter in the truth of religion ?
" He who solely governs the metropolitan province of
Holland," continued the Ambassador, with a direct stab in
the back at Barneveld, "is reputed generally, as your
Excellency best knows, to be the only patron of Vorstius,
and the protector of the schisms of Arminius. And like-
wise, what possibility is there that the Protestants of France
can expect favour from these Provinces when the same man
is known to depend at the devotion of France ? "
The international, theological, and personal jealousy of the
King against Holland's Advocate having been thus plainly
developed, the Ambassador proceeded to pour into the
Prince's ear the venom of suspicion, and to inflame his
jealousy against his great rival. The secret conversation
showed how deeply laid was the foundation of the political
hatred, both of James and of Maurice, against the Advocate,
and certainly nothing could be more preposterous than to
imagine the King as the director and head of the great
Protestant League. We have but lately seen him confiden-
tially assuring his minister that his only aim was " to wind
himself handsomely out of the whole business." Maurice
must have found it difficult to preserve his gravity when
assigning such a part to " Master Jacques."
" Although Monsieur Barneveld has cast off all care of re-
ligion." said Maurice, "and although some towns in Holland,
INTERVIEW BETWEEN MAURICE AND WINWOOD. 279
wherein his power doth reign, are infected with the like
neglect, yet so long as so many good towns in Holland
stand sound, and all the other provinces of this confederacy,
the proposition would at the first motion be cheerfully
accepted.
"I confess I find difficulty in satisfying your second
question," continued the Prince, "for I acknowledge that
Barneveld is wholly devoted to the service of France.
During the truce negotiations, when some difference arose
between him and myself, President Jeannin came to me,
requiring me in the French king's name to treat Monsieur
Barneveld well, whom the King had received into his pro-
tection. The letters which the States' ambassador in
France wrote to Barneveld (and to him all ambassadors
address their despatches of importance), the very auto-
graphs themselves, he sent back into the hands of Ville'roy."
Here the Prince did not scruple to accuse the Advocate
of doing the base and treacherous trick against Aerssens
which he had expressly denied doing, and which had been
done during his illness, as he solemnly avowed, by a sub-
ordinate probably for the sake of making mischief.
Maurice then discoursed largely and vehemently of the
suspicious proceedings of Barneveld, and denounced him
as dangerous to the State. " When one man who has the
conduct of all affairs in his sole power," he said, "shall hold
underhand intelligence with the ministers of Spain and
the Archduke, and that without warrant, thereby he may
have the means so to carry the course of affairs that, do
what they will, these Provinces must fall or stand at the
mercy and discretion of Spain. Therefore some good reso-
lutions must be taken in time to hold up this State from
a sudden downfall, but in this much moderation and dis-
cretion must be used."
The Prince added that he bad invited his cousin Lewis
280 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. V.
William to appear at the Hague at May day, in order to con-
sult as to the proper means to preserve the Provinces from
confusion under his Majesty's safeguard, and with the aid of
the Englishmen in the States' service whom Maurice pro-
nounced to be " the strength and flower of his army."
Thus the Prince developed his ideas at great length, and
accused the Advocate behind his back, and without the
faintest shadow of proof, of base treachery to his friends and
of high-treason. Surely Barneveld was in danger, and was
walking among pitfalls. Most powerful and deadly enemies
were silently banding themselves together against him.
Could he long maintain his hold on the slippery heights of
power, where he was so consciously serving his country, but
where he became day by day a mere sliining mark for
calumny and hatred ?
The Ambassador then signified to the Prince that he had
been instructed to carry to him the King's purpose to confer
on him the Order of the Garter.
" If his Majesty holds me worthy of so great honour,"
said the Prince, " I and my family shall ever remain bound
to his service and that of his royal posterity.
" That the States should be offended I see no cause, but
holding the charge I do in their service, I could not accept
the honour without first acquainting them and receiving
then* approbation."
Winwood replied that, as the King knew the terms on
which the Prince lived with the States, he doubted not his
Majesty would first notify them aiid say that he honoured the
mutual amity between his realms and these Provinces by
honouring the virtues of their general, whose services, as
they had been most faithful and affectionate, so had they
been accompanied with the blessings of happiness and
prosperous success.
Thus said Winwood to the King : " Your Majesty rnciy
INTERVIEW BETWEEN MAURICE AND WINWOOD. 281
plaster two walls with one trowel (unafidelia duos dealbare
parities), reverse the designs of them who to facilitate their
own practices do endeavour to alienate your affections from
the good of these Provinces, and oblige to your service the
well-affected people, who know that there is no surety for
themselves, their wives and children, but under the pro-
tection of your Majesty's favour. Perhaps, however, the
favourers of Vorstius and Arminius will buzz into the ears
of their associates that your Majesty would make a party
in these Provinces by maintaining the truth of religion and
also by gaming unto you the affections of their chief com-
mander. But your Majesty will be pleased to pass forth
whose worthy ends will take their place, which is to honour
virtue where you find it, and the suspicious surmises of
malice and envy in one instant will vanish into smoke." *
Winwood made no scruple in directly stating to the
English government that Barneveld's purpose was to
" cause a divorce between the King's realms and the Pro-
vinces, the more easily to precipitate them into the arms
of Spain."2 He added that the negotiation with Count
Maurice then on foot was to be followed, but with much
secrecy, on account of the place he held in the State.
Soon after the Ambassador's secret conversation with
Maurice he had an interview with Barneveld. He assured
the Advocate that no contentment could be given to his
Majesty but by the banishment of Vorstius. " If the town of
Ley den should understand so much," replied Barneveld, " I
fear the magistrates would retain him still in their town."
" If the town of Leyden should retain Vorstius/' answered
Winwood, " to brave or despight his Majesty, the King has
the means, if it pleases him to use them, and that without
1 Winwood to the King, 7 April
(o. 8.) 1012. (Cecil Papers, Hatfield
Archives MS.) See Appendix.
1 Same to Viscount Rochester. 7
April 1612. (Hatfield Archives MS.)
See Appendix.
282 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V
drawing sword, to range them to reason, and to make the
magistrates on their knees demand his pardon, and I say as
much of Rotterdam."
Such insolence on the part of an ambassador to the first
minister of a great republic was hard to bear. Barneveld
was not the man to brook it. He replied with great indig-
nation. " I was born in liberty," he said with rising choler,
" I cannot digest this kind of language. The King of Spain
himself never dared to speak in so high a style." 1
" I well understand that logic," returned the Ambassador
with continued insolence. " You hold your argument to be
drawn a majori ad minus; but I pray you to believe that
the King of Great Britain is peer and companion to the
King of Spain, and that his motto is, 'Nemo me impune
lacessit.' "
And so they parted in a mutual rage ; Winwood adding
on going out of the room, " Whatsoever I propose to you in
his Majesty's name can find with you neither goust nor
grace."
He then informed Lord Rochester that "the man was
extremely distempered and extremely distasted with his
Majesty.
" Some say," he added, " that on being in England when
his Majesty first came to the throne he conceived some
offence, which ever since hath rankled in his heart, and now
doth burst forth with more violent malice."
Nor was the matter so small as it superficially appeared.
Dependence of one nation upon the dictation of another can
never be considered otherwise than grave. The subjection
of all citizens, clerical or lay, to the laws of the land, the
supremacy of the State over the Church, were equally grave
subjects. And the question of sovereignty now raised for
the first time, not academically merely, but practically,
3 MS. last cited.
BITTERNESS BETWEEN BARNEVELD AND MAURICE. 283
was the gravest one of all. It was soon to be mooted
vigorously and passionately whether the United Provinces
were a confederacy or a union ; a league of sovereign and inde-
pendent states bound together by treaty for certain specified
purposes or an incorporated whole. The Advocate and all
the principal lawyers in the country had scarcely a doubt
on the subject. Whether it were a reasonable system or an
absurd one, a vigorous or an imbecile form of government,
they were confident that the Union of Utrecht, made about a
generation of mankind before, and the only tie by which
the Provinces were bound together at all, was a compact
between sovereigns.
Barneveld styled himself always the servant and officer
of the States of Holland. To them was his allegiance, for
them he spoke, wrought, and thought, by them his meagre
salary was paid. At the congress of the States-General, the
scene of his most important functions, he was the ambas-
sador of Holland, acting nominally according to their
instructions, and exercising the powers of minister of foreign
affairs and, as it were, prime minister for the other con-
federates by their common consent. The system would
have been intolerable, the great affairs of war and peace
could never have been carried on so triumphantly, had not
the preponderance of the one province Holland, richer, more
powerful, more important in every way than the other six
provinces combined, given to the confederacy illegally, but
virtually, many of the attributes of union. Bather by usu-
caption than usurpation Holland had in many regards come
to consider herself and be considered as the Republic
itself. And Barneveld, acting always in the name of
Holland and with the most modest of titles and appoint-
ments, was for a long time in all civil matters the chief of
the whole country. This had been convenient during the
war, still more convenient during negotiations for peace, but
284 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
it was inevitable that there should be murmurs now that the
cessation from military operations on a large scale had given
men time to look more deeply into the nature of a consti-
tution partly inherited and partly improvised, and having
many of the defects usually incident to both sources of
government.
The military interest, the ecclesiastical power, and the
influence of foreign nations exerted through diplomatic in-
trigue, were rapidly arraying themselves in determined
hostility to Barneveld and to what was deemed his tyran-
nous usurpation. A little later the national spirit, as op-
posed to provincial and municipal patriotism, was to be
aroused against him, and was likely to prove the most
formidable of all the elements of antagonism.
It is not necessary to anticipate here what must be de-
veloped on a subsequent page. This much, however, it is
well to indicate for the correct understanding of passing
events. Barneveld did not consider himself the officer or
servant of their High Mightinesses the States-General, while
in reality often acting as their master, but the vassal and
obedient functionary of their Great Mightinesses the States
of Holland, whom he almost absolutely controlled.
His present most pressing business was to resist the en-
croachments of the sacerdotal power and to defend the
magistracy. The casuistical questions which were fast mad-
dening the public mind seemed of importance to him only
as enclosing within them a more vital and practical question
of civil government.
But the anger of his opponents, secret and open, was
rapidly increasing. Envy, jealousy, political and clerical
hate, above all, that deadliest and basest of malignant spirits
which in partisan warfare is bred out of subserviency to
rising and rival power, were swarming about him and sting-
ing him at every step. No parasite of Maurice could more
BITTERNESS BETWEEN BARNEVELD AND MAURICE. 285
effectively pay his court and more confidently hope for
promotion or reward than by vilipending Barneveld. It
would be difficult to comprehend the infinite extent and
power of slander without a study of the career of the Ad-
vocate of Holland.
" I thank you for your advices," he wrote to Caron,1 " and
I wish from my heart that his Majesty, according to his
royal wisdom and clemency towards the condition of this
country, would listen only to My Lords the States or their
ministers, and not to his own or other passionate persons
who, through misunderstanding or malice, furnish him with
information and so frequently flatter him. I have tried
these twenty years to deserve his Majesty's confidence, and
have many letters from him reaching through twelve or
fifteen years, in which he does me honour and promises his
royal favour. I am the more chagrined that through false
and passionate reports and information — because I am re-
solved to remain good and true to My Lords the States, to
the fatherland, and to the true Christian religion — I and
mine should now be so traduced. I hope that God Al-
mighty will second my upright conscience, and cause his
Majesty soon to see the injustice done to me and mine. To
defend the resolutions of My Lords the States of Holland
is my office, duty, and oath, and I assure you that those
resolutions are taken with wider vision and scope than his
Majesty can believe. Let this serve for My Lords' defence
and my own against indecent calumny, for my duty allows
me to pursue no other course."
He again alluded to the dreary affair of Vorstius, and
told the Envoy that the vexation caused by it was incredible.
" That men unjustly defame our cities and their regents is
nothing new," he said ; " but I assure you that it is far more
damaging to the common weal than the defamers imagine."
1 Barneveld to Caroa, 21 May 1612. (Hague Archives MS.)
286 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
Some of the private admirers of Arminius who were deeply
grieved at so often hearing him "publicly decried as the
enemy of Grod " * had been defending the great heretic to
James, and by so doing had excited the royal wrath not
only against the deceased doctor and themselves, but against
the States of Holland who had given them no commission.
On the other hand the advanced orthodox party, most
bitter haters of Barneveld, and whom in his correspondence
with England he uniformly and perhaps designedly called
the Puritans, knowing that the very word was a scarlet rag
to James, were growing louder and louder in their demands.
"Some thirty of these Puritans," said he, "of whom at least
twenty are Flemings or other foreigners equally violent,
proclaim that they and the like of them mean alone to
govern the Church. Let his Majesty compare this proposal
with his Royal Present, with his salutary declaration at
London in the year 1603 to Doctor Reynolds and his asso-
ciates, and with his admonition delivered to the Emperor,
kings, sovereigns, and republics, and he will best understand
the mischievous principles of these people, who are now
gaining credit with him to the detriment of the freedom and
laws of these Provinces/' 2
A less enlightened statesman than Barneveld would have
found it easy enough to demonstrate the inconsistency of
the King in thus preaching subserviency of government to
church and favouring the rule of Puritans over both. It
needed but slender logic to reduce such a policy on his part
to absurdity, but neither kings nor governments are apt to
value themselves on their logic. So long as James could
play the pedagogue to emperors, kings, and republics, it
mattered little to him that the doctrines which he preached
in one place he had pronounced flat blasphemy in another.
1 Barneveld to Caron, 21 May 1612. (Hague Archives MS.)
8 Ibid.
BITTERNESS BETWEEN BARNEVELD AND MAURICE. 287
That he would cheerfully hang in England the man whom
he would elevate to power in Holland might be inconsistency
in lesser mortals ; hut what was the use of his infallibility
if he was expected to be consistent ?
But one thing was certain. The Advocate saw through
him as if he had been made of glass, and James knew that
he did. This fatal fact outweighed all the decorous and
respectful phraseology under which Barneveld veiled his
remorseless refutations. It was a dangerous thing to incur
the wrath of this despot-theologian.
Prince Maurice, who had originally joined in the invita-
tion given by the overseers of Leyden to Yorstius, and had
directed one of the deputies and his own " court trumpeter,"
Uytenbogaert, to press him earnestly to grant his services
to the University,1 now finding the coldness of Bameveld to
the fiery remonstrances of the King, withdrew his protection
of the Professor.
" The Count Maurice, who is a wise and understanding
prince," said Winwood, " and withal most affectionate to his
Majesty's service, doth foresee the miseries into which these
countries are likely to fall, and with grief doth pine away."
It is probable that the great stadholder had never been
more robust, or indeed inclining to obesity, than precisely at
this epoch ; but Sir Ralph was of an imaginative turn. He
had discovered, too, that the Advocate's design was "of no
other nature than so to stem the course of the State that
insensibly the Provinces shall fall by relapse into the hands
of Spain."2
A more despicable idea never entered a human brain.
Every action, word, and thought, of Barneveld's life was a
refutation of it. But he was unwilling, at the bidding of a
king, to treat a professor with contumely who had just been
1 Baylc, in Tore. "Winwood'a 'Mem.' iii. 294, note.
1 Winwood, iii. 343.
288 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
solemnly and unanimously invited by the great university,
by the States of Holland, and by the Stadholder to an im-
portant chair, and that was enough for the diplomatist and
courtier. " He, and only he," said Winwood passionately,
"hath opposed his Majesty's purposes with might and
main." 1 Formerly the Ambassador had been full of com-
plaints of " the craving humour of Count Maurice," 2 and had
censured him bitterly in his correspondence for having
almost by his inordinate pretensions for money and other
property brought the Treaty of Truce to a standstill. And
in these charges he was as unjust and as reckless as he was
now in regard to Bameveld.
The course of James and his agents seemed cunningly
devised to sow discord in the Provinces, to inflame the grow-
ing animosity of the Stadholder to the Advocate, and to
paralyse the action of the Kepublic in the duchies. If the
King had received direct instructions from the Spanish
cabinet how to play the Spanish game, he could hardly have
done it with more docility. But was not Gondemar ever at
his elbow, and the Infanta always in the perspective ?
And it is strange enough that, at the same moment,
Spanish marriages were in France as well as England the
turning-point of policy.
Henry had been willing enough that the Dauphin should
espouse a Spanish infanta, and that one of the Spanish
princes should be affianced to one of his daughters. But the
proposition from Spain had been coupled with a condition
that the friendship between France and the Netherlands
should be at once broken off, and the rebellious heretics left
to their fate. And this condition had been placed before
him with such arrogance that he had rejected the whole
scheme. Henry was not the man to do anything dis-
honourable at the dictation of another sovereign. He was
1 Winwood, iii. 343. * Ibid. 1, 2.
1612. PROJECTS OF SPANISH MARRIAGES IN FRANCE. 289
also not the man to be ignorant that the friendship of the
Provinces was necessary to him, that cordial friendship
between France and Spain was impossible, and that to allow
Spain to reoccupy that splendid possession between his own
realms and Germany, from which she had been driven by
the Hollanders in close alliance with himself, would be
unworthy of the veriest schoolboy in politics. But Henry
was dead, and a Medici reigned in his place, whose whole
thought was to make herself agreeable to Spain.
Aerssens, adroit, prying, experienced, unscrupulous, knew
very well that these double Spanish marriages were resolved
upon, and that the inevitable condition refused by the King
would be imposed upon his widow. He so informed the
States-General, and it was known to the French government
that he had informed them. His position soon became
almost untenable, not because he had given this information,
but because the information and the inference made from it
were correct.
It will be observed that the policy of the Advocate was
to preserve friendly relations between France and England,
and between both and the United Provinces. It was for this
reason that he submitted to the exhortations and denuncia-
tions of the English ambassadors. It was for this that he
kept steadily in view the necessity of dealing with and sup-
porting corporate France, the French government, when
there were many reasons for feeling sympathy with the in-
ternal rebellion against that government. Maurice felt dif-
ferently. He was connected by blood or alliance with more
than one of the princes now perpetually in revolt. Bouillon
was his brother-in-law, the sister of Conde was his brother's
wife. Another cousin, the Elector-Palatine, was already
encouraging distant and extravagant hopes of the Imperial
crown. It was not unnatural that he should feel promptings
of ambition and sympathy difficult to avow even to himself,
VOL i. u
290 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
and that he should feel resentment against the man by whom
this secret policy was traversed in the well-considered in-
terest of the Republican government.
Aerssens, who, with the keen instinct of self-advancement
was already attaching himself to Maurice as to the wheels
of the chariot going steadily up the hill, was not indisposed
to loosen his hold upon the man through whose friendship
he had first risen, and whose power was now perhaps on the
decline. Moreover, events had now caused him to hate the
French government with much fervour. With Henry IV.
he had been all-powerful. His position had been altogether
exceptional, and he had wielded an influence at Paris more
than that exerted by any foreign ambassador. The change
naturally did not please him, although he well knew the
reasons. It was impossible for the Dutch ambassador to be
popular at a court where Spain ruled supreme. Had he
been willing to eat humiliation as with a spoon, it would not
have sufficed. They knew him, they feared him, and they
could not doubt that his sympathies would ever be with the
malcontent princes. At the same time he did not like to
lose his hold upon the place, nor to have it known, as yet,
to the world that his power was diminished.
" The Queen commands me to tell you," said the French
ambassador de Eussy to the States-General,1 " that the
language of the Sieur Aerssens has not only astonished her,
but scandalized her to that degree that she could not re-
frain from demanding if it came from My Lords the States
or from himself. He having, however, affirmed to her
Majesty that he had express charge to justify it by reasons
so remote from the hope and the belief that she had con-
ceived of your gratitude to the Most Christian King and
herself, she is constrained to complain of it, and with great
frankness."
1 Speech of de Russy, 19 April 1611. (Hague Archives MS.)
1612. PEOJECT8 OP SPANISH MARRIAGES IN FRANCE. 291
Some months later than this Aerssens communicated to the
States-General the project of the Spanish marriage, " which,"
said he, " they have declared to me with so many oaths to
be false." 1 He informed them that M. de Eefuge was to go
on special mission to the Hague, " having been designated
to that duty before Aerssens' discovery of the marriage
project." He was to persuade their Mightinesses that the
marriages were by no means concluded, and that, even if
they were, their Mightinesses were not interested therein,
their Majesties intending to remain by the old maxims and
alliances of the late king. Marriages, he would be instructed
to say, were mere personal conventions, which remained of
no consideration when the interests of the crown were
touched. "Nevertheless, I know very well," said Aerssens,
" that in England these negotiations are otherwise understood,
and that the King has uttered great complaints about them,
saying that such a negotiation as this ought not to have
been concealed from him. He is pressing more than ever
for reimbursement of the debt to him, and especially for the
moneys pretended to have been furnished to your Mighti-
nesses in his Majesty's name." 2
Thus it will be seen how closely the Spanish marriages
were connected with the immediate financial arrangements
of France, England, and tho States, without reference to the
wider political consequences anticipated.
" The princes and most gentlemen," here continued the
Ambassador, " believe that these reciprocal and double mar-
riages will bring about great changes in Christendom if
they take the course which the authors of them intend,
however much they may affect to believe that no novelties
are impending. The marriages were proposed to the late
king, and approved by him, during the negotiations for the
1 Aorssens to the States-General, 8 Nov. 1011. (Hague Archives MS.)
* MS. last cited.
292 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
truce, and had Don Pedro de Toledo been able to govern
himself, as Jeannin has just been telling me, the United
Provinces would have drawn from it their assured security.
What he means by that, I certainly cannot conceive, for Don
Pedro proposed the marriage of the Dauphin (nowLouis XIII.)
with the Infanta on the condition that Henry should re-
nounce all friendship .with your Mightinesses, and neither
openly nor secretly give you any assistance. You were to be
entirely abandoned, as an example for all who throw off the
authority of their lawful prince. But his Majesty answered
very generously that he would take no conditions ; that he
considered your Mightinesses as his best friends, whom he
could not and would not forsake. Upon this Don Pedro
broke off the negotiation. What should now induce the
King of Spain to resume the marriage negotiations but to
give up the conditions, I am sure I don't know, unless,
through the truce, his designs and his ambition have grown
flaccid.1 This I don't dare to hope, but fear, on the con-
trary, that he will so manage the irresolution, weakness,
and faintheartedness of this kingdom as through the aid
of his pensioned friends here to arrive at all his former
aims." 2
Certainly the Ambassador painted the condition of France
in striking and veracious colours, and he was quite right in
sending the information which he was first to discover, and
which it was so important for the States to know. It was
none the less certain in Barneveld's mind that the best, not
the worst, must be made of the state of affairs, and that
France should not be assisted in throwing herself irrecover-
ably into the arms of Spain.
" Refuge will tell you," said Aerssens, a little later,3 " that
these marriages will not interfere with the friendship of
1 " Vermurwt." s MS. just cited.
3 Aerssens to the States-General, 11 Jan. 1612. (Hague Archives MS.)
1612. PROJECTS OF SPANISH MARRIAGES IN FRANCE. 293
France for you nor with her subsidies, and that no advantage
will be given to Spain in the treaty to your detriment or
that of her other allies. But whatever fine declarations
they may make, it is sure to be detrimental. And all the
princes, gentlemen, and officers here have the same convic-
tion. Those of the Keformed religion believe that the trans-
action is directed solely against the religion which your
Mightinesses profess, and that the next step will be to effect
a total separation between the two religions and the two
countries."
Refuge arrived soon afterwards, and made the commu-
nication 1 to the States-General of the approaching nuptials
between the King of France and the Infanta of Spain, and
of the Prince of Spain with Madame, eldest daughter of
France, exactly as Aerssens had predicted four months
before. There was a great flourish of compliments, much
friendly phrase-making, and their Mightinesses were informed
that the communication of the marriages was made to them
before any other power had been notified, in proof of the
extraordinary affection entertained for them by France.
" You are so much interested in the happiness of France,"
said Refuge, " that this treaty by which it is secured will be
for your happiness also." He did not indicate, however, the
precise nature of the bliss beyond the indulgence of a senti-
mental sympathy, not very refreshing in the circumstances,
which was to result to the Confederacy from this close
alliance between their firmest friend and their ancient and
deadly enemy. He would have found it difficult to do so.
" Don Rodrigo dc Calderon, secretary of state, is daily
expected from Spain," wrote Aerssens once more.2 "He
brings probably the articles of the marriages, which have
hitherto been kept secret, so they say. 'Tis a shrewd nego-
1 Refuge to the States-General, 28 Feb. 1612. (Hajrue Archives MS.)
1 Aersscns to the States-General. 6 March 1612. (Hague Archives MS.)
294 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. V.
tiator ; and in this alliance the King's chief design is to
injure your Mightinesses, as M. de Villeroy now confesses,
although he says that this will not be consented to on this
side. It behoves your Mightinesses to use all your ears and
eyes. It is certain these are much more than private con-
ventions. Yes, there is nothing private about them, save
the conjunction of the persons whom they concern. In short,
all the conditions regard directly the state, and directly
likewise, or by necessary consequence, the state of your
Mightinesses' Provinces. I reserve explanations until it shall
please your Mightinesses to hear me by word of mouth."
For it was now taken into consideration by the States'
government whether Aerssens was to remain at his post or
to return. Whether it was his wish to be relieved of his
embassy or not was a question. But there was no question
that the States at this juncture, and in spite of the dangers
impending from the Spanish marriages, must have an am-
bassador ready to do his best to keep France from prema-
turely sliding into positive hostility to them. Aerssens was
enigmatical in his language, and Barneveld was somewhat
puzzled.
" I have according to your reiterated requests," wrote the
Advocate to the Ambassador, " sounded the assembly of My
Lords the States as to your recall ; but I find among some
gentlemen .the opinion that if earnestly pressed to continue
you would be willing to listen to the proposal. This I can-
not make out from your letters. Please to advise me frankly
as to your wishes, and assure yourself in everything of my
friendship." *
Nothing could be more straightforward than this lan-
guage, but the Envoy was less frank than Barneveld, as will
subsequently appear. The subject was a most important
one, not only in its relation to the great affairs of state,
1 Barneveld to Aerssens, 2 April 1611. (Hague Archives MS.)
1612. PROPOSED RECALL OF AERSSENS. 295
but to momentous events touching the fate of illustrious
personages.
Meantime a resolution was passed by the States of Holland1
"in regard to the question whether Ambassador Aerssens
should retain his office, yes or no ?" And it was j^ay 11.
decided by a majority of votes " to leave it to his 161L
candid opinion if in his free conscience he thinks he can serve
the public cause there any longer. If yes, he may keep his
office one year more. If no, he may take leave and come
home. In no case is his salary to be increased."
Surely the States, under the guidance of the Advocate,
had thus acted with consummate courtesy towards a diplo-
matist whose position from no apparent fault of his own but
by the force of circumstances — and rather to his credit than
otherwise — was gravely compromised.
1 Van Rees and Brill, 512, tqq.
296 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VJL
CHAPTEK VI.
Establishment of the Condominium in the Duchies — Dissensions between
the Neuburgers and Brandenburgers — Occupation of Julich by the
Brandenburgers assisted by the States-General — Indignation in Spain
and at the Court of the Archdukes — Subsidy despatched to Brussels —
Spinola descends upon Aix-la-Chapelle and takes possession of Orsoy and
other places — Surrender of Wesel — Conference at Xanten — Treaty
permanently dividing the Territory between Brandenburg and Neuburg
— Prohibition from Spain — Delays and Disagreements.
THUS the Condominium had been peaceably established.
Three or four years passed away in the course of which
the evils of a joint and undivided sovereignty of two rival
houses over the same territory could not fail to manifest
themselves. Brandenburg, Calvinist in religion, and for
other reasons more intimately connected with and more
favoured by the States' government than his rival, gained
ground in the duchies. The Palatine of Neuburg, origin-
ally of Lutheran faith like his father, soon manifested
Catholic tendencies, which excited suspicion in the Nether-
lands. These suspicions grew into certainties at the moment
when he espoused the sister of Maximilian of Bavaria and
of the Elector of Cologne. That this close connection with
the very heads of the Catholic League could bode no good
to the cause of which the States-General were the great pro-
moters was self-evident. Very soon afterwards the Palatine,
a man of mature age and of considerable talents, openly
announced his conversion to the ancient church. Obviously
the sympathies of the States could not thenceforth fail to
be on the side of Brandenburg. The Elector's brother died,
1614
DISSENSIONS IN THE DUCHIES.
297
and was succeeded in the governorship of the Condominium
by the Elector's brother, a youth of eighteen. He took up
his abode in Cleve, leaving Diisseldorf to be the sole re-
sidence of his co-stadholder.
Rivalry growing warmer, on account of this difference of
religion, between the respective partisans of Neuburg and
Brandenburg, an attempt was made in Diisseldorf by a
sudden entirely unsuspected rising of the Brandenburgers
to drive their antagonist colleagues and their portion of the
garrison out of the city. It failed, but excited great anger.
A more successful effort was soon afterwards made in Jiilich ;
the Neuburgers were driven out, and the Brandenburgers
remained in sole possession of the town and citadel, far the
most important stronghold in the whole territory. This
was partly avenged by the Neuburgers, who gained absolute
control of Diisseldorf.1 Here were however no important
fortifications, the place being merely an agreeable palatial
residence and a thriving mart. The States-General, not
concealing their predilection for Brandenburg, but under
pretext of guarding the peace which they had done so much
to establish, placed a garrison of 1000 infantry and a troop
or two of horse in the citadel of Jiilich.
Dire was the anger not unjustly excited in Spain when
the news of this violation of neutrality reached that govern-
ment. Jiilich, placed midway between Liege and Cologne,
and commanding those fertile plains which make up the
opulent duchy, seemed virtually converted into a province
of the detested heretical republic. The German gate of the
Spanish Netherlands was literally in the hands of its most
formidable foe.
The Spaniards about the court of the Archduke did not
1 Bentivoglio. ' Rclaziono dflla
Monsa d' nrmu die sisrui in Fiandra
d' anno 1014 j>er havi-r le Provincie
Unite occnpato la Terra o Castello
di Giuliers,' &c. (' Opere,' ed. Parigi.
1747.)
298 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. VL
dissemble their rage. The seizure of Jiilich was a stain
upon his reputation, they cried. Was it not enough, they
asked, for the United Provinces to have made a truce to
the manifest detriment and discredit of Spain, and to have
treated her during all the negotiation with such insolence ?
Were they now to be permitted to invade neutral territory,
to violate public faith, to act under no responsibility save to
their own will ? What was left for them to do except
to set up a tribunal in Holland for giving laws to the
whole of Northern Europe ? Arrogating to themselves
absolute power over the controverted states of Cleve,
Jiilich, and the dependencies, they now pretended to dis-
pose of them at their pleasure in order at the end insolently
to take possession of them for themselves.
These were the egregious fruits of the truce, they said
tauntingly to the discomfited Archduke. It had caused a
loss of reputation, the very soul of empires, to the crown of
Spain. And now, to conclude her abasement, the troops in
Flanders had been shaven down with such parsimony as
to make the monarch seem a shopkeeper, not a king. One
would suppose the obedient Netherlands to be in the heart
of Spain rather than outlying provinces surrounded by their
deadliest enemies. The heretics had gained possession of
the government at Aix-la-Chapelle ; they had converted the
insignificant town of Mulheim into a thriving and fortified
town in defiance of Cologne and to its manifest detriment,
and in various other ways they had insulted the Catholics
throughout those regions. And who could wonder at such
insolence, seeing that the army in Flanders, formerly the
terror of heretics, had become since the truce so weak as
to be the laughing-stock of the United Provinces ? * If it
was expensive to maintain these armies in the obedient
Netherlands, let there be economy elsewhere, they urged.
1 Bentivoglio, ' Relazione,' &c.
1614. SUBSIDY DESPATCHED TO BRUSSELS. 299
From India came gold and jewels. From other kingdoms
came ostentation and a long series of vain titles for the
crown of Spain. Flanders was its place of arms, its nursery
of soldiers, its bulwark in Europe, and so it should be
preserved.1
There was ground for these complaints. The army at
the disposition of the Archduke had been reduced to 8000
infantry and a handful of cavalry. The peace establishment
of the Republic amounted to 20,000 foot, 3000 horse, besides
the French and English regiments.2
So soon as the news of the occupation of Jiilich was
officially communicated to the Spanish cabinet, a subsidy of
400,000 crowns was at once despatched to Brussels. Levies
of Walloons and Germans were made without delay by order
of Archduke Albert and under guidance of Spinola, so that
by midsummer the army was swollen to 18,000 foot and
3000 horse. With these the great Genoese captain took the
field in the middle of August. On the 22nd of that Aug- 23j
month the army was encamped on some plains mid- 1G14>
way between Maestricht and Aachen. There was profound
mystery both at Brussels and at the Hague as to the ob-
jective point of these military movements. Anticipating an
attack upon Jiilich, the States had meantime strengthened the
garrison of that important place with 3000 infantry and a
regiment of horse. It seemed scarcely probable therefore that
Spinola would venture a foolhardy blow at a citadel so well
fortified and defended. Moreover, there was not only no
declaration of war, but strict orders had been given by each
of the apparent belligerents to their military commanders
to abstain from all offensive movements against the adver-
sary. And now began one of the strangest series of warlike
evolutions that were ever recorded. Maurice at the head of
an army of 14,000 foot and 3000 horse mano3uvred in tho
1 Bentivoglio, 'Relazionc,' &c. * Ibid.
300 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VL
neighbourhood of his great antagonist and professional rival
without exchanging a blow. It was a phantom campaign,
the prophetic rehearsal of dreadful marches and tragic
histories yet to be, and which were to be enacted on that
very stage and on still wider ones during a whole generation
of mankind. That cynical commerce in human lives which
was to become one of the chief branches of human industry
in the century had already begun.
Spinola, after hovering for a few days in the neighbour-
hood, descended upon the Imperial city of Aachen (Aix-la-
Chapelle). This had been one of the earliest towns in
Germany to embrace the Keforined religion, and up to the
close of the sixteenth century the control of the magistracy
had been in the hands of the votaries of that creed. Subse-
quently the Catholics had contrived to acquire and keep the
municipal ascendency, secretly supported by Archduke
Albert, and much oppressing the Protestants with imprison-
ments, fines, and banishment, until a new revolution which
had occurred in the year 1610, and which aroused the
wrath of Spinola.1 Certainly, according to the ideas
of that day, it did not seem unnatural in a city where
a very large majority of the population were Protestants
that Protestants should have a majority in the town
council.2 It seemed, however, to those who surrounded the
Archduke an outrage which could no longer be tolerated,
especially as a garrison of 600 Germans, supposed to have
formed part of the States' army, had recently been introduced
into the town. Aachen, lying mostly on an extended plain,
had but very slight fortifications, and it was commanded
by a neighbouring range of hills. It had no garrison but
the 600 Germans. Spinola placed a battery or two on
the hills, and within three days the town surrendered. The
1 Grotii ' Hist.' Ixvii. p. 472. Wagenaar, x. 74, 75.
8 Bentivoglio, ' Relazione,' &c.
1814. SPINOLA CAPTURES AACHEN, WESEL, ETC. 301
inhabitants expected a scene of carnage and pillage, but not
a life was lost. No injury whatever was inflicted on person
or property, according to the strict injunctions of the Arch-
duke. The 600 Germans were driven out, and 1200 other
Germans then serving under Catholic banners were put in
their places to protect the Catholic minority, to whose
keeping the municipal government was now confided.1
Spinola, then entering the territory of Cleve, took pos-
session of Orsoy, an important place on the Rhine, besides
Diiren, Duisburg, Raster, Greevenbrock, and Berchem.
Leaving garrisons in these places, he razed the fortifications
of Mulheim, much to the joy of the Archbishop and his faith-
ful subjects of Cologne, then crossed the Rhine at Rheinberg,
and swooped down upon Wesel. This flourishing Sept 7>
and prosperous city had formerly belonged to the 1C14>
Duchy of Cleve. Placed at the junction of the Rhine and
Lippe and commanding both rivers, it had become both power-
ful and Protestant, and had set itself up as a free Imperial city,
recognising its dukes no longer as sovereigns, but only as
protectors. So fervent was it in the practice of the Reformed
religion that it was called the Rhenish Geneva, the very
cradle of German Calvinism. So important was its pre-
servation considered to the cause of Protestantism that the
States-General had urged its authorities to accept from them
a garrison. They refused. Had they complied, the city
would have been saved, because it was the rule in this extra-
ordinary campaign that the belligerents made war not upon
each other, nor in each other's territory, but against neutrals
and upon neutral soil. The Catholic forces under Spinola
or his lieutenants, meeting occasionally and accidentally with
the Protestants under Maurice or his generals, exchanged no
cannon shots or buffets, but only acts of courtesy ; falling
away each before the other, and each ceding to the othei
1 Bentivoglio, ' Relazione,' &c. Wagenaar, x. 76.
302 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VL
with extreme politeness the possession of towns which one
had preceded the other in besieging.1
The citizens of Wesel were amazed at being attacked, con-
sidering themselves as Imperial burghers. They regretted
too late that they had refused a garrison from Maurice,
which would have prevented Spinola from assailing them.
They had now nothing for it but to surrender, which they did
within three days. The principal condition of the capitula-
tion was that when Julich should be given up by the States
Wesel should be restored to its former position. Spinola then
took and garrisoned the city of Xanten, but went no further.
Having weakened his army sufficiently by the garrisons taken
from it for the cities captured by him, he declined to make any
demonstration upon the neighbouring and important towns of
Emmerich and Eees. The Catholic commander falling back,
the Protestant moved forward. Maurice seized both Em-
merich and Kees, and placed garrisons within them, besides
occupying Goch, Kranenburg, Gennip, and various places in
the County of Mark. This closed the amicable campaign.2
Spinola established himself and his forces near Wesel.
The Prince encamped near Kees. The two armies were
within two hours' march of each other. The Duke of
Neuburg — for the Palatine had now succeeded on his father's
death to the ancestral dukedom and to his share of the
Condominium of the debatcable provinces — now joined
Spinola with an army of 4000 foot and 400 horse. The
young Prince of Brandenburg came to Maurice with 800
cavalry and an infantry regiment of the Elector-Palatine.
Negotiations destined to be as spectral and fleeting as the
campaign had been illusory now began. The whole Pro-
testant world was aflame with indignation at the loss of
Wesel. The States' government had already proposed to
1 "Wagenaar, x. 76. Bentivoglio.
1 Baudartius, vi. 42, 43. Wagenaar, x. 76, 77. Bentivoglio.
1614. CONFERENCE AT XANTEN. 303
deposit Julich in the hands of a neutral power if the Arch-
duke would abstain from military movements. But Albert,
proud of his achievements in Aachen, refused to pause in
his career. Let them make the deposit first, he said.
iBoth belligerents, being now satiated with such military
glory as could flow from the capture of defenceless cities
belonging to neutrals, agreed to hold conferences at Xanten.
To this town, in the Duchy of Cleve, and midway between
the rival camps, came Sir Henry Wotton and Sir Dudley
Carleton, ambassadors of Great Britain ; de Refuge and de
Russy, the special and the resident ambassador of France at
the Hague ; Chancellor Peter Pecquius and Counsellor Yisser,
to represent the Archdukes ; seven deputies from the United
Provinces, three from the Elector of Cologne, three from
Brandenburg, three from Neuburg, and two from the Elector-
Palatine, as representative of the Protestant League.1
In the earlier conferences the envoys of the Archduke
and of the Elector of Cologne were left out, but they were
informed daily of each step in the negotiation. The most
important point at starting was thought to be to get rid of
the Condominium. There could be no harmony nor peace
in joint possession. The whole territory should be cut
provisionally in halves, and each possessory prince rule
exclusively within the portion assigned to him. There
might also be an exchange of domain between the two every
six months. As for Wesel and Jiilich, they could remain
respectively in the hands then holding them, or the forti-
fications of Jiilich might be dismantled and Wesel restored
to the status quo? The latter alternative would have best
suited the States, who were growing daily more irritated at
seeing Wesel, that Protestant stronghold, with an exclusively
Calvinistic population, in the hands of Catholics.
The Spanish ambassador at Brussels remonstrated, how-
1 Wagcnaar, x. 7&-80. * Ibid. Bcntivoglio.
304 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. VI.
ever, at the thought of restoring his precious conquest,
obtained without loss of time, money, or blood, into the
hands of heretics, at least before consultation with the
government at Madrid and without full consent of the King.
"How important to your Majesty's affairs in Flanders,"
wrote Guadaleste to Philip, "is the acquisition of Wesel may
be seen by the manifest grief of your enemies. They see
with immense displeasure your royal ensigns planted on the
most important place on the Ehine, and one which would
become the chief military station for all the armies of
Flanders to assemble in at any moment,
" As no acquisition could therefore be greater, so your
Majesty should never be deprived of it without thorough
consideration of the case. The Archduke fears, and so do
his ministers, that if we refuse to restore Wesel, the United
Provinces would break the truce. For my part I believe,
and there are many who agree with me, that they would on
the contrary be more inclined to stand by the truce, hoping
to obtain by negotiation that which it must be obvious to
them they cannot hope to capture by force. But let Wesel
bo at once restored. Let that be done which is so much
desired by the United Provinces and other great enemies
and rivals of your Majesty, and what security will there be
that the same Provinces will not again attempt the same
invasion ? Is not the example of Jiilich fresh ? And how
much more important is Wesel ! Jiilich was after all not
situate on their frontiers, while Wesel lies at their principal
gates. Your Majesty now sees the good and upright inten-
tions of those Provinces and their friends. They hare made
a settlement between Brandenburg and Neuburg, not in
order to breed concord but confusion between those two, not
tranquillity for the country, but greater turbulence than ever
before. Nor have they done this with any other thought
than that the United Provinces might find new opportunities
1C14. TREATY DIVIDING THE TERRITORY. 305
to derive the same profit from fresh tumults as they have
already done so shamelessly from those which are past.
After all I don't say that Wesel should never he restored, if
circumstances require it, and if your Majesty, approving the
Treaty of Xanten, should sanction the measure. But such a
result should be reached only after full consultation with
your Majesty, to whose glorious military exploits these
splendid results are chiefly owing." 1
'The treaty finally decided upon rejected the principle of
alternate possession, and established a permanent division
of the territory in dispute between Brandenburg and
Neuburg.
The two portions were to be made as equal as possible,
and lots were to be thrown or drawn by the two princes for
the first choice. To the one side were assigned Dec
the Duchy of Cleve, the County of Mark, and the 1614-
Seigniories of Eavensberg and Eavenstein, with some other
baronies and feuds in Brabant and Flanders ; to the other
the Duchies of Jiilich and Berg with their dependencies.
Each prince was to reside exclusively within the territory
assigned to him by lot. The troops introduced by either
party were to be withdrawn, fortifications made since the
preceding month of May to be razed, and all persons who had
been expelled, or who had emigrated, to be restored to their
offices, property, or benefices. It was also stipulated that no
place within the whole debateable territory should be put in
the hands of a third power.2
These articles were signed by the ambassadors of France
and England, by the deputies of the Elector-Palatine and
of the United Provinces, all binding their superiors to the
execution of the treaty. The arrangement was supposed to
refer to the previous conventions between those two crowns,
1 Bcntivojflio, ' Relazionc,'4c.
» Ibid. Wagenaar, x. 78, 79.
VOL. I. X
306 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VI.
with the Republic, and the Protestant princes and powers.
Count Zollern, whom we have seen bearing himself so
arrogantly as envoy from the Emperor Rudolph to Henry IV.,
was now despatched by Matthias on as fruitless a mission to
the congress at Xanten, and did his best to prevent the
signature of the treaty, except with full concurrence of the
Imperial government. He likewise renewed the frivolous
proposition that the Emperor should hold all the provinces
in sequestration until the question of rightful sovereignty
should be decided. The " proud and haggard " ambassador
was not more successful in this than in the diplomatic task
previously entrusted to him, and he then went to Brussels,
there to renew his remonstrances, menaces, and intrigues.
//*"~ For the treaty thus elaborately constructed, and in
/ appearance a triumphant settlement of questions so com-
/ plicated and so burning as to threaten to set Christendom
f at any moment in a blaze, was destined to an impotent and
\v most unsatisfactory conclusion.
The signatures were more easily obtained than the rati-
fications. Execution was surrounded with insurmountable
difficulties which in negotiation had been lightly skipped
over at the stroke of a pen. At the very first step, that of
military evacuation, there was a stumble. Maurice and
Spinola were expected to withdraw their forces, and to
undertake to bring in no troops in the future, and to make
no invasion of the disputed territory.
But Spinola construed this undertaking as absolute ; the
Prince as only binding in consequence of, with reference
to, and for the duration of, the Treaty of Xanten. The
ambassadors and other commissioners, disgusted with the
long controversy which ensued, were making up their minds
to depart when a courier arrived from Spain, bringing not a
ratification but strict prohibition of the treaty. The articles
were not to be executed, no change whatever was to be made,
1814 PROHIBITION FROM SPAIN. 307
and, above all, Wesel was not to "be restored without fresh
negotiations with Philip, followed by his explicit con-
currence.1
Thus the whole great negotiation began to dissolve into
a shadowy, unsatisfactory pageant. The solid barriers which
were to imprison the vast threatening elements of religious
animosity and dynastic hatreds, and to secure a peaceful
future for Christendom, melted into films of gossamer, and
the great war of demons/ no longer to be quelled by the
commonplaces of diplomatic exorcism, revealed its close
approach. The prospects of Europe grew blacker than
ever.
The ambassadors, thoroughly disheartened and disgusted,
all took their departure from Xanten, and the treaty
remained rather a by- word than a solution or even a sug-
gestion
" The accord could not be prevented," wrote Archduke
Albert to Philip, " because it depended alone on the will of
the signers. Nor can the promise to restore Wesel be violated,
should Jiilich be restored. Who can doubt that such contra-
vention would arouse great jealousies in France, England,
the United Provinces, and all the members of the heretic
League of Germany? Who can dispute that those inter-
ested ought to procure the execution of the treaty ? Sus-
picions will not remain suspicions, but they light up the
flames of public evil and disturbance. Either your Majesty
wishes to maintain the truce, in which case Wesel must be
restored, or to break the truce, a result which is certain if
Wesel be retained. But the reasons which induced your
Majesty to lay down your arms remain the same as ever.
Our affairs are not looking better, nor is the requisition of
Wesel of so great importance as to justify our involving
Flanders in a new and more atrocious war than that which
1 Wagenaar, Bontivoglio, Baudartius, ubi sup.
308 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VL
has so lately been suspended. The restitution is due to the
tribunal of public faith. It is a great advantage when
actions done for the sole end of justice are united to that
of utility. Consider the great successes we have had. How
well the affairs of Aachen and Miilheim have been arranged ;
those of the Duke of Neuburg how completely re-esta-
blished. The Catholic cause, always identical with that of
the House of Austria, remains in great superiority to the
cause of the heretics. We should use these advantages
well, and to do so we should not immaturely pursue greater
ones. Fortune changes, flies when we most depend on
her, and delights in making her chief sport of the highest
quality of mortals." l
CTFhus wrote the Archduke sensibly, honourably from his
point of view, and with an intelligent regard to the interests
of Spain and the Catholic cause. After months of delay
came conditional consent from Madrid to the conventions,
but with express condition that there should be absolute
undertaking on the part of the United Provinces never to
send or maintain troops in the duchies. Tedious and futile
correspondence followed between Brussels, the Hague,
London, Paris. But the difficulties grew every moment. It
was a Penelope's web of negotiation, said one of the
envoys. Amid pertinacious and wire-drawn subtleties, every
trace of practical business vanished. Neuburg departed to
look after his patrimonial estates, leaving his interests in
the duchies to be watched over by the Archduke. Even
Count Zollern, after six months of wrangling in Brussels,
took his departure. Prince Maurice distributed his army
in various places within the debateable land, and Spinola
did the same, leaving a garrison of 3000 foot and 300
horse in the important city of Wesel. The town and
citadel of Jiilich were as firmly held by Maurice for the
1 Bentivoglio, ' Relazione.'
1614. DELAYS AND DISAGREEMENTS. 309
Protestant cause. Thus the duchies were jointly occupied
by the forces of Catholicism and Protestantism, while nomi-
nally possessed and administered by the princes of Bran-
denburg and Neuburg. And so they were destined to
remain until that Thirty Years' War, now so near its out-
break, should sweep over the earth, and bring its fiery
solution at last to all these great debates.
310 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VII.
CHAPTEK VII.
Proud Position of the Republic — France obeys her — Hatred of Carleton —
Position and Character of Aerssens — Claim for the " Third " — Recall of
Aerssens — Rivalry between Maurice and Barneveld, who always sustains
the separate Sovereignties of the Provinces — Conflict between Church
and State added to other Elements of Discord in the Commonwealth —
Religion a necessary Element in the Life of all Classes.
THUS the Republic had placed itself in as proud a posi-
tion as it was possible for commonwealth or kingdom to
occupy. It had dictated the policy and directed the
combined military movements of Protestantism. It had
gathered into a solid mass the various elements out of
which the great Germanic mutiny against Borne, Spain, and
Austria had been compounded. A breathing space of un-
certain duration had come to interrupt and postpone the
general and inevitable conflict. Meantime the Republic
was encamped upon the enemy's soil.
France, which had hitherto commanded, now obeyed.
England, vacillating and discontented, now threatening and
now cajoling, saw for the time at least its influence over the
councils of the Netherlands neutralized by the genius of
the great statesman who still governed the Provinces,
supreme in all but name. The hatred of the British
government towards the Republic, while in reality more
malignant than at any previous period, could now only
find vent in tremendous, theological pamphlets, composed
by the King in the form of diplomatic instructions, and
hurled almost weekly at the heads of the States-General,
by his ambassador, Dudley Carleton.
1611. HATRED OF CARLETON. 311
Few men hated Barneveld more bitterly than did Carleton.
I wish to describe as rapidly, but as faithfully, as I can
the outline at least of the events by which one of the saddest
and most superfluous catastrophes in modern history was
brought about. The web was a complex one, wrought ap-
parently of many materials ; but the more completely it is
unravelled the more clearly we shall detect the presence
of the few simple but elemental fibres which make up the
tissue of most human destinies, whether illustrious or ob-
scure, and out of which the most moving pictures of human
history are composed.
The religious element, which seems at first view to be
the all pervading and controlling one, is in reality rather the
atmosphere which surrounds and colours than the essence
which constitutes the tragedy to be delineated.
Personal, sometimes even paltry, jealousy ; love of power,
of money, of place ; rivalry between civil and military am-
bition for predominance in a free state ; struggles between
Church and State to control and oppress each other ; con-
flict between the cautious and healthy, but provincial and
centrifugal, spirit on the one side, and the ardent central-
izing, imperial, but dangerous, instinct on the other, for
ascendency in a federation ; mortal combat between aristo-
cracy disguised in the plebeian form of trading and political
corporations and democracy sheltering itself under a famous
sword and an ancient and illustrious name ; — all these
principles and passions will be found hotly at work in the
melancholy five years with which we are now to be occu-
pied, as they have entered, and will always enter, into every
political combination in the great tragi-comedy which we
call human history. As a study, a lesson, and a warning,
perhaps the fate of Barncvcld is as deserving of serious
attention as most political tragedies of the last few
centuries.
312
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VII.
Francis Aerssens, as we have seen, continued to be the
Dutch ambassador after the murder of Henry IV. Many
of the preceding pages of this volume have been occupied
with his opinions, his pictures, his conversations, and his
political intrigues during a memorable epoch in the history
of the Netherlands and of France. He was beyond all
doubt one of the ablest diplomatists in Europe. Versed in
many languages, a classical student, familiar with history
and international law, a man of the world and familiar with
its usages, accustomed to associate with dignity and tact
on friendliest terms with sovereigns, eminent statesmen, and
men of letters ; endowed with a facile tongue, a fluent pen,
and an eye and ear of singular acuteness and delicacy ; dis-
tinguished for unflagging industry and singular aptitude for
secret and intricate affairs ; — he had by the exercise of these
various qualities during a period of nearly twenty years at
the court of Henry the Great been able to render inestimable
services to the Kepublic which he represented. Of respect-
able but not distinguished lineage, not a Hollander, but a
Belgian by birth, son of Cornelis Aerssens, Greffier of the
States-General, long employed in that important post, he
had been brought forward from a youth by Barneveld and
early placed by him in the diplomatic career, of which
through his favour and his own eminent talents he had now
achieved the highest honours.
He had enjoyed the intimacy and even the confidence of
Henry IV., so far as any man could be said to possess that
monarch's confidence, and his friendly relations and familiar
access to the King gave him political advantages superior
to those of any of his colleagues at the same court.1
Acting entirely and faithfully according to the instruc-
1 I pass over with disdain one of
the causes which scandalous chro-
nicles once assigned to the influence
of the Dutch ambassador, being satis-
fied that the rumour was as malig-
nant and false as political rumours
often are.
1611. POSITION AND CHARACTER OF AERSSENS. 313
tions of the Advocate of Holland, he always gratefully
and copiously acknowledged the privilege of being guided
and sustained in the difficult paths he had to traverse by so
powerful and active an intellect. I have seldom alluded in
terms to the instructions and despatches of the chief, but
every position, negotiation, and opinion of the envoy — and
the reader has seen many of them — is pervaded by their
spirit. Certainly the correspondence of Aerssens is full to
overflowing of gratitude, respect, fervent attachment to the
person and exalted appreciation of the intellect and high
character of the Advocate.1
There can be no question of Aerssen's consummate
abilities. Whether his heart were as sound as his head,
whether his protestations of devotion had the ring of true
gold or not, time would show. Hitherto Barneveld had
not doubted him, nor had he found cause to murmur at
Barneveld.
But the France of Henry IV., where the Dutch envoy
was so all-powerful, had ceased to exist. A duller eye than
that of Aerssens could have seen at a glance that the potent
kingdom and firm ally of the Kepublic had been converted,
for a long time to come at least, into a Spanish province.
The double Spanish marriages (that of the young Louis XIII.
with the Infanta Anna, and of his sister with the Infante,
one day to be Philip IV.), were now certain, for it was to
make them certain that the knife of Ravaillac had been
employed. The condition precedent to those marriages had
long been known. It was the renunciation of the alliance
between France and Holland. It was the condemnation to
death, so far as France had the power to condemn her to
death, of the young Republic. Had not Don Pedro de
Toledo pompously announced this condition a year and a
1 Correspondence of Aerssens with Barneveld. (Rojal Archives. Hague,
MSS. passim.)
314 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIL
half before ? Had not Henry spurned the bribe with scorn ?
And now had not Francis Aerssens been the first to com-
municate to his masters the fruit which had already ripened
upon Henry's grave ? As we have seen, he had revealed
these intrigues long before they were known to the world,
and the French court knew that he had revealed them.
His position had become untenable. His friendship for
Henry could not be of use to him with the delicate-featured,
double-chinned, smooth and sluggish Florentine, who had
passively authorized and actively profited by her husband's
murder.
It was time for the Envoy to be gone. The Queen-Begcnt
and Concini thought so. And so did Villeroy and Sillery
and the rest of the old servants of the King, now become
pensionaries of Spain. But Aerssens did not think so. He
liked his position, changed as it was. He was deep in the
plottings of Bouillon and Conde and the other malcontents
against the Queen-Regent. These schemes, being entirely
personal, the rank growth of the corruption and apparent
disintegration of France, were perpetually changing, and
could be reduced to no principle. It was a mere struggle
of the great lords of France to wrest places, money, govern-
ments, military commands from the Queen-Regent, and
frantic attempts on her part to save as much as possible of
the general wreck for her lord and master Concini.
It was ridiculous to ascribe any intense desire on the
part of the Due de Bouillon to aid the Protestant cause
against Spain at that moment, acting as he was in combi-
nation with Conde, whom we have just seen employed by
Spain as the chief instrument to effect the destruction of
France and the bastardy of the Queen's children. Nor did
the sincere and devout Protestants who had clung to the
cause through good and bad report, men like Duplessis-
Mornay, for example, and those who usually acted with him,
1611. POSITION AND CHARACTER OF AERSSBNS. 315
believe in any of these schemes for partitioning France on
pretence of saving Protestantism. But Bouillon, greatest of
all French fishermen in troubled waters, was brother-in-law
of Prince Maurice of Nassau, and Aerssens instinctively felt
that the time had come when he should anchor himself to
firm holding ground at home.
The Ambassador had also a personal grievance. Many of
his most secret despatches to the States-General in which
he expressed himself very freely, forcibly, and accurately on
the general situation in France, especially in regard to the
Spanish marriages and the Treaty of Hampton Court, had
been transcribed at the Hague and copies of them sent to
the French government. No baser act of treachery to an
envoy could be imagined. It was not surprising that
Aerssens complained bitterly of the deed. He secretly sus-
pected Barneveld, but with injustice, of having played him
this evil turn, and the incident first planted the seeds of the
deadly hatred which was to bear such fatal fruit.
" A notable treason has been played upon me," he wrote
to Jacques de Maldere, " which has outraged my heart. All
the despatches which I have been sending for several months
to M. de Barneveld have been communicated by copy in
whole or in extracts to this court. Villcroy quoted from
them at our interview to-day, and I was left as it were with-
out power of reply. The despatches were long, solid, omit-
ting no particularity for giving means to form the best
judgment of the designs and intrigues of this court. No
greater damage could be done to me and my usefulness. All
those from whom I have hitherto derived information, princes
and great personages, will shut themselves up from me. . . .
What can be more ticklish than to pass judgment on the
tricks of those who are governing this state ? This single
blow has knocked me down completely. For I was moving
about among all of them, making my profit of all, without
316 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. VU.
any reserve. M. de Barneveld knew by this means the
condition of this kingdom as well as I do. Certainly in a
well-ordered republic it would cost the life of a man
who had thus trifled with the reputation of an ambassador.
I believe M. de Barneveld will be sorry, but this will
never restore to me the confidence which I have lost. If
one was jealous of my position at this court, certainly I
deserved rather pity from those who should contemplate it
closely. If one wished to procure my downfall in order to
raise oneself above me, there was no need of these tricks. I
have been offering to resign my embassy this long time,
which will now produce nothing but thorns for me. How
can I negotiate after my private despatches have been read ?
L'Hoste, the clerk of Villeroy, was not so great a criminal as
the man who revealed my despatches ; and L'Hoste was torn
by four horses after his death. Four months long I have
been complaining of this to M. de Barneveld. . . . Patience !
I am groaning without being able to hope for justice. I
console myself, for my term of office will soon arrive. Would
that my embassy could have finished under the agreeable
and friendly circumstances with which it began. The man
who may succeed me will not find that this vile trick will
help him much. . . . Pray find out whence and from whom
this intrigue has come." 1
Certainly an envoy's position could hardly be more
utterly compromised. Most unquestionably Aerssens had
reason to be indignant, believing as he did that his con-
scientious efforts in the service of his government had been
made use of by his chief to undermine his credit and blast
his character. There was an intrigue between the newly
appointed French minister, de Kussy, at the Hague and the
enemies of Aerssens to represent him to his own government
as mischievous, passionate, unreasonably vehement in sup-
1 Aerssens to Maldere, 26 Feb. 1611. (Hague Archives MS.)
1611. CLAIM FOR THE "THIRD." 317
porting the claims and dignity of his own country at the
court to which he was accredited. Not often in diplomatic
history has an ambassador of a free state been censured or
removed for believing and maintaining in controversy that
his own government is in the right. It was natural that
the French government should be disturbed by the vivid
light which he had flashed upon their pernicious intrigues
with Spain to the detriment of the Republic, and at the
pertinacity with which he resisted their preposterous claim
to be reimbursed for one-third of the money which the late
king had advanced as a free subsidy towards the war of the
Netherlands for independence. But no injustice could be
more outrageous than for the Envoy's own government to
unite with the foreign State in damaging the character of
its own agent for the crime of fidelity to itself.
Of such cruel perfidy Aerssens had been the victim, and
he most wrongfully suspected his chief as its real perpetrator.
The claim for what was called the " Third " had been
invented after the death of Henry. As already explained,
the " Third " was not a gift from England to the Nether-
lands. It was a loan from England to France, or more
properly a consent to abstain from pressing for payment
for this proportion of an old debt. James, who was
always needy, had often desired, but never obtained, the
payment of this sum from Henry. Now that the King
was dead, he applied to the Regent's government, and the
Regent's government called upon the Netherlands, to pay
the money.
Aerssens, as the agent of the Republic, protested firmly
against such claim. The money had been advanced by the
King as a free gift, as his contribution to"a war in which he
was deeply interested, although he was nominally at peace
with Spain. As to the private arrangements between
France and England, the Republic, said the Dutch envoy,
318
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIL
was in no sense bound by them. He was no party to the
Treaty of Hampton Court, and knew nothing of its stipu-
lations.1
Courtiers and politicians in plenty at the French court,
now that Henry was dead, were quite sure that they had
heard him say over and over again that the Netherlands
had bound themselves to pay the Third. They persuaded
Mary de' Medici that she likewise had often heard him say
so, and induced her to take high ground on the subject in
her interviews with Aerssens. The luckless queen, who was
always in want of money to satisfy the insatiable greed of
her favourites, and to buy off the enmity of the great
princes, was very vehement — although she knew as much of
those transactions as of the finances of Prester John or the
Lama of Thibet — in maintaining this claim of her govern-
ment upon the States.
"After talking with the ministers," said Aerssens, "I had
an interview with the Queen. I knew that she had been
1 " Ils me disent . . . qa'ils ont tons
la memoire assez fraiche pour se sou-
venir que le feu Roy avait parle sou-
vent et etoit resolud'obliger Messieurs
les Etats a reconnaitre ce qui a ete
fourny au nom du Roi de Grande
Bretagne, se contentant de ne nous
rien dernander des deux tiers payes
pour sa part. S'il vivait il s'abahiroit
de cette excuse. . . . Ma repartye
etoit que nous avons recu ce secours
pour pur don employe par nos voisins
en notre guerre par raison d'etat, pour
notre defense et occupation de leur
ennemy, que en 1'envoyant on ne nous
a point pa.rle ni d'obligation ni de
restitution." — Aerssens to Maldere,
26Jeb. 1611. (Hague Arch. MS.)
. . . je n'ay pas juge cette de-
mande moins esloignee de la volonte
du feu Roy que de la raison. Ce
tiers n'a jamais ete distingue des
autres deux, on ne nous a point dit
qu'il a ete fourny au nom du Royde
la G. Bretagne. Nog acquits des-
quels on s'est contente n'en font nulle
mention.et nous avons employe cette
somme comme les autres qui ont fait
accroitre (?) la depense de nos prepa-
ratifs sans que ayons jamais fait estat
d'en rien rendre ni eux de le pre-
tendre. Le traite fait en Angleterre
a ete negocie entre le Roy et M. de
Sully. Vous, Monsieur, qui lors y
etiez present n'y intervinstes jamais
pour ouyr la distinction de ces payc-
ments quaud la protestation a ete
faicte centre la continuation de ce
traite. Elle ne vousa point ete insi-
nuee, et d'ici on ne s'est pas depart y
d'en continuer le payement do ma-
niere que nous devons, et de faict
pouvons ignorer ce qu'il ait rien traite
entre ces deux couronnes que nous kit
peu concerner. On me reproche la
dessus notre ingratitude de ne voul-
loir pas seulement avouer par ecrit
qu'avons recu ce Tiers au nom des
Anglois. Je les ren voye a 1'inspection
de nos acquits." — Same to same, 28
Aug. 1610.
1811. CLAIM FOR THE "THIRD." 319
taught her lesson, to insist on the payment of the Third. So
I did not speak at all of the matter, but talked exclusively
and at length of the French regiments in the States' service.
She was embarrassed, and did not know exactly what to say.
At last, without replying a single word to what I had been
saying, she became very red in the face, and asked me if I
were not instructed to speak of the money due to England.
Whereupon I spoke in the sense already indicated. She
interrupted me by saying she had a perfect recollection that
the late king intended and understood that we were to pay
the Third to England, and had talked with her very
seriously on the subject. If he were living, he would think
it very strange, she said, that we refused ; and so on.
" Soissons, too, pretends to remember perfectly that such
were the King's intentions. 'Tis a very strange thing, Sir.
Every one knows now the secrets of the late king, if you
are willing to listen. Yet he was not in the habit of taking
all the world into his confidence. The Queen takes her
opinions as they give them to her. 'Tis a very good
princess, but I am sorry she is so ignorant of affairs. As
she says she remembers, one is obliged to say one believes
her. But I, who knew the King so intimately, and saw him
so constantly, know that he could only have said that the
Third was paid in acquittal of his debts to and for account
of the King of England, and not that we were to make
restitution thereof. The Chancellor tells me my refusal has
been taken as an affront by the Queen, and Puysieux says
t is a contempt which she can't swallow." 1
Aerssens on his part remained firm ; his pertinacity being
the greater as he thoroughly understood the subject which
he was talking about, an advantage which was rarely shared
in by those with whom he conversed. The Queen, highly
scandalized by his demeanour, became from that time forth
1 Aerescns to Barnevcld, 13 April 1611. (Hague Arch. MS.)
320 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIL
his bitter enemy, and, as already stated, was resolved to be
rid of him.
Nor was the Envoy at first desirous of remaining. He
had felt after Henry's death and Sully's disgrace, and the
complete transformation of the France which he had known,
that his power of usefulness was gone. " Our enemies/' he
said, "have got the advantage which I used to have in
times past, and I recognize a great coldness towards us,
which is increasing every day."1 Nevertheless, he yielded
reluctantly to Baraeveld's request that he should for the
time at least remain at his post. Later on, as the intrigues
against him began to unfold themselves, and his faithful
services were made use of at home to blacken his character
and procure his removal, he refused to resign, as to do so
would be to play into the hands of his enemies, and by
inference at least to accuse himself of infidelity to his trust.
But his concealed rage and his rancor grew more deadly
every day. He was fully aware of the plots against him,
although he found it difficult to trace them to their source.
" I doubt not," he wrote to Jacques de Maldere, the distin-
guished diplomatist and senator, who had recently returned
from his embassy to England, " that this beautiful proposi-
tion of de Russy has been sent to your Province of Zealand.
Does it not seem to you a plot well woven as well in
Holland as at this court to remove me from my post with
disreputation ? What have I done that should cause the
Queen to disapprove my proceedings ? Since the death of
the late king I have always opposed the Third, which they
have been trying to fix upon the treasury, on the ground
that Henry never spoke to me of restitution, that the re-
ceipts given were simple ones, and that the money given
was spent for the common benefit of France and the States
under direction of the King's government. But I am
1 Aeresens to Barneveld, 31 Aug. 1610. (Hague Archives MS.)
1511. RECALL OF AERSSENS. 321
expected here to obey M. de Villeroy, who says that it was
the intention of the late king to oblige us to make the
payment. I am not accustomed to obey authority if it be
not supported by reason. It is for my masters to reply and
to defend me. The Queen has no reason to complain. I
have maintained the interests of my superiors. But this is
not the cause of the complaints. My misfortune is that all
my despatches have been sent from Holland in copy to this
court. Most of them contained free pictures of the con-
dition and dealings of those who govern here. M. de
Villeroy has found himself depicted often, and now under
pretext of a public negotiation he has found an opportunity
of revenging himself. . . . Besides this cause which Vil-
leroy has found for combing my head, Russy has given
notice here that I have kept my masters in the hopes of
being honourably exempted from the claims of this govern-
ment. The long letter which I wrote to M. de Barneveld
justifies my proceedings." 1
It is no wonder that the Ambassador was galled to the
quick by the outrage which those concerned in the govern-
ment were seeking to put upon him. How could an honest
man fail to be overwhelmed with rage and anguisli at being
dishonoured before the world by his masters for scrupu-
lously doing his duty, and for maintaining the rights and
dignity of his own country ? He knew that the charges
were but pretexts, that the motives of his enemies were as
base as the intrigues themselves, but he also knew that the
world usually sides with the government against the indi-
vidual, and that a man's reputation is rarely strong enough
to maintain itself unsullied in a foreign land when his own
government stretches forth its hand not to shield, but to
stab, him.
" I know," he said, " that this plot has been woven partly
1 Aeresens to Jacques de Maldero, 20 April 1611. (MS.)
VOL. I. K
322 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIL
in Holland and partly here by good correspondence, in
order to drive me from my post with disreputation. To this
has tended the communication of my despatches to make
me lose my best friends. This too was the object of the
particular imparting to de Kussy of all my propositions, in
order to draw a complaint against me from this court.
" But as I have discovered this accurately, I have resolved
to offer to my masters the continuance of my very humble
service for such time and under such conditions as they
may think good to prescribe. I prefer forcing my natural
and private inclinations to giving an opportunity for the
ministers of this kingdom to discredit us, and to my enemies
to succeed in injuring me, and by fraud and malice to
force me from my post. ... I am truly sorry, being ready
to retire, wishing to have an honourable testimony in recom-
pense of my labours, that one is in such hurry to take advan-
tage of my fall. I cannot believe that my masters wish to
suffer this. They are too prudent, and cannot be ignorant
of the treachery which has been practised on me. I have
maintained their cause. If they have chosen to throw down
the fruits of my industry, the blame should be imputed to
those who consider their own ambition more than the in-
terests of the public. ... What envoy will ever dare to
speak with vigour if he is not sustained by the government
at home ? . . . My enemies have misrepresented my actions,
and my language as passionate, exaggerated, mischievous,
but I have no passion except for the service of my supe-
riors. They say that I have a dark and distrustful dis-
position, but I have been alarmed at the alliance now forming
here with the King of Spain, through the policy of M.
de Villeroy. I was the first to discover this intrigue, which
they thought buried in the bosom of the Triumvirate. I
gave notice of it to My Lords the States as in duty bound.
It all cdme back to the government in the copies furnished
1611. RECALL OP AERSSENS. 323
of my secret despatches. This is the real source of the
complaints against me. The rest of the charges, relating to
the Third and other matters, are but pretexts. To parry
the blow, they pretend that all that is said and done with
the Spaniard is but feigning. Who is going to believe that ?
Has not the Pope intervened in the affair ? . . . I tell
you they are furious here because I have my eyes open. I
see too far into their affairs to suit their purposes. A new
man would suit them better." J
His position was hopelessly compromised. He remained
in Paris, however, month after month, and even year after
year, defying his enemies both at the Queen's court and in
Holland, feeding fat the grudge he bore to Barneveld as the
supposed author of the intrigue against him, and drawing
closer the personal bonds which united him to Bouillon and
through him to Prince Maurice.
The wrath of the Ambassador flamed forth without dis-
guise against Barneveld and all his adherents when his
removal, as will be related on a subsequent page, was at
last effected. And his hatred was likely to be deadly.
A man with a shrewd, vivid face, cleanly cut features and
a restless eye ; wearing a close-fitting skull cap, which gave
him something the look of a monk, but with the thorough-
bred and facile demeanour of one familiar with the world ;
stealthy, smooth, and cruel, a man coldly intellectual, who
feared no one, loved but few, and never forgot or forgave ;
Francis d'Aerssens, devoured by ambition and burning with
revenge, was a dangerous enemy.
Time was soon to show whether it was safe to injure
him. Barneveld, from well-considered motives of public
policy, was favouring his honourable recall. But he allowed
a decorous interval of more than three years to elapse
1 Aerssens to Jacques de Maldere, 8 May 1611. (MS.)
324 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VII.
in which to terminate his affairs, and to take a deli-
berate departure from that French embassy to which the
Advocate had originally promoted him, and in which there
had been so many years of mutual benefit and confidence
between the two statesmen. He used no underhand means.
He did not abuse the power of the States-General which he
wielded to cast him suddenly and brutally from the dis-
tinguished post which he occupied, and so to attempt to
dishonour him before the world. Nothing could be more
respectful and conciliatory than the attitude of the govern-
ment from first to last towards this distinguished functionary.
The Kepublic respected itself too much to deal with honour-
able agents whose services it felt obliged to dispense with
as with vulgar malefactors who had been detected in crime.
But Aerssens believed that it was the Advocate who had
°,aused copies of his despatches to be sent to the French court,
and that he had deliberately and for a fixed purpose been
undermining his influence at home and abroad and blacken-
ing his character. All his ancient feelings of devotion, if
they had ever genuinely existed towards his former friend
and patron, turned to gall. He was almost ready to deny
that he had ever respected Barneveld, appreciated his public
services, admired his intellect, or felt gratitude for his
guidance.
A fierce controversy — to which at a later period it will be
necessary to call the reader's attention, because it is inti-
mately connected with dark scenes afterwards to be enacted
— took place between the late ambassador and Cornelis van
. der Myle. Meantime Barneveld pursued the policy which he
had marked out for the States-General in regard to France.
. Certainly it was a difficult problem. There could be no
doubt that metamorphosed France could only be a dangerous
ally for the Republic. It was in reality impossible that
she should be her ally at all. And this Barneveld knew.
1811. BARNEVELD'S POLICY TOWARDS FRANCE. 325
Still it was better, so lie thought, for the Netherlands that
France should exist than that it should fall into utter
decomposition. France, though under the influence of
Spain, and doubly allied by marriage contracts to Spain, was
better than Spain itself in the place of France. This seemed
to be the only choice between two evils. Should the whole
weight of the States-General be thrown into the scale of the
malcontent and mutinous princes against the established but
tottering government of France, it was difficult to say how
soon Spain might literally, as well as inferentially, reign in
Paris.
Between the rebellion and the legitimate government,
therefore, Barneveld did not hesitate. France, corporate
France, with which the Kepublic had been so long in
close and mutually advantageous alliance, and from whose
late monarch she had received such constant and valuable
benefits, was in the Advocate's opinion the only power to be
recognised, Papal and Spanish though it was. The advan-
tage of an alliance with the fickle, self-seeking, and ever
changing mutiny, that was seeking to make use of Pro-
testantism to effect its own ends, was in his eyes rather
specious than real.
By this policy, while making the breach irreparable with
Aerssens and as many leading politicians as Aerssens could
influence, he first brought on himself the stupid accusation
of swerving towards Spain. Dull murmurs like these, which
were now but faintly making themselves heard against the
reputation of the Advocate, were destined ere long to swell
into a mighty roar ; but he hardly listened now to in-
sinuations which seemed infinitely below his contempt. He
still effectually ruled the nation through his influence in
the States of Holland, where he reigned supreme. Thus
far Barneveld and My Lords the States-General were one
personage.
326 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VII,
But there was another great man in the State who had
at last grown impatient of the Advocate's power, and was
secretly resolved to brook it no longer. Maurice of Nassau
had felt himself too long rebuked by the genius of the
Advocate. The Prince had perhaps never forgiven him for
the political guardianship which he had exercised over him
ever since the death of William the Silent. He resented
the leading strings by which his youthful footstep had
been sustained, and which he seemed always to feel about
his limbs so long as Barneveld existed. He had never for-
gotten the unpalatable advice given to him by the Advocate
through the Princess-Dowager.
The brief campaign in Cleve and Jiilich was the last
great political operation in which the two were likely to
act in even apparent harmony. But the rivalry between
the two had already pronounced itself emphatically during
the negotiations for the truce. The Advocate had felt it
absolutely necessary for the Republic to suspend the war
at the first moment when she could treat with her ancient
sovereign on a footing of equality. Spain, exhausted with
the conflict, had at last consented to what she considered
the humiliation of treating with her rebellious provinces
as with free states over which she claimed no authority.
The peace party, led by Barneveld, had triumphed, not-
withstanding the steady opposition of Prince Maurice and
his adherents.
Why had Maurice opposed the treaty? Because his
vocation was over, because he was the greatest captain of
the age, because his emoluments, his consideration, his
dignity before the world, his personal power, were all vastly
greater in war than in his opinion they could possibly be in
peace. It was easy for him to persuade himself that what
was manifestly for his individual interest was likewise
essential to the prosperity of the country.
1611. RIVALRY BETWEEN MAURICE AND BARNEVELD. 327
The diminution in his revenues consequent on the return
to peace was made good to him, his brother, and his cousin,
by most munificent endowments and pensions. And it was
owing to the strenuous exertions of the Advocate that these
large sums were voted. A hollow friendship was kept up
between the two during the first few years of the truce, but
resentment and jealousy lay deep in Maurice's heart.
At about the period of the return of Aerssens from his
French embassy, the suppressed fire was ready to flame forth
at the first fanning by that artful hand. It was impos-
sible, so Aerssens thought and whispered, that two heads
could remain on one body politic. There was no room in
the Netherlands for both the Advocate and the Prince.
Barneveld was in all civil affairs dictator, chief magistrate,
supreme judge ; but he occupied this high station by the
force of intellect, will, and experience, not through any
constitutional provision. In time of war the Prince was
generalissimo, commander-in -chief of all the armies of the
Kepublic. Yet constitutionally he was not captain-general
at all. He was only stadholder of five out of seven provinces.
Barneveld suspected him of still wishing to make himself
sovereign of the country. Perhaps his suspicions were in-
correct. Yet there was every reason why Maurice should
be ambitious of that position. It would have been in
accordance with the openly expressed desire of Henry IV.
and other powerful allies of the Netherlands. His father's
assassination had alone prevented his elevation to the rank
of sovereign Count of Holland. The federal policy of the
Provinces had drifted into a republican form after their
renunciation of their Spanish sovereign, not because the
people, or the States as representing the people, had de-
liberately chosen a republican system, but because they
could get no powerful monarch to accept the sovereignty.
They had offered to become subjects of Protestant England
328 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIL
and of Catholic France. Both powers had refused the offer,
and refused it with something like contumely. However
deep the subsequent regret on the part of both, there was no
doubt of the fact. But the internal policy in all the pro-
vinces, and in all the towns, was republican. Local self-
government existed everywhere. Each city magistracy was
a little republic in itself. The death of William the Silent,
before he had been invested with the sovereign power of all
seven provinces, again left that sovereignty in abeyance.
Was the supreme power of the Union, created at Utrecht
in 1579, vested in the States-General ?
They were beginning theoretically to claim it, but Barne-
veld denied the existence of any such power either in law
or fact. It was a league of sovereignties, he maintained ;
a confederacy of seven independent states, united for certain
purposes by a treaty made some thirty years before. No-
thing could be more imbecile, judging by the light of
subsequent events and the experience of centuries, than such
an organization. The independent and sovereign republic
of Zealand or of Groningen, for example, would have made
a poor figure campaigning, or negotiating, or exhibiting
itself on its own account before the world. Yet it was
difficult to show any charter, precedent, or prescription for
the sovereignty of the States-General. Necessary as such
an incorporation was for the very existence of the Union, no
constitutional union had ever been enacted. Practically
the Province of Holland, representing more than half the
population, wealth, strength, and intellect of the whole
confederation, had achieved an irregular supremacy in the
States-General. But its undeniable superiority was now
causing a rank growth of envy, hatred, and jealousy through-
out the country, and the great Advocate of Holland, who
was identified with the province, and had so long wielded its
power, was beginning to reap the full harvest of that malice.
HE SUSTAINS THE SOVEREIGNTY OF EACH PROVINCE. 329
Thus while there was so much of vagueness in theory and
practice as to the sovereignty, there was nothing criminal
on the part of Maurice if he was ambitious of obtaining the
sovereignty himsel£ He was not seeking to compass it by
base artifice or by intrigue of any kind. It was very natu-
ral that he should be restive under the dictatorship of the
Advocate. If a single burgher and lawyer could make him-
self despot of the Netherlands, how much more reasonable
that he — with the noblest blood of Europe in his veins, whose
direct ancestor three centuries before had been emperor not
only of those provinces, but of all Germany and half
Christendom besides, whose immortal father had under God
been the creator and saviour of the new commonwealth, had
made sacrifices such as man never made for a people, and
had at last laid down his life in its defence ; who had himself
fought daily from boyhood upwards in the great cause, who
had led national armies from victory to victory till he had
placed his country as a military school and a belligerent
power foremost among the nations, and had at last so
exhausted and humbled the great adversary and former
tyrant that he had been glad of a truce while the rebel
chief would have preferred to continue the war — should
aspire to rule by hereditary right a land with which his
name and his race were indelibly associated by countless
sacrifices and heroic achievements.
It was no crime in Maurice to desire the sovereignty.
It was still less a crime in Barneveld to believe that he
desired it. There was no special reason why the Prince
should love the republican form of government provided
that an hereditary one could be legally substituted for it.
He had sworn allegiance to the statutes, customs, and privi-
leges of each of the provinces of which he had been elected
stadholder, but there would have been no treason on his
part if the name and dignity of stadholder should bo
330 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VII.
changed "by the States themselves for those of King or
sovereign Prince.
Yet it was a chief grievance against the Advocate on the
part of the Prince that Barneveld believed him capable of
this ambition.
The Republic existed as a fact, but it had not long
existed, nor had it ever received a formal baptism. So un-
defined was its constitution, and so conflicting were the various
opinions in regard to it of eminent men, that it would be
difficult to say how high-treason could be committed against
it. Great lawyers of highest intellect and learning believed
the sovereign power to reside in the separate states, others
found that sovereignty in the city magistracies, while during
a feverish period of war and tumult the supreme function
had without any written constitution, any organic law, prac-
tically devolved upon the States-General, who had now begun
to claim it as a right. The Republic was neither venerable
by age nor impregnable in law. It was an improvised aris-
tocracy of lawyers, manufacturers, bankers, and corporations
which had done immense work and exhibited astonishing
sagacity and courage, but which might never have achieved
the independence of the Provinces unaided by the sword of
Orange-Nassau and the magic spell which belonged to that
name.
Thus a bitter conflict was rapidly developing itself in the
heart of the Commonwealth. There was the civil element
struggling with the military for predominance ; sword
against gown ; states' rights against central authority ;
peace against war ; above all the rivalry of one prominent
personage against another, whose mutual hatred was now
artfully inflamed by partisans.
And now another element of discord had come, more
potent than all the rest : the terrible, never ending, struggle
of Church against State. Theological hatred which forty
1611. CONFLICT BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. 331
years long had found vent in the exchange of acrimony
between the ancient and the Keformed churches was now
assuming other shapes. Religion in that age and country
was more than has often been the case in history the atmo-
sphere of men's daily lives. But during the great war for
independence, although the hostility between the two reli-
gious forces was always intense, it was modified especially
towards the close of the struggle by other controlling in-
fluences. The love of independence and the passion for
nationality, the devotion to ancient political privileges, was
often as fervid and genuine in Catholic bosoms as in those
of Protestants, and sincere adherents of the ancient church
had fought to the death against Spain in defence of char-
tered rights.
At that very moment it is probable that half the popu-
lation of the United Provinces was Catholic. Yet it would
be ridiculous to deny that the aggressive, uncompromising,
self-sacrificing, intensely believing, perfectly fearless spirit
of Calvinism had been the animating soul, the motive power
of the great revolt. For the Provinces to have encountered
Spain and Pkome without Calvinism, and relying upon muni-
cipal enthusiasm only, would have been to throw away the
sword and fight with the scabbard.
But it is equally certain that those hot gospellers who bad
suffered so much martyrdom and achieved so many miracles
were fully aware of their power and despotic in its exercise.
Against the oligarchy of commercial and juridical corpora-
tions they stood there the most terrible aristocracy of all :
the aristocracy of God's elect, predestined from all tune and
to all eternity to take precedence of and to look down upon
their inferior and lost fellow creatures. It was inevitable
that this aristocracy, which had done so much, which had
breathed into a new-born commonwealth the breath of its
life, should be intolerant, haughty, dogmatic.
332 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VII
The Church of Borne, which had been dethroned after
inflicting such exquisite tortures during its period of power,
was not to raise its head. Although so large a proportion
of the inhabitants of the country were secretly or openly
attached to that faith, it was a penal offence to participate
openly in its rites and ceremonies. Religious equality,
except in the minds of a few individuals, was an unimaginable
idea. There was still one Church which arrogated to itself
the sole possession of truth, t^ie Church of Geneva. Those
who admitted the possibility of other forms and creeds were
either Atheists or, what was deemed worse than Atheists,
Papists, because Papists were assumed to be traitors also, and
desirous of selling the country to Spain. An undevout man
in that land and at that epoch was an almost unknown
phenomenon. Religion was as much a recognized necessity
of existence as food or drink. It were as easy to find people
going about without clothes as without religious convictions.
The Advocate, who had always adhered to the humble spirit
of his ancestral device, "Nil scire tutissima fides" and almost
alone among his fellow citizens (save those immediate
apostles and pupils of his who became involved in his fate)
in favour of religious toleration, began to be suspected of
treason and Papacy because, had he been able to give the
law, it was thought he would have permitted such horrors as
the public exercise of the Roman Catholic religion.
The hissings and screamings of the vulgar against him
as he moved forward on his stedfast course he heeded less
than those of geese on a common. But there was coming a
time when this proud and scornful statesman, conscious of
the superiority conferred by great talents and unparalleled
experience, would find it less easy to treat the voice of
slanderers, whether idiots or powerful and intellectual
enemies, with contempt.
1608. SCHISM IN THE CHUKCH A PUBLIC FACT. 333
CHAPTER VIII.
Schism in the Church a Public Fact — Struggle for Power between the
Sacerdotal and Political Orders — Dispute between Arminius and Goma-
rus — Rage of James I. at the Appointment of Vorstius — Arminians
called Remonstrants — Hague Conference — Contra Remonstrance by
Qomarites of Seven Points to the Remonstrants' Five — Fierce Theological
Disputes throughout the Country — Ryswyk Secession — Maurice wishes
to remain neutral, but finds himself the Chieftain of the Contra-Remon-
strant Party — The States of Holland Remonstrant by a large Majority —
The States-General Contra-Remonstrant — Sir Ralph Winwood leaves
the Hague — Three Armies to take the Field against Protestantism.
SCHISM in the Church head become a public fact, and theo-
logical hatred was in full blaze throughout the country.
The great practical question in the Church had been as
to the appointment of preachers, wardens, schoolmasters, and
other officers. By the ecclesiastical arrangements of 1591
great power was conceded to the civil authority in church
matters, especially in regard to such appointments, which
were made by a commission consisting of four members
named by the churches and four by the magistrates in each
district.1
Barneveld, who above all things desired peace in the
Church, had wished to revive this ordinance, and in 1612
it had been resolved by the States of Holland that each city
or village should, if the magistracy approved, provisionally
conform to it. The States of Utrecht made at the same
time a similar arrangement.
1 Watrcnaar. x. 5!). ' Groot Plak- I Van Rees and Brill, Continuation of
katboek,' iii. deol, 1>1. 4.59. 'Groot Arend, iii. d. ii. stuk, pp. 499. eeq.
Utrechtsch Plakkat-boek.' i. d. 859. 1
334 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIIL
It was the controversy which has been going on since the
beginning of history and is likely to be prolonged to the
end of time — the struggle for power between the sacerdotal
and political orders ; the controversy whether priests shall
control the state or the state govern the priests.
This was the practical question involved in the fierce
dispute as to dogma. The famous duel between Arminius
and Gomarus ; the splendid theological tournaments which
succeeded ; six champions on a side armed in full theological
panoply and swinging the sharpest curtal axes which learn-
ing, passion, and acute intellect could devise, had as yet
produced no beneficent result. Nobody had been convinced
by the shock of argument, by the exchange of those
desperate blows. The High Council of the Hague
had declared that no difference of opinion in the
Church existed sufficient to prevent fraternal harmony and
happiness. But Gomarus loudly declared that, if there were
no means of putting down the heresy of Arminius, there
would before long be a struggle such as would set province
against province, village against village, family against
family, throughout the land.1 He should bo afraid to die
in such doctrine. He shuddered that any one should dare
to come before God's tribunal with such blasphemies.
Meantime his great adversary, the learned and eloquent, the
musical, frolicsome, hospitable heresiarch was no more.
Worn out with controversy, but peaceful and happy in the
convictions which were so bitterly denounced by Gomarus
and a large proportion of both preachers and laymen in the
Netherlands, and convinced that the schism which in his
Aug. view had been created by those who called them-
5091 selves the orthodox would weaken the cause of
Protestantism throughout Europe, Arminius died at the age
of forty-nine.
1 Van Recs and Brill, ' Vad. Gesch.' iii. 419, 422, seq.
RAGE OF JAMES I. AT APPOINTMENT OF VORSTIUS. 335
The magistrates throughout Holland, with the exception
of a few cities, were Anninian, the preachers Gomarian ;
for Arminius ascribed to the civil authority the right to
decide upon church matters, while Gomarus maintained that
ecclesiastical affairs should be regulated in ecclesiastical
assemblies. The overseers of Lcyden University appointed
Conrad Vorstius to be professor of theology in place of Armi-
nius. The selection filled to the brim the cup of bitterness,
for no man was more audaciously latitudinarian than he.
He was even suspected of Socinianism. There came a shriek
from King James, fierce and shrill enough to rouse Arminius
from his grave. James foamed to the mouth at the insolence
of the overseers in appointing such a monster of infidelity
to the professorship. He ordered his books to be publicly
burned in St. Paul's Churchyard and at both Universities,1
and would have burned the Professor himself with as much
delight as Torquemada or Peter Titelrnan ever felt in
roasting their victims, had not the day for such festivities
gone by. He ordered the States of Holland on pain of for
ever forfeiting his friendship to exclude Vorstius at once
from the theological chair and to forbid him from " nestling
anywhere in the country."
He declared his amazement that they should tolerate such
a pest as Conrad Vorstius. Had they not had enough of
the seed sown by that foe of God, Arminius ? He ordered the
States-General to chase the blasphemous monster from
the land, or else he would cut off all connection with their
false and heretic churches and make the other Reformed
churches of Europe do the same, nor should the youth
of England ever bo allowed to frequent the University of
Leyden.2
In point of fact the Professor was never allowed to qualify,
to preach, or to teach ; so tremendous was the outcry of
1 Van Rees and Brill, ' Vad. Oesch.' iii. 495. * Ibid. ' Carleton Letters.1
336
THE LIFE OF JOHN OP BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIII.
Peter Plancius and many orthodox preachers, echoing the
wrath of the King. He lived at Gouda in a private capa-
city for several years, until the Synod of Dordrecht at last
publicly condemned his opinions and deprived him of his
professorship.
Meantime, the preachers who were disciples of Arminius
had in a private assembly drawn up what was called a
Kemonstrance, addressed to the States of Holland, and
defending themselves from the reproach that they were
seeking change in the Divine service and desirous of
creating tumult and schism.1
This Kemonstrance, set forth by the pen of the famous
Uytenbogacrt, whom Gomarus called the Court Trumpeter,
because for a long time he had been Prince Maurice's
favourite preacher, was placed in the hands of Barneveld,
for delivery to the States of Holland. Thenceforth the
Arminians were called Remonstrants.
The Hague Conference followed, six preachers on a side,
and the States of Holland exhorted to fraternal compromise.
Until further notice, they decreed that no man should be
required to believe more than had been laid down in the
Five Points.
Before the conference, however, the Gomarite preachers
1 Wagenaar, x. 36, 37. ' Haagsche
Conferentie/i. 435. Brandt, ' Hist, der
Ref.' ii. 128. Uytenbogaert, 524, 525.
They formulated their position in
the famous Five Points : —
I. God has from eternity resolved
to choose to eternal life those who
through his grace believe in Jesus
Christ, and in faith and obedience so
continue to the end, and to condemn
the unbelieving and unconverted to
eternal damnation.
II. Jesus Christ died for all ; so,
nevertheless, that no one actually ex-
cept believers is redeemed by His
death.
HI. Man has not the saving belief
from himself, nor out of his free will,
but he needs thereto God's grace in
Christ.
IV. This grace is the beginning,
continuation, and completion of man's
salvation; all good deeds must be
ascribed to it, but it does not work ir-
resistibly.
V. God's grace gives sufficient
strength to the true believers to over-
come evil ; but whether they cannot
lose grace should be more closely ex-
amined before it should be taught in
full security.
Afterwards they expressed them-
selves more distinctly on this point,
and declared that a true believer,
through his own fault, can fall away
from God and lose faith.
1609.
THE FIVE AND THE SEVEN POINTS.
337
had drawn np a Contra-Remonstrance of Seven Points in
opposition to the Remonstrants' five.1
They demanded the holding of a National Synod to
settle the difference between these Five and Seven Points, or
the sending of them to foreign universities for arbitration,
a mutual promise being given by the contending parties to
abide by the decision.
Thus much it has been necessary to state concerning
what in the seventeenth century was called the platform of
the two great parties : a term which has been perpetuated
in our own country, and is familiar to all the world in the
nineteenth.
There shall be no more setting forth of these subtle and
finely wrought abstractions in our pages. "We aspire not to
the lofty heights of theological and supernatural contem-
plation, where the atmosphere becomes too rarefied for
1 Authorities last cited.
These were the Seven Points : —
I. God has chosen from eternity
certain persons oat of the human race,
which in and with Adam fell into sin
and has no more power to believe and
convert itself than a dead man to re-
store himself to life, in order to make
them blessed through Christ ; while
He passes by the rest through His
righteous judgment, and leaves them
lying in their sins.
II. Children of believing parents,
as well as full-grown believers, arc to
be considered as elect so long as they
with action do not prove the contrary.
HI. God in His election has not
looked at the belief and the repent-
ance of the elect ; but, on the con-
trary, in His eternal and unchange-
able design, has resolved to give to
the elect faith and stedfastness, and
thus to make them blessed.
IV. He, to this end, in the first
place, presented to them His only be-
got tenSon, whose snfferings.aHhough
sufficient for the expiation of all men's
sins, nevertheless, according to God's
decree, serves alone to the reconcilia-
VOL. I.
tion of the elect.
V. God causest he Gospel to be
preached to them, making the same,
through the Holy Ghost, of strength
upon their minds ; so that they not
merely obtain power to repent and to
believe, but also actually and volun-
tarily do repent and believe.
VI. Such elect, through the same
power of the Holy Ghost through
which they have once become repent-
ant and believing, are kept in such
wise that they indeed through weak-
ness fall into heavy sins ; but can
never wholly and for always lose the
true faith.
VII. True believers from this,
however, draw no reason for fleshly
quiet, it being impossible that they
who through a true faith ware planted
in Christ should bring forth no fruit*
of thankfulness; the promises of God's
help and the warnings of Scripture
tending to make their salvation work
in them in fear and trembling, and to
cause them more earnestly to desire
help from that spirit without which
they can do nothing.
338 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIIL
ordinary constitutions. Bather we attempt an objective and
level survey of remarkable phenomena manifesting them-
selves on the earth ; direct or secondary emanations from
those distant spheres.
For in those days, and in that land especially, theology
and politics were one. It may be questioned at least whether
this practical fusion of elements, which may with more
safety to the Commonwealth be kept separate, did not tend
' quite as much to lower and contaminate the religious senti-
ments as to elevate the political idea. To mix habitually
* the solemn phraseology which men love to reserve for their
* highest and most sacred needs with the familiar slang
* of politics and trade seems to our generation not a very
. desirable proceeding.
The aroma of doubly distilled and highly sublimated
dogma is more difficult to catch than to comprehend the
broader and more practical distinctions of e very-day party
strife.
King James was furious at the thought that common men
— the vulgar, the people in short — should dare to discuss
deep problems of divinity which, as he confessed, had puzzled
even his royal mind. Barneveld modestly disclaimed the
power of seeing with absolute clearness into things beyond
the reach of the human intellect. But the honest Nether-
landers were not abashed by thunder from the royal pulpit,
nor perplexed by hesitations which darkened the soul of
the great Advocate.
In burghers' mansions, peasants' cottages, mechanics' back-
parlours, on board herring smacks, canal boats, and East
Indiamen; in shops, counting-rooms, farmyards, guard-rooms,
ale-houses ; on the exchange, in the tennis-court, on the
mall ; at banquets, at burials, christenings, or bridals ;
Vherever and whenever human creatures met each other,
there was ever to be found the fierce wrangle of Bemon
1609. FIERCE THEOLOGICAL DISPUTES. 339
strant and Contra-Remonstrant, the hissing of red-hot*
theological rhetoric, the pelting of hostile texts. The *
blacksmith's iron cooled on the anvil, the tinker dropped a
kettle half mended, the broker left a bargain unclinched,
the Scheveningen fisherman in his wooden shoes forgot the
cracks in his pinkie, while each paused to hold high con- -
verse with friend or foe on fate, free will, or absolute fore-
knowledge ; losing himself in wandering mazes whence
there was no issue. Province against province, city against
city, family against family ; it was one vast scene of •
bickering, denunciation, heartburnings, mutual excommuni-,
cation and hatred.
Alas ! a generation of mankind before, men had stood
banded together to resist, with all the might that comes
from union, the fell spirit of the Holy Inquisition, which
was dooming all who had wandered from the ancient fold
or resisted foreign tyranny to the axe, the faggot, the living
grave. There had been small leisure then for men who ,
fought for Fatherland, and for comparative liberty of con- /•
science, to tear each others' characters in pieces, and to /
indulge in mutual hatreds and loathing on the question of ,
predestination.
As a rule the population, especially of the humbler classes*
and a great majority of the preachers were Contra-Remon-
strant ; the magistrates, the burgher patricians, were
Remonstrant. In Holland the controlling influence was Re-
monstrant ; but Amsterdam and four or five other cities of
that province held to the opposite doctrine. These cities
formed therefore a small minority in the States Assembly of
Holland sustained by a large majority in the States-General.
The Province of Utrecht was almost unanimously Remon-
strant. The five other provinces were decidedly Contra-
Remonstrant. *
It is obvious therefore that the influence of Barncveld,
340 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP.VHI.
hitherto so all-controlling in the Statcs-Generni, and which
rested on the complete submission of the States of Holland
-» to his will, was tottering. The battle-line between Church
and State was now drawn up ; and it was at the same time
a battle between the union and the principles of state
sovereignty.
It had long since been declared through the mouth of the
Advocate, but in a solemn state manifesto, that My Lords
the States-General were the foster-fathers and the natural
protectors of the Church, to whom supreme authority in
church matters belonged.1
The Contra-Kemonstrants, on the other hand, maintained
that all the various churches made up one indivisible church,
seated above the States, whether Provincial or General, and
governed by the Holy Ghost acting directly upon the con-
gregations.
** As the schism grew deeper and the States-General receded
from the position which they had taken up under the lead
of the Advocate, the scene was changed. A majority of the
Provinces being Contra-Eemonstrant, and therefore in favour
of a National Synod, the States-General as a body were of
necessity for the Synod.
It was felt by the clergy that, if many churches existed,
they would all remain subject to the civil authority.
The power of the priesthood would thus sink before
that of the burgher aristocracy. There must be one
church — the Church of Geneva and Heidelberg — if that
theocracy which the Gomarites meant to establish was not
to vanish as a dream. It was founded on Divine Right, and
knew no chief magistrate but the Holy Ghost. A few years
before the States-General had agreed to a National Synod,
but -with a condition that there should be revision of the
Netherland Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism.
1 Van Rees and Brill, iii. 422. Baudart. i. 9, 10.
1609. FIERCE THEOLOGICAL DISPUTES. 341
Against this the orthodox infallibilists had protested and
. thundered, because it was an admission that the vile Armi-
nian heresy might perhaps be declared correct, 'it was now
however a matter of certainty that the States-General would
cease to oppose the unconditional Synod, because the majority
sided with the priesthood./
The magistrates of Leyden had not long before opposed
the demand for a Synod on the ground that the war against
Spain was not undertaken to maintain one sect ; that men of
various sects and creeds had fought with equal valour against
the common foe ; that religious compulsion was hateful, and
that no synod had a right to claim Netherlanders as slaves.1
To thoughtful politicians like Barneveld, Hugo Grotius,
and men who acted with them, that seemed a doctrine
fraught with danger to the state, by which mankind were
not regarded as saved or doomed according to belief or
deeds, but as individuals divided from all eternity into two
classes which could never be united, but must ever mutually
regard each other as enemies.^
And like enemies Netherlanders were indeed beginning
to regard each other. The men who, banded like brothers,
had so heroically fought for two generations long for liberty
against an almost superhuman despotism, now howling and
jeering against each other like demons, seemed determined
to bring the very name of liberty into contempt.'
Where the Remonstrants were in the ascendant, they
excited the hatred and disgust of the orthodox by their
overbearing determination to carry their Five Points. A
broker in Rotterdam of the Contra- Remonstrant persuasion,
being about to take a wife, swore he had rather be married
by a pig than a parson. For this sparkling epigram he
was punished by the Remonstrant magistracy with loss of
his citizenship for a year and the right to practise his trade
1 Van Rees and Brill, ' Vad. Gesch." iii. 499 seg.
342 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAENEVELD. CHAP. VIII.
U
for life. A casuistical tinker, expressing himself violently
in the same city against the Five Points, and disrespectfully
towards the magistrates for tolerating them, was banished
from the town.2^ A printer in the neighbourhood, disgusted
with these and similar efforts of tyranny on the part of the
dominant party, thrust a couple of lines of doggrel into the
lottery :
" In name of the Prince of Orange, I ask once and again,
What difference between the Inquisition of Rotterdam and Spain ? "
For this poetical effort the printer was sentenced to forfeit
the prize that he had drawn in the lottery, and to be kept in
prison on bread and water for a fortnight.3
Certainly such punishments were hardly as severe as
being beheaded or burned or buried alive, as would have
been the lot of tinkers and printers and brokers who
opposed the established church in the days of Alva, but the
demon of intolerance, although its fangs were drawn, still
survived, and had taken possession of both parties in the
Keformed Church: For it was the Kcmonstrants who had
possession of the churches at Eotterdam, and the printer's
distich is valuable as pointing out that the name of prango
was beginning to identify itself with the Contra-Kemon-
strant faction. At this time, on the other hand, the gabble
that Barneveld had been bought by Spanish gold, and was
about to sell his country to Spain, became louder than a
whisper.^ Men were not ashamed, from theological hatred,
to utter such senseless calumnies against a venerable states-
man whose long life had been devoted to the cause of his
country's independence and to the death struggle with
Spain.
* As if because a man admitted the possibility of all his
fellow-creatures being saved from damnation through re-
1 Wagenaar, s. 82, 83. * Ibid. 3 Ibid.
1616. RTSWTK SECESSION. 343
pentance and the grace of God, he must inevitably be a
traitor to his country and a pensionary of her deadliest •
foe.
And where the Contra-Kemonstrants held possession of
the churches and the city governments, acts of tyranny
which did not then seem ridiculous were of everyday occur-
rence. Clergymen, suspected of the Five Points, were driven
out of the pulpits with bludgeons or assailed with brickbats
at the church door. At Amsterdam, Simon Goulart, for
preaching the doctrine of universal salvation and for dis-
puting the eternal damnation of young children, was for-
bidden thenceforth to preach at all.1 •
But it was at the Hague that the schism in religion and
politics first fatally widened itself. Henry Rosaeus, an
eloquent divine, disgusted with his colleague Uytenbogaert,
refused all communion with him, and was in consequence
suspended. Excluded from the Great Church, where he had
formerly ministered, he preached every Sunday at Ryswyk,
two or three miles distant.2 Seven hundred Contra-Re-
monstrants of the Hague followed their beloved Feb 12>
pastor, and, as the roads to Ryswyk were muddy 161G-
and sloppy in winter, acquired the unsavouiy nickname of
the " Mud Beggars." The vulgarity of heart which sug-
gested the appellation does not inspire to-day great sym-
pathy with the Remonstrant party, even if one were
inclined to admit, what is not the fact, that they repre-
sented the cause of religious equality. For even the
illustrious Grotius was at that very moment repudiating
the notion that there could be two religions in one state.
^Difference in public worship," he said, "was in king-
doms pernicious, but in free commonwealths in the highest
degree destructive." 3'
1 Wagonaar, x. 80, 87. Brandt, ' Hist. Ref.' ii. 261, sea.
* Van der Kemp, iv. 2. » Wagenaar, x. 137.
344 THE LIFE OP JOHN OP BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIII.
It was the struggle between Church and State for su-
premacy over the whole body politic. " The Reformation,"
said Grotius, " was not brought about by synods, but by
kings, princes, and magistrates." It was the same eternal
story, the same terrible two-edged weapon, " Cujus regio
efus religio," found in the arsenal of the first Reformers, and
in every politico-religious arsenal of history.
" By an eternal decree of God," said Gomarus in accordance
with Calvin, "it has been fixed who are to be saved and
who damned. By His decree some are drawn to faith and
godliness, and, being drawn, can never fall away. God
leaves all the rest in the general corruption of human nature
and their own misdeeds." *
" God has from eternity made this distinction in the fallen
human race," said Arminius, " that He pardons those who
desist from their sins and put their faith in Christ, and will
give them eternal life, but will punish those who remain
impenitent. Moreover, it is pleasanter to God that all men
should repent, and, coining to knowledge of truth, remain
therein, but He compels none." 2
This was the vital difference of dogma. And it was because
they could hold no communion with those who believed in
the efficacy of repentance that Rosaeus and his followers
had seceded to Ryswyk, and the Reformed Church had been
torn into two very unequal parts. But it is difficult to
believe that out of this arid field of controversy so plentiful
a harvest of hatred and civil convulsion could have ripened.
More practical than the insoluble problems, whether repent-
ance could eifect salvation, and whether dead infants were
~ hopelessly damned, was the question who should rule both
Church and State.
There could be but one church. On that Remonstrants
1 Wagenaar, x. 15, 16. Gomari 'Op.' p. i. 428 ; p. ii. 27, 277, 280.
9 Arminii ' Opera,' pp. 283, 288, 389, 943. Wag. ulri sup.
1616. MAURICE WISHES TO REMAIN NEUTRAL. 345
and Contra-Kemonstrants were agreed. But should the Five '
Points or the Seven Points obtain the mastery ? Should that
framework of hammered iron, the Confession and Catechism,
be maintained in all its rigidity around the sheepfold, or
should the disciples of the arch-heretic Anninius, the
salvation-mongers, be permitted to prowl within it ?
"Was Barneveld, who hated the Keformed religion1 (so
men told each other), and who believed in nothing, to con-
tinue dictator of the whole Kepublic through his influence
over one province, prescribing its religious dogmas and lay- 7)
ing down its laws ; or had not the time come for the States-
General to vindicate the rights of the Church, and to crush
for ever the pernicious principle of State sovereignty and
burgher oligarchy ?
The abyss was wide and deep, and the wild waves were
raging more madly every hour. The Advocate, anxious and
troubled, but undismayed, did his best in the terrible
emergency. He conferred with Prince Maurice on the sub-
ject of the Kyswyk secession, and men said that he sought
to impress upon him, as chief of the military forces, the
necessity of putting down religious schism with the armed I
hand.
The Prince had not yet taken a decided position. He
was still under the influence of John Uytenbogaert, who
with Arminius and the Advocate made up the fateful three
from whom deadly disasters were deemed to have come upon
the Commonwealth. He wished to remain neutral. But no
man can be neutral in civil contentions threatening the life
of the body politic any more than the heart can be indif-
ferent if the human frame is sawn in two.
" I am a soldier," said Maurice, " not a divine. These are
matters of theology which I don't understand, and about
which I don't trouble myself." :
1 Van dcr Kemp, iv. 5. * Brandt, ii. 558. Van der Kemp, iv. 20.
346 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIII.
On another occasion he is reported to have said, " I know
nothing of predestination, whether it is green or whether it
is hlue ; but I do know that the Advocate's pipe and mine
will never play the same tune." *
It was not long before he fully comprehended the part
which he must necessarily play. To say that he was in-
different to religious matters was as ridiculous as to make
a like charge against Barneveld. Both were religious
men. It would have been almost impossible to find an
irreligious character in that country, certainly not among
its highest-placed and leading minds. Maurice had strong
intellectual powers. He was a regular attendant on divine
worship, and was accustomed to hear daily religious
discussions. To avoid them indeed, he would have been
obliged not only to fly his country, but to leave Europe.
He had a profound reverence for the memory of his father,
Calbo y Calbanista, as William the Silent had called
himself. But the great prince had died before these fierce
disputes had torn the bosom of the Reformed Church, and
while Reformers still were brethren. But if Maurice were a
religious man, he was also a keen politician ; a less capable
politician, however, than a soldier, for he was confessedly the
first captain of his age. He was not rapid in his concep-
tions, but he was sure in the end to comprehend his oppor-
tunity.
, The Church, the people, the Union — the sacerdotal, the
democratic, and the national element — united under a name
so potent to conjure with as the name of Orange-Nassau, was
stronger than any other possible combination. Instinctively
and logically therefore the Stadholder found himself the
chieftain of the Contra-Remonstrant party, and without
the necessity of an apostasy such as had been required of
his great contemporary to make himself master of France.
1 Van Kampen, vol. ii.
HE FINDS HIMSELF CHIEF OF CON TRA-REMONSTR ANTS. 347
The power of Barneveld and his partisans was now put
to a severe strain. His efforts to bring back the Hague
seceders were powerless. The influence of Uytenbogaert
over the Stadholder steadily diminished. He prayed to be
relieved from his post in the Great Church of the Hague,
especially objecting to serve with a Contra-Remonstrant
preacher whom Maurice wished to officiate there in place of
the seceding Rosaeus. But the Stadholder refused to let
him go, fearing his influence in other places. " There is
stuff in him/' said Maurice, "to outweigh half a dozen
Contra-Remonstrant preachers." l Everywhere in Holland
the opponents of the Five Points refused to go to the
churches, and set up tabernacles for themselves in barns,
outhouses, canal-boats. And the authorities in town and
village nailed up the barn-doors, and dispersed the canal-
boat congregations, while the populace pelted them with
stones. The seceders appealed to the Stadholder, pleading
that at least they ought to be allowed to hear the word of
God as they understood it without being forced into churches
where they were obliged to hear Arminian blasphemy. At
least their barns might be left them. " Barns," said
Maurice, " barns and outhouses ! Are we to preach in barns ?
The churches belong to us, and we mean to have them too." 2
Not long afterwards the Stadholder, clapping his hand on
his sword hilt, observed that these differences could only bo
settled by force of arms.3 An ominous remark and a dreary
comment on the forty years' war against the Inquisition.
And the same scenes that were enacting in Holland were
going on in Ovcryssel and Friesland and Groningen ; but
with a difference. Here it was the Five Points men who were
driven into secession, whose barns were nailed up, and whose
preachers were mobbed. A lugubrious spectacle, but less
1 Van dcr Kemp. iv. 21. » Ibid. 22.
8 Wngenaar, x. 201. 'Uytcnb. Loven,' c. is. 122.
348 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIII.
painful certainly than the hangings and drownings and
burnings alive in the previous century to prevent secession
from the indivisible church.
It is certain that stadholders and all other magistrates
ever since the establishment of independence were sworn to
maintain the Keformed religion and to prevent a public
divine worship under any other form. It is equally certain
that by the 13th Article of the Act of Union — the organic
law of the confederation made at Utrecht in 1579 — each
province reserved for itself full control of religious questions.
It would indeed seem almost unimaginable in a country
where not only every province, but every city, every muni-
cipal board, was so jealous of its local privileges and tradi-
tional rights that the absolute disposition over the highest,
gravest, and most difficult questions that can inspire and
perplex humanity should be left to a general government,
and one moreover which had scarcely come into existence.
» Yet into this entirely illogical position the Commonwealth
was steadily drifting. The cause was simple enough. The
States of Holland, as already observed, were Kemonstrant by
a large majority. The States-General were Contra-Remon-
strant by a still greater majority. The Church, rigidly at-
tached to the Confession and Catechism, and refusing all
change except through decree of a synod to be called by the
general government which it controlled, represented the na-
tional idea. It thus identified itself with the Republic, and
was in sympathy with a large majority of the population.
Logic, law, historical tradition were on the side of the
Advocate and the States' right party. The instinct of
national self-preservation, repudiating the narrow and de-
structive doctrine of provincial sovereignty, were on the side
of the States-General and the Church.
Meantime James of Great Britain had written letters both
to the States of Holland and the States-General expressing
1613.
THE STATES OF HOLLAND REMONSTRANT.
349
1613.
his satisfaction with the Five Points, and deciding that there
was nothing objectionable in the doctrine of predestination
therein set forth. He had recommended unity and peace in
Church and Assembly, and urged especially that these con-
troverted points should not be discussed in the pulpit to the
irritation and perplexity of the common people.
The King's letters had produced much satisfaction in the
moderate party. Barneveld and his followers were then still
in the ascendant, and it seemed possible that the
Commonwealth might enjoy a few moments of
tranquillity. That James had given a new exhibition of
his astounding inconsistency was a matter very indifferent
to all but himself, and he was the last man to trouble
himself for that reproach.
It might happen, when he should come to realize how
absolutely he had obeyed the tuition of the Advocate and
favoured the party which he had been so vehemently op-
posing, that he might regret and prove willing to retract.
But for the time being the course of politics had seemed
running smoother. The acrimony of the relations between*
the English government and dominant party at the Hague
was sensibly diminished. The King seemed for an instant to
have obtained a true insight into the nature of the struggle
in the States. That it was after all less a theological than a
political question which divided parties had at last dawned
upon him. \
"If you have occasion to write on the subject," said Bar-
neveld,1 " it is above all necessary to make if clear that eccle-
siastical persons and their affairs must stand under the direc-
tion of the sovereign authority ,\for our preachers understand
that the disposal of ecclesiastical persons and affairs belongs
1 Barneveld to Cnron, 11 Feb. 1613.
(Hague Archives MS.)
* These lines arc underlined in tho
original despatch : "datdio kercke-
lycko pcreoncn ende hare zaeckon
moeten staan onder die directie van
de Bouveraine Overicheyt," &c.
350 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. VIII.
to them, so that they alone are to appoint preachers, elders,
'deacons, and other clerical persons, and to regulate the
whole ecclesiastical administration according to their
pleasure or by a popular government which they call the
community."*-
" The Counts of Holland from all ancient times were never
willing under the Papacy to surrender their right of pre-
sentation to the churches and control of all spiritual and
ecclesiastical benefices. The Emperor Charles and King
Philip even, as Counts of Holland, kept these rights to
themselves, save that they in enfeoffing more than a hundred
gentlemen, of noble and ancient families with seigniorial
manors, enfeoffed them also with the right of presentation
to churches and benefices on their respective estates. Our
preachers pretend to have won thip right against the
Countship, the gentlemen, nobles, an<t others, and that it
belongs to them." 1
f It is easy to see that this was a grave, constitutional,
legal, and historical problem not to be solved offhand by
vehement citations from Scripture, nor by pragmatical dis-
sertations from the lips of foreign ambassadors.
" I believe this point," continued Barneveld, " to be the
most difficult question of all, importing far more than subtle
searchings and conflicting sentiments as to passages of Holy
Writ, or disputations concerning God's eternal predestina-
tion and other points thereupon depending. Of these
doctrines the Archbishop of Canterbury well observed in the
Conference of 1604 that one ought to teach them ascendendo
and not descendendo."
The letters of the King had been very favourably received
both in the States-General and in the Assembly of Holland.
" You will present the replies," wrote Barneveld to the
ambassador in London, " at the best opportunity and with
1 Barneveld to Caron, 3 April 1613. (Hague Archives MS.)
1613. THE STATES-GENERAL CONTRA-REMONSTRANT. 351
becoming compliments. You may be assured and assure
his Majesty that they have been very agreeable to both
assemblies. Our commissioners over there on the East
Indian matter ought to know nothing of these letters." 1
This statement is worthy of notice, as Grotius was one of
those commissioners, and, as will subsequently appear, was
accused of being the author of the letters.
"I understand from others," continued the Advocate,
" that the gentleman well known to you 2 is not well pleased
that through other agency than his these letters have been
written and presented. I think too that the other business
is much against his grain, but on the whole since your
departure he has accommodated himself to the situation."
But if Aerssens for the moment seemed quiet, the orthodox
clergy were restive.
" I know," said Barneveld,3 " that some of our ministers
are so audacious that of themselves, or through others, they
mean to work by direct or indirect means against these
letters. They mean to show likewise that there are other
and greater differences of doctrine than those already dis-
cussed. You will keep a sharp eye on the sails and provide
against the effect of counter-currents. To maintain the
authority of their Great Mightinesses over ecclesiastical
matters is more than necessary for the conservation of the
country's welfare and of the true Christian religion. As his
Majesty would not allow this principle to be controverted in
his own realms, as his books clearly prove, so we trust that
he will not find it good that it should be controverted in
our state as sure to lead to a very disastrous and inequitable
sequel."
And a few weeks later the Advocate and the whole party
of toleration found themselves, as is so apt to be the case,
1 Barneveld to Caron, 8 April 1013. (Hague Archives MS.)
* Obviously Francis Acrssens. * MS. just cited
352 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VIII.
between two fires. The Catholics became as turbulent as
the extreme Calvinists, and already hopes were entertained
by Spanish emissaries and spies that this rapidly growing
schism in the Reformed Church might be dexterously made
use of to bring the Provinces, when they should become
fairly distracted, back to the dominion of Spain.
"Our precise zealots in the Keformed religion, on the one
side," wrote Barneveld,1 "and the Jesuits on the other, are
vigorously kindling the fire of discord. Keep a good look-
out for the countermine which is now working against
the good advice of his Majesty for mutual toleration. The
publication of the letters was done without order, but I
believe with good intent, in the hope that the vehemence
and exorbitance of some precise Puritans in our State should
thereby be checked. That which is now doing against us in
printed libels is the work of the aforesaid Puritans and a
few Jesuits. The pretence in those libels, that there are
other differences in the matter of doctrine, is mere fiction
designed to make trouble and confusion."
In the course of the autumn, Sir Ralph Win wood departed
from the Hague, to assume soon afterwards in England the
position of secretary of state for foreign affairs. He did
not take personal farewell of Barneveld, the Advocate being
absent in North Holland at the moment, and detained there
by indisposition. The leave-taking was therefore by letter.2
He had done much to injure the cause which the Dutch
statesman held vital to the Republic, and in so doing he
had faithfully carried out the instructions of his master.
Now that James had written these conciliatory letters to
the States, recommending toleration, letters destined to be
famous, Barneveld was anxious that the retiring ambas-
sador should foster the spirit of moderation, which for a
1 Barneveld to Caron, 3 May 1613. (Hague Archives MS.)
8 Same to same, 10 Sept. 1613. (Hague Archives MS.)
1613. SIR RALPH WINWOOD LEAVES THE HAGUE. 353
moment prevailed at the British court. But he was not
very hopeful in the matter.
" Mr. Winwood is doubtless over there now," he wrote to
Caron. " He has promised in public and private to do all
good offices. The States-General made him a present on
his departure of the value of £4000. I fear neverthe-
less that he, especially in religious matters, will not do
the best offices. For besides that he is himself very hard
and precise, those who in this country are hard and precise
have made a dead set at him,1 and tried to make him
devoted to their cause, through many fictitious and un-
truthful means." 3
The Advocate, as so often before, sent assurances to the
King that " the States-General, and especially the States of
Holland, were resolved to maintain the genuine Reformed
religion, and oppose all novelties and impurities conflicting
with it," and the Ambassador was instructed to see that the
countermine, worked so industriously against his Majesty's
service and the honour and reputation of the Provinces, did
not prove successful.
" To let the good mob play the master," he said, " and
to permit hypocrites and traitors in the Flemish manner
to get possession of the government of the provinces and
cities, and to cause upright patriots whose faith and truth
has so long been proved, to be abandoned, by the blessing
of God, shall never be accomplished. Be of good heart,
and cause these Flemish tricks to be understood on every
occasion, and let men know that we mean to maintain, with
unchanging constancy, the authority of the government, the
privileges and laws of the country, as well as the true
Reformed religion."
1 "... hem zeer aengeloopcn." — Barneveld to Caron, 10 Sept. 1613.
(HacTie Archives MS.)
» Ibid.
VOL. I. 2 A
354 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. VHI.
The statesman was more than ever anxious for moderate
counsels in the religious questions, for it was now more
important than ever that there should be concord in the
Provinces, for the cause of Protestantism, and with it the
existence of the Republic, seemed in greater danger than at
any moment since the truce. It appeared certain that the
alliance between France and Spain had been arranged, and
that the Pope, Spain, the Grand -duke of Tuscany, and their
various adherents had organized a strong combination, and
were enrolling large armies to take the field in the spring,
against the Protestant League of the princes and electors
in Germany. The great king was dead. The Queen-Regent
was in the hand of Spain, or dreamed at least of an impos-
sible neutrality, while the priest who was one day to resume
the part of Henry, and to hang upon the sword of France
the scales in which the opposing weights of Protestantism
and Catholicism in Europe were through so many awful
years to be balanced, was still an obscure bishop.
The premonitory signs of the great religious war in Ger-
many were not to be mistaken. In truth, the great conflict
had already opened in the duchies, although few men as
yet comprehended the full extent of that movement. The
superficial imagined that questions of hereditary succession,
like those involved in the dispute, were easily to be settled
by statutes of descent, expounded by doctors of law, and
sustained, if needful, by a couple of comparatively bloodless
^campaigns. Those who looked more deeply into causes felt
that the limitations of Imperial authority, the ambition
of a great republic, suddenly starting into existence out of
nothing, and the great issues of the religious reformation,
were matters not so easily arranged. When the scene
shifted, as it was so soon to do, to the heart of Bohemia,
when Protestantism had taken the Holy Roman Empire by
the beard in its ancient palace, and thrown Imperial stad-
1813. THREE ARMIES TO TAKE THE FIELD. 355
holders out of window, it would be evident to the blindest
that something serious was taking place.
Meantime Barneveld, ever watchful of passing events,
knew that great forces of Catholicism were marshalling in the
south. Three armies were to take the field against Pro-
testantism at the orders of Spain and the Pope. One at
the door of the Kepublic, and directed especially against the
Netherlands, was to resume the campaign in the duchies,
and to prevent any aid going to Protestant Germany from
Great Britain or from Holland. Another in the Upper
Palatinate was to make the chief movement against the
Evangelical hosts. A third in Austria was to keep down
the Protestant party in Bohemia, Hungary, Austria, Moravia,
and Silesia. To sustain this movement, it was understood
that all the troops then in Italy were to be kept all the
winter on a war footing.1
Was this a time for the great Protestant party in the
Netherlands to tear itself in pieces for a theological
subtlety, about which good Christians might differ without
taking each other by the throat ?
" I do not lightly believe or fear," said the Advocate, in
communicating a survey of European affairs at that moment
to Caron, " but present advices from abroad make me appre-
hend dangers." 2
1 Barnoveld to Caron, 29 Oct. 1613. (Hague Archives MS.)
* Ibid.
356 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IX
CHAPTER IX.
Aerssens remains Two Years longer in France — Derives many Personal
Advantages from his Post — He visits tlie States-General — Aubery du
Maurier appointed French Ambassador — He demands the Recall of
Aerssens — Peace of Sainte-Menehould — Asperen de Langerac appointed
in Aerssens' Place.
FRANCIS AERSSENS had remained longer at his post than
had been intended by the resolution of the States of
Holland, passed in May 1611.
It is an exemplification of the very loose constitutional
framework of the United Provinces that the nomination of
the ambassador to France belonged to the States of Holland,
by whom his salary was paid, although, of course, he was
the servant of the States-General, to whom his public and
official correspondence was addressed. His most important
despatches were however written directly to Barneveld so
long as he remained in power, who had also the charge of
the whole correspondence, public or private, with all the
envoys of the States.
Aerssens had, it will be remembered, been authorized
to stay one year longer in France if he thought he could
be useful there. He stayed two years, and on the whole
was not useful. He had too many eyes and too many
ears. He had become mischievous by the very activity
of his intelligence. He was too zealous. There were
occasions in France at that moment in which it was as well
to be blind and deaf. It was impossible for the Republic,
unless driven to it by dire necessity, to quarrel with its great
AERS3ENS REMAINS TWO YEARS LONGER IN FRANCE. 357
ally. It had been calculated "by Duplessis-Mornay that
France had paid subsidies to the Provinces amounting from
first to last to 200 millions of livres.1 This was an enormous
exaggeration. It was Barneveld's estimate that before the
truce the States had received from France eleven millions
of florins in cash, and during the truce up to the year 1613
3,600,000 in addition, besides a million still due, making a
total of about fifteen millions. During the truce France
kept two regiments of foot amounting to 4200 soldiers and
two companies of cavalry in Holland at the service of the
States, for which she was bound to pay yearly 600,000 livres,
And the Queen-Regent had continued all the treaties
by which these arrangements were secured, and professed
sincere and continuous friendship for the States. While
the French-Spanish marriages gave cause for suspicion,
uneasiness, and constant watchfulness in the States, still the
neutrality of France was possible in the coming storm. So
long as that existed, particularly when the relations of
England with Holland through the unfortunate character
of King James were perpetually strained to a point of im-
minent rupture, it was necessary to hold as long as it was
possible to the slippery embrace of France.
But Aerssens was almost aggressive in his attitude. He
rebuked the vacillations, the shortcomings, the imbecility,
cf the Queen's government in offensive terms. He consorted
openly with the princes who were on the point of making
war upon the Queen-Regent. He made a boast to the
Secretary of State Villeroy that he had unravelled all his
secret plots against the Netherlands. He declared it to be
understood in France, since the King's death, by the dominant
and Jesuitical party that the crown depended temporally
as well as spiritually on the good pleasure of the Pope.
1 Dup.-Mornny, 'Vie et Corresp.'
viii. 514 ; x. 227. Ouvre's ' Aub«'ry
du Maurier ' (Paris, 1855), p. 172.
Barneveld to States of Holland, 31
March 1613. (Hague Archives MS.)
358 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IX.
No doubt he was perfectly right in many of his opinions.
No ruler or statesman in France worthy of the name would
hesitate, in the impending religious conflict throughout
Europe and especially in Germany, to maintain for the
kingdom that all controlling position which was its splendid
privilege. But to preach this to Mary de' Medici was waste
of breath. She was governed by the Concini's, and the Con-
cini's were governed by Spain. The woman who was believed
to have known beforehand of the plot to murder her great
husband, who had driven the one powerful statesman on
whom the King relied, Maximilian de Bethune, into retire-
ment, and whose foreign affairs were now completely in the
hands of the ancient Leaguer Villeroy — who had served
every government in the kingdom for forty years — was not
likely to be accessible to high views of public policy.
Two years had now elapsed since the first private com-
plaints against the Ambassador, and the French government
were becoming impatient at his presence. Aerssens had
been supported by Prince Maurice, to whom he had long
paid his court. He was likewise loyally protected by Bar-
neveld, whom he publicly flattered and secretly maligned.
But it was now necessary that he should be gone if peaceful
relations with France were to be preserved.
After all, the Ambassador had not made a bad business of
his embassy from his own point of view. A stranger in the
Republic, for his father the Greffier was a refugee from
Brabant, he had achieved through his own industry and
remarkable talents, sustained by the favour of Barneveld —
to whom he owed all his diplomatic appointments — an
eminent position in Europe. Secretary to the legation to
France in 1594, he had been successively advanced to the
post of resident agent, and when the Republic had been
acknowledged by the great powers, to that of ambassador.
The highest possible functions that representatives of
HE DERIVES MANY ADVANTAGES FROM HIS POST. 359
emperors and kings could enjoy had been formally recog-
nized in the person of the minister of a new-born republic.
And this was at a moment when, with exception of tha
brave but insignificant cantons of Switzerland, the Republic
had long been an obsolete idea.
In a pecuniary point of view, too, he had not fared badly
during his twenty years of diplomatic office. He had made
much money in various ways. The King not long before
his death sent him one day 20,000 florins as a present, with
a promise soon to do much more for him.1
Having been placed in so eminent a post, he considered
it as due to himself to derive all possible advantage from it.
" Those who serve at the altar," he said a little while after
his return, " must learn to live by it. I served their High
Mightinesses at the court of a great king, and his Majesty's
liberal and gracious favours were showered upon me. My
upright conscience and steady obsequiousness greatly aided
me. I did not look upon opportunity with folded arms,
but seized it and made my profit by it. Had I not met
with such fortunate accidents, my ofiice would not have given
me dry bread/' 2
Nothing could exceed the frankness and indeed the
cynicism with which the Ambassador avowed his practice
of converting his high and sacred office into merchandise.
And these statements of his should be scanned closely,
because at this very moment a cry was distantly rising,
which at a later day was to swell into a roar, that the great
Advocate had been bribed and pensioned. Nothing had
occurred to justify such charges, save that at the period of
the truce he had accepted from the King of France a fee
of 20,000 florins for extra official and legal services rendered
1 From Aerssons' own statements : " Stukken rakendeden Twist tuBSchen
Aerwena endo van der Myle, anno 1618." (Hague Archives MS.)
» MS. just cited.
360 THE LIFE OP JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IX.
him a dozen years before, and had permitted his younger
son to hold the office of gentleman-in-waiting at the French
court with the usual salary attached to it. The post, cer-
tainly not dishonourable in itself, had been intended by the
King as a kindly compliment to the leading statesman of
his great and good ally the Republic. It would be difficult
to say why such a favour conferred on the young man should
be held more discreditable to the receiver than the Order of
the Garter recently bestowed upon the great soldier of the
Eepublic by another friendly sovereign. It is instructive
however to note the language in which Francis Aerssens
spoke of favours and money bestowed by a foreign monarch
upon himself, for Aerssens had come back from his embassy
full of gall and bitterness against Barneveld. Thenceforth
he was to be his evil demon.
" I didn't inherit property," 1 said this diplomatist. " My
father and mother, thank G-od, are yet living. I have
enjoyed the King's liberality. It was from an ally, not an
enemy, of our country. Were every man obliged to give a
reckoning of everything he possesses over and above his
hereditary estates, who in the government would pass muster ?
Those who declare that they have served their country in
her greatest trouble, and lived in splendid houses and in
service of princes and great companies and the like on a
yearly salary of 4000 florins, may not approve these maxims."
It should be remembered that Barneveld, if this was a
fling at the Advocate, had acquired a large fortune by mar-
riage, and, although certainly not averse from gathering
gear, had, as will be seen on a subsequent page, easily
explained the manner in which his property had increased.
No proof was ever offered or attempted of the anonymous
calumnies levelled at him in this regard.
"I never had the management of finances," continued
1 "Stukken rakende den Twist," &c.
HE DERIVES MANY ADVANTAGES FROM HIS POST. 361
Aerssens. " My profits I have gained in foreign parts. My
condition of life is without excess, and in my opinion every
means are good so long as they are honourable and legal.
They say my post was given me by the Advocate. Ergo,
all my fortune comes from the Advocate. Strenuously to
have striven to make myself agreeable to the King and his
counsellors, while fulfilling my office with fidelity and
honour, these are the arts by which I have prospered, so
that my splendour dazzles the eyes of the envious. The
greediness of those who believe that the sun should shine
for them alone was excited, and so I was obliged to resign
the embassy." :
So long as Henry lived, the Dutch ambassador saw him
daily, and at all hours, privately, publicly, when he would.
Rarely has a foreign envoy at any court, at any period of
history, enjoyed such privileges of being useful to his govern-
ment. And there is no doubt that the services of Aerssens
had been most valuable to his country, notwithstanding his
constant care to increase his private fortune through his
public opportunities. He was always ready to be useful to
Henry likewise. When that monarch some time before the
truce, and occasionally during the preliminary negotiations
for it, had formed a design to make himself sovereign of
the Provinces, it was Aerssens who charged himself with the
scheme, and would have furthered it with all his might, had
the project not met with opposition both from the Advocate
and the Stadholder. Subsequently it appeared probable that
Maurice would not object to the sovereignty himself, and
the Ambassador in Paris, with the King's consent, was not
likely to prove himself hostile to the Prince's ambition.
1 These passages are from an ad-
dress to tho States-General, 18 Juno
1618, fivo years later than the date of
his return from France, with which
we are at this moment occupied. As
they paint tho character of the man.
and refer precisely to his feelings at
the instant of his recall, it is necessary
to (five them here. From the collec-
tion of MSS. in the Archives at the
Hague already cited. " Stukken ra-
kende," &c.
362 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IX.
" There is but this means alone," wrote Jeannin1 to Villeroy,
" that can content him, although hitherto he has done like
the rowers, who never look toward the place whither they
wish to go." 2 The attempt of the Prince to sound Barne-
veld on this subject through the Princess-Dowager has
already been mentioned, and has much intrinsic probability.
Thenceforward, the republican form of government, the
municipal oligarchies, began to consolidate their power. Yet
although the people as such were not sovereigns, but
subjects, and rarely spoken of by the aristocratic magis-
trates save with a gentle and patronizing disdain, they
enjoyed a larger liberty than was known anywhere else in
the world. Buzenval was astonished at the "infinite and
almost unbridled freedom" which he witnessed there during
his embassy, and which seemed to him however "without
peril to the state." 3
The extraordinary means possessed by Aerssens to be
important and useful vanished with the King's death. His
secret despatches, painting in sombre and sarcastic colours
the actual condition of affairs at the French court, were sent
back in copy to the French court itself. It was not known
who had played the Ambassador this vilest of tricks, but
it was done during an illness of Barneveld, and without his
knowledge. Early in the year 1613 Aerssens resolved, not to
take his final departure, but to go home on leave of absence.
His private intention was to look for some substantial office
of honour and profit at home. Failing of this, he meant to
return -to Paris. But with an eye to the main chance as
usual, he ingeniously caused it to be understood at court,
without making positive statements to that effect, that his
departure was final. On his leavetaking, accordingly, he
1 Jeannin, ' Negotiations,' t. ii. 13«, 159, 291 ; t. iii. 4. Ouvre, 179.
8 See also Jeannin, iv. 212, 310, 321 ; v. 33. Ouvre, 184.
• Ibid. 199.
1613. AERSSENS VISITS THE STATES-GENERAL. 363
received larger presents from the crown than had been
often given to a retiring ambassador. At least 20,000
florins were thus added to the frugal store of profits on which
he prided himself. Had he merely gone away on leave of
absence, he would have received no presents whatever. But
he never went back. The Queen-Regent and her ministers
were so glad to get rid of him, and so little disposed, in the
straits in which they found themselves, to quarrel with the
powerful republic, as to be willing to write very compli-
mentary public letters to the States, concerning the character
and conduct of the man whom they so much detested.
Pluming himself upon these, Aerssens made his appear-
ance 1 in the Assembly of the States-General, to give account
by word of mouth of the condition of affairs, speaking as if
he had only come by permission of their Mightinesses for
temporary purposes. Two months later he was summoned
before the Assembly, and ordered to return to his post.
Meantime a new French ambassador had arrived at the
Hague, in the spring of 1613. Aubery du Mauricr, a son of
an obscure country squire, a Protestant, of moderate May 20,
opinions, of a sincere but rather obsequious cha- 1613-
racter, painstaking, diligent, and honest, had been at an
earlier day in the service of the turbulent and intriguing
Due do Bouillon. He had also been employed by Sully as an
agent in financial affairs between Holland and France, and
had long been known to Villcroy. He was living on his
estate, in great retirement from all public business, when
Secretary Villcroy suddenly proposed him the embassy to
the Hague. There was no more important diplomatic post
at that time in Europe. Other countries were virtually at
peace, but in Holland, notwithstanding the truce, there was
really not much more than an armistice, and great armies
1 30 July 1G13. (Register in the TIapue Archives MS.) 2 Oct. 1G13.
(Ouvrc, 199.)
364 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IX.
lay in the Netherlands, as after a battle, sleeping face to
face with arms in their hands. The politics of Christendom
were at issue in the open, elegant, and picturesque village
which was the social capital of the United Provinces. The
gentry from Spain, Italy, the south of Europe, Catholic
Germany, had clustered about Spinola at Brussels, to learn
the art of war in his constant campaigning against Maurice.
English and Scotch officers, Frenchmen, Bohemians, Aus-
trians, youths from the Palatinate and all Protestant coun-
tries in Germany, swarmed to the banners of the prince
who had taught the world how Alexander Farnese could be
baffled, and the great Spinola outmanoeuvred. Especially
there was a great number of Frenchmen of figure and
quality who thronged to the Hague, besides the officers of
the two French regiments which formed a regular portion
of -the States' army. That army was the best appointed
and most conspicuous standing force in Europe. Besides
the French contingent there were always nearly 30,000
infantry and 3000 cavalry on a war footing, splendidly dis-
ciplined, experienced, and admirably armed. The navy, con-
sisting of thirty war ships, perfectly equipped and manned,
was a match for the combined marine forces of all Europe,
and almost as numerous.1
When the Ambassador went to solemn audience of the
States-General, he was attended by a brilliant group of
gentlemen and officers, often to the number of three hundred,
who volunteered to march after him on foot to honour their
sovereign in the person of his ambassador ; the Envoy's
carriage following empty behind. Such were the splendid
diplomatic processions often received by the stately Ad-
vocate in his plain civic garb, when grave international
questions were to be publicly discussed.2
1 See Dup.-Mornay, xii. 524. Ouvre, 201.
8 Du Maurier, ' Memoires,' pp. 191-193.
1613. DU MAURIER APPOINTED FRENCH AMBASSADOR. 365
There was much murmuring in France when the appoint-
ment of a personage comparatively so humble to a position
so important was known. It was considered as a blow aimed
directly at the malcontent princes of the blood, who were
at that moment plotting their first levy of arms against
the Queen. Du Maurier had been ill-treated by the Due
de Bouillon, who naturally therefore now denounced the
man whom he had injured to the government to which he
was accredited.1 Being the agent of Mary de' Medici,
he was, of course, described as a tool of the court and a
secret pensioner of Spain. He was to plot with the arch
traitor Barneveld as to the best means for distracting the
Provinces and bringing them back into Spanish subjection.
Du Maurier, being especially but secretly charged to prevent
the return of Francis Aerssens to Paris, incurred of course
the enmity of that personage and of the French grandees
who ostentatiously protected him. It was even pretended by
Jeannin2 that the appointment of a man so slightly known to
the world, so inexperienced in diplomacy, and of a parentage
so little distinguished, would be considered an affront by
the States-General.
But on the whole, Villeroy had made an excellent choice.
No safer man could perhaps have been found in France for
a post of such eminence, in circumstances so delicate, and
at a crisis so grave. The man who had been able to make
himself agreeable and useful, while preserving his integrity,
to characters so dissimilar as the refining, self-torturing,
intellectual Duplessis-Mornay, the rude, aggressive, and
straightforward Sully, the deep-revolving, restlessly plotting
Bouillon, and the smooth, silent, and tortuous Villeroy — men
between whom there was no friendship, but, on the contrary,
constant rancour — had material in him to render valuable
services at this particular epoch. Everything depended on
1 Ouviv, 203. « IMd.
366 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. IX.
patience, tact, watchfulness in threading the distracting,
'almost inextricable, maze which had been created by
personal rivalries, ambitions, and jealousies in the state he
represented and the one to' which he was accredited. "I
ascribe it all to G-od," he said,1 in his testament to his children,
" the impenetrable workman who in His goodness has enabled
me to make myself all my life obsequious, respectful, and
serviceable to all, avoiding as much as possible, in content-
ing some, not to discontent others." He recommended his
children accordingly to endeavour "to succeed in life by
making themselves as humble, intelligent, and capable as
possible."
This is certainly not a very high type of character, but a
safer one for business than that of the arch intriguer Francis
Aerssens. And he had arrived at the Hague under trying cir-
cumstances. Unknown to the foreign world he was now enter-
ing, save through the disparaging rumours concerning him,
sent thither in advance by the powerful personages arrayed
against his government, he might have sunk under such, a
storm at the outset, but for the incomparable kindness and
friendly aid of the Princess-Dowager, Louise de Coligny.
" I had need of her protection and recommendation as much
as of life," said du Maurier ; "and she gave them in such
excess as to annihilate an infinity of calumnies which envy
had excited against me on ever}7 side."2 He had also a most
difficult and delicate matter to arrange at the very moment
of his arrival.
For Aerssens had done his best not only to produce a
dangerous division in the politics of the Eepublic, but to
force a rupture between the French government and the
States. He had carried matters before the assembly with
so high a hand as to make it seem impossible to get rid of
him without public scandal. He made a parade of the offi-
1 Ouvre, 170. * Ibid. 204.
16ia DU MAURIER APPOINTED FRENCH AMBASSADOR. 3C7
cial letters from, the Queen-Regent and lier ministers, in
which he was spoken of in terms of conventional compli-
ment. He did not know, and Barneveid wished, if possible,
to spare him the annoyance of knowing, that both Queen
and ministers, so soon as informed that there was a chance
of coming back to them, had written letters breathing great
repugnance to him and intimating that he would not be
received. Other high personages of state had written
to express their resentment at his duplicity, perpetual
mischief-making, and machinations against the peace of the
kingdom, and stating the impossibility of his resuming
the embassy at Paris. And at last the Queen 1 wrote to the
States-General to say that, having heard their intention to
send him back to a post " from which he had taken leave
formally and officially," she wished to prevent such a step.
" We should see M. Aerssens less willingly than comports
with our friendship for you and good neighbourhood. Any
other you could send would be most welcome, as M. du
Maurier will explain to you more amply."
And to du Maurier himself she wrote distinctly,2 " Rather
than suffer the return of the said Aerssens, you will declare
that for causes which regard the good of our affairs and our
particular satisfaction we cannot and will not receive him in
the functions which he has exercised here, and we rely too
implicitly upon the good friendship of My Lords the States
to do anything in this that would so much displease us." 3
And on the same day Villeroy privately wrote to the
Ambassador, " If, in spite of all this, Aerssens should en-
deavour to return, he will not be received, after the know-
ledge we have of his factious spirit, most dangerous in a
public personage in a state such as ours and in the minority
of the King."4
1 2 Nov. 1618. " Stukken rnkendc
den Twist," Ac. (Hague Archives
MS.)
1 MS. just cited.
» Ibid. 2 Nov. 1618.
* Ibid.
368 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAEJS'EVELD. CHAP. IX.
Meantime Aerssens had been going about flaunting letters
in everybody's face from the Due de Bouillon insisting on
the necessity of his return.1 The fact in itself would have
been sufficient to warrant his removal, for the Duke was just
taking up arms against his sovereign. Unless the States
meant to interfere officially and directly in the civil war
about to break out in France, they could hardly send a
minister to the government on recommendation of the leader
of the rebellion.
It had, however, become impossible to remove him with-
out an explosion. Barneveld, who, said du Maurier, " knew
the man to his finger nails," 2 had been reluctant to " break
the ice," and wished for official notice in the matter from
the Queen. Maurice protected the troublesome diplomatist.
" 'Tis incredible," said the French ambassador,3 " how
covertly Prince Maurice is carrying himself, contrary to his
wont, in this whole affair. I don't know whether it is from
simple jealousy to Barneveld, or if there is some mystery
concealed below the surface."
Du Maurier had accordingly been obliged to ask his
government for distinct and official instructions. " He holds
to his place," said he,4 " by so slight and fragile a root as
not to require two hands to pluck him up, the little linger
being enough. There is no doubt that he has been in con-
cert with those who are making use of him to re-establish
their credit with the States, and to embark Prince Maurice
contrary to his preceding custom in a cabal with them."
Thus a question of removing an obnoxious diplomatist
could hardly be graver, for it was believed that he was
doing his best to involve the military chief of his own
state in a game of treason and rebellion against the govern-
ment to which he was accredited. It was not the first
1 Ouvre, 209. 3 Ibid. 308.
» Ibid. 207. 4 Ibid.
DU MAURIER DEMANDS THE RECALL OP AERSSENS. 3G9
nor likely to be the last of Bouillon's deadly intrigues.
But the man who had been privy to Biron's conspiracy
against the crown and life of his sovereign was hardly a safe
ally for his brother-in-law, the straightforward stadholder.
The instructions desired by du Maurier and by Barneveld
had, as we have seen, at last arrived. The French ambas-
sador thus fortified appeared before the Assembly of the
States-General,1 and officially demanded the recall of
Aerssens. In a letter addressed privately and confidentially
to their Mightinesses, he said, " If in spite of us you throw
him at our feet, we shall fling him back at your head." 2
At last Maurice yielded to the representations of the
French envoy, and Aerssens felt obliged to resign his claims
to the post. The States-General passed a resolution that it
would be proper to employ him in some other capacity in
order to show that his services had been agreeable to them,
he having now declared that he could no longer be useful in
France.3 Maurice, seeing that it was impossible to save him,
admitted to du Maurier his unsteadiness and duplicity, and
said that, if possessed of the confidence of a great king,
he would be capable of destroying the state in less than a
year.4
But this had not always been the Prince's opinion, nor
was it likely to remain unchanged. As for Villeroy, he
denied flatly that the cause of his displeasure had been that
Aerssens had penetrated into his most secret affairs. He
protested, on the contrary, that his annoyance with him
had partly proceeded from the slight acquaintance he had
acquired of his policy, and that, while boasting to be better
informed than any one, he was in the habit of inventing and
imagining things in order to get credit for himself.
1 13 Nov. 1613. Ouvre, 210.
» Ibid. 211.
1 13 Dec. 1013, 31Jan. 1614. Resol.
4 Ouvre, 2ia
s 4 Jan. 1614. "Stukken," &c.
(Hague Arch. MS.)
States-Gen. (Hague Arch. MS.)
VOL. I. 2 B
370 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAT. IX.
It was highly essential that the secret of this affair should
be made clear, for its influence on subsequent events was to
be deep and wide. For the moment Aerssens. remained
without employment, and there was no open rupture with
Barneveld. The only difference of opinion between the
Advocate and himself, he said, was whether he had or had
not definitely resigned his post on leaving Paris.1
Meantime it was necessary to fix upon a successor for this
most important post. The war soon after the new year had
broken out in France. Conde, Bouillon, and the other mal-
content princes with their followers had taken possession of
the fortress of Mezieres, and issued a letter in the name of
Conde to the Queen-Regent demanding an assembly of the
States-General of the kingdom and rupture of the Spanish
marriages.2 Both parties, that of the government and that
of the rebellion, sought the sympathy and active succour of
the States. Maurice, acting now in perfect accord with the
Advocate, sustained the Queen and execrated the rebellion
of his relatives with perfect frankness. Conde, he said, had
got his head stuffed full of almanacs whose predictions he
wished to see realized.3 He vowed he would have shortened
by a head the commander of the garrison wl±o betrayed
Mezieres, if he had been under his control. He forbade on
pain of death the departure of any officer oi: private of the
French regiments from serving the rebels, and placed the
whole French force at the disposal of the Queen, with as
many Netherland regiments as could be spared. One
soldier was hanged and three others branded with the mark
of a gibbet on the face for attempting desertion. The legal
government was loyally sustained by the authority of the
States, notwithstanding all the intrigues of Aerssens with
1 " Stukken," &c. (Hague Archives MS.)
4 Ouvre, 219.
* Ouvre, 215, from du Maurier's MS. despatches.
loll PEACE OP SAINTE-MENEHOULD. 371
the agents of the princes to procure them assistance. The
mutiny for the time was brief, and was settled on
the 15th of May 1614, by the peace of Sainte-Mene-
hould, as much a caricature of a treaty as the rising had
been the parody of a war.1 Van der Myle, son-in-law of
Barneveld, who had been charged with a special and tem-
porary mission to France, brought back the terms of the
convention to the States-General. On the other hand,
Conde and his confederates sent a special agent to the
Netherlands to give their account of the war and the ne-
gotiation, who refused to confer either with du Maurier or
Barneveld, but who held much conference with Aerssens.3
It was obvious enough that the mutiny of the princes
would become chronic. In truth, what other condition was
possible with two characters like Mary de' Medici and the
Prince of Conde respectively at the head of the government
and the revolt ? What had France to hope for but to remain
the bloody playground for mischievous idiots, who threw
about the firebrands and arrows of reckless civil war in
pursuit of the paltriest of personal aims ?
Van der Myle had pretensions to the vacant place of
Aerssens. He had some experience in diplomacy. He had
conducted skilfully enough the first mission of the States
to Venice, and had subsequently been employed in matters
of moment. But he was son-in-law to Barneveld, and
although the Advocate was certainly not free from the
charge of nepotism, he shrank from the reproach of having
apparently removed Acrssens to make a place for one of his
own family.
Van der Myle remained to bear the brunt of the late
ambassador's malice, and to engage at a little later period
in hottest controversy with him, personal and political.
" Why should van der Myle strut about, with his arms
' Ouvrc, 215. * Ibid. 215, 218, tqq.
372 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. IX.
akimbo like a peacock ? " * complained Aerssens one day in
confused metaphor. A question not easy to answer satis-
factorily.
The minister selected was a certain Baron Asperen de
Langerac, wholly unversed in diplomacy or other public
affairs, with abilities not above the average. A series of
questions 2 addressed by him to the Advocate, the answers
to which, scrawled on the margin of the paper, were to serve
for his general instructions, showed an ingenuousness as
amusing as the replies of Barneveld were experienced and
substantial.
In general he was directed to be friendly and respectful
to every one, to the Queen-Kegent and her counsellors espe-
cially, and, within the limits of becoming reverence for her,
to cultivate the good graces of the Prince of Conde and the
other great nobles still malcontent and rebellious, but whose
present movement, as Barneveld foresaw, was drawing
rapidly to a close. Langerac arrived in Paris on the 5th of
April 1614.
Du Maurier thought the new ambassador likely to " fall
a prey" to the specious language and gentle attractions of
the Due de Bouillon." 3 He also described him as very
dependent upon Prince Maurice. On the other hand Lan-
gerac professed unbounded and almost childlike reverence
for Barneveld,4 was devoted to his person, and breathed as
it were only through his inspiration. Time would show
whether those sentiments would outlast every possible
storm.
"... ende daerinne met geboechde
armen als een Paauw te pronken,"
&c.— " Stukken rakende," &c. (MS.
before cited.)
2 MS. Hague Archives.
s Ouvre, 213.
4 MS. before cited.
1614. WEAKNESS OF THE EULEE OF FEANCE. 373
CHAPTER X.
Weakness of the Rulers of France and England — The Wisdom of Barneveld
inspires Jealousy — Sir Dudley Carleton succeeds Win wood — Young
Neuburg under the Guidance of Maximilian — Barneveld strives to have
the Treaty of Xanten enforced — Spain and the Emperor wish to make
the States abandon their Position with regard to the Duchies — The
French Government refuses to aid the States — Spain and the Emperor
•resolve to hold Wesel — The great Eeligious War begun— The Protestant
Union and Catholic League both wish to secure the Border Provinces —
Troubles in Turkey — Spanish Fleet seizes La Roche — Spain places large
Armies on a War Footing.
FEW things are stranger in history than the apathy with
which the wide designs of the Catholic party were at that
moment regarded. The preparations for the immense
struggle which posterity learned to call the Thirty Years'
War, and to shudder when speaking of it, were going for-
ward on every side. In truth the war had really begun, yet
those most deeply menaced by it at the outset looked on
with innocent calmness because their own roofs were not
quite yet in a blaze. The passage of arms in the duchies,
the outlines of which have just been indicated, and which
.was the natural sequel of the campaign carried out four
years earlier on the same territory, had been ended by a
mockery. In France, reduced almost to imbecility by the
absence of a guiding brain during a long minority, fallen
under the distaff of a dowager both weak and wicked,
distracted by the intrigues and quarrels of a swarm of self-
seeking grandees, and with all its offices, from highest to
lowest, of court, state, jurisprudence, and magistracy, sold
as openly and as cynically as the commonest wares, there
374
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. X.
were few to comprehend or to grapple with the danger.1 It
should have seemed obvious to the meanest capacity in the
kingdom that the great house of Austria, reigning supreme
in Spain and in Germany, could not be allowed to crush the
Duke of Savoy on the one side, and Bohemia, Moravia, and
the Netherlands on the other without danger of subjection
for France. Yet the aim of the Queen-Regent was to culti-
vate an impossible alliance with her inevitable foe.
And in England, ruled as it then was with no master
mind to enforce against its sovereign the great lessons of
policy, internal and external, on which its welfare and almost
its imperial existence depended, the only ambition of those
who could make their opinions felt was to pursue the same
impossibility, intimate alliance with the universal foe.
Any man with slightest pretensions to statesmanship
knew that the liberty for Protestant worship in Imperial
Germany, extorted by force, had been given reluctantly,
and would be valid only as long as that force could still
be exerted or should remain obviously in reserve. The
" Majesty Letter " and the " Convention " of the two religions
would prove as flimsy as the parchment on which they were
engrossed, the Protestant churches built under that sanction
would be shattered like glass, if once the Catholic rulers
could feel their hands as clear as their consciences would be
for violating their sworn faith to heretics. Men knew, even
if the easy-going and uxorious emperor, into which character
the once busy and turbulent Archduke Matthias had sub-
sided, might be willing to keep his pledges, that Ferdinand
" Tutti li officii e servigii," eays
Pietro Contarini, ' Relazione di Fran-
da, 1613-1616,' "detla casa del re
Bino agli ultimi valletti, tutti li carichi
militari per cgni magistral! di gius-
tizia si vendono e col pagarsi per
questo certa annua imposizione che
chiamono la stolletta possono anco
disponerno dopo la vita ; cio causa die
non le persone di merito non quelle
che travagliano, ma solo chi puo com-
prare ha posto nelli carichi e nelli
primi servigii del regno, dove ben
spesso li meno atti ed idonei sono li
preferiti e da questo accidente av-
viene che il re e mal visto rubato e la
giustizia mal aministrata," &c. Ba-
rozzi and Berchet.
1614. WEAKNESS OF THE RULER OF ENGLAND. 375
of Styria, who would soon succeed him, and Maximilian of
Bavaria were men who knew their own minds, and had
mentally never resigned one inch of the ground which
Protestantism imagined itself to have conquered.
These things seem plain as daylight to all who look back
upon them through the long vista of the past ; but the
sovereign of England did not see them or did not choose to
see them. He saw only the Infanta and her two millions of
dowry, and he knew that by calling Parliament together to
ask subsidies for an anti-Catholic war he should ruin those
golden matrimonial prospects for his son, while encouraging
those " shoemakers/' his subjects, to go beyond their " last/'
by consulting the representatives of his people on matters
pertaining to the mysteries of government. He was slowly
digging the grave of the monarchy and building the scaffold
of his son ; but he did his work with a laborious and pedantic
trifling, when really engaged in state affairs, most amazing
to contemplate. He had no penny to give to the cause in
which his nearest relatives were so deeply involved and for
which his only possible allies were pledged ; but he was
ready to give advice to all parties, and with ludicrous gravity
imagined himself playing the umpire between great con-
tending hosts, when in reality he was only playing the fool
at the beck of masters before whom he quaked.
" You are not to vilipend my counsel," said he one day
to a foreign envoy. " I am neither a camel nor an ass to
take up all this work on my shoulders. Where would you
find another king as willing to do it as I am ? " l
The King had little time and no money to give to serve
his own family and allies and the cause of Protestantism,
but he could squander vast sums upon worthless favourites,
and consume reams of paper on controverted points of
1 Q. W. Vrecde, Extract from a MS. Report of F. Aerssens. (Prov-
Utrecht Archivca)
376 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BAKNEVELD. CHAP. X.
divinity. The appointment of Vorstius to the chair of theo-
logy in Leyden aroused more indignation in his bosom, and
occupied more of his time, than the conquests of Spinola
in the duchies, and the menaces of Spain against Savoy and
Bohemia. He perpetually preached moderation to the
States in the matter of the debateable territory, although
moderation at that moment meant submission to the House
of Austria. He chose to affect confidence in the good faith
of those who were playing a comedy by which no statesman
could be deceived, but which had secured the approbation of
the Solomon of the age.
But there was one man who was not deceived. The
warnings and the lamentations of Barneveld sound to us
out of that far distant time like the voice of an inspired
prophet. It is possible that a portion of the wrath to come
might have been averted had there been many men in high
places to heed his voice. I do not wish to exaggerate the
power and wisdom of the man, nor to set him forth as one of
the greatest heroes of history. But posterity has done far
less than justice to a statesman and sage who wielded a vast
influence at a most critical period in the fate of Christendom,
and uniformly wielded it to promote the cause of temperate
human liberty, both political and religious. Viewed by the
light of two centuries and a half of additional experience,
he may appear to have made mistakes, but none that were
necessarily disastrous or even mischievous. Compared with
the prevailing idea of the age in which he lived, his schemes
of polity seem to dilate into large dimensions, his sentiments
of religious freedom, however limited to our modern ideas,
mark an epoch in human progress, and in regard to the
general commonwealth of Christendom, of which he was so
leading a citizen, the part he played was a lofty one. No
man certainly understood the tendency of his age more
exactly, took a broader and more comprehensive view than
1614 THE WISDOM OF BAKNEVELD CAUSES JEALOUSY. 377
he did of the policy necessary to preserve the largest portion
of the results of the past three-quarters of a century, or
had pondered the relative value of great conflicting forces
more skilfully. Had his counsels been always followed, had
illustrious birth placed him virtually upon a throne, as was
the case with William the Silent, and thus allowed him
occasionally to carry out the designs of a great mind with
almost despotic authority, it might have been better for the
world. But in that age it was royal blood alone that could
command unflinching obedience without exciting personal
rivalry. Men quailed before his majestic intellect, but hated
him for the power which was its necessary result. They
already felt a stupid delight in cavilling at his pedigree.
To dispute his claim to a place among the ancient
nobility to which he was an honour was to revenge them-
selves for the rank he unquestionably possessed side by side
in all but birth with the kings and rulers of the world.
Whether envy and jealousy be vices more incident to the
republican form of government than to other political
systems may be an open question. But it is no question
whatever that Barneveld's every footstep from this period
forward was dogged by envy as patient as it was devouring.
Jealousy stuck to him like his shadow. We have examined
the relations which existed between Winwood and himself;
we have seen that ambassador, now secretary of state for
James, never weary in denouncing the Advocate's haughti-
ness and grim resolution to govern the country according to
its laws rather than at the dictate of a foreign sovereign,
and in flinging forth malicious insinuations in regard to his
relations to Spain. The man whose every hour was devoted
— in spite of a thousand obstacles strewn by stupidity,
treachery, and apathy, as well as by envy, hatred, and
bigotry — to the organizing of a grand and universal league
of Protestantism against Spain, and to rolling up with
378 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. X.
strenuous and sometimes despairing arms a dead mountain
weight, ever ready to fall back upon and crush him, was
accused in dark and mysterious whispers, soon to grow louder
and bolder, of a treacherous inclination for Spain.
There is nothing less surprising nor more sickening for
those who observe public life, and wish to retain faith in
the human species, than the almost infinite power of the
meanest of passions.
The Advocate was obliged at the very outset of Langerac's
mission to France to give him a warning on this subject.
"Should her Majesty make kindly mention of me," he
said, " you will say nothing of it in your despatches as you
did in your last, although I am sure with the best intentions.
It profits me not, and many take umbrage at it ; wherefore
it is wise to forbear."
But this was a trifle. By and by there would be many
to take umbrage at every whisper in his favour, whether
from crowned heads or from the simplest in the social scale.
Meantime he instructed the Ambassador, without paying
heed to personal compliments to his chief, to do his best to
keep the French government out of the hands of Spain, and
with that object in view to smooth over the differences be-
tween the two great parties in the kingdom, and to gain the
confidence, if possible, of Conde and Nevers and Bouillon,
while never failing in straightforward respect and loyal
friendship to the Queen -Kegent and her ministers, as the
legitimate heads of the government.
From England a new ambassador was soon to take the
place of Win wood. Sir Dudley Carleton was a diplomatist
Jan. of respectable abilities, and well trained to business
1615- and routine. Perhaps on the whole there was none
other, in that epoch of official mediocrity, more competent
than he to fill what was then certainly the most important
of foreign posts. His course of life had in no wise fami-
1615. SIR DUDLEY CARLETON SUCCEEDS WINWOOD. 37D
liarized him with the intricacies of the Dutch constitution,
nor could the diplomatic profession, combined with a long re-
sidence at Venice, be deemed especially favourable for deep
studies of the mysteries of predestination. Yet he would
be found ready at the bidding of his master to grapple with
Grotius and Barneveld on the field of history and law, and
thread with Uytenbogaert or Taurinus all the subtleties of
Arminianism and Gomarism as if he had been half his life
both a regular practitioner at the Supreme Court of the
Hague and professor of theology at the University of Leyden.
Whether the triumphs achieved in such encounters were
substantial and due entirely to his own genius might be
doubtful. At all events he had a sovereign behind him
who was incapable of making a mistake on any subject.
" You shall not forget," said James in his instructions to
Sir Dudley, " that you are the minister of that master whom
God hath made the sole protector of his religion and
you may let fall how hateful the maintaining of erroneous
opinions is to the majesty of God and how displeasing to
us." l
The warlike operations of 1614 had been ended by the
abortive peace of Xanten. The two rival pretenders to
the duchies were to halve the territory, drawing lots for the
first choice, all foreign troops were to be withdrawn, and a
pledge was to be given that no fortress should be placed in
the hands of any power. But Spain at the last moment had
refused to sanction the treaty, and everything was remitted
to what might be exactly described as a state of sixes and
sevens. Subsequently it was hoped that the States' troops
might be induced to withdraw simultaneously with the
Catholic forces on an undertaking by Spinola that there
should be no re-occupation of the disputed territory either
by the Republic or by Spain. But Barneveld accurately
1 ' Carleton's Letters ' (London, 1780), p. 6.
380 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. X.
pointed out that, although the Marquis was a splendid com-
mander and, so long as he was at the head of the armies, a
most powerful potentate, he might be superseded at any
moment. Count Bucquoy, for example, might suddenly
appear in his place and refuse to "be bound by any military
arrangement of his predecessor. Then the Archduke pro-
posed to give a guarantee that in case of a mutual with-
drawal there should be no return of the troops, no recapture
of garrisons. But Barneveld, speaking for the States, liked
not the security. The Archduke was but the puppet of
Spain, and Spain had no part in the guarantee. She held
the strings, and might cause him at any moment to play
what pranks she chose. It would be the easiest thing in the
world for despotic Spain, so the Advocate thought, to re-
appear suddenly in force again at a moment's notice after
the States' troops had been withdrawn and partially dis-
banded, and it would be difficult for the many-headed and
many-tongued republic to act with similar promptness. To
withdraw without a guarantee from Spain to the Treaty
of Xanten, which had once been signed, sealed, and all but
ratified, would be to give up fifty points in the game.
Nothing but disaster could ensue. The Advocate as leader
in all these negotiations and correspondence was ever
actuated by the favourite quotation of William the Silent
from Demosthenes, that the safest citadel against an invader
and a tyrant is distrust. And he always distrusted in these
dealings, for he was sure the Spanish cabinet was trying
to make fools of the States, and there were many ready to
assist it in the task. Now that one of the pretenders, tem-
porary master of half the duchies, the Prince of Neuburg,
had espoused both Catholicism and the sister of the Arch-
bishop of Cologne and the Duke of Bavaria, it would be more
safe than ever for Spain to make a temporary withdrawal.
Maximilian of Bavaria was beyond all question the ablest
1615. NEUBURG UNDER GUIDANCE OF MAXIMILIAN. 381
and most determined leader of the Catholic party in
Germany, and the most straightforward and sincere. No
man before or since his epoch had, like him, been destined
to refuse, and more than once refuse, the Imperial crown.1
Through his apostasy the Prince of Neuburg was in
danger of losing his hereditary estates, his brothers en-
deavouring to dispossess him on the ground of the late duke's
will, disinheriting any one of his heirs who should become a
convert to Catholicism. He had accordingly implored aid
from the King of Spain. Archduke Albert had urged Philip
to render such assistance as a matter of justice, and the
Emperor had naturally declared that the whole right as
eldest son belonged, notwithstanding the will, to the Prince.2
With the young Neuburg accordingly under the able
guidance of Maximilian, it was not likely that the grasp of
the Spanish party upon these all-important territories would
be really loosened. The Emperor still claimed the right to
decide among the candidates and to hold the provinces under
sequestration till the decision should be made — that was
to say, until the Greek Kalends. The original attempt to do
this through Archduke Leopold had been thwarted, as we
have seen, by the prompt movements of Maurice sustained
by the policy of Barneveld. The Advocate was resolved
that the Emperor's name should not be mentioned either
in the preamble or body of the treaty. And his course
throughout the simulations, which were never negotiations,
was perpetually baffled as much by the easiness and languor
of liis allies as the ingenuity of the enemy.
He was reproached with the loss of Wesel, that Geneva of
the Rhino, which would never be abandoned by Spain if it
was not done forthwith. Let Spain guarantee the Treaty of
Xanten, he said, and then she cannot come back. All else
1 Viflf, Gindelv, ' Gcsch. desdreissirriuhr. KriegR,' vol. i. passim.
» Archduke Albert to Philip III. (Archives of Belgium MS.)
382
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD.
CHAP. X.
is illusion. Moreover, the Emperor had given positive orders
that Wesel should not be given up.1 He was assured by
Villeroy that France would never put on her harness for
Aachen, that cradle of Protestantism. That was for the
States-General to do, whom it so much more nearly con-
cerned. The whole aim of Bameveld was not to destroy
the Treaty of Xanten, but to enforce it in the only way in
which it could be enforced, by the guarantee of Spain. So
secured, it would be a barrier in the universal war of religion
which he foresaw was soon to break out. But it was the
resolve of Spain, instead of pledging herself to the treaty, to
establish the legal control of the territory in the hand of the
Emperor. Neuburg complained that Philip in writing to
him did not give him the title of Duke of Jiilich and Cleve,
although he had been placed in possession of those estates by
the arms of Spain. Philip, referring to Archduke Albert for
his opinion on this subject, was advised that, as the Emperor
had not given Neuburg the investiture of the duchies, the
King was quite right in refusing him the title. Even
should the Treaty of Xanten be executed, neither he nor
the Elector of Brandenburg would be anything but ad-
ministrators until the question of right was decided by the
Emperor.2
Spain had sent Neuburg the Order of the Golden Fleece 3
as a reward for his conversion, but did not intend him to be
anything but a man of straw in the territories which he
claimed by sovereign right. They were to form a permanent
bulwark to the Empire, to Spain, and to Catholicism.
Barneveld of course could never see the secret letters
passing between Brussels and Madrid, but his insight into
"... que no se restituisse Wesel
y assi ae distrizo la Junta quedando
cada una en su posesion." (MS.
Archives of Belgium. A paper en-
titled " Memoria para informar al Mro
de Campo D. Inigo de Borsa," &c.)
2 Philip III. to Archdnke Albert,
17 April 1615. (Bel?. Arch. MS.)
Archduke Albert to Philip III., July
1615. (Belg. Arch. MS.)
3 Same to same, 1 Feb. 1615. (Belg.
Arch. MS.)
1615. ENDEAVOUR TO ENFORCE TREATY OF XANTEN. 383
the purposes of the enemy was almost as acute as if the
correspondence of Philip and Albert had been in the pigeon-
holes of his writing-desk in the Kneuterdyk.
The whole object of Spain and the Emperor, acting
through the Archduke, was to force the States to abandon
then: positions in the duchies simultaneously with the with-
drawal of the Spanish troops, and to be satisfied with a bare
convention between themselves and Archduke Albert that
there should be no renewed occupation by either party.
Barneveld, rinding it impossible to get Spam upon the
treaty, was resolved that at least the two mediating powers,
their great allies, the sovereigns of Great Britain and France,
should guarantee the convention, and that the promises of
the Archduke should be made to them. This was steadily
refused by Spain ; for the Archduke never moved an inch
in the matter except according to the orders of Spain, and
besides battling and buffeting with the Archduke, Barne-
veld was constantly deafened with the clamour of the
English king, who always declared Spain to be in the right
whatever she did, and forced to endure with what patience he
might the goading of that King's envoy. France, on the
other hand, supported the States as firmly as could have
been reasonably expected.
" We proposed," said the Archduke, instructing an envoy
whom he was sending to Madrid with detailed accounts of
these negotiations,1 " that the promise should be made to
each other as usual in treaties. But the Hollanders said the
promise should be made to the Kings of France and England,
at which the Emperor would have been deeply offended,2 as
if in the affair he was of no account at all. At any moment
by this arrangement in concert with France and England
the Hollanders might walk in and do what they liked."
1 ' ' Memoria para informar al Mro de Carapo D. Inlffo de Borsa do la qn. ha
pasado on cl neg^ de Jullicre," &c. (Belg. Arch. MS.)
* "offcndidisaitno."
384 THE LIFE OF JOHN OP BARNEVELD. CHAP. X-
Certainly there could have been no succincter eulogy of
the policy steadily recommended, as we shall have occasion
to see, by Barneveld. Had he on this critical occasion
been backed by England and France combined, Spain would
have been forced to beat a retreat, and Protestantism in the
great general war just beginning would have had an enor-
mous advantage in position. But the English Solomon
could not see the wisdom of this policy. " The King of
England says we are right," continued the Archduke, " and
has ordered his ambassador to insist on our view. The
French ambassador here says that his colleague at the
Hague has similar instructions, but admits that he has
not acted up to them. There is not much chance of the
Hollanders changing. It would be well that the King should
send a written ultimatum that the Hollanders should sign
the convention which we propose. If they don't agree, the
world at least will see that it is not we who are in fault." 1
The world would see, and would never have forgiven a
statesman in the position of Barneveld, had he accepted
a bald agreement from a subordinate like the Archduke, a
perfectly insignificant personage in the great drama then
enacting, and given up guarantees both from the Archduke's
master and from the two great allies of the Republic. He
stood out manfully against Spain and England at every
hazard, and under a pelting storm of obloquy, and this was
the man whose designs the English secretary of state had
dared to describe " as of no other nature than to cause the
Provinces to relapse into the hands of Spain/' '
It appeared too a little later that Barneveld's influence
with the French government, owing to his judicious support
of it so long as it was a government, had been decidedly
successful. Drugged as France was by the Spanish marriage
J " Memoria para infonnar al Mro de Campo Don Inigo de Borsa." (MS.
before cited, Arch. Belg.) 9 Vide antea.
1G15. FHANCE REFUSES TO AID THE STATES. 385
treaty, she was yet not so sluggish nor spell-bound as the
King of Great Britain.
'•'France will not urge upon the Hollanders to execute
the proposal as we made it," wrote the Archduke to the
King, " so negotiations are at a standstill. The Hollanders
say it is better that each party should remain with what
each possesses. So that if it does not come to blows, and if
these insolences go on as they have done, the Hollanders
will be gaming and occupying moro territory every day." 1
Thus once more the ancient enemies and masters of the
Kepublic were making the eulogy of the Dutch statesman.
It was impossible at present for the States to regain Wesel,
nor that other early stronghold of the Reformation, the old
Imperial city of Aachen (Aix-la-Chapellc). The price to be
paid was too exorbitant.
The French government had persistently refused to assist
the States and possessory princes in the recovery of this
stronghold. The Queen-Regent was afraid of offending
Spain, .although her government had induced the citizens of
the place to make the treaty now violated by that country.
The Dutch ambassador had been instructed categorically
to enquire whether their Majesties meant to assist Aachen
and the princes if attacked by the Archdukes. " No," said
Villeroy ; " we are not interested in Aachen, 'tis too far off.
Let them look for assistance to those who advised their
mutiny."
To the Ambassador's remonstrance that France was both
interested in and pledged to them, the Secretary of State
replied, " We made the treaty through compassion and love,
but we shall not put on harness for Aachen. Don't think it.
You, the States and the United Provinces, may assist them
if you like."
The Envoy then reminded the Minister that the States-
1 Albert to Philip III. 29 Doc. 1015. (Arch. Belg. MS.)
VOL. I. 2 0
386
THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. 2.
General had always agreed to go forward evenly in this
business with the Kings of Great Britain and France and
tho united princes, the matter being of equal importance
to all. They had given no further pledge than this to the
Union.
It was plain, however, that France was determined not to
lift a finger at that moment. The Duke of Bouillon and those
acting with him had tried hard to induce their Majesties
"to write seriously to the Archduke in order at least to
intimidate him by stiff talk," 1 but it was hopeless. They
thought it was not a time then to quarrel with their
neighbour and give offence to Spain.
So the stiff talk was omitted, and the Archduke was not
intimidated. The man who had so often intimidated him
was in his grave, and his widow was occupied iu marrying
her son to the Infanta. " These are the first-fruits," said
Aerssens, " of the new negotiations with Spain." 2
Both the Spanish king and the Emperor were resolved to
hold Wesel to the very last. Until the States should retire
from all their positions on the bare word of the Archduke,
that the Spanish forces once withdrawn would never return,
the Protestants of those two cities must suffer. There was
no help for it. To save them would be to abandon all. For
no true statesman could be so ingenuous as thus to throw all
the cards on the table for the Spanish and Imperial cabinet
to shuffle them at pleasure for a new deal. The Duke of
Neuburg, now Catholic and especially protected by Spain, had
become, instead of a pretender with more or less law on his
side, a mere standard-bearer and agent of the Great Catholic
League in the debateable land. He was to be supported at
all hazard by the Spanish forces, according to the express
1 Aerssens to States-General, 18
Feb. 1612. (Hague Archives MS.)
" Serieuselyk aeu den Ertshertog te
schryven om ten minsten door het
styf spreken Iiem t' intimidereu," &c.
* Ibid
CPAIN AND EMPEROR RESOLVED TO HOLD WESEL. 387
command of Philip's government, especially now that his
two brothers with the countenance of the States were dis-
puting his right to his hereditary dominions in Germany.1
The Archduke was sullen enough at what he called the
weakmindedness of France. Notwithstanding that by ex-
press orders from Spain he had sent 5000 troops 2 under
command of Juan de Rivas to the Queen's assistance just
before the peace of Sainte-Menehould, he could not induce
her government to take the firm part which the English
king did in browbeating the Hollanders.
" 'Tis certain," he complained, " that if, instead of this
sluggishness on the part of France, they had done us there
the same good services we have had from England, the Hol-
landers would have accepted the promise just as it was
proposed by us." 3 He implored the King, therefore, to use
his strongest influence with the French government that
it should strenuously intervene with the Hollanders, and
compel them to sign the proposal which they rejected.
" There is no means of composition if France does not oblige
them to sign," said Albert rather pitcousl}7-.
But it was not without reason that Barneveld had in
many of his letters instructed the States' ambassador, Lan-
gcrac, "to caress tho old gentleman" (meaning and never
1 " . . . y eiendo el Nicwburg
en esto nog" do la calidad q. V. A.
pondera justamu obliga mucho a no
dexallo caer, pues los herrn0* do N.
c-oran favorecidos de los do O'anda
y Zel" para sus intentos, y assi devo
V. A. poner muy particular cuydado
en q. en los conciertos q. EG tratan
con ocasion de lo do Juiiers, quede
nsegur4" todo antes do resolver lo do
"Wesel; paes de otra manera, ei B3
soltasse de la mano lo q. so tiene ein
quedar resgnardo, BO entreria en nuc-
vos cuyda<los y trubajos con mucha
dudade salir, con lo q. agora so puc.le
de teniendo los conciertos do VVeeel,
en quo es bien do creer prevendra
V. A. lo quo convenga, pues podrian
Olandeses con la gpnto q. han eacado
en campana ya tomando plazas, y assi
siendo necessario, ordenara V. A. al
inarq. Spinola q. traga con egso ex'*
los miamos movimientos q. hiziera el
enemigo," &c. Philip III. to Arch-
dnko Albert, 20 Sept. 1615. (Arch.
Belg. MS.)
* Philip III. to Archduke Albert,
17 April 1015. (Arch. Belg. MS.)
3 " floxedad con q. BO ha procedido
do parto do Francia, teniendo for
cicrto q. si huvieran hecho los oficioa
q. de la parto d. Inglat*, admit ieran
los Olandeses la promesa propucsta
I/or nos." — "Instrucion jior D. Inigo
dc Borsa." (Arch. Belg. MS.)
S88 THE LIFE OF JOHN OF BARNEVELD. CHAP. X
naming Villeroy), for he would prove to be in spite of all
obstacles a good friend to the States, as he always had been.
And Villeroy did hold firm. Whether the Archduke was
right or not in his conviction, that, if France would only
unite with England in exerting a strong pressure on the
Hollanders, they would evacuate the duchies, and. so give
up the game, the correspondence of Barneveld shows very
accurately. But the Archduke, of course, had not seen that
correspondence.
The Advocate knew what was plotting, what was impend-
ing, what was actually accomplished, for he was accustomed
to sweep the whole horizon with an anxious and comprehen-
sive glance. He knew without requiring to read the secret
letters of the enemy that vast preparations for an extensive
war against the Eeformation were already completed. The
movements in the duchies were the first drops of a coming
deluge. The great religious war which was to last a gene-
ration of mankind had already begun ; the immediate and
apparent pretext being a little disputed succession to some
petty sovereignties, the true cause being the necessity for
each great party — the Protestant Union and the Catholic
League — to secure these border provinces, the possession of
which would be of such inestimable advantage to either.
If nothing decisive occurred in the year 1614, the following
year would still be more convenient for the League. There
had been troubles in Turkey. The Grand Vizier had been
murdered. The Sultan was engaged in a war with Persia.
There was no eastern bulwark in Europe to the ever
menacing power of the Turk and of Mahometanism in Europe
save Hungary alone. Supported and ruled as that king-
dom was by the House of Austria, the temper of the popu-
lations of Germany had become such as to make it doubtful
in the present conflict of religious opinions between them
and their rulers whether the Turk or the Spaniard would
1615. THE GREAT RELIGIOUS WAR BEGUN. 389
be most odious as an invader. But for the moment, Spain
and the Emperor had their hands free. They were not in
danger of an attack from helow the Danube. Moreover, the
Spanish fleet had been achieving considerable successes on
the Barbary coast, having seized La Roche, and one or two
important citadels, useful both against the corsairs and
against sudden attacks by sea from the Turk. There were
at least 100,000 men on a war footing ready to take the
field at command of the two branches of the House of
Austria, Spanish and German. In the little war about Mont-
serrat, Savoy was on the point of being crushed, and Savoy
was by position and policy the only possible ally, in the
south, of the Netherlands and of Protestant Germany.
While professing the most pacific sentiments towards the
States, and a profound anxiety to withdraw his troops from
their borders, the King of Spain, besides daily increasing
those forces, had just raised 4,000,000 ducats, a lo,rge portion
of which was lodged with his bankers in Brussels. Deeds
like those were of more significance than sufarec' vords.
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